Public reporting shows that:

• A formal U.S.–China “deal” was in fact reached and announced in early November 2025. After the Oct. 30 Trump–Xi meeting in Busan, the White House released a fact sheet describing a trade pact under which China suspends new rare‑earth export controls and terminates investigations into U.S. semiconductor firms, while the U.S. rolls back or pauses certain tariffs and extends Section 301 exclusions. (straitstimes.com) Reuters subsequently referred to this as a broader U.S.–China trade agreement when reporting on the Nov. 26 extension of tariff exclusions. (reuters.com)

• However, all available descriptions of this deal limit it to trade, tariffs, export controls, and fentanyl‑related measures; they do not contain any new U.S.–China arrangement or jointly announced formula on Taiwan. Detailed summaries from the White House fact sheet and trade-focused analyses enumerate concessions on rare earths, critical minerals, tariff levels, and regulatory probes, but make no mention of Taiwan, strategic ambiguity, or any modification of U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act or the One‑China policy framework. (straitstimes.com)

• Separate coverage of U.S.–China interactions around the same period confirms Taiwan remains a point of contention, not an agreed subject of a new deal. In late October, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly said the U.S. would not change its Taiwan policy to secure a China trade agreement. (scmp.com) In a Nov. 24 phone call, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing’s claim that Taiwan’s “return to China” is central to the post‑WWII order, but U.S. readouts did not announce any new U.S. stance or joint Taiwan language linked to the Busan trade pact. (reuters.com) Taiwan and Japan’s subsequent reactions likewise treat Taiwan as unresolved and increasingly tense, not as the subject of a newly agreed framework. (reuters.com)

Because the prediction specifically required that the China deal include “some new arrangement or statement affecting the Taiwan issue” (e.g., an updated/clarified form of strategic ambiguity), and the November 2025 U.S.–China agreement is, by all public accounts, a trade and export‑control deal with no new Taiwan component, the prediction did not come true as stated.