Inside the White House Tech Dinner, Weak Jobs Report, Tariffs Court Challenge, Google Wins Antitrust

The prediction is about cumulative U.S. federal revenue from Trump-era tariffs "over the next decade" and explicitly references a 10‑year horizon after full implementation, i.e., through about 2035. As of today (November 30, 2025), that 10‑year period has not elapsed (2025 + 10 = 2035), so it is not yet possible to determine whether total tariff revenues will reach or exceed $1 trillion.

While we can look at interim tariff revenue data and forecasts, those do not logically settle a claim about totals by 2035. Therefore, the only defensible status at this time is that the prediction’s truth value is too early to call.

The prediction concerns what actual federal revenue from U.S. tariffs will total over the decade following 2025 (roughly 2026–2035) under Trump-era policy. As of the current date (November 30, 2025), only a small fraction of that 10‑year window has elapsed, so it is impossible to determine whether realized tariff revenues will end up around $4 trillion or not.

Sacks’ quote describes a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projection (i.e., a forecast) of tariff revenues, not an outcome that can already be checked against final numbers. CBO baseline projections are forward‑looking estimates and are routinely revised; whether those projections ultimately prove accurate can only be evaluated after the full period has passed and actual collections are known, which will not be until around 2036 when data for the full 10‑year span are available.

Because:

• The relevant period is ~10 years after 2025.
• We are only in late 2025.
• Final tariff revenue data for that decade do not yet exist.

The correctness of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated. Therefore the appropriate status is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Sacks predicted that by October 14, 2025 (the Federal Circuit’s stay-expiry date) the U.S. Supreme Court would not issue a ruling requiring a material rollback or cessation of Trump’s then‑current tariff policy, and that the tariffs would remain substantially in place, with the option to rely on alternative statutory authority.

What actually happened by October 14, 2025:

1. Lower courts ruled the IEEPA tariffs illegal but stayed their effect.
   The Court of International Trade and then the Federal Circuit held that Trump’s broad “Liberation Day”/IEEPA tariffs exceeded his statutory authority, but the Federal Circuit stayed its ruling until October 14, 2025 to allow an appeal. These decisions expressly left the tariffs in place pending Supreme Court review. (law.justia.com)

2. Supreme Court took the case but did not decide it by October 14.
   On September 9, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and fast‑tracked the consolidated cases Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (No. 24‑1287) and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. (No. 25‑250), setting oral argument for November 5, 2025. As of that date and through October 14, 2025, the docket listed the opinion as TBD and showed no merits ruling. (supreme.justia.com) A Brownstein client alert after argument similarly notes that the Court heard argument on Nov. 5 and that a decision is still pending. (bhfs.com)

3. Tariffs remained in force past October 14.
   Coverage of the appeals and Supreme Court grant consistently reports that, despite the illegality findings, Trump’s IEEPA‑based tariffs remained in effect during the appeal window and into the Supreme Court phase, at least through mid‑October. (apnews.com) Subsequent analyses after certiorari emphasize that the IEEPA tariffs will remain in effect pending the Supreme Court’s decision. (bhfs.com)

4. Trump’s broader tariff regime was still substantially intact.
   The “Liberation Day” tariffs—Trump’s signature second‑term global tariff policy imposed via Executive Order 14257 under IEEPA—continued to apply broad baseline and reciprocal tariffs on imports. (en.wikipedia.org) Other Trump tariffs under different statutes (e.g., Section 232 metals and autos, and separate Venezuela‑related tariffs) were unaffected by the IEEPA litigation and remained in place as well. (en.wikipedia.org) Commentary around the case also notes that, even if the IEEPA route is ultimately struck down, the administration can and intends to pivot to other statutory authorities to preserve tariff policy. (en.wikipedia.org)

Putting this together: By October 14, 2025, the Supreme Court had issued no merits ruling at all in the tariff cases, let alone one compelling a material rollback or cessation of Trump’s tariff policy, and Trump’s key tariffs remained substantially in effect. That matches Sacks’s prediction, including the core claim about the absence of a Supreme Court‑mandated rollback by that date.

The prediction explicitly covers a period through at least January 20, 2033 and asserts that no U.S. president after Trump, over that entire span, will fully repeal Trump‑era tariffs (i.e., no broad return to pre‑Trump tariff levels across major categories like Chinese imports and EVs).

As of November 30, 2025, that end date has not occurred, so it is impossible to know whether some future administration between now and January 20, 2033 might substantially roll back or restructure these tariffs. Even if we checked the current tariff regime today, that would only tell us whether the prediction is holding so far, not whether it is ultimately right or wrong over the full time window it specifies.

Because the relevant future period has not elapsed, the correctness of the prediction cannot yet be determined, so the only appropriate classification is "inconclusive (too early)".

Available data show that U.S. tariff revenue has risen sharply but has not yet actually reached the $400–500 billion range discussed in the prediction, and the forecast horizon (“late‑2020s, once fully ramped”) has not arrived.

Key points from current data:

• For FY 2024, federal customs duties were about $77–83 billion, well below even $200 billion. (usafacts.org)
• Through August 2025, FY 2025 customs revenue totaled about $165.2 billion, already a record pace but still far from $400–500 billion on a realized 12‑month basis. (usafacts.org)
• Other reporting on FY 2025 indicates net customs receipts a bit above $100 billion through June and around $195–215 billion for the full fiscal year, depending on how one counts newer tariffs—again, materially below the $400–500 billion range. (voice.lapaas.com)
• In October 2025, monthly customs duties hit a record $31.4 billion, which, if simply annualized, implies something in the high‑$300 billions per year; some officials now project tariff revenue of around $400 billion in FY 2026 and even suggest it could exceed $500 billion annually. But these are projections, not realized receipts, and depend on policies and economic conditions holding through the late 2020s. (reuters.com)

Because (1) actual annual tariff revenue to date is still well below $400–500 billion, and (2) the prediction explicitly targets late‑2020s, once fully ramped, which is after November 30, 2025, there is not yet enough realized history to say whether annual receipts will in fact sustain the $400–500 billion level by that time. Therefore, the prediction’s accuracy is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Available data on 2025 tariff/customs‑duty receipts fall far short of the prediction that Trump‑era tariffs would be bringing in roughly $50B per month from April 1, 2025 onward (≈$400B over the remainder of 2025).

Key facts:

• Before the new 2025 tariff wave, total customs duties for all tariffs in FY 2024 were about $77B for the full year, illustrating the historical scale of tariff revenue. (usafacts.org)
• After the "Liberation Day" tariffs in early April 2025, monthly customs duties rose sharply but remained far below $50B per month:
  • April 2025: about $16–16.3B in customs duties, a record at the time. (reuters.com)
  • June 2025: about $26.6–27.2B. (english.alarabiya.net)
  • August 2025: $29.5B, a new monthly record. (fastbull.com)
  • October 2025: $31.4B in customs duties, again a record but still well below $50B. (reuters.com)
    These are total customs duties; the incremental portion attributable specifically to Trump’s new tariffs would be smaller.
• A Congressional-budget style analysis finds that total customs‑duty collections for all of FY 2025 were about $195B, with $151B collected in the second half of the fiscal year (April–September 2025)—an average of roughly $25B per month, roughly half of the predicted $50B run rate. (crfb.org)
• USAFacts, summarizing Treasury data, reports $165.2B in customs duties through August of FY 2025, consistent with other estimates that the entire FY 2025 total ends up around $195B, not anywhere near $400B or a $600B annualized pace. (usafacts.org)
• A recent article on the “Liberation Day” tariffs notes that they generated $215.2B in FY 2025 and $40.4B so far in FY 2026, which again implies total annual revenue from these tariffs in the low‑hundreds of billions, not $400B+ in just the April–December 2025 window. (the-sun.com)

Putting this together:

• To match Chamath’s claim, by late 2025 tariff revenue would need to be running at about $50B/month, implying roughly $300B from April–September alone and ≈$400B over the rest of calendar 2025.
• Actual total customs‑duty receipts from April–September 2025 were about $151B (≈$25B/month), and even including record months in August and October never approached $50B in a single month. (crfb.org)

Even allowing for some uncertainty in separating “Trump‑era” tariffs from baseline duties and for incomplete December 2025 data, the realized and projected revenue levels are far below the implied ~$400B over the 2025 stub period or a $600B annualized pace. The prediction therefore did not come true.

Jason’s prediction is tied to the Polymarket contract “Will tariffs generate >$250b in 2025?”, which resolves Yes if U.S. customs duties in fiscal year 2025 exceed $250 billion in the Treasury’s Financial Report of the United States Government for FY 2025, with a resolution deadline of February 28, 2026; otherwise it resolves No.【4view0】 As of November 30, 2025, this Polymarket market is still live and trading at about a 4% implied probability with no final outcome posted.【4view0】 The Treasury’s site currently provides projections and prior-year reports but not yet an FY 2025 Financial Report, so the official customs‑duties total for FY 2025 is not available.【5search0】 Interim reporting indicates tariff revenues have surged in 2025 (roughly $195 billion by October 2025), which is still below $250 billion and covers only part of the fiscal period referenced by the market.【0news16】 Because the reference contract has not resolved and the determining data are not yet published, Jason’s prediction cannot currently be evaluated and remains too early to call.【4view0】【3search0】

The prediction covers roughly 30 years beyond 2018 (to about 2048–2055), so as of November 30, 2025 we are far too early in the forecast window to know whether future presidents will eventually roll tariffs back to pre‑2018 baselines.

Evidence to date is consistent with Chamath’s claim but cannot prove it. Before the 2018 trade war, average U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods were about 2.7%; they rose to about 19% by 2023 and, after further escalations and partial de‑escalations in 2025, still remain dramatically above the pre‑2018 level. (congress.gov) President Biden’s 2024 Section 301 review chose to maintain Trump’s China tariffs and in many sectors (EVs, batteries, semiconductors, solar cells, steel and aluminum, etc.) to increase them substantially rather than cut them. (cambridge.org) Earlier reporting also noted that Biden, despite criticizing Trump’s approach during the 2020 campaign, kept the Trump‑era tariffs in place once in office. (npr.org) More recently, under President Donald Trump in 2025, U.S.–China tariffs were driven to very high levels (well above 100% on average) and then partially reduced in a negotiated truce, but even the reduced levels are still far above the pre‑2018 baseline, not a rollback to it. (reuters.com)

Because only a small fraction of the 30‑year horizon has elapsed, and future administrations could still fundamentally change course, the prediction cannot yet be classified as definitively right or wrong. Therefore the appropriate status is: inconclusive (too early).

As of the evaluation date (November 30, 2025), both milestones in Chamath’s prediction are still in the future:

• Groundbreaking is predicted for July 2026, which has not yet occurred.
• Commercial operations are predicted by July 2028, which is also in the future.

The referenced All-In Podcast episode was released on September 7, 2025, so his timeline ("groundbreaking in Michigan will be in July of next year... it'll be online two years after that") clearly targets mid‑2026 and mid‑2028.

Public information about Chamath’s battery-related investments (e.g., his backing of cathode maker Mitra Chem) does not provide verifiable detail on a specific Michigan battery factory schedule, nor evidence that such a project has been definitively canceled or made impossible before July 2026.(rova.nz)

Because the deadlines have not arrived yet and there is no conclusive evidence that the project cannot meet them, the accuracy of this prediction cannot yet be determined.

As of November 30, 2025, the Supreme Court has not yet decided the consolidated tariff-authority case (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., docket 24-1287 and 25-250). The Court accepted the case on September 9, 2025 and heard oral argument on November 5, 2025, but has not issued an opinion; coverage notes that a decision is expected by the end of the Court’s term in mid‑2026, not yet reached.

• The Learning Resources / V.O.S. Selections case is still pending at the Supreme Court; the questions presented concern whether IEEPA authorizes Trump’s tariffs and, if so, whether that statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. No decision is listed yet in the Court’s 2025 term entry for the case. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Reporting on the November 2025 oral arguments emphasizes that the justices have not ruled and that a decision is expected by summer 2026 / July 2026. (theguardian.com)

Sacks’s prediction is explicitly conditional: if Trump wins this pending Supreme Court case on tariff authority, then his administration will during this term (through January 20, 2029) seek to have Congress codify key parts of his tariff policy into statute. As of now:

1. The condition (“Trump wins the pending Supreme Court case”) has not yet been met or falsified, because the Court has not ruled.
2. Even if Trump eventually wins, the time window for the administration to try to get Congress to codify the tariffs runs until January 20, 2029, which is still more than three years away.

Because neither the legal predicate nor the time horizon has resolved yet, there is not enough information to say whether the prediction will ultimately be right or wrong. Hence the status is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Trump’s second term began on January 20, 2025 and is scheduled to run through January 20, 2029, so “the end of his current term” is still over three years away as of November 30, 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)

Following his August 11, 2025 executive order declaring a “crime emergency” in Washington, D.C., Trump federalized control of D.C. policing under the Home Rule Act and deployed more than 2,000 National Guard troops and federal law‑enforcement personnel in the city.(en.wikipedia.org) These deployments immediately drew legal challenges from D.C. officials.

On November 20, 2025, U.S. District Judge Jia Cobb ruled that Trump’s National Guard deployment in D.C. is unlawful, granting a preliminary injunction ordering the administration to end the deployment and barring similar deployments without the mayor’s consent. The order is stayed for 21 days to allow appeal, and the administration has announced it will appeal.(oag.dc.gov) As of late November, Guard troops remain in D.C. and additional forces have even been requested after a fatal attack, while the injunction has not yet taken effect and higher courts have not ruled.(time.com)

Because (1) Trump’s term has only just begun and runs until 2029, and (2) the key D.C. case is at the preliminary-injunction stage with appeals pending, it is too early to know whether federal court challenges will ultimately invalidate the D.C. interventions or whether they will remain legally permitted “through at least the end of his current term.” Early signs from the district court cut against Sacks’s view, but the final legal outcome and long‑run permissibility are not yet determined. Therefore the prediction is best scored as inconclusive (too early to tell).

The prediction explicitly places most of the effects of the ~$8T in announced U.S. investment in the period “late 2026” and “2027” (per the quote: “We should see that in 2027. Maybe late 2026.”). As of the current date, November 30, 2025, that time window has not yet begun, so it is too early to evaluate whether the investment has “significantly” impacted the real economy in the way described. Therefore, the accuracy of this prediction cannot yet be assessed.

Evidence from multiple outlets and Fed-related summaries shows that at the September 16–17, 2025 FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds target range by 25 basis points, from 4.25%–4.50% to 4.00%–4.25%, marking its first cut since December 2024—i.e., not a 50 bp move. (cbsnews.com)

At the subsequent meeting on October 28–29, 2025, the FOMC again lowered the target range by 25 basis points, to 3.75%–4.00%. Both the Fed’s own minutes and independent market commentary describe this as the second consecutive 0.25% rate cut, following the September move. (federalreserve.gov)

The next FOMC meeting is scheduled for December 9–10, 2025 and has not yet occurred as of November 30, 2025, but Sacks’ prediction only required that the Fed cut 25 bps in September and then deliver at least one additional 25 bp cut afterward—which has already happened with the October cut. (federalreserve.gov)

The prediction is primarily about conditions in 2026:

• A rate‑cut cycle starting in late 2025.
• Those lower rates stimulating US economic growth in 2026.
• An improved US fiscal position and a generally bullish US economy in 2026.

As of November 30, 2025, 2026 has not yet occurred, so we cannot assess:

1. Whether 2026 GDP growth, labor markets, markets, and broader conditions will in fact be “bullish.”
2. Whether the US fiscal position (deficit, debt trajectory, interest costs as % of GDP) will have improved during 2026 as a result of the rate‑cut cycle.

Even if we fully knew the Fed’s actions by late 2025 (e.g., whether they have begun cutting rates), the core of the prediction is about outcomes in 2026, which are still in the future relative to the current date. Because those outcomes cannot yet be observed or measured, the prediction cannot be judged as right or wrong at this time.

Therefore, the correct classification is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Available data show that U.S. retail gasoline prices in the months after summer 2025 stayed well below the 2022–2023 highs and did not spike back to those prior levels.

• In 2022, the national average price for regular gasoline hit an all‑time high of about $5.01/gal in June, with several months averaging close to or above $4/gal. (newsroom.acg.aaa.com) In 2023, the national average also remained elevated, with multiple months around $3.80–$3.90/gal and an annual average of about $3.52/gal. (lendingtree.com)
• By contrast, in 2025, national average retail regular gasoline prices have been around $3.10–$3.17/gal through the year, with the highest months (April and September) still far below 2022–2023 peaks. (ycharts.com)
• Specifically after summer 2025 (September onward), federal and private data show monthly averages of about $3.17/gal in September and $3.06/gal in October, and weekly averages in November around $3.06/gal, with Thanksgiving 2025 national averages reported near $3.05/gal—essentially flat to slightly lower than late‑2024 levels. (bts.gov) There is no evidence of any run‑up toward the $3.8–$5.0/gal levels seen in 2022–2023.
• The Energy Information Administration and other analyses further characterize 2025 gasoline prices as lower than in recent years, with projected 2025 average around $3.10/gal, below both 2023 and 2024, and trending down into 2026. (ajot.com)

Given that, in the months following summer 2025, gas prices remained relatively low compared with the 2022–2023 period and did not spike back to prior highs, Sacks’s prediction that “low gas prices don’t seem to be going anywhere anytime soon” has been borne out over the observable near term.

As of November 30, 2025, it is too early to definitively judge this prediction.

• No official recession call yet: The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), whose dating is the reference standard for U.S. business cycles, still lists the most recent peak as February 2020 and trough as April 2020, with no later recession yet identified.(nber.org) NBER typically announces peaks/troughs with an 8–22 month lag, so if a new recession began sometime in 2025, that would almost certainly not be announced yet.
• Mixed real‑time indicators: BEA data show real GDP fell slightly in Q1 2025 (about –0.6% annualized after revision) but then rebounded strongly, with Q2 2025 revised up to +3.8% annualized.(bea.gov) Forecasts going into late 2025 still point to positive growth (e.g., ~4% annualized Q3 nowcasts), and weekly jobless claims remain relatively low, arguing against an obvious, already-recognized recession.(reuters.com) However, the Sahm rule recession indicator was already triggered in 2024, and unemployment has drifted up into the mid‑4% range, signaling elevated recession risk.(congress.gov) New research (e.g., Michaillat’s classifier) even puts the probability that the U.S. was already in recession by May 2025 at about 70%, but that is an estimate, not a consensus declaration.(arxiv.org)
• Forecasters and markets see high risk, but no consensus that a recession has begun: Through 2025, mainstream forecasters (IMF, NABE surveys, Mark Zandi’s baseline, etc.) generally describe the U.S. as not yet in recession but at high risk, often highlighting that only parts of the economy or some states appear to be in recession.(reuters.com) Real‑money prediction markets (Kalshi, Polymarket) put 2025‑recession odds as high as ~60–70% in April 2025 but later reduced them to roughly 20–40% as trade tensions partially eased; they have not resolved any contract as a 2025 recession because that depends on a future NBER call.(wsj.com)
• Calendar year 2025 is not over and ex‑post dating is unknown: A recession could still begin in December 2025, and even if the turning point has already occurred earlier in the year, we won’t know how NBER (and thus most forecasters and betting markets) will ultimately date it until well into 2026 or later.

Because (1) the year has not fully elapsed, (2) NBER has not yet dated any new recession, and (3) there is genuine disagreement in high‑quality academic and market‑based indicators about whether a recession is already underway, we cannot presently say with confidence whether the U.S. did or did not "enter a recession" during 2025 under the definitions commonly used by forecasters and betting markets. Hence the prediction is best scored as inconclusive (too early) rather than clearly right or wrong.

Evidence shows Jason’s logistics/timing prediction was accurate.

• Fourth All‑In Summit in Los Angeles soon after the recording. The episode “Inside the White House Tech Dinner, Weak Jobs Report, Tariffs Court Challenge, Google Wins Antitrust” is listed with a release date of September 7, 2025. That same day marked the start of All‑In Summit 2025 in Los Angeles, which ran September 7–9, 2025, at the Shrine Auditorium/LA, described as the 2025 All‑In Summit and part of the annual series that began in 2022 (making 2025 the fourth edition). (everand.com)
Since the summit began the day the episode was released, the “fourth edition” in Los Angeles did in fact occur immediately after the recording.

• Summit video/content released publicly within 1–2 weeks, including surprise/guest speakers.

• An All‑In Summit 2025 session with Energy Secretary Chris Wright was released as a podcast episode on September 8, 2025, one day after the summit began and within a day of its end; a separate page tracking the YouTube upload shows a publication timestamp of September 10, 2025. (everand.com)
• The summit debate episode “How to Save America: Mark Cuban and Tucker Carlson Debate | All‑In Summit 2025” was posted on September 9, 2025, i.e., during the summit and effectively within zero to two days of its close. (podbay.fm)
• Another high‑profile summit talk, “Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis on AI, Creativity, and a Golden Age of Science | All‑In Summit,” was released September 12, 2025, three days after the summit ended. (everand.com)
• Coverage of Solana founder Anatoly Yakovenko’s remarks notes that his All‑In Summit 2025 session appeared in a video “published to YouTube on Friday” September 19, 2025, ten days after the summit ended—still within the “one to two weeks after the event” window Jason mentioned. (cointelegraph.com)
• A media‑watch report from MRC Free Speech America on September 20, 2025 discusses YouTube age‑restricting multiple All‑In Summit 2025 interview videos on the All‑In channel, confirming that various summit sessions with prominent figures (including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard) had been uploaded publicly by then. (mrcfreespeechamerica.org)

These releases show that substantial video and podcast content from All‑In Summit 2025—including sessions with high‑profile, not‑previously‑announced guests—was published over roughly September 8–19, 2025, i.e., within about 0–12 days after the summit ended, which fits Jason’s “over the next week or two after the event” description. Later uploads (e.g., some special sessions appearing at the end of September) do not contradict his statement, which was about the primary rollout window rather than the exclusive cutoff for all content.

Given that:

1. The fourth All‑In Summit in Los Angeles did in fact occur immediately after the recording, and
2. A wave of summit videos featuring marquee/“surprise” guests was released publicly within one to two weeks of the event,

the prediction is best categorized as right.