As of November 30, 2025, it’s too early to definitively judge a prediction whose key time horizon is “until at least Q1 2026 and maybe mid‑2026,” because those dates have not yet occurred.

What has happened so far (Sept 2023 → late 2025):

• The Fed kept the policy rate at a historically high 5.25–5.50% from July 2023 through July 2024, then only began cutting in late 2024 and 2025. As of the October 28–29, 2025 FOMC meeting, the federal funds target range is still 3.75–4.00%, well above the near‑zero regime of the 2010s. (ycharts.com)
• Fed projections and market commentary as of late 2025 generally show rates staying in the mid‑3% range through 2026, implying policy remains tighter than the pre‑2022 norm and only gradually normalizes. (fxstreet.com)
• Global and U.S. VC investment rebounded somewhat in 2024–2025 but remains far below the 2021 peak, heavily concentrated in a few large AI deals, with deal volume (especially smaller checks) down and investors more selective—consistent with a more capital‑constrained environment for many founders. (barrons.com)
• IPO and exit markets in 2025 are still relatively weak by historical standards, with global IPO volumes in mid‑2025 at a nine‑year low, reinforcing that liquidity conditions for startups remain challenging. (reuters.com)

Taken together, the world between late 2023 and late 2025 has broadly matched Chamath’s description of a high‑rate, tougher‑funding environment. However, his specific claim was about that environment persisting at least through Q1 2026 and possibly to mid‑2026. Because we are still before Q1 2026, we cannot yet know whether conditions will, in fact, remain comparably tight over that full horizon. Therefore the status of the prediction must be rated inconclusive (too early) rather than clearly right or wrong.