E85: SBF's crypto bailout, Zendesk sells for ~$10B, buyout targets, US diplomacy, AlphaFold & more

California’s first full fiscal year after the June 30, 2022 discussion was FY 2023‑24 (starting July 1, 2023). For that year, the Legislative Analyst’s Office and other analysts identified a large General Fund deficit on the order of roughly $24–32 billion, following earlier years of very large surpluses, which fits the description of a huge budget shortfall. (lao.ca.gov) Multiple budget analyses attribute this shortfall primarily to revenues coming in far below what had been projected for the 2022 tax year because of the steep stock‑market decline in 2022, which sharply reduced personal‑income‑tax collections from high‑income Californians whose income is disproportionately composed of capital gains and stock‑based compensation. (calbudgetcenter.org) Department of Finance figures reported in the press show capital gains falling from 25% of total personal‑income‑tax liability in 2021 to 13% in 2022—an $18 billion drop in capital‑gains revenue in a single year—creating large holes in the budget compared with the prior boom year. (aol.com) So although there was not literally zero capital‑gains revenue, California did experience a very large budget shortfall in the first fiscal year after the discussion, and that shortfall was driven largely by the collapse of capital‑gains‑related tax revenue relative to the preceding boom, making Sacks’s prediction substantively correct.

Evidence since mid‑2022 shows that Jason was partly right about a surge in investigations and enforcement, but wrong about the longer‑term regulatory outcome he forecast.

1. Part of the prediction that did happen: intense criminal/civil activity

• Sam Bankman‑Fried was prosecuted and convicted on seven counts of fraud and conspiracy over the FTX collapse, receiving a 25‑year sentence in 2024, a marquee DOJ case that put the whole industry under scrutiny.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Binance and its CEO Changpeng Zhao pleaded guilty in 2023 to anti‑money‑laundering and sanctions violations, paying over $4 billion in one of the largest corporate criminal resolutions ever.(justice.gov)
• The SEC sued Coinbase in June 2023 for allegedly operating as an unregistered exchange, broker, and clearing agency and for an unregistered staking program, a major civil case against a flagship U.S. exchange.(sec.gov)(sec.gov)
• New York’s Attorney General brought and settled multiple high‑profile actions (Nexo, KuCoin, Genesis, Gemini, DCG), securing hundreds of millions to billions in recoveries and bans on certain crypto activities in New York, explicitly framing this as increasing oversight and regulation of crypto platforms.(ag.ny.gov)(ag.ny.gov)(ag.ny.gov)(ag.ny.gov)(ag.ny.gov)
• DOJ and other agencies also pursued scams and laundering cases (e.g., a 2025 civil complaint to seize $225M in Tether tied to “pig‑butchering” frauds).(theverge.com)

These confirm his expectation of substantial DOJ/state AG enforcement and extensive discovery.

2. Where the prediction fails: “most regulated space we’ve ever seen” & killing opportunity

Jason’s key claim was not just more enforcement, but that crypto would become “the most regulated space we’ve ever seen” and that regulation would “kill a lot of the opportunity.” On those points, the record diverges:

• No overwhelming, comprehensive regulatory framework. As of 2025, the U.S. still lacks a broad, unified federal crypto statute. The Digital Commodities Consumer Protection Act remains only a proposal.(en.wikipedia.org) New York’s Attorney General was still urging Congress in April 2025 to pass strong federal crypto legislation, explicitly citing a “lack of strong federal regulations on cryptocurrencies”—the opposite of a fully saturated regulatory environment.(ag.ny.gov)
• First major federal law is limited and criticized as not strict enough. The 2025 GENIUS Act creates a framework for payment stablecoins, with reserve and transparency requirements, but it is only one slice of the sector.(en.wikipedia.org)(en.wikipedia.org) Consumer Reports and Democratic critics argue it does not provide enough consumer protections and may be too permissive toward big tech and industry players.(en.wikipedia.org)(apnews.com)(politico.com) That is not consistent with crypto becoming one of the most heavily regulated sectors in the economy.
• Enforcement pivoted away from maximal crackdown. In 2025 the DOJ disbanded the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team and announced it would stop using enforcement as de‑facto regulation of exchanges, mixers, and wallets, refocusing instead on traditional crimes (terrorism, drugs, hacking) that merely use crypto.(reuters.com)(theguardian.com) Trump’s Executive Order 14178 simultaneously revoked a prior Biden‑era digital‑asset EO and tasked a new group with proposing a friendlier federal framework, framed as ending a regulatory “war on crypto.”(en.wikipedia.org)(washingtonpost.com) This is a rollback, not a progression to the “most regulated space we’ve ever seen.”
• Other industries remain much more heavily regulated. Empirical studies of U.S. regulation (e.g., RegData‑based counts of legal restrictions) consistently show sectors like petroleum and coal products manufacturing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, broadcasting, depository credit intermediation, health care, and utilities among the most heavily regulated industries—crypto does not appear on these “most regulated” lists at all.(planetcompliance.com)(sciencedirect.com)(mercatus.org)(cnbc.com) That contradicts the idea that crypto has become the or even one of the most regulated spaces in the economy.

3. Opportunity and innovation clearly not “killed”

• Record prices and mainstream financial integration. In January 2024 the SEC approved 11 spot bitcoin ETFs, widely described as a watershed moment opening the door for mainstream and institutional investment.(techcrunch.com)(winston.com) By March 2024, Bitcoin reached new all‑time highs above $69,000–$73,000, far above its post‑2022 lows, with inflows into the new ETFs a major driver.(ft.com)(theguardian.com)(statmuse.com)(time.com) Those are not the price dynamics of an opportunity that has been “killed.”
• Policy pivot toward promotion, not suppression, of crypto. In 2025 Trump signed Executive Order 14178 and launched a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and broader Digital Asset Stockpile to make the U.S. the “crypto capital of the world,” while publicly declaring an end to the government “war on crypto.”(en.wikipedia.org)(en.wikipedia.org)(washingtonpost.com) The SEC in 2025 also streamlined listing rules for spot crypto ETFs, explicitly aiming to foster innovation and lower barriers to digital‑asset products.(cnbc.com) These moves are designed to enable profit and innovation, not extinguish them.

Given this:

• The narrow part of Jason’s forecast—big DOJ and regulatory actions—came true.
• But the central, stronger claim that this would produce crypto as “the most regulated space” and would “kill a lot of the opportunity” is not supported by the trajectory of law, policy, or market outcomes through late 2025.

Because the prediction, as stated, hinges on those strong claims about extreme regulation and destroyed opportunity, the overall forecast did not materialize as described.

Bitcoin was trading around $20,000 at the end of June 2022; StatMuse shows a June 30, 2022 closing price of about $19,800, consistent with the podcast’s reference point.​(statmuse.com)

After that, the lowest closing price for Bitcoin from 2022 through November 29, 2025 was $15,787.28 on November 21, 2022, and this remains the cycle low in that multi‑year window. Bitcoin never traded anywhere near the predicted $3,500–$5,000 “rational” band.​(statmuse.com) From the June 2022 reference level (~$20k) to the bottom (~$15.8k), the drawdown was on the order of 20–25%, not the additional ~75% decline Chamath described.

Moreover, the subsequent market cycle has clearly progressed: Bitcoin later set new all‑time highs above $124k–$126k in October 2025, far above both the 2022 levels and any supposed $3.5k–$5k “rebase.”​(statmuse.com) With more than three years elapsed and a full new bull cycle and ATHs already in the books, there has been ample time for the hypothesized post‑QE repricing to occur.

Because Bitcoin never approached the $3,500–$5,000 range and instead bottomed around $15.8k before rallying to new record highs, Chamath’s prediction that it would likely rebase to that much lower band over the subsequent cycle is incorrect.

Evidence on some parts of the prediction is directional but the core claim about free cash flow is not verifiable now that Zendesk is private.

What we can see:

• Deal happened as described. Zendesk was acquired by a Hellman & Friedman / Permira–led consortium for about $10.2B and taken private in November 2022, shortly after the podcast. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Revenue growth did slow materially. Public and secondary data sources agree on roughly:

  • 2021 revenue ≈ $1.34B, growing ~30% YoY (pre‑buyout). (getlatka.com)
  • 2022 ≈ $1.58B (~18% growth), 2023 ≈ $1.75–1.9B (~11–16% growth depending on source), 2024 ≈ $1.93B (~10% growth). (getlatka.com)
    Over 2021–2024, this implies a revenue CAGR of ~13%, i.e., a clear slowdown from ~30%. That’s directionally consistent with Chamath’s claim that growth would be pulled down, but it ended up below his 15–20% range rather than inside it.

• There has been some cost cutting, but not clearly "slashing" R&D and S&M.

  • Zendesk cut about 5% of staff (~300 employees) in November 2022 explicitly for cost optimization, and later announced a smaller layoff (51 employees in SF) in 2025. (sfchronicle.com)
  • At the same time, the company is investing in growth initiatives like a major Austin office that it describes as a “go-to-market hub” with sales, engineering, marketing and support roles, and plans to expand that location from ~300 to ~500 employees. (statesman.com)
  • Some secondary write‑ups say adjusted EBITDA margins “have improved to approximately 12%” post‑privatization, implying improved profitability but still modest margins for a SaaS LBO. (grokipedia.com)
    Overall, this looks like typical PE efficiency work (moderate headcount cuts, price increases, focus on AI/enterprise) rather than an obviously radical shutdown of R&D and sales & marketing.

• Pre‑buyout free cash flow was far from his $300–500M target. Public filings and data aggregators show trailing‑twelve‑month free cash flow around the time of the deal at roughly $95M on ~$1.59B of revenue (≈6% FCF margin), with historical FCF margins mostly in the mid‑single to low‑double digits. (discountingcashflows.com) That’s well below the $300–500M he envisioned, but those figures stop at Q3 2022 (right before going fully private).

What we cannot see (and why this is ambiguous):

• After November 2022, Zendesk no longer files detailed financials, so there is no authoritative public data on:
  • Actual free cash flow in 2023–2025 (his key numerical claim was $300–500M in annual FCF).
  • Exact R&D and sales & marketing spend levels or their percentage of revenue post‑buyout.
• Third‑party sites and AI/consulting write‑ups that give 2023–2024 revenue and margin estimates appear to rely on company marketing materials or modeled estimates, not audited statements; none credibly report free cash flow in the $300–500M range, but they also don’t rule it out explicitly. (getlatka.com)

Because the centerpiece of Chamath’s prediction—the ability to generate $300–500M in annual free cash flow on roughly today’s revenue base—depends on private, unreported cash‑flow numbers, we cannot definitively say whether that part came true. We can confirm the growth slowdown and some cost optimization, but not the magnitude of profitability he forecast.

Given that enough time has passed but the relevant post‑LBO cash‑flow data is not publicly knowable, the fairest label for this prediction as stated is "ambiguous" rather than clearly right or wrong.

Available evidence strongly supports Chamath’s prediction about how Zendesk would be run post‑acquisition.

Key points:

• Private‑equity takeover and leadership change: Zendesk was acquired by a Hellman & Friedman / Permira–led group in November 2022 and taken private. Shortly after closing, founder‑CEO Mikkel Svane resigned and was replaced by Tom Eggemeier, a former Permira partner and PE operating executive, which is consistent with a classic PE control and governance reset. (businesswire.com)

• Layoffs of higher‑paid staff and leadership turnover:

  • November 2022: ~5% of the workforce (about 300 employees) laid off as a cost‑reduction move while the sale to PE was pending. (sfchronicle.com)
  • May 2023: a further 8% global workforce reduction (~440 people), including dozens of California managers, ordered by the new CEO to correct “overhiring” and reduce operating expenses. (zendesk.com)
  • February 2025: another layoff of 51 SF employees, again framed as reallocating resources and cutting costs. (sfchronicle.com)
  • A 2025 Glassdoor review by a software engineer describes five rounds of layoffs, “offshore talent to cut costs,” “gutted” leadership (founder fired, board replaced), and a culture now run by lawyers and finance to dress the company up for exit—exactly the “private‑equity type play” Chamath described. (glassdoor.com)
    Altogether, this matches his forecast of getting rid of many high‑priced engineers and executives.

• Shift away from stock‑based compensation toward cash/bonuses:

  • As a public company, Zendesk had large share‑based compensation; Q2 2022 alone included over $73m in share‑based comp, a major component of operating expenses. (content.edgar-online.com)
  • A post‑buyout Glassdoor Q&A explicitly states that under the new leadership “Employees are no longer offered RSUs, bonuses have dropped below the 10% range, and performance evaluations are based on percentile ranking.” (glassdoor.co.in)
  • Current job postings across functions (engineering, sales, customer success, compensation) systematically describe pay as base salary plus commission/bonus, with no mention of equity or RSUs, reinforcing that new packages are cash/bonus‑heavy rather than stock‑heavy. (builtinaustin.com)
    This is very close to Chamath’s claim that stock‑based comp would “go away” and be replaced with bonus‑based pay tied to targets.

• Retaining customer‑facing/support functions while cutting elsewhere: Zendesk remains a large customer‑support SaaS platform; customer support and CX roles continue to be heavily recruited (e.g., customer success, support‑adjacent roles), while multiple rounds of layoffs have focused on HQ staff, managers, and higher‑cost locations. (sfgate.com) This is consistent with keeping frontline/support capacity while trimming expensive engineering/leadership layers.

• Classic PE value‑extraction pattern: Employee reviews explicitly attribute the new culture and incentive structure to PE ownership, citing PE “squeezing the company,” harsher commission/bonus schemes, cost‑cutting, offshoring, and a focus on near‑term profit and IPO positioning rather than long‑term product vision. (repvue.com) That is exactly the “run it like a private‑equity type play” scenario that was predicted.

Because:

• the acquisition closed in late 2022 (so “within the next few years” has now elapsed),
• stock‑based compensation for rank‑and‑file employees appears to have been largely eliminated in favor of cash and relatively small bonuses,
• there have been multiple cost‑driven layoff waves and leadership turnover in line with targeting high‑cost engineers and executives, and
• the company is now being operated with a textbook PE cost‑cutting and incentive model,

Chamath’s prediction is best characterized as right in substance, even if his language (“all the high priced engineers”) was somewhat hyperbolic.

U.S. CPI (year-over-year, headline) did stay in the 8–9% range for four consecutive monthly readings around the time of his prediction, then began to decline:

• June 2022: 9.1% YoY (largest 12‑month increase since 1981). (theworlddata.com)
• July 2022: 8.5% YoY. (bls.gov)
• August 2022: 8.3% YoY. (theworlddata.com)
• September 2022: 8.2% YoY. (bls.gov)
• October 2022: 7.7% YoY, the smallest 12‑month increase since January 2022, i.e., a marginal improvement from the 8%+ range. (bls.gov)

Chamath’s claim was that from roughly June 2022 there would be “eight and 9% inflation prints for at least the next 3 or 4 months” and that “things could get marginally better after that.” From June through September there were indeed four straight CPI prints between 8% and 9%, and by October the YoY rate had edged down below 8%. The realized data therefore matches both the persistence he forecast and the subsequent marginal improvement, so the prediction is best judged as right.

Peloton has not been acquired or taken private since the June 30, 2022 podcast. As of late November 2025, Peloton Interactive, Inc. still trades publicly on a U.S. exchange under the ticker PTON, indicating it remains an independent public company rather than having been “taken out.” (en.wikipedia.org) Recent SEC filings through fiscal 2024–2025 describe Peloton’s ongoing restructuring and operations but do not report any merger, acquisition, or going‑private transaction. (sec.gov) In mid‑2025, Peloton’s CEO also explicitly stated that he had no interest in selling the company and intended to keep it a standalone business. (bloomberg.com) Because more than “a couple of years” have passed since mid‑2022 and Peloton remains an independent public firm, Jason’s prediction that the company “is going to get taken out” within that timeframe is incorrect.

The prediction was that U.S. CPI year‑over‑year inflation would continue to print around 8–9% for at least the next 3–4 months after the late‑June 2022 discussion.

Looking at the official CPI‑U (year‑over‑year) figures for 2022:

• June 2022: 9.1%
• July 2022: 8.5%
• August 2022: 8.3%
• September 2022: 8.2%
• October 2022: 7.7%

These values come from BLS‑based compilations and tables that reproduce the official CPI‑U annual rates: June 9.1%, July 8.5%, August 8.3%, September 8.2%, October 7.7%. (cpiinflationcalculator.com)

The episode aired June 30, 2022. The next 3–4 inflation prints after that (the June, July, August, and September 2022 CPI reports) were all in the 8–9% band:

1. June 2022 report (released mid‑July): 9.1%
2. July 2022 report (released mid‑August): 8.5%
3. August 2022 report (released mid‑September): 8.3%
4. September 2022 report (released mid‑October): 8.2%

It was only with the October 2022 print that headline CPI YoY fell below 8%, to 7.7%. (cnbc.com)

Since there were four consecutive months of YoY CPI in the 8–9% range immediately following the discussion, the claim that we would "see eight and 9% inflation prints for at least the next 3 or 4 months" is borne out by the data.

Therefore, the prediction is right.

The near-term part of Chamath’s call was broadly accurate, but the core of the prediction – a huge oil spike and a renewed inflation surge in late 2022 – did not happen.

1. Next three months of high inflation (mid-2022): After the June 2022 CPI release (9.1% year-over-year), U.S. headline inflation stayed in the 8–9% range for the following months: July 8.5%, August 8.3%, and September 8.2%, all year-over-year figures from BLS data. (theworlddata.com) That aligns reasonably well with his statement that “these next three months … we’re going to be printing eight and 9%.”

2. Oil at ~$180/barrel by Nov–Dec 2022: Global oil prices never came close to $180. Brent crude peaked around $133/barrel earlier in 2022 and by November–December 2022 was mostly in the mid‑80s to mid‑90s per barrel. Weekly EIA data show Brent in November 2022 between about $86 and $96, and in December 2022 mostly in the high‑70s to low‑80s. (eia.gov) This is far below the predicted ~$180.

3. Inflation ‘kicking back up’ to 7–9% in winter 2022: Rather than re-accelerating, U.S. headline CPI inflation continued to decline into late 2022. After 8.2% in September, it fell to 7.7% in October, 7.1% in November, and 6.5% in December year-over-year. (theworlddata.com) That means by December, inflation was already below the bottom of his projected 7–9% “kicked back up again” range, and the trajectory was clearly downward, not another spike driven by energy.

Because the key conditional scenario he described (oil to ~$180 and a renewed winter inflation surge) clearly failed to occur, the overall prediction is best judged as wrong, despite the short-term accuracy about summer 2022’s elevated inflation prints.

Chamath’s condition for a durable bottom in global risk assets had two parts: (1) roughly $30T needed to be wiped out or clearly on track to be wiped out from global markets, and also (2) there had to be an off‑ramp / resolution to the Russia–Ukraine war restoring predictable energy and food supplies before markets would truly bottom.

On the first point, global stocks and bonds did lose more than $30 trillion in 2022. Multiple summaries of 2022 market performance, drawing on Financial Times/Bloomberg data, report that world equity market capitalization fell about $25T and global bonds roughly $9–10T, for total losses exceeding $30T.(thenews.com.pk) So his order‑of‑magnitude drawdown threshold was essentially met.

However, the second condition clearly did not occur. The Russo‑Ukrainian war is still described as an ongoing conflict (“2022–present”), with active offensive operations such as the Pokrovsk offensive starting in 2024 and continuing into 2025, and only tentative peace frameworks being discussed. There has been no conclusive peace agreement or stable political “off‑ramp” that resolves the war.(en.wikipedia.org)

Despite the absence of that off‑ramp, both U.S. and global equity markets appear to have established a durable bottom in October 2022:

• The S&P 500’s bear‑market closing low was 3,577.03 on October 12, 2022; by June 8, 2023 it had risen more than 20% off that low, meeting the standard definition of a new bull market and end of the 2022 bear cycle.(en.wikipedia.org) The index then posted strong positive total returns in 2023 and 2024 and went on to set multiple record highs, surpassing 6,800 by late October 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Global equities behaved similarly. The MSCI All‑Country World Index (ACWI) and related global benchmarks reached new all‑time highs in 2024 and again in 2025, with commentary explicitly noting that global stocks had fully recovered from the 2022 decline and moved to record levels.(reuters.com)

In other words, global risk asset markets did form a durable bottom in late 2022 and went on to make new highs over the next several years even though the Russia–Ukraine war remained unresolved and continued to disrupt geopolitics. That directly contradicts the prediction that markets would not establish a durable bottom until both the ~$30T drawdown and a clear off‑ramp to the war were in place. For that reason, the prediction is best classified as wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, there is still no final political settlement or peace treaty ending the Russia–Ukraine war. Fighting continues on multiple fronts while various U.S.-brokered and European-influenced peace frameworks are being discussed, but all sides acknowledge that key issues such as territorial control and Ukraine’s security guarantees remain unresolved.(reuters.com)

Current facts partially resemble elements of the prediction: Russia militarily controls roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory, including Crimea and most of the Donbas region, and this control has been de facto but not internationally recognized.(aljazeera.com) Ukraine also remains outside NATO, though membership and security guarantees are an ongoing political issue rather than a settled commitment to permanent neutrality.(euronews.com) However, Ukrainian leadership continues to publicly reject territorial concessions and insists that any peace must not legitimize Russian annexations, directly contesting the kind of formalized outcome the prediction describes.(time.com)

Because the prediction was specifically about the eventual political settlement and no such settlement yet exists, it is not possible to determine whether the war will ultimately end in the three-point arrangement Sacks described. The forecast is therefore too early to judge and must be rated as inconclusive.

As of November 30, 2025, there has been no final peace agreement ending the Russia–Ukraine war that matches the structure Sacks described (neutral Ukraine outside NATO, formal autonomy of Donbas under effective Russian influence, and internationally accepted Russian control of Crimea).

Key facts:

1. No comprehensive peace treaty or final political settlement exists yet. The war, begun with Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, is ongoing; front lines and limited ceasefires have shifted, but there is no agreed end-state constitutional or territorial settlement between Russia and Ukraine.
2. Ukraine’s NATO orientation has hardened rather than disappeared. Ukraine formally applied for NATO membership in September 2022 and NATO states have repeatedly affirmed that Ukraine has a future in NATO, even if no immediate accession date is set. Ukraine’s 2019 constitutionally-enshrined Euro-Atlantic integration course remains in place and has not been replaced by a formal neutrality commitment.
3. Donbas status is unresolved and contested. Russia claims to have annexed Donetsk and Luhansk (and two other regions) following staged referendums in September 2022, but these annexations are internationally rejected. There is no mutually agreed autonomy framework recognized by both Kyiv and Moscow; instead, there is de facto military control by Russia in some areas and ongoing combat in others.
4. Crimea remains under Russian occupation but without an agreed settlement. Russia has occupied Crimea since 2014 and claims it as its territory; Ukraine continues to reject that claim and has conducted military strikes and special operations against Russian forces and infrastructure in Crimea. No agreement has been reached in which Ukraine formally recognizes Russian sovereignty over Crimea.

Because the war has not ended and no final agreement is in place, it is impossible to say whether the eventual end-state of the war will or will not match Sacks’s detailed prediction. The necessary time horizon ("that will be the deal") has not yet elapsed; thus the prediction’s truth value cannot currently be determined.

Therefore the correct classification is: inconclusive (too early).