E146: Did the Fed break the VC model? Plus IPOs, M&A, revaluing unicorns & more

Within 4–8 weeks of September 18, 2023 (roughly October 16–November 13, 2023), Vivek Ramaswamy did not become the clear #2 Republican presidential candidate in either national or New Hampshire polling averages.

Nationally, reconstructions of FiveThirtyEight’s GOP primary polling average show Ron DeSantis holding a solid second place through this period: around September 27, 2023 DeSantis was about 13–14% while Ramaswamy was ~6–7%, and by November 7 DeSantis was ~14% with Ramaswamy around 5%. (donsnotes.com) A broad set of late‑September and October national polls compiled by Wikipedia likewise show DeSantis generally in the low‑ to mid‑teens versus Ramaswamy in the mid‑single digits, with only an occasional near‑tie in an individual survey and no sustained period where Ramaswamy clearly led DeSantis. (en.wikipedia.org) By late 2023, Nikki Haley had actually overtaken Ramaswamy for third place in the FiveThirtyEight average, while DeSantis remained in second. (catholicvote.org)

In New Hampshire, one mid‑September UNH/CNN poll showed Ramaswamy briefly ahead of DeSantis (13% vs. 10%), but this was before the prediction’s 4–8 week window. (en.wikipedia.org) Subsequent New Hampshire polling did not make him a clear #2: a late‑September USA Today/Boston Globe/Suffolk poll had DeSantis 10% and Ramaswamy 4%, and mid‑November polls showed either Haley or DeSantis ahead of Ramaswamy (e.g., WaPo/Monmouth: Trump 46%, Haley 18%, Ramaswamy 8%, DeSantis 7; Emerson/WHDH: Haley ~18%, DeSantis ~7, Ramaswamy ~5). (en.wikipedia.org) In aggregate, New Hampshire data never produced a polling average in that timeframe where Ramaswamy was the clear #2.

Because Ramaswamy did not surpass DeSantis and establish himself as the clear second‑place Republican in either national or New Hampshire polling averages by mid‑October to mid‑November 2023, Chamath’s prediction did not come true.

EY’s Global IPO Trends 2023 data show that the global IPO market in 2023 closed with 1,298 IPOs, raising US$123.2b.(ey.com)

For comparison, EY’s 2022 report puts 2022 at 1,333 IPOs globally.(technode.global) And EY’s review of 2019 states that 2019 had 1,115 IPOs worldwide.(cyprusprofile.com)

So, while 2023’s IPO count was lower than 2022, it was higher than both 1,200 and the 2019 level (1,298 > 1,200 and 1,298 > 1,115). Because the prediction specified that 2023 would have fewer than 1,200 IPOs and be lower than both 2022 and 2019, it did not come true.

Instacart’s SEC filings show that “advertising and other” revenue was $406 million for the six months ended June 30, 2023, on top of $740 million for full‑year 2022. That H1 2023 figure already implied an annualized run‑rate above $800 million (2 × $406M ≈ $812M), which is exactly what Jason was referring to when he said they were “on track for 800 million in ad revenue.” (sec.gov)

Subsequent actuals confirm the trajectory: Instacart’s full‑year 2023 “advertising and other” revenue came in at $871 million, per the company’s 2023 Form 10‑K and shareholder materials, with the 10‑K noting that a majority of this line item is advertising. (sec.gov)

Because the realized 2023 ad‑related revenue ($871M) is reasonably close to and in fact above Jason’s ~$800M run‑rate prediction, and it refers to the same combined ad segment he was discussing, the prediction is best scored as right rather than wrong or inconclusive.

Public filings and earnings materials for Klaviyo’s 2024 results show that by the end of calendar year 2024 the company crossed a $1 billion annualized revenue run rate, which is effectively how public SaaS companies proxy for ARR when they don’t disclose ARR explicitly.

Key points:

• In Klaviyo’s official FY 2024 earnings release (filed with the SEC and distributed via BusinessWire), CEO Andrew Bialecki states that they “had a very strong finish to the year, crossing a $1 billion revenue run rate” as they closed 2024, with Q4 2024 revenue of $270.2M and full‑year 2024 revenue of $937.5M. (sec.gov) Annualizing the Q4 revenue ($270.2M × 4 ≈ $1.08B) is consistent with that claim.
• The Q4 2024 earnings call summary likewise notes that Q4 revenue of ~$270M put Klaviyo at a ~$1B revenue run rate, with full‑year revenue of ~$937M, again indicating that by late 2024 they were operating at roughly a $1B annualized subscription revenue level. (news.futunn.com)
• Independent write‑ups summarizing the same results repeat that Klaviyo “achieved a $1 billion revenue run rate” for FY 2024. (tipranks.com)
• A third‑party data site estimates Klaviyo’s full‑year 2024 revenue at ~$937M and trailing‑twelve‑month revenue at about $1.01B by March 31, 2025, which is consistent with the company having exited 2024 near or above a $1B recurring run rate. (canvasbusinessmodel.com)

While some external estimate models pegged end‑2024 ARR around ~$903M, those are not based on Klaviyo’s own disclosed run‑rate commentary and were issued before final numbers. (sacra.com) The official language from the company is that they crossed a $1B revenue run rate as they finished 2024, which is exactly the kind of milestone Sacks was pointing to with “probably going to be at a billion in [recurring] revenue next year.”

Given:

• the prediction said “roughly” $1B,
• Klaviyo’s own 2024 disclosures say they crossed a $1B annualized run rate during that year, and
• there is no contrary official data showing they were far short of that threshold,

the most reasonable judgment is that Sacks’ prediction came true in substance.

Chamath’s prediction had two parts: (1) the Magnificent Seven would be the main winners, and (2) the rest of tech/growth would mostly stay in a “holding pattern” instead of recovering prior valuations.

1. Magnificent Seven outperformance (largely correct)

• In 2023, the Magnificent Seven returned about 107% on average and were responsible for nearly two‑thirds of the S&P 500’s 24% gain, far outpacing the broader market. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In 2024, the group gained roughly 47–63% as a basket, while the Russell 1000 Index returned ~24%. The Russell 1000 ex‑Magnificent Seven returned only ~16.5%, showing very large, sustained outperformance by the seven mega‑caps versus other large‑cap stocks. (paceretfs.com)

This confirms the direction of his view: the Magnificent Seven did materially outperform most other equities over the 1–2 years after September 2023.

2. “Everything else” trading sideways (contradicted by data)

• Broad U.S. growth and tech did not stay in a flat holding pattern. The Russell 1000 Growth index (a proxy for large‑cap growth/tech beyond just the Seven) returned 33.1% in 2024 alone, a very strong gain rather than sideways action. (financecharts.com)
• The Nasdaq Composite, a wider tech‑heavy benchmark, rose about 28.6% in 2024, again indicating a robust rally across many tech and growth names beyond the Magnificent Seven. (fool.com.au)
• Even when you explicitly strip out the Seven, the Russell 1000 ex‑Magnificent Seven still returned about 16.5% in 2024—slower than the mega‑caps but far from a flat market. (paceretfs.com)
• By early 2024, Goldman Sachs noted that the average S&P 500 stock’s valuation (equal‑weight index forward P/E ≈17) had become as stretched as that of the mega‑caps, reflecting a broad re‑rating of stocks beyond the Seven rather than valuations being stuck. (marketwatch.com)

On the private/VC side, it’s true that late‑stage venture and unicorn exits remained depressed versus the 2021 bubble, with 2023–24 seeing much lower exit values and down‑round pressure, especially outside hot AI names. (cbinsights.com) That lends some support to his pessimism about parts of the VC/unicorn universe, but it doesn’t rescue the broader claim that “everything else” in tech and growth would simply move sideways in public markets.

Overall assessment

• The core leadership call—Magnificent Seven outperforming the rest—was broadly right over 2023–24.
• The stronger claim that the rest of tech and growth would merely trade sideways and fail to recover valuations is clearly inconsistent with the double‑digit, often 20–30%+ annual gains seen in broad growth/tech benchmarks and in ex‑Magnificent‑Seven large‑cap indexes over that period.

Because the normalized prediction joins both ideas, and the second part is decisively refuted by realized returns and valuation data, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, albeit directionally right about mega‑cap leadership.

As of November 30, 2025, it’s too early to definitively judge a prediction whose key time horizon is “until at least Q1 2026 and maybe mid‑2026,” because those dates have not yet occurred.

What has happened so far (Sept 2023 → late 2025):

• The Fed kept the policy rate at a historically high 5.25–5.50% from July 2023 through July 2024, then only began cutting in late 2024 and 2025. As of the October 28–29, 2025 FOMC meeting, the federal funds target range is still 3.75–4.00%, well above the near‑zero regime of the 2010s. (ycharts.com)
• Fed projections and market commentary as of late 2025 generally show rates staying in the mid‑3% range through 2026, implying policy remains tighter than the pre‑2022 norm and only gradually normalizes. (fxstreet.com)
• Global and U.S. VC investment rebounded somewhat in 2024–2025 but remains far below the 2021 peak, heavily concentrated in a few large AI deals, with deal volume (especially smaller checks) down and investors more selective—consistent with a more capital‑constrained environment for many founders. (barrons.com)
• IPO and exit markets in 2025 are still relatively weak by historical standards, with global IPO volumes in mid‑2025 at a nine‑year low, reinforcing that liquidity conditions for startups remain challenging. (reuters.com)

Taken together, the world between late 2023 and late 2025 has broadly matched Chamath’s description of a high‑rate, tougher‑funding environment. However, his specific claim was about that environment persisting at least through Q1 2026 and possibly to mid‑2026. Because we are still before Q1 2026, we cannot yet know whether conditions will, in fact, remain comparably tight over that full horizon. Therefore the status of the prediction must be rated inconclusive (too early) rather than clearly right or wrong.

The normalized prediction was that the U.S. Federal Reserve would implement at least one interest-rate cut in the second half of 2024 (Q3 or Q4).

That did happen:

• On September 18, 2024 (Q3 2024), the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate by 50 basis points, lowering the target range from 5.25%–5.50% to 4.75%–5.00%. Multiple outlets identify this as the first rate cut in more than four years and the start of a new easing cycle. (cnbc.com)
• Reference summaries of the federal funds rate history also note that the Fed’s first post‑hiking cut occurred in September 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)

Since a clear rate cut occurred in Q3 2024, within the predicted “third, fourth quarter of next year” window relative to September 2023, the prediction is right.

Available data since late 2023 show a large, sustained pullback in LP commitments to venture funds relative to the 2020–2021 boom, and a corresponding drop in capital flowing into startups.

• In the U.S., VC fundraising peaked around 2021–2022 (~$170–190B per year) and then fell sharply: NVCA/PitchBook report only $66.9B raised across 474 funds in 2023 (a 61% drop from 2022 and the lowest since 2017) and about $76–77B across ~500+ funds in 2024, with fund counts at decade lows and fundraising described as ‘slow’ and concentrated in a few large managers.(scribd.com) Q3 2025 data show just $45.7B raised year‑to‑date, on track for the weakest year since 2017, indicating the slump is persisting rather than snapping back to 2020–2021 levels.(nvca.org)
• Globally, VC fundraising also dropped materially: PitchBook estimates global VC funds raised about $404B in 2021 versus roughly $170B in 2024, a decline of more than 50%.(blog.kowatek.com) Annual startup investment (deal value) followed suit, with global VC investments of ~$368B in 2024, about 50–55% below the 2021 peak (~$750B), despite a partial rebound driven by large AI rounds.(blog.kowatek.com)
• Industry commentary ties this directly to LP behavior: NVCA and PitchBook repeatedly note LP ‘hesitation’ and an inability or unwillingness to allocate new capital without more exits; dry powder is high but largely comes from earlier funds, while new fundraising is muted.(privatemarketsinsights.com) The Financial Times similarly reports that many LPs have pulled back from smaller and newer U.S. VC funds, with more than half of 2024’s U.S. VC fundraising going to just nine firms and a 25% drop in the number of active VC firms, reducing funding access for many startups.(ft.com)

Taken together, these data show that in the years following 2023 there has indeed been significantly less LP money going into venture funds and, in aggregate, substantially less capital deployed into startups than during the 2020–2021 cycle, matching the substance of Friedberg’s prediction so far.

Multiple independent sources show that, within three years of September 2023, Tesla introduced a U.S. Model Y trim with a base MSRP of about $40,000 (before taxes and incentives), matching Chamath’s forecast.

Key facts:

• In early October 2025, Tesla announced a new Model Y Standard for the U.S. market with a starting price of $39,990 before taxes and fees. (houstonchronicle.com)
• Coverage of the same launch notes that Tesla positioned this Model Y Standard explicitly as the new cheapest and entry-level Model Y, priced roughly $5,000 below the previous base trim (which had been $44,990). (karmactive.com)
• Independent spec/price listings (e.g., Cars.com) for the 2026 Tesla Model Y Standard RWD show an MSRP of $39,990 for the base configuration, confirming that this price point is not just a transient promotion. (cars.com)

Chamath’s normalized prediction was that the mainline Model Y would be “a $40,000 car” within three years of September 2023 (deadline September 2026). By October 2025—well before that deadline—Tesla was selling a mainstream Model Y Standard trim at $39,990 MSRP before incentives, i.e., approximately $40,000.

Because the predicted price level has already been reached by a regular production Model Y trim within the specified time window, the prediction is best classified as right.

Evidence since the Sept 22, 2023 episode broadly supports Friedberg’s forecast that this liver‑targeted glycosylated‑antigen (“inverse vaccine”) modality would, within a couple of years, generate specific autoimmune therapeutics that show clinical success and gain traction toward market.

1. Modality and mechanism match the paper he described
   The Nature Biomedical Engineering paper he referenced (“Synthetically glycosylated antigens for the antigen-specific suppression of established immune responses”) from the University of Chicago uses a polymer glycosylated with N‑acetylgalactosamine (pGal) to deliver antigens to the liver, inducing antigen‑specific tolerance and reversing disease in a mouse MS model (EAE) and in other settings. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) This is exactly the liver‑targeted glycosylated‑antigen modality Friedberg summarized on the podcast.

2. Translation into specific clinical therapeutics for autoimmune disease
   Anokion’s KAN‑101 is a “liver‑targeting glycosylation signature conjugated to a deaminated gliadin peptide” designed to induce immune tolerance to gluten in celiac disease—i.e., a direct clinical implementation of the liver‑targeted glycosylated‑antigen idea for a concrete autoimmune indication. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) Similarly, ANK‑700 for relapsing‑remitting multiple sclerosis (RRMS) uses a myelin immuno‑domain conjugated to a glycosylation signature to induce antigen‑specific tolerance to myelin autoantigens. (businesswire.com) Both are clear examples of “very specific therapeutics for very specific autoimmune conditions using this approach,” as he predicted.

3. Early clinical success and traction by 2024–2025
   Celiac disease (KAN‑101):

   • Phase 1 (ACeD) in 41 celiac patients showed KAN‑101 was safe and well tolerated, with no serious or dose‑limiting toxicities, and produced dose‑dependent modulation of gluten‑induced IL‑2, reduction of gliadin‑specific T cells, and favorable effects on gut‑homing CD8+ T cells—evidence of antigen‑specific tolerance. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)
   • On the strength of these data, Anokion advanced KAN‑101 into a global Phase 1b/2 ACeD‑it trial and a separate Phase 2a SynCeD trial, and the drug received FDA Fast Track designation in May 2023, indicating regulatory and clinical “traction.” (celiac.org)
   • In May 2024, updated Phase 1b/2 data again supported safety and biomarker efficacy and emphasized KAN‑101’s “unique liver‑targeting mechanism” and induction of functional tolerance after gluten challenge. (businesswire.com)
   • In January 2025, Anokion reported positive symptom data from the Phase 2 ACeD‑it trial, calling it the first symptomatic clinical proof of concept for KAN‑101 as a disease‑modifying treatment for celiac disease; KAN‑101 reduced multiple gluten‑induced symptoms and celiac‑specific composite patient‑reported outcome measures and remained safe across dose levels. (businesswire.com)
     Collectively, these results constitute clear early clinical success and significant advancement into mid‑stage development within ~1.5 years of the podcast.

   Multiple sclerosis (ANK‑700):

   • The Phase 1 MoveS‑it trial in RRMS completed enrollment by late 2023. Interim reports showed ANK‑700 was safe and well tolerated, with biomarker data suggesting induction of immune tolerance to myelin proteins and bystander suppression to related myelin antigens—mechanistic proof that the liver‑targeted glycosylated‑antigen platform is working in humans. (multiplesclerosisnewstoday.com)
   • In September 2024, Anokion presented full Phase 1 MoveS‑it data, describing ANK‑700 as featuring “a novel myelin immuno‑domain conjugated to a glycosylation signature” and reporting no serious adverse events or MRI evidence of disease worsening, plus evidence of tolerization of myelin‑reactive T cells and bystander suppression. The company characterized these results as clinical proof of concept and positioned ANK‑700 as a potential disease‑modifying RRMS therapy. (businesswire.com)
     This again matches Friedberg’s expectation that the modality would produce promising, disease‑specific autoimmune therapeutics relatively quickly.

4. “Go to market” and stage of development by late 2025
   By November 30, 2025, no inverse‑vaccine/glycosylated‑antigen product has yet been approved or commercially launched; even University of Chicago’s own summaries emphasize that no clinically approved inverse vaccines exist yet and human trials are just beginning. (pme.uchicago.edu) KAN‑101 and ANK‑700 are in Phase 2 and Phase 1/early‑development respectively—short of Phase 3 or market authorization—but they are clearly in active clinical development with positive human data, Fast Track status, and multiple global trials, which in industry usage is a standard part of the “go‑to‑market” trajectory for a new modality. (celiac.org)

5. Assessment relative to the normalized prediction
   The normalized claim was that within a couple of years of 2023, “at least some therapies” based on this liver‑targeted glycosylated‑antigen approach would (a) show clinical success, (b) gain traction, and (c) advance toward market (e.g., into late‑stage development or commercial use).

   • (a) and (b) are clearly satisfied: KAN‑101 and ANK‑700 have produced human safety and mechanistic/clinical‑effect signals, are described by their sponsor and independent publications as showing clinical proof of concept or potential disease‑modifying activity, and have progressed into multiple Phase 2 trials with regulatory Fast Track designation. (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov)
   • (c) is partially realized: these drugs have advanced meaningfully along the commercialization path (multi‑national Phase 2 with positive data, platform clearly “productized”), even though they have not yet reached Phase 3 or approval.

Given that Friedberg’s core directional prediction—that this glycosylated, liver‑targeted tolerance approach would rather quickly yield specific autoimmune therapeutics with early clinical success and visible momentum toward the market—has indeed materialized by late 2025, the fairest overall judgment is that his prediction is substantively right, with the caveat that full market approval has not yet occurred.