E140: LK-99, Sclerotic establishments, Fitch downgrades US debt, Trump indicted... again

• By mid‑August 2023, independent replications had already concluded that LK‑99 itself is not a room‑temperature superconductor but a highly resistive insulator/semiconductor, and subsequent detailed studies up to 2024–2025 have reinforced this view rather than uncovering a viable superconducting phase in the original material. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Follow‑on work has focused heavily on LK‑99 and closely related lead‑apatite variants (Cu/S co‑doping, PCPOSOS, etc.). These studies report phenomena such as strange‑metal behavior and possible diamagnetism in sulfur–copper co‑doped lead apatite, but even the more optimistic papers only describe a "clear pathway" toward superconductivity, not a robust, widely accepted superconducting state in a new material family derived from LK‑99. (arxiv.org)

• A 2024 review titled "Reflecting on the LK‑99 fervour: insights and future prospects" surveys the post‑2023 literature and explicitly concludes that LK‑99 has not demonstrated the anticipated ambient‑condition superconductivity; it treats doped apatites mainly as a speculative future avenue rather than reporting any concrete new, practically superior superconductors that have already emerged from the LK‑99 episode. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

• In parallel, the broader field has indeed seen new superconductors and superconducting states reported since 2023 (e.g., a chiral platinum–iridium–zirconium compound, novel one‑dimensional and 2D moiré superconductors, and a copper‑free high‑temperature nickel‑oxide superconductor around 40 K at ambient pressure). These results extend long‑running graphene/TMD/nickelate research programs and, in their own papers and press material, trace their motivation to earlier cuprate and nickelate work, not to LK‑99 or its simulation models. (phys.org)

• Crucially, there is no documented case in the peer‑reviewed literature where a new, distinct superconducting material (beyond the LK‑99/lead‑apatite family) is both (a) presented as a direct outgrowth of LK‑99–driven simulations or experiments and (b) shown to have properties that are clearly easier to manufacture or superior to the (ultimately false) room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure claims originally made for LK‑99. Reviews of the LK‑99 saga frame its main impact as a cautionary episode and a case study in flat‑band physics, not as the progenitor of a wave of new, better superconductors. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

Given that more than two years have passed since the August 2023 LK‑99 claims and no such LK‑99‑spawned, clearly superior superconducting materials have appeared in the literature, Friedberg’s specific prediction about the episode catalyzing new, better superconducting materials within that timeframe has not materialized.

Evidence shows that the scientific community reached a broad consensus on LK‑99 much faster than “months to years” after early August 2023.

• Multiple independent groups synthesized LK‑99 in early August 2023 and found that pure LK‑99 is an insulator with very high resistance, not a room‑temperature superconductor.(techspot.com)
• Summaries of the episode note that by mid‑August 2023—i.e., within roughly one to two weeks of the podcast date—"the consensus was that LK‑99 is not a superconductor at room temperature, and is an insulator in pure form," following many replication attempts.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Popular and technical write‑ups from that period describe a clear and rapid convergence: worldwide collaboration “found relatively quickly (less than a month) that pure LK‑99 is not a superconductor,” and the apparent superconducting signatures were traced to impurities (notably Cu₂S) and mundane magnetic effects.(techspot.com)
• News coverage from Korea and elsewhere likewise reported in August 2023 that more and more scientists were refuting the original claim and that publications such as Nature were already characterizing LK‑99 as “not a superconductor.”(koreajoongangdaily.joins.com)
• Later peer‑reviewed work and committee reviews (e.g., from the Korean Society of Superconductivity and Cryogenics) have reinforced this conclusion; the mainstream view remains that LK‑99 is not a room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconductor.(nextbigfuture.com)

Because broad scientific consensus that LK‑99 is not a room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconductor emerged within weeks—well under “many months to a few years”—Friedberg’s timing claim that “it’s probably months to years away from knowing” is incorrect. The prediction is therefore wrong on the key point it was making (the time required to know one way or the other).

Available evidence as of late 2025 supports Chamath’s prediction about LK‑99.

By mid‑August 2023, replication attempts had established a broad consensus that LK‑99 is not a room‑temperature superconductor; in pure form it behaves as an insulator, and the initially reported superconducting‑like signatures were traced to non‑superconducting magnetic effects and impurities (especially Cu₂S). (en.wikipedia.org)

Multiple experimental studies that synthesized LK‑99 using or improving on the original procedure found no zero resistance at any relevant temperature and instead reported a highly resistive (insulating) material whose magnetization is consistent with a weakly magnetic or diamagnetic solid, not a superconductor. One detailed re‑evaluation explicitly concluded that LK‑99 is better classified as a diamagnetic semiconductor rather than a room‑temperature superconductor. (arxiv.org) Another investigation reproduced the sharp resistivity drop but showed it arises from a first‑order structural transition in Cu₂S impurities, with LK‑99 itself behaving as a semiconductor with weak diamagnetism, again ruling out superconductivity. (sciencedirect.com)

Later high‑quality single‑crystal work found phase‑pure LK‑99 crystals to be highly insulating and optically transparent, with temperature‑dependent magnetization measurements showing a predominantly diamagnetic response plus a small ferromagnetic component—no anomalies indicative of any superconducting transition from 2 K up to 800 K. (scisimple.com) Theoretical and experimental studies through 2024–2025 now describe LK‑99 as a wide‑gap or charge‑transfer Mott insulator with interesting correlated‑electron and flat‑band physics, but not as a superconductor. (arxiv.org)

Regarding technological impact, after the initial 2023 hype faded, LK‑99 has settled into the literature as a niche platform for studying correlated electrons, with no major practical applications or technologies emerging from it to date. The scientific narrative has become that LK‑99 was a high‑profile false alarm in the search for room‑temperature superconductivity, now mainly of interest as a case study and as a correlated‑electron material, not as a transformative superconductor. (en.wikipedia.org)

Overall, subsequent investigations have indeed concluded that LK‑99 is not a practical room‑temperature superconductor and that its observed behavior is largely explained by diamagnetism (plus minor ferromagnetism) and impurities, with no major technological impact—matching Chamath’s stated intuition.

The forecasted event was that the LK‑99 room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconductivity claim (or a very similar material’s claim) would be experimentally replicated to the satisfaction of the scientific community by the end of 2024.

By mid‑August 2023, replication efforts had already led to a consensus that LK‑99 is not a room‑temperature superconductor and is instead an insulator in pure form.(en.wikipedia.org) Subsequent theoretical and experimental work reinforced this conclusion, characterizing copper‑doped lead apatite (LK‑99) as a correlated, non‑superconducting material (e.g., a charge‑transfer Mott insulator) rather than a superconductor.(arxiv.org)

More broadly, as of late 2024 and even into 2025, mainstream reviews still state that no room‑temperature superconductor at ambient pressure has been accepted by the community; at standard atmospheric pressure, cuprate superconductors around 138 K remain the record‑holders, and room‑temperature superconductivity under ambient conditions is still described as hypothetical.(en.wikipedia.org) Attempts to introduce successor materials (e.g., PCPOSOS) likewise have not produced evidence judged convincing by the wider community and are reported as one‑sided claims lacking independent verification.(pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)

Because no preprint’s claim of room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconductivity in LK‑99 or a closely related material was confirmed and accepted by the scientific community by 31 December 2024, the event whose probability Friedberg was assessing did not occur in the forecast window. Under a binary “did the predicted event happen?” scoring, this prediction resolves as wrong.

10‑ and 30‑year Treasury yields did not move into, or "settle" in, a sustained 5–7% range after the August 2023 podcast.

• Realized 10‑year yields: FRED data show the monthly average 10‑year constant‑maturity yield from August 2023 through October 2025 ranged roughly 3.9–4.8%, peaking around 4.8% in October 2023, and then running mostly in the low‑to‑mid‑4s through 2024–2025, never averaging at or above 5%. (fred.stlouisfed.org) Recent weekly data put the 10‑year around 4.1% in late November 2025. (fred.stlouisfed.org)
• Realized 30‑year yields: The 30‑year constant‑maturity yield averaged about 3.7–4.95% monthly from August 2023 through October 2025, with the high point ~4.95% in October 2023 and values in 2025 generally between 4.6–4.9%. (fred.stlouisfed.org) Daily data show occasional spikes above 5% (e.g., a move to about 5.09% in May 2025) but these were short‑lived, not a stable regime. (barrons.com) As of late November 2025, 20‑ and 30‑year yields are around 4.6–4.7%, i.e., below 5%. (federalreserve.gov)
• Expectations for coming years: Consensus forecasts and model‑based projections as of late 2025 see the 10‑year yield hovering near 4–4.2% over the next year and the 20‑ to 30‑year segment in the mid‑4s, not 5–7%. (reuters.com)

Even allowing that “for a very long period of time” is somewhat vague, the prediction was specifically about a new long‑run regime with long‑term Treasury rates in the 5–7% range. Two-plus years later, both realized data and forward‑looking market and analyst expectations cluster well below 5%, with only brief, temporary forays near or slightly above 5%. That pattern is inconsistent with rates having settled into a persistent 5–7% regime, so this prediction is best judged wrong as of November 30, 2025.

Available data since the August 2023 prediction show that Chamath’s view is so far consistent with reality, but the claim is about future decades (“It’ll never happen again”), so it cannot be decisively tested yet.

1. Status since the prediction:

   • OECD data for 2023 show that most advanced economies, including the G7, are running fiscal deficits; only six OECD members ran overall surpluses, led by Norway, and these do not include any G7 country. This indicates that none of the G7/G8 has recently “moved away and started printing surpluses.” (oecd.org)
   • Germany, one of the more fiscally conservative G7 members, still recorded a general government deficit of about 2.1% of GDP in 2023, not a surplus. (destatis.de)
   • Canada has continued to post federal budget deficits through 2024–25 and into 2025–26, not surpluses. (reuters.com)
   • Aggregate analyses based on IMF forecasts show G7 debt ratios remaining high or rising through 2029, implying continued structural deficits rather than a shift to Clinton‑style sustained surpluses. (visualcapitalist.com)
   • IMF- and media-based assessments emphasize that major advanced economies like the U.S., UK, France, and others face persistent deficits and rising debt trajectories absent major fiscal reforms. (ft.com)

2. Why the prediction can’t be fully judged yet:

   • Chamath’s statement is effectively a very long‑horizon claim: that “there’s not going to be a single G8 country” that returns to sustained budget surpluses akin to the U.S. in the late 1990s, and that this will “never happen again.” That implies a multi‑decade time frame.
   • As of November 2025, only a bit more than two years have elapsed since the prediction. Even if all G7/G8 members are currently in deficit (which they are), that does not logically prove that none of them will run sustained surpluses at any point over the coming decades.

Because the horizon of the prediction extends far beyond the data we can observe today, the correct evaluation is that it is too early to tell whether his "never again" claim will ultimately be right or wrong. Hence the result is classified as inconclusive.

Evidence from late‑2023 Treasury data shows that while the U.S. Treasury did issue roughly the amount Chamath was talking about, the demand characteristics were the opposite of “the easiest $2 trillion” with a “line out the door.”

1. The ~$2T in extra borrowing did occur over the relevant window.
Treasury’s own borrowing estimates show:

• July–September 2023: Treasury borrowed $1.010 trillion in privately‑held net marketable debt.
• October–December 2023: Treasury borrowed $776 billion in privately‑held net marketable debt. That is about $1.786T in H2 2023 alone, and Treasury expected another $760–816B in January–March 2024, pushing new borrowing well over $2T across the two following quarters he was discussing. (home.treasury.gov) All of this debt was indeed sold; there was no failed auction.

2. But demand was not “very strong” – it deteriorated sharply as supply rose.
The Federal Reserve’s post‑mortem on the “Treasury tantrum of 2023” documents that in the second half of 2023 the 10‑year yield jumped from below 4% to above 5%, with the rise driven largely by a higher term premium caused by greater Treasury issuance, quantitative tightening, and heightened uncertainty—i.e., investors demanded more compensation to hold the growing supply of long‑term Treasuries. (federalreserve.gov) That is inconsistent with an environment where demand is so strong that extra supply is absorbed easily at prevailing yields.

An analytical review of this period notes that by late 2023 U.S. bond auctions were “flashing warning signs,” with investors “showing less enthusiasm for U.S. debt issuance, especially at longer maturities.” It highlights that a November 2023 30‑year Treasury auction had weak demand and helped push the 30‑year yield briefly above 5%, reviving fears of a UK‑style gilt shock. (benmaccorquodale.com)

3. Key long‑bond auctions in the period were notably weak, not over‑subscribed.
The November 9, 2023 30‑year auction was widely described as one of the ugliest on record:

• $24B of 30‑year bonds were sold at a 4.769% yield, versus a 4.716% when‑issued level, a 5.3 bp tail – the largest on record at the time.
• Bid‑to‑cover was 2.24 vs a 2.44 six‑auction average, and
• Primary dealers were forced to take 24.7% of the issue vs a 12.7% six‑auction average and 18.2% in the prior auction, indicating that end‑investor demand was unusually weak and dealers had to absorb far more supply. (forexfactory.com)

A contemporaneous Q&A on Treasury auctions describes the November 9, 2023 30‑year sale as having “weak” demand, with primary dealers “tak[ing] on more than they wanted” and both long‑term Treasuries and stocks falling more than usual that day. It frames this as a warning sign that long‑term Treasuries “may be harder to sell” amid persistent deficits and elevated inflation. (finregrag.com)

These are exactly the opposite of “line out the door” conditions.

4. Bottom line for the prediction.

• On the narrow question “Will the bonds sell?”, Chamath was effectively right: Treasury successfully borrowed around the planned amounts; there was no outright failure to place the debt. (mondovisione.com)
• But his actual claim was much stronger: that this extra ~$2T would be the “easiest” debt to sell with very strong demand.

In reality, the period was characterized by a Treasury tantrum, historically large jumps in yields driven by higher term premia tied to increased issuance, and at least one record‑bad 30‑year auction with very weak demand and heavy dealer takedown. (federalreserve.gov) That contradicts the idea of exceptionally strong, effortless demand.

Given that the core of the prediction was about how strong and easy demand would be—not just that auctions would technically clear—the evidence points to the prediction being wrong.

Evidence since 2023 matches the normalized prediction that, absent major consolidation, U.S. federal deficits would stay very large (≥≈$1T) and trend higher in nominal terms.

• Actual deficits: Treasury data show the federal deficit was about $1.70T in FY 2023, then rose to about $1.83T in FY 2024.(en.wikipedia.org) For FY 2025, the final Treasury figures put the deficit at roughly $1.8T, very close to 2024’s level and still larger than 2023 in nominal dollars.(americanactionforum.org) Thus, all post‑2023 deficits so far have remained well above $1T and, compared with 2023, are higher in absolute terms.

• Projected path: The Congressional Budget Office’s 2024 and 2025 outlooks project annual deficits staying in the ~$1.5–2.0T range in the 2020s and rising to about $2.5–2.6T by the mid‑2030s under current law, i.e., without major new deficit‑cutting policies.(crfb.org) These official baselines explicitly describe deficits as remaining historically large and growing over time.

• Net effect of policy changes: While there have been significant policy moves (e.g., new tariffs and large tax/spending packages), independent analyses of these measures still find continued large and rising deficits and debt, not a sustained move to sub‑$1T deficits.(politico.com)

There is a small one‑year dip from 2024 to 2025, but relative to 2023 and looking at the medium‑term trajectory, deficits have stayed far above $1T and are broadly on a rising nominal path, which is consistent with the normalized prediction rather than contradicting it.

Condition on deficits/issuance: In mid‑2023 the U.S. Treasury projected very large net marketable borrowing: about $1.007 trillion in Q3 2023 and $852 billion in Q4 2023—roughly $1.86 trillion total—assuming continued high deficits.(home.treasury.gov) An updated October 30, 2023 release reported actual borrowing of $1.010 trillion in Q3 and expected $776 billion in Q4, for about $1.79 trillion in late‑2023 net issuance, still reasonably described as “roughly $2 trillion.”(home.treasury.gov) Independent commentary at the time also highlighted persistently large U.S. fiscal deficits (around or above 6% of GDP) and growing interest costs, confirming the “large deficits” part of the premise.(barrons.com)

Outcome for the 10‑year yield: Official and market analyses show the 10‑year U.S. Treasury yield rose sharply through 2023, peaking at about 4.98% on October 19, 2023 according to a fund report summarizing Treasury data.(sec.gov) Major financial news outlets reported that around October 19–20, 2023, the 10‑year yield “notched above 5%” or “hit the 5% mark”—its first touch of that level since 2007—before closing just under 5%.(cnbc.com) That is within the 5–7% range Sacks specified. As of late 2025 the yield is back near 4%, but it did in fact move from roughly the low‑4s into the 5% area after the late‑2023 borrowing surge.(tradingeconomics.com)

Given that (1) the U.S. did continue running large deficits and issued roughly the volume of Treasuries he described in late 2023, and (2) the 10‑year yield subsequently rose into the lower end of his 5–7% target band, this prediction is best scored as right.

U.S. Treasury yields did move into the 5–7% range after August 2023: the 10‑year yield crossed 5% on October 19, 2023, and shorter maturities such as the 5‑year were already around or above 4–5% in early August 2023. (cnbc.com) However, instead of broad U.S. equity valuations falling relative to prior levels, the S&P 500 rose sharply: from 4,478 on August 4, 2023 to the mid‑6,000s by late 2025, a total return of about 52%. (wellergroupllc.com) Forward valuation multiples also expanded rather than contracted: the S&P 500 forward 12‑month P/E was about 19x in mid‑2023, then moved above 20x in early 2024 and reached roughly 22x by late 2025, all well above its 5‑ and 10‑year averages. (lipperalpha.refinitiv.com) This means that even though Treasury yields reached the predicted range, equity discount rates (as inferred from prices and earnings) did not rise enough to drive market valuations down versus their earlier levels; instead, valuations became more stretched. Thus the prediction that higher Treasury yields in the 5–7% range would cause the stock market to go down on a relative basis was not borne out by subsequent data.

Key parts of the setup and outcome are only partially in place, and the horizon he implicitly refers to (a full decade of growth) hasn’t elapsed.

1. Condition on long‑term yields only partly met
   Sacks conditioned his claim on U.S. long‑term Treasury yields rising into the 5–7% range. The 10‑year Treasury briefly crossed 5% in October 2023, and the 30‑year was around or slightly above 5% in late 2023 and again in May 2025, but yields have mostly traded in the high‑3% to sub‑5% range rather than moving into and staying in a 5–7% band. (investopedia.com)
   Because the move to 5% has been intermittent and the upper half of his range (near 7%) has not been approached, it’s debatable whether his antecedent has truly been satisfied in the way he envisioned (a sustained high‑rate regime at 5–7%).

2. Risk capital (VC/PE) did tighten, but not in the simple “way less capital” sense
   Venture capital: U.S. VC fundraising from limited partners fell sharply after rates rose: funds raised about $188.5B in 2022, then roughly $97.5B in 2023 and $76.1B in 2024, the lowest fund count in a decade, with capital concentrated in a small number of large firms. (afurrier.com) That reflects meaningful tightening in the supply of new VC funds, consistent with his “way less risk capital” point.
   However, actual VC investment into companies rebounded: U.S. VC deal value was about $162B in 2023 and $209B in 2024, the third‑highest total in 20 years, helped largely by AI. (feg.com) Early 2025 data show U.S. VC funding above $100B in the first five months, up ~90% year‑on‑year. (blog.tmcnet.com) So capital became more selective and concentrated, but the overall volume of risk capital has remained very large and has recently surged again, which partly contradicts a simple story of enduring “way less” risk capital.

   Private equity: Global PE/VC deal value plunged in 2023 vs 2021, and PE fundraising in 2024–2025 has run well below its 2021 peak, with commentators explicitly tying this to higher rates and tighter financing. (spglobal.com) At the same time, PE dry powder has hit record levels (over $2.6T globally by mid‑2024), and buyout and megadeal activity started to recover in 2024 as conditions improved. (spglobal.com) Overall, risk‑asset activity cooled versus the 2020–21 boom but has not collapsed; it’s more a selective, slower recycling of a still‑huge capital base.

   Net: parts of his mechanism (higher rates → tougher fundraising / slower deal flow) are visible, but the data don’t cleanly support a lasting, broad collapse in risk capital—particularly on the VC side, where investment volumes have rebounded strongly.

3. No clear evidence yet that U.S. growth is slower than in the prior low‑rate decade
   The 2010s (roughly his “prior low‑rate decade”) saw real U.S. GDP growth averaging around the low‑2% range per year (e.g., many individual years between about 1.5% and 3%). (statistico.com) By contrast, in the higher‑rate period so far:

   • 2022 real GDP growth ≈ 2.1%
   • 2023 ≈ 2.5–2.9% depending on series
   • 2024 ≈ 2.8% (BEA third estimate) (bea.gov)
     As of mid‑2025, trailing year growth is around 2%+. (multpl.com) These figures are not clearly lower than the 2010s average and in some cases are slightly higher. BEA’s own long‑period statistics show 2007–2023 real GDP averaging about 1.8%, so recent years are at least in line with, and often above, that pace. (apps.bea.gov)
     So far, there’s no decisive empirical support for the claim that the U.S. economy, in aggregate, “will just grow slower” than in the prior decade because of higher long‑term yields.

4. Why the verdict is “inconclusive” rather than “right” or “wrong”

   • Time horizon: Sacks was effectively making a long‑run statement about growth over a decade‑scale regime change in interest rates. We have only about two to three years of post‑hike, post‑5%‑yield data—too short to judge a structural growth slowdown versus a full prior decade.
   • Condition only partially satisfied: Long‑term yields have flirted with 5% but have not moved into or remained in a 5–7% band in a durable way, so the exact scenario he described has not fully materialized. (investopedia.com)
   • Mixed evidence on mechanisms: There has been material tightening and re‑pricing in VC/PE fundraising and deal activity relative to the 2020–21 boom, consistent with his causal story, but the absolute supply of risk capital remains very large and has recently re‑accelerated in areas like AI. Simultaneously, observed GDP growth has not yet been weaker than in the prior low‑rate decade.

Because (a) the rate environment he specified hasn’t fully come to pass in a stable way, and (b) the relevant long‑run growth period is far from complete, we cannot cleanly label his prediction as either correct or incorrect at this point; the outcome is best described as inconclusive.

Friedberg argued that, given high debt levels, rising rates, and global bond repricing, additional inflationary pressure in the U.S. and other indebted Western economies was "inevitable" over the coming years. Since August 2023, however, inflation in these economies has generally moved down toward central-bank targets rather than re-accelerating.

In the U.S., headline CPI inflation averaged about 4.3% in 2023 and fell to 2.9% in 2024; as of September 2025 the annual rate is about 3.0%, with core inflation also easing—consistent with continued disinflation from the 9.1% peak in 2022, not a renewed surge. (jpmorgan.com) The euro area’s headline inflation has declined to around 2.3–2.4% in 2024–25, with ECB projections and surveys indicating inflation stabilizing near the 2% target over the medium term rather than drifting higher. (ecb.europa.eu) The UK, another highly indebted Western economy, has likewise seen inflation fall sharply from over 11% in 2022 to around the mid‑3% range in 2025, with both actual inflation and surveyed expectations trending downward even though inflation remains above the 2% target. (cambridgecurrencies.com)

Global assessments from the IMF similarly describe advanced‑economy inflation as on a declining path through 2024–26, with inflation projected to keep easing rather than showing an unavoidable new wave of price pressure. (meetings.imf.org) While inflation is not fully back at target everywhere and upside risks persist, the realized path since the prediction has been broadly disinflationary rather than one of "inevitable" additional inflationary pressure. On that basis, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

The specific scenario Sacks predicted did not occur.

• In United States v. Trump, Jack Smith’s federal election‑obstruction / January 6–related case in D.C., Trump was indicted in August 2023 but never went to trial. Proceedings were delayed by litigation over presidential immunity and other pretrial issues.(en.wikipedia.org)
• On July 1, 2024, the Supreme Court decided Trump v. United States, recognizing significant presidential immunity for official acts and remanding the case for further proceedings, but there was no trial, no conviction, and thus no criminal appeal from a conviction for the Court to overturn.(en.wikipedia.org)(congress.gov)
• After Trump won the 2024 election, Smith moved to dismiss the D.C. case without prejudice, citing longstanding DOJ policy not to prosecute a sitting president; Judge Tanya Chutkan granted the dismissal on November 25, 2024.(en.wikipedia.org)(ap.org) Later reporting and Smith’s own final report confirm that prosecutors believed they could have obtained and sustained a conviction had the case gone to trial, but they closed it because of Trump’s return to office, not because the Supreme Court overturned any conviction as a “novel legal theory.”(ap.org)(reuters.com)

Bottom line: Trump did "win" in the sense that he avoided conviction in this case, but he did not do so via the path Sacks predicted. There was no D.C. jury conviction, no appeal from a conviction, and no Supreme Court decision overturning such a conviction on the ground that the prosecution’s theory was impermissibly novel. On the normalized prediction — which centers on that conviction‑then‑reversal sequence — the outcome is therefore wrong.

Trump did in fact face continued criminal prosecution over his efforts to overturn the 2020 election and his conduct around January 6. Special Counsel Jack Smith obtained a four‑count federal indictment on August 1, 2023 in Washington, D.C., charging Trump with conspiracies to defraud the United States and obstruct the January 6 certification of electoral votes, explicitly tying the case to the Capitol attack. Georgia separately indicted Trump and 18 co‑defendants under its RICO statute in August 2023 for a broader scheme to overturn the state’s 2020 results, before that case was ultimately dropped in 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)

Those prosecutions themselves became highly polarizing issues. An August 2023 Quinnipiac poll found a bare national majority favoring federal election‑subversion charges against Trump (about mid‑50s percent), but views were almost perfectly split along party lines: roughly the entire Democratic electorate supported prosecuting him, while a large majority of Republicans opposed it.(cnbc.com) A 2025 Marquette Law School national survey similarly found 58% of Americans saying the 2023–24 criminal cases against Trump were justified, but 90% of Democrats versus only 23% of Republicans agreed—while 77% of Republicans called the cases unjustified—showing how the prosecutions crystallized perceptions of a weaponized justice system.(law.marquette.edu)

Over the subsequent election cycle, multiple indicators show political division worsening rather than easing. Pew Research reported that between 2023 and mid‑2024 the share of Americans who saw even “some common ground” between the parties on major issues fell by an average of 12 percentage points, and later found that most adults now say Republican and Democratic voters cannot even agree on basic facts.(pewresearch.org) A Johns Hopkins SNF Agora poll in 2024 found nearly half of Americans describing members of the opposing party as “downright evil,” a striking marker of affective polarization.(nypost.com) Ahead of the 2024 vote, about two‑thirds of Americans told Reuters/Ipsos they feared election‑related political violence, and Chicago Council and AP‑NORC polling showed large majorities in both parties convinced that U.S. democracy itself was at serious risk—each side primarily blaming the other candidate.(reuters.com)

It is impossible to isolate the prosecutions as the sole cause of this worsening division, since other events (the 2024 campaign, economic and foreign‑policy crises) were also important drivers. But the data are consistent with Sacks’s directional claim: the January‑6‑related criminal cases against Trump became a central partisan flashpoint and coincided with, and plausibly contributed to, a further hardening of attitudes and a more fractured, mutually hostile electorate over the next election cycle. The rhetoric that they would literally “tear the country apart” is hyperbolic—institutions did not collapse—but in the more measured sense of deepening and entrenching political division, the prediction was borne out.

Context from the episode shows that Sacks was arguing 2024 would be a referendum on 2020 and Trump’s prosecutions rather than a contest about substantive issues: he said he wanted the 2024 election “to be about issues” but that instead “it’s going to be a referendum on what happened in 2020,” and that the country should “move forward” but was being dragged back into criminal proceedings.(podscripts.co)

Post‑election data do not support the normalized prediction that the election primarily centered on 2020 disputes and Trump’s trials rather than forward‑looking issues:

• AP VoteCast found that voters’ top perceived problems were the economy and jobs, followed by immigration and abortion; when asked what most influenced their vote, about half of voters named the future of democracy, ahead of inflation, the border, abortion policy, or free speech.(ap.org) These are mainly forward‑looking policy or system‑governance concerns.
• The same VoteCast reporting notes that Trump voters were driven largely by high prices and the situation at the U.S.–Mexico border, while Harris voters focused on democracy, abortion, the economy, health care, and climate—again, issue agendas.(wtop.com)
• Critically, VoteCast reports that factors like the assassination attempts and Trump’s legal cases were secondary issues, with only about 1 in 10 voters saying his legal cases were the most important factor in their vote.(pressdemocrat.com) That directly contradicts the idea that prosecutions were the main axis of the election.
• Overviews of the 2024 elections list the major issues as the economy, abortion, immigration, democracy, and foreign policy.(en.wikipedia.org) The presidential‑election article’s campaign‑issues sections detail extensive policy debates on border security, economic strategy, climate/energy, and housing, indicating a campaign heavily structured around policy programs on both sides.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Trump’s various legal proceedings—his New York criminal conviction in May 2024 and the federal and Georgia cases tied to his efforts to overturn the 2020 election—were indeed prominent and framed by Trump as “election interference,” but retrospective accounts treat them as a major backdrop rather than the central substantive issue driving voter choice.(en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, the best evidence shows that while 2020‑related concerns about democracy and Trump’s behavior were important, the 2024 election was not primarily organized around relitigating 2020 or around Trump’s prosecutions. Forward‑looking issues—especially the economy, immigration, abortion policy, and the broader future of democracy—dominated voter priorities and campaign messaging. On that basis, Sacks’s normalized prediction is overall wrong.