Trump Brokers Gaza Peace Deal, National Guard in Chicago, OpenAI/AMD, AI Roundtripping, Gold Rally

The prediction explicitly uses a 10 to 20 year horizon from the 2025 discussion ("in the ten or 15 or 20 year time frame"), which maps roughly to 2035–2045. As of November 30, 2025, we are only ~0 years into that window, so:

• It is too early to know whether nuclear, natural gas, and solar will become so abundant by 2035–2045 that they structurally reduce long‑term oil demand and weaken oil’s persistent bid as an asset.
• Current data on the global energy mix and oil demand/prices in the mid‑2020s cannot definitively confirm or falsify a claim about the structural situation a decade or more in the future.

Because the forecast’s evaluation period has not arrived yet, its correctness cannot be determined at this time.

Public reporting shows that:

• A formal U.S.–China “deal” was in fact reached and announced in early November 2025. After the Oct. 30 Trump–Xi meeting in Busan, the White House released a fact sheet describing a trade pact under which China suspends new rare‑earth export controls and terminates investigations into U.S. semiconductor firms, while the U.S. rolls back or pauses certain tariffs and extends Section 301 exclusions. (straitstimes.com) Reuters subsequently referred to this as a broader U.S.–China trade agreement when reporting on the Nov. 26 extension of tariff exclusions. (reuters.com)

• However, all available descriptions of this deal limit it to trade, tariffs, export controls, and fentanyl‑related measures; they do not contain any new U.S.–China arrangement or jointly announced formula on Taiwan. Detailed summaries from the White House fact sheet and trade-focused analyses enumerate concessions on rare earths, critical minerals, tariff levels, and regulatory probes, but make no mention of Taiwan, strategic ambiguity, or any modification of U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act or the One‑China policy framework. (straitstimes.com)

• Separate coverage of U.S.–China interactions around the same period confirms Taiwan remains a point of contention, not an agreed subject of a new deal. In late October, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly said the U.S. would not change its Taiwan policy to secure a China trade agreement. (scmp.com) In a Nov. 24 phone call, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing’s claim that Taiwan’s “return to China” is central to the post‑WWII order, but U.S. readouts did not announce any new U.S. stance or joint Taiwan language linked to the Busan trade pact. (reuters.com) Taiwan and Japan’s subsequent reactions likewise treat Taiwan as unresolved and increasingly tense, not as the subject of a newly agreed framework. (reuters.com)

Because the prediction specifically required that the China deal include “some new arrangement or statement affecting the Taiwan issue” (e.g., an updated/clarified form of strategic ambiguity), and the November 2025 U.S.–China agreement is, by all public accounts, a trade and export‑control deal with no new Taiwan component, the prediction did not come true as stated.

Polymarket’s market explicitly defined the event as: “Hamas releases all living Israeli hostages held in Gaza by October 31, 2025.” Hostage rescues were excluded; only voluntary release of living hostages counted. (polymarket.com)

On 13 October 2025, Hamas released the last 20 living Israeli hostages to the Red Cross/IDF under the Trump-brokered Gaza peace plan, as reported by ABC News, The Guardian, People, and other outlets, and summarized in reference entries for the Gaza war hostage crisis and specific hostages (e.g., Alon Ohel, Rom Braslavski, Bar Kupershtein). All of these sources state that by that date all remaining living hostages had been freed and returned to Israel alive. (abc.net.au)

Encyclopedic overviews of the ceasefire/hostage deal note that the last 20 living hostages were released on October 13, 2025, while the return of the bodies of deceased hostages lagged behind; as of late October and even November, some remains were still held in Gaza. These accounts clearly distinguish between “living hostages” and “bodies of slain hostages.” (britannica.com)

Polymarket’s own multi-date “Will Hamas release all Israeli hostages by…?” contract shows the October 31th line resolved as “Yes,” consistent with the fact that all living hostages had already been released well before the October 31 deadline. (polymarket.com)

Jason’s statement—paraphrased as Polymarket implying that by October 31, 2025, 100% of the remaining Israeli hostages (understood per the market rules as the remaining living hostages) would have been released and returned alive—matches what actually happened. Living hostages were all freed and back in Israel by October 13, and no credible reporting indicates any of them died before October 31. Therefore, under the interpretation used by Polymarket and contemporary reporting (which separates living hostages from the remains of the dead), the prediction is right.

The prediction concerns U.S. midterm elections that would follow the Trump administration’s then-current behavior. Given the podcast release date (October 10, 2025) and today’s date (November 30, 2025), the relevant midterm elections would be in November 2026. Those elections have not occurred yet, so it is not yet possible to determine whether Democrats will "shellac" Republicans in terms of congressional seat gains and popular vote. Therefore, the accuracy of this prediction cannot currently be evaluated.

Available public data don’t let us cleanly test Jason’s specific ratio (≈1/3 of deported people being self‑reported/self‑deported), and the government has not released the granular breakdown his prediction relies on.

Key points:

1. What we can see in official‑adjacent stats

   • The Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) reports 15,241 grants of voluntary departure in the 12 months ending Sept. 30, 2025, up from 8,663 the prior year.
   • Over roughly the same period, ICE states it carried out 319,980 deportations (Oct. 1, 2024–Sept. 20, 2025).(washingtonpost.com)
   • If you naively treat “voluntary departure” + “deportations” as the relevant universe, that would imply on the order of 4–5% of formal exits were via voluntary departure—not anywhere near Jason’s “about one‑third.” However, these figures mix months under Biden and Trump, and it’s unclear whether all voluntary‑departure cases are (or are not) counted inside ICE’s deportation total, so this is not a clean Trump‑term ratio.

2. Data needed to directly test his claim are missing

   • The Migration Policy Institute notes that DHS stopped releasing detailed ICE/CBP enforcement tables after November 2024, and that for FY 2025 only partial, aggregated estimates (e.g., ~340,000 ICE deportations) are available—without breakdowns showing what share involved people who “self‑reported” vs. were arrested in raids.(migrationpolicy.org)
   • A Heritage Foundation analysis of Trump’s 2025 deportation push points out that DHS is not currently producing or publishing the detailed immigration‑enforcement statistics needed to substantiate its own claims, and specifically notes that DHS has not shared any statistics on how many people have used the CBP Home app to self‑deport.(heritage.org)
   • Reporting based on AP/EOIR data says it is “impossible to know how many people left the U.S. voluntarily” since Trump took office because many leave without telling authorities, underscoring that self‑deportation numbers (and thus any precise fraction of deportees who self‑reported) cannot be reliably calculated.(washingtonpost.com)

3. Conflicting and opaque government messaging

   • A DHS press line cited by Heritage claims that 2 million people have left since Trump returned to office, with 1.6 million described as voluntary self‑deportations and more than 400,000 as deportations, implying a very high voluntary‑departure share among all exits—but this figure comes with no public underlying data and is criticized for inconsistency and lack of transparency.(heritage.org)
   • A secondary data aggregator similarly repeats that voluntary departures are around 38% of “total exits” under Trump, again working from DHS/ICE press numbers rather than detailed official tables, and without clarifying how “total exits” maps onto the narrower category of formal deportations Jason referenced.(theglobalstatistics.com)

Because:

• Official, disaggregated enforcement data for Trump’s current term (2025) have not been published in the level of detail needed;
• Independent analyses explicitly state it is impossible to know total voluntary/self‑deportations and that DHS has not provided CBP Home usage stats; and
• The limited stats we do see (EOIR voluntary departures vs. ICE deportations) suggest a share far below one‑third, but with definitional and timeframe mismatches,

we cannot definitively determine whether “about one‑third of those we deported self‑reported” is true or false based on verifiable statistics. The prediction therefore falls into the “ambiguous” category rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, it is far too early to determine whether this 2030-ish prediction is correct.

The claim is that by around 2030 (about five years after the October 2025 recording), OpenAI or its close infrastructure partners will be operating at least one data center of roughly 10 GW power capacity, with an intermediate ramp of ~2–3 GW in 2026–2027 and ~5 GW in the following couple of years.

Even with up‑to‑date news and industry reporting, there is no way in 2025 to verify what OpenAI’s or its partners’ data center fleet will look like in 2028–2030; at most we can observe current build‑outs, announced projects, and power contracts. Those do not constitute confirmation or refutation of a specific 2030‑scale outcome yet. Any judgment now would be speculative rather than factual.

Because the prediction’s evaluation window is centered on future years (2028–2030) and has not arrived, the correct status as of late 2025 is "inconclusive (too early)".

As of 30 November 2025, BRICS has not launched a unified, widely used, gold‑backed settlement currency for international trade, but the prediction’s time window ("the next few years," i.e., roughly until 2028) has not yet elapsed.

Current status:

• At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio, leaders explicitly did not launch a joint BRICS currency and instead prioritized local‑currency trade and development of the BRICS Pay payment platform. Analysts reviewing the summit concluded that any euro‑style BRICS currency is at least a decade away, with a possible settlement "unit of account" only around 2028–2030 and broader systems (like BRICS Pay) now targeted toward 2030.

  These same sources note that, as of October 2025, there is still no unified BRICS currency and no near‑term release date. (ebc.com)

• A detailed October 2025 analysis of Russia’s role in the project reports that the much‑touted BRICS common currency proposal was effectively shelved ahead of the 2024 summit and was not on the formal agenda at the 2025 summit, underscoring the lack of a currently functioning BRICS joint currency. (desk-russie.info)

• There is an emerging gold‑linked settlement architecture: the New Development Bank has set up a cross‑border settlement hub to facilitate BRICS trade under a gold‑influenced standard, and officials/analysts describe a proposed settlement unit (often called the “Unit”) backed 40% by gold and 60% by member currencies. However, this is described as a future or pilot‑stage mechanism, with operational targets around 2030 and pilots possibly starting in 2026—not as a presently widely used international settlement currency. (watcher.guru)

Given this, Sacks’s claim that we are unlikely to "see anything" like a BRICS gold‑backed currency in the next few years has not yet been falsified, but it also cannot yet be confirmed as correct, because there is still significant time before his implied horizon of ~2028. The appropriate rating therefore is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Evidence from late 2025 shows that Polymarket did, in fact, become legally available for real‑money trading to users in the United States during 2025, even if only in a limited beta.

Key points:

1. Regulatory green light in 2025

   • In September 2025, the CFTC issued a no‑action letter related to Polymarket’s US return via its acquired, CFTC‑licensed exchange QCX (rebranded as Polymarket US). This was publicly described by CEO Shayne Coplan as the “green light to go live in the USA.” (casinobeats.com)
   • In late November 2025, Polymarket obtained an Amended Order of Designation from the CFTC, explicitly authorizing it to operate an intermediated contract market in the US and to directly onboard US customers and brokerages. (yogonet.com) These actions establish that real‑money Polymarket trading by US users is legally permitted under US derivatives law.

2. Actual US trading (limited beta) with real money in 2025
   Multiple independent reports in November 2025 state that Polymarket reopened in the US in beta form, with real‑money event contracts available to a limited set of US users:

   • Yahoo Finance reported that Polymarket had begun live testing its US exchange, onboarding a slice of users and matching real trades as part of a limited rollout. (finance.yahoo.com)
   • Webopedia, LiveBitcoinNews, and ForkLog all describe a US beta relaunch where a restricted group of users is already placing real bets / trading live contracts on Polymarket US. (webopedia.com)
     These accounts confirm that by mid‑November 2025, some US‑based users were legally trading real‑money markets on Polymarket’s US platform.

3. Public rollout still pending but not required by the prediction
   Other coverage notes that as of late November 2025 the full public launch and broad consumer availability are still pending; US users going to the global site remain geoblocked and must wait for the dedicated US venue to fully open. (datawallet.com) However, the normalized prediction only requires that Polymarket “become legally available for real‑money trading by users in the United States sometime during calendar year 2025,” not that it be broadly or universally available.

Given that (a) US regulators explicitly cleared Polymarket’s US operation in 2025, and (b) a limited but real group of US users has been legally trading real‑money event contracts on Polymarket US during a beta in November 2025, the condition was satisfied within calendar year 2025. Therefore, Jason’s prediction resolves as right.

It’s too early to evaluate this prediction.

• The prediction, made on 10 October 2025, concerned “the next few years,” i.e., roughly the late‑2020s. That horizon (multiple years after 2025) has not yet elapsed as of 30 November 2025, so we cannot know whether average U.S. real GDP growth will indeed run at ~4–5% annually over that future period.
• Current realized data show recent U.S. real GDP growth in the 2–3% range, not 4–5%. For example, BEA estimates real GDP grew 2.5% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024 on an annual basis, with quarterly annualized rates like 2.3–3.1% in late 2024. (bea.gov) Early 2025 data are mixed, with an advance estimate showing a 0.3% annualized decline in Q1 2025 and later revisions showing a 3.8% annualized increase in Q2 2025, underscoring short‑term volatility rather than a clear multi‑year 4–5% trend. (apps.bea.gov)
• However, the prediction explicitly refers to average growth over the coming “few years” conditional on regulatory choices around AI. Multi‑year averages cannot be inferred from a few quarters of data, and long‑run effects of AI build‑out on productivity and growth would reasonably take more time to manifest and be measured.

Because the specified time window (the late‑2020s) has not yet occurred, and the claim is about a multi‑year future path of GDP growth under certain policy conditions, the accuracy of the prediction cannot yet be determined.