Key parts of the setup and outcome are only partially in place, and the horizon he implicitly refers to (a full decade of growth) hasn’t elapsed.

1. Condition on long‑term yields only partly met
   Sacks conditioned his claim on U.S. long‑term Treasury yields rising into the 5–7% range. The 10‑year Treasury briefly crossed 5% in October 2023, and the 30‑year was around or slightly above 5% in late 2023 and again in May 2025, but yields have mostly traded in the high‑3% to sub‑5% range rather than moving into and staying in a 5–7% band. (investopedia.com)
   Because the move to 5% has been intermittent and the upper half of his range (near 7%) has not been approached, it’s debatable whether his antecedent has truly been satisfied in the way he envisioned (a sustained high‑rate regime at 5–7%).

2. Risk capital (VC/PE) did tighten, but not in the simple “way less capital” sense
   Venture capital: U.S. VC fundraising from limited partners fell sharply after rates rose: funds raised about $188.5B in 2022, then roughly $97.5B in 2023 and $76.1B in 2024, the lowest fund count in a decade, with capital concentrated in a small number of large firms. (afurrier.com) That reflects meaningful tightening in the supply of new VC funds, consistent with his “way less risk capital” point.
   However, actual VC investment into companies rebounded: U.S. VC deal value was about $162B in 2023 and $209B in 2024, the third‑highest total in 20 years, helped largely by AI. (feg.com) Early 2025 data show U.S. VC funding above $100B in the first five months, up ~90% year‑on‑year. (blog.tmcnet.com) So capital became more selective and concentrated, but the overall volume of risk capital has remained very large and has recently surged again, which partly contradicts a simple story of enduring “way less” risk capital.

   Private equity: Global PE/VC deal value plunged in 2023 vs 2021, and PE fundraising in 2024–2025 has run well below its 2021 peak, with commentators explicitly tying this to higher rates and tighter financing. (spglobal.com) At the same time, PE dry powder has hit record levels (over $2.6T globally by mid‑2024), and buyout and megadeal activity started to recover in 2024 as conditions improved. (spglobal.com) Overall, risk‑asset activity cooled versus the 2020–21 boom but has not collapsed; it’s more a selective, slower recycling of a still‑huge capital base.

   Net: parts of his mechanism (higher rates → tougher fundraising / slower deal flow) are visible, but the data don’t cleanly support a lasting, broad collapse in risk capital—particularly on the VC side, where investment volumes have rebounded strongly.

3. No clear evidence yet that U.S. growth is slower than in the prior low‑rate decade
   The 2010s (roughly his “prior low‑rate decade”) saw real U.S. GDP growth averaging around the low‑2% range per year (e.g., many individual years between about 1.5% and 3%). (statistico.com) By contrast, in the higher‑rate period so far:

   • 2022 real GDP growth ≈ 2.1%
   • 2023 ≈ 2.5–2.9% depending on series
   • 2024 ≈ 2.8% (BEA third estimate) (bea.gov)
     As of mid‑2025, trailing year growth is around 2%+. (multpl.com) These figures are not clearly lower than the 2010s average and in some cases are slightly higher. BEA’s own long‑period statistics show 2007–2023 real GDP averaging about 1.8%, so recent years are at least in line with, and often above, that pace. (apps.bea.gov)
     So far, there’s no decisive empirical support for the claim that the U.S. economy, in aggregate, “will just grow slower” than in the prior decade because of higher long‑term yields.

4. Why the verdict is “inconclusive” rather than “right” or “wrong”

   • Time horizon: Sacks was effectively making a long‑run statement about growth over a decade‑scale regime change in interest rates. We have only about two to three years of post‑hike, post‑5%‑yield data—too short to judge a structural growth slowdown versus a full prior decade.
   • Condition only partially satisfied: Long‑term yields have flirted with 5% but have not moved into or remained in a 5–7% band in a durable way, so the exact scenario he described has not fully materialized. (investopedia.com)
   • Mixed evidence on mechanisms: There has been material tightening and re‑pricing in VC/PE fundraising and deal activity relative to the 2020–21 boom, consistent with his causal story, but the absolute supply of risk capital remains very large and has recently re‑accelerated in areas like AI. Simultaneously, observed GDP growth has not yet been weaker than in the prior low‑rate decade.

Because (a) the rate environment he specified hasn’t fully come to pass in a stable way, and (b) the relevant long‑run growth period is far from complete, we cannot cleanly label his prediction as either correct or incorrect at this point; the outcome is best described as inconclusive.