Trump wins! How it happened and what's next

Jason predicted that after the 2024 election Tim Walz would (1) rapidly disappear from national prominence to the point people would "never" hear about him again, (2) be even more forgotten than Tim Kaine, and (3) become the subject of recurring Saturday Night Live sketches whose central joke is how forgettable he is.

1. Walz has not faded from national prominence
Since the 2024 loss, Walz has remained a visible national figure. Major outlets have covered his post‑election town‑hall tour in Republican‑held districts, his critiques of the 2024 campaign strategy, his ongoing national media interviews, and open discussion of a potential 2028 presidential bid.

• AP and others report him holding large town halls in Iowa and other states and staying active as a national Democratic voice. (apnews.com)
• Coverage in national outlets like the Guardian and WSJ in 2025 discusses his reflections on the 2024 race, his continued governorship, declining but still substantial approval ratings, and whether he’ll run again in 2026 or seek higher office in 2028. (nypost.com)
  This is inconsistent with “you’re never going to hear about that guy again” or a rapid slide into obscurity.

2. “More forgettable than Tim Kaine” is not borne out by events
Tim Kaine remains a sitting U.S. senator who won reelection in 2024 and continues to be publicly visible. (en.wikipedia.org)
Crucially, an SNL “What’s That Name?” sketch in November 2024 used Kaine as the butt of a joke about how people forget him, explicitly contrasting him with Tim Walz as the more memorable figure: the host notes that Kaine “looks exactly like Tim Walz” and emphasizes that even his first name is the same, underscoring that Walz is the one people actually remember. (realclearpolitics.com)
If anything, SNL canonically treated Kaine as the more forgettable of the two, directly contradicting the prediction.

3. SNL did not do recurring sketches about Walz’s forgettability
SNL did feature Tim Walz several times in 2024, impersonated by Jim Gaffigan, but the humor revolved around his Midwestern “dad energy,” policy persona, and the Harris–Walz ticket, not about him being forgotten. (reddit.com)
By contrast, the recurring SNL device where the entire joke is that someone is unmemorable was used on Tim Kaine in 2024, not on Walz. (thewrap.com)
There is no evidence of a run of SNL sketches whose central gag is that Walz is forgettable.

Given that (a) Walz has remained an active national political figure, (b) public/pop‑culture treatment has cast Kaine—not Walz—as the quintessentially forgettable politician, and (c) SNL’s recurring forgettability joke was applied to Kaine instead of Walz, Jason’s prediction is best classified as wrong.

The prediction explicitly gives an eight‑year window from November 2024 (“in the next eight years”). That window runs until roughly November 2032. As of the current date (November 30, 2025), only about one year has elapsed, so it is too early to determine whether Democrats will “lose one of California or New York” (via losing the governorship or a durable statewide majority) within that full time frame. Because the deadline has not yet passed, the prediction cannot be evaluated for accuracy at this point.

The prediction claims that, following the 2024 defeat, Democrats will continue and intensify a strategic shift to the political center "over the coming election cycles." That’s both directional (more centrist) and temporal (multiple election cycles), so by November 2025 we are only in the very early part of the forecast window.

Evidence is mixed and still evolving:

• Institutionally, House moderates have gained ground. The New Democrat Coalition (a centrist/center‑left caucus) now comprises over half of House Democrats and is the party’s largest ideological bloc, suggesting at least some organizational pull toward the center. (en.wikipedia.org)
• That caucus has pushed explicitly centrist policy frames, e.g., a 2025 immigration framework that emphasizes stronger border enforcement and deportations alongside expanded legal pathways, marketed as a pragmatic middle ground aimed at 2026 swing‑district voters. (newdemocratcoalition.house.gov)
• Outside groups like WelcomePAC and allied strategists (Axelrod, Plouffe, Carville) are publicly urging Democrats to moderate positions on immigration, crime, and cultural issues and to refocus on bread‑and‑butter economics—clear advocacy for a centrist realignment, but not proof that the whole party has already adopted it. (politico.com)
• At the same time, there are strong counter‑currents: progressive energy and anger after Trump’s reelection, calls for more aggressive left‑populist leadership, and phenomena like “Dark Woke,” which explicitly push more confrontational progressive messaging rather than a pivot to the center. (theguardian.com)
• In high‑profile local politics, figures identified with democratic socialism, such as Zohran Mamdani winning the 2025 New York City Democratic mayoral primary, indicate that in some blue constituencies the party is not obviously moving toward the center in its standard‑bearers or rhetoric. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The DNC’s official “autopsy” of the 2024 loss is still being slow‑walked into late 2025, and internal debates over direction remain unresolved, which underlines that there is no fully settled, party‑wide strategic line yet. (washingtonpost.com)

Because:

1. The prediction explicitly concerns "coming election cycles" (plural), which clearly extends beyond 2025 (at least through the 2026 midterms, and likely to 2028), and
2. Current evidence shows an internal tug‑of‑war rather than a clearly consolidated, intensified centrist strategy across the Democratic Party as a whole,

it is too early to say whether the prediction is definitively right or wrong. The trajectory could still break decisively either toward a sustained centrist pivot or toward a more combative progressive direction as later cycles unfold.

Available reporting indicates that after Donald Trump’s 2024 victory, there were no Capitol-style riots or similar large-scale violent protests over the election result involving mobs attacking police.

Key points:

• Donald Trump did win the 2024 U.S. presidential election over Kamala Harris, so the scenario Jason was talking about (a clear Trump victory) did occur. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The January 6, 2025 joint session of Congress to certify the 2024 electoral votes proceeded in an orderly, peaceful manner. Associated Press explicitly contrasted it with 2021, noting that Congress certified Trump’s win “without the Jan. 6 mob violence of four years ago,” and that there were no objections and no disruption. (apnews.com)
• Analyses of the fourth anniversary of Jan. 6 likewise reported that Capitol proceedings on January 6, 2025 “proceeded without incident”, underscoring the absence of a repeat of the 2021-style attack or mass assaults on police in connection with the 2024 result. (politico.com)
• Large post-election or post-inauguration opposition events—such as the People’s March in Washington on January 18, 2025, organized by Women’s March and allied groups—were sizable but described as largely peaceful, with only minor scuffles (e.g., a Trump supporter briefly interrupting the march and being removed by police), not riots or mass attacks on law enforcement. (en.wikipedia.org)
• There was political violence in the broader period (assassination attempts on Trump, isolated shootings and murders linked to election-related arguments), but these were individual criminal incidents, not "Capitol-style" riots or mass protests beating police officers over the 2024 result. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Major violent protests and riots during Trump’s second term—for example, the June–July 2025 Los Angeles protests against mass deportations, which involved arson, looting, and clashes with LAPD and federal agents—were tied to immigration and deportation policies, not to disputing the 2024 election outcome itself. (en.wikipedia.org)

Given that (a) the election certification and inauguration period passed without a Jan. 6-style mob attack on the Capitol or similar mass assault on police over the result, and (b) subsequent large-scale violent protests were about policy rather than overturning the 2024 election, Jason’s prediction that “we're not going to have riots at the Capitol and people beating up police officers” in the wake of Trump’s 2024 victory matches what actually happened.

Authoritative post‑election tallies for the 2024 U.S. Senate elections show Republicans ending with 53 Senate seats, not 54. The official 2024 Senate elections summary lists the post‑election composition as 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 2 Independents, with the Independents caucusing with Democrats, yielding a 53–47 functional split in favor of Republicans.(en.wikipedia.org)(congress.gov)(everycrsreport.com) Independent roundups (e.g., CBS News and other national outlets) likewise describe GOP control as a 53‑seat majority, not 54.(cbsnews.com)(grokipedia.com)

Moreover, Congressional Research Service profiles of the 119th Congress confirm that the Senate has 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 2 Independents who both caucus with the Democrats; there is no indication of any party switch or GOP‑caucusing independent that would have taken the Republican caucus to 54 at any point during that period.(congress.gov)(senate.gov)

Since the predictor said the final counts in the remaining undecided races would bring the Republican caucus to 54 seats within about a week of November 8, 2024, and the caucus in practice stabilized at 53, the prediction did not come true.

The prediction was that with a 53–54 seat Republican majority in the U.S. Senate, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. would be able to secure confirmation to a major cabinet-level position in the incoming Trump administration.

Relevant facts:

1. Republicans ended up with a 53-seat majority in the Senate for the 119th Congress. After the 2024 U.S. Senate elections, Republicans held 53 seats (Democrats 45, Independents 2), giving them a 53–47 majority. (en.wikipedia.org)
2. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. holds a major cabinet-level post in the Trump administration. He has served as the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services under President Donald Trump since February 13, 2025. This is a cabinet-level position. (en.wikipedia.org)
3. He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in that role. Multiple reports and his biography describe that the Senate confirmed him as HHS Secretary on February 13, 2025, following a full Senate vote. (en.wikipedia.org)

Putting this together:

• The condition described (a 53–54 seat Republican majority) did occur (Republicans have 53 seats).
• Under that majority, RFK Jr. was confirmed to a major cabinet-level position (Secretary of Health and Human Services) in the Trump administration.

Therefore, the prediction that such a majority would allow RFK Jr. to secure confirmation to a major cabinet post in the Trump administration came true.

Donald Trump’s second term began with his inauguration on January 20, 2025, and there was no peace treaty or formal end to the Russia‑Ukraine war on that day or in the weeks immediately following; instead, the war continued and only later did talks about a temporary ceasefire emerge. (en.wikipedia.org) Reporting on Trump’s early Ukraine diplomacy notes that his promised 24‑hour resolution did not occur and that an initial U.S. proposal tied to aid and economic arrangements went unsigned by Kyiv because Zelenskyy judged it unacceptable and said he could not “sell Ukraine away,” indicating a refusal to accept the demanded terms. (en.wikipedia.org) Throughout early and mid‑2025, Zelenskyy repeatedly and publicly ruled out territorial concessions as the price of peace or a ceasefire, stating that Ukraine would not recognize occupied land as Russian and would not give up territory under any circumstances. (eadaily.com) As of late 2025, Ukrainian officials still insist they will not cede territory even though draft peace plans from the U.S. and Russia explicitly require Ukraine to surrender land, underscoring that Kyiv has not been willing to make the key concessions Trump and Moscow have sought. (theguardian.com) While Russia’s own maximalist demands are also a major obstacle, the specific claim that Trump could not end the war on “day one” because Ukraine was not yet prepared to make the concessions his kind of deal would require is well supported by the subsequent record, so the prediction is best judged as right.

As of November 30, 2025, Donald Trump has not begun a new presidential term, because he did not win the 2024 U.S. presidential election; therefore, the condition "During Trump’s upcoming term" has not been triggered.

Since the prediction is explicitly about what Congress will or will not do during a future Trump term, and that term has not occurred, we cannot yet evaluate whether Congress enacts $2 trillion in federal spending cuts in such a term.

Accordingly, the correct classification is inconclusive (too early): the scenario the prediction is about has not taken place, so the prediction cannot be judged right or wrong.

Trump did win in 2024 and began a second term on January 20, 2025, so the context for Chamath’s prediction is in place.

So far, there have been some notable, administration-led transparency moves:

• Assassination records declassification: Trump signed Executive Order 14176 on January 23, 2025, ordering declassification of JFK, RFK, and MLK assassination files. Tens of thousands of pages were released by the National Archives in March–July 2025, described as a significant disclosure of long‑withheld intelligence and law‑enforcement records.
• Epstein Files Transparency Act: In November 2025, Trump signed a bipartisan law requiring DOJ to make all unclassified Jeffrey Epstein–related records public in a searchable, downloadable form within 30 days and to give Congress an unredacted list of officials and politically exposed persons named in those files. DOJ is now in court seeking to unseal previously protected grand‑jury materials under that mandate.

Those steps clearly move in a transparency direction on highly sensitive subjects and involve large document dumps of internal government records. That is partly in the spirit of what Chamath described.

However, there are important caveats:

• The Epstein law was driven mainly by Congress, over initial resistance from Trump and his team, who lobbied Republicans to block it before ultimately acquiescing and signing once overwhelming majorities forced the issue. That weakens the claim that it reflects a Trump‑led push.
• Trump did sign EO 14149, “Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship,” which orders an investigation of past government “censorship” activities, but so far there is no evidence of a broad, Twitter‑Files‑style public release of internal emails or chats arising from that order. Searches for any such “censorship files” or similar initiative turn up nothing beyond the EO itself and commentary on it.
• At the same time, parts of the administration are moving against transparency: the Pentagon has imposed unprecedented restrictions requiring reporters not to publish even unclassified information without prior approval, a new White House‑linked “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE) was deliberately structured to dodge FOIA until a judge ordered it to release records, and the Defense Department has been deleting DEI‑related historical content from its public sites under Trump’s DEI‑rollback order. These trends run counter to a general “radical push to transparency.”

Crucially for Chamath’s specific image of “a version of the Twitter files for the government,” there is, as of November 30, 2025, no clearly documented, administration‑orchestrated mass release of contemporary internal government communications (emails, chats, etc.) analogous to the original Twitter Files project. The large releases we do see are mostly historic archival records (JFK/RFK/MLK, and soon Epstein) rather than a systematic, contemporaneous exposé of present‑day government operations.

Since Trump’s term runs through January 2029, there is still ample time for such a Twitter‑Files‑style disclosure effort to occur, or for a broader, more consistent transparency agenda to emerge. Based on available evidence up to November 30, 2025, the prediction is neither clearly fulfilled nor clearly falsified: we see partial alignment (notable document‑dump transparency moves) but also strong counter‑evidence (secrecy and control in other domains, and no clear Twitter‑Files‑equivalent yet).

Given that the key elements could still materialize later in the term, the fairest classification at this point is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than “right” or “wrong.”

Trump did win the 2024 election and began his second (non‑consecutive) term on January 20, 2025, so the prediction’s time window (his “upcoming term”) runs from January 20, 2025 until January 20, 2029 and is still ongoing as of November 30, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org)

On the JFK files: Trump signed Executive Order 14176 on January 23, 2025 directing declassification of JFK, RFK, and MLK assassination records. A large tranche of JFK records (over 60,000 documents / 77,000+ pages) was released in March 2025, significantly expanding public access to the files. (en.wikipedia.org) However, reporting indicates at least some historically noted material (e.g., a Mexican government report allegedly blaming Cuba) still has not surfaced publicly, so even here it is debatable whether all “JFK files” are truly public. (washingtonpost.com)

On the Epstein files and “dirty lists”: In November 2025 Trump signed the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which requires the DOJ to release all unclassified Epstein‑related DOJ records in a public, searchable format and to give Congress an unredacted list of all government officials and politically exposed persons named in those files. The law sets a 30‑day deadline from signature, implying a target around December 19, 2025 for the public release. (en.wikipedia.org) As of November 30, 2025, news coverage still describes these releases as upcoming or in process, not completed; the full set of DOJ files and any comprehensive official “dirty list” have not yet been made public.

Because:

• Trump’s term still has more than three years remaining, and
• the core parts of the prediction about Epstein‑related files and associated lists hinge on actions that are legally mandated but not yet carried out as of the evaluation date,

it is too early to determine whether Chamath’s prediction will ultimately be correct. Some steps (notably on JFK records) have moved in the direction he described, but the key conjunctive claim—that during this term we will “see the Epstein files,” “the dirty lists,” and “the JFK files”—cannot yet be judged fulfilled or disproven. Hence the status is best classified as inconclusive (too early to tell).

Evidence from the first year of Trump’s second term shows a deliberate, multi-front push to declassify and release previously non‑public federal information, especially in the early months, which broadly matches Chamath’s prediction about “phase one.”

Key points:

• Early executive order focused on declassification: On January 23, 2025, just three days into his second term, Trump signed Executive Order 14176 directing the declassification of remaining records related to the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Large volumes of previously withheld records released online: Following that order, the National Archives released about 77,000 pages of assassination-related records between March 18–20, 2025, making them accessible via a centralized public webpage; officials and allies described this as a “new era of maximum transparency.”(en.wikipedia.org)
• Ongoing declassification/transparency push in the intelligence community: Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard set up the Director’s Initiatives Group to review documents for declassification, dismantle politicization, and increase transparency across the intelligence community, explicitly framed as carrying out Trump’s transparency-focused executive orders.(dni.gov)
• Broader set of disclosure initiatives (Epstein, etc.): The administration publicly committed to declassifying files on Jeffrey Epstein, 9/11, COVID‑19 origins, and UFOs; this was followed by the bipartisan Epstein Files Transparency Act, passed almost unanimously in Congress and signed by Trump on November 19, 2025, requiring DOJ to release all unclassified Epstein-related records within 30 days.(thetimes.co.uk)
• Additional declassified analytic products: A declassified CIA assessment on COVID‑19’s origins was released under Trump’s CIA director (implementing an earlier law but executed as part of the broader transparency framing), further adding to the volume of previously non-public intelligence material made public.(apnews.com)

At the same time, there has been an aggressive removal and suppression of other federal data and web resources—over 8,000 webpages and about 3,000 datasets (often on DEI, gender, public health, and climate) were taken down or altered after Trump’s early 2025 executive orders, which clearly cuts the other way on overall openness.(en.wikipedia.org) This means the reality is mixed and falls short of the “Twitter files for the whole federal government” vision Chamath described.(podcasts.happyscribe.com)

However, judged narrowly against the specific normalized prediction—that the initial phase of the new Trump administration would feature a broad declassification/data‑release drive making large amounts of previously non‑public federal information openly accessible—the substantial, early, and ongoing declassification and document‑release campaign around assassinations, intelligence products, and Epstein does fit that description. Hence the prediction is best scored as right, while noting that it coexists with major efforts to restrict access to other categories of government information.

Available evidence shows no government‑wide "massive declassification effort" under Trump’s second administration that substantially reduces the overall volume of classified federal documents.

What has happened:

• Targeted assassination‑records declassification. Executive Order 14176 (Jan. 23, 2025) orders declassification of records related to the assassinations of JFK, RFK, and MLK, with implementation plans led by the DNI. This is significant but narrowly focused on three historical cases, not a system‑wide program. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Specific large document releases. Following EO 14176, the administration released over 10,000 pages of RFK‑assassination documents, again important but confined to one topic. (nypost.com)
• Issue‑specific transparency laws. The Epstein Files Transparency Act (Nov. 19, 2025) requires the DOJ to release all unclassified records related to Jeffrey Epstein; it does not itself overhaul or substantially shrink the classified universe, and applies only to one case. (en.wikipedia.org)

What has not happened:

• No new overarching classification/declassification order. The general national‑security classification framework continues to be governed by earlier Executive Order 13526 and its declassification rules (e.g., 25‑year automatic declassification), with no Trump‑era replacement or major amendment establishing a broad mass‑declassification program. (archives.gov)
• No evidence of a cross‑agency "large‑scale" declassification initiative. Reviews of the catalog of Trump’s second‑term executive orders show actions on DEI programs, censorship, WHO withdrawal, climate agreements, digital assets, DOGE, etc., but nothing creating a government‑wide drive to systematically declassify large swaths of classified holdings across agencies. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the prediction specifically called for a **"massive" or "large‑scale" declassification program that substantially reduces the volume of classified documents across the federal government, and what we see instead are narrow, topic‑specific releases and one‑off transparency measures, the prediction is best evaluated as wrong rather than partially fulfilled.

Sacks predicted that a core, outcome-defining question of Trump’s second term would be whether he could curb the autonomy of the federal bureaucracy and bring agencies under tighter presidential control. That is exactly how the second Trump administration has been widely characterized so far.

Trump has made implementation of the Project 2025 vision to “dismantle the administrative state” and centralize control of agencies in the White House a central tenet of his second term, according to detailed reporting and analysis.(en.wikipedia.org) On taking office in January 2025, he immediately reinstated and expanded Schedule F–style classifications (now “Schedule Policy/Career”), making tens of thousands of policy‑influencing civil servants easier to remove and more directly answerable to presidential directives.(theguardian.com) He also created the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) under Elon Musk to drive layoffs and restructuring across agencies, leading to roughly 200,000–300,000 federal employees being fired or pushed out in 2025 alone, an effort commentators describe as an unprecedented attempt to reshape the civil service and concentrate executive power.(en.wikipedia.org)

Additional executive orders have aimed to bring independent regulators under White House control and to “commence the deconstruction of the overbearing and burdensome administrative state,” explicitly framing bureaucratic restructuring as a top presidential priority.(politico.com) Major outlets and scholars now treat the struggle over the administrative state—reclassifications, mass layoffs, union rollbacks, and litigation over agency independence—as one of the defining battles of Trump’s second term, not a side issue.(millercenter.org)

Because this fight over reducing bureaucratic autonomy and increasing direct presidential control has, by late 2025, become a central organizing theme of Trump’s governance and a major determinant of his administration’s trajectory, Sacks’s prediction about what would be a key, outcome‑shaping issue of the term is borne out by events to date.

The prediction describes a roughly 20‑year era starting in the early–mid 2020s that, in hindsight, will be seen as a systemic “return to originalism” in U.S. policy and jurisprudence. As of today (November 30, 2025), only a few years of that window have elapsed, so we cannot yet assess how the entire 20‑year span will look in retrospect.

Current evidence does show that originalism remains highly influential on the Supreme Court and in legal scholarship – for example, ongoing debates about originalist methods and precedent, and analysis of recent major decisions that rely on originalist reasoning. (harvardlawreview.org) But those facts only establish that originalism is important now, not that the next two decades of American governance will, on net, be remembered as an overarching “return to originalism.”

Because:

1. The prediction is explicitly about a multi‑decade historical judgment (“we’re going to look back on this era… about 20 years or so”), and
2. We are only ~1–5 years into the asserted time frame,

there is not yet enough elapsed time or hindsight to determine whether the United States will, overall, fit Chamath’s long‑range characterization.

Therefore the status of the prediction is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Chamath’s prediction on the Nov. 8, 2024 All-In episode was not just that he wanted David Sacks to be governor of California, but that he would convince Sacks within two years to do it ("within two years I will have convinced him to do it").(happyscribe.com)

As of the current date (Nov. 30, 2025), public records of the 2026 California gubernatorial race list numerous declared candidates, but David Sacks is not among them.(en.wikipedia.org) Instead, Sacks is serving in a federal role as the White House AI and Crypto Czar and co‑chair of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology in the Trump administration, not preparing a gubernatorial campaign.(en.wikipedia.org)

However, the two‑year window Chamath himself referenced runs until roughly November 2026, and it is still at least theoretically possible that Sacks could be persuaded to run for governor (whether in the 2026 race via a late entry or in a later cycle). Because that self‑imposed deadline has not yet passed and there is no definitive evidence that such persuasion is impossible, the prediction cannot yet be judged as either fulfilled or failed.

Given the available evidence and remaining time window, the status of this prediction is too early to call.

The prediction window is “within two years” of the November 8, 2024 recording, i.e., by roughly November 8, 2026. As of November 30, 2025, that deadline has not yet arrived, so the prediction cannot be finally judged.

Available reporting and biographical sources describe David Sacks as serving as Trump’s White House AI and cryptocurrency czar and as co‑chair/chair of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology; they do not report him announcing or running a campaign for governor of California, nor do they say he has decided to run. (en.wikipedia.org) Some coverage even notes that Sacks has publicly stated he has no intention of running for public office, but that is about his stated intent, not whether Chamath might yet “convince” him by late 2026. (panewslab.com)

Because:

• The prediction’s deadline (Nov 2026) is still in the future; and
• Whether Sacks has been internally convinced to run is not fully observable from public records,

the most appropriate status as of Nov 30, 2025 is: inconclusive (too early to tell).

The prediction explicitly covers "the next few years" after the November 2024 election, i.e., roughly through 2028. As of November 30, 2025, only about one year has elapsed, and U.S. party platforms for 2026–2028 (including the 2028 Democratic platform) have not yet fully formed, been adopted, and played out in national elections.

While commentators do debate whether Democrats are moving left, right, or tacking to the center in response to Donald Trump’s 2024 victory, these are early, contested interpretations—not settled outcomes. The Democratic Party’s official 2028 platform does not exist yet, and any durable strategic repositioning toward the center (or away from it) can’t be conclusively assessed this far ahead of the prediction’s own deadline.

Because the prediction’s timeframe ("by around 2028") has not yet expired, there is not enough information to say it was right or wrong.

The prediction is explicitly about a long-term trend: starting with the 2024 election and playing out "over subsequent election cycles," abortion supposedly becomes progressively less salient as a national wedge issue. As of 30 Nov 2025, there has not yet been another federal election cycle (e.g., the 2026 midterms or the 2028 presidential) to test whether the issue’s salience is actually declining over time. We only have partial indicators (polling, legislative fights, and 2025 state-level developments), which still show abortion as a prominent and mobilizing issue in U.S. politics, but that does not yet falsify or confirm a multi‑cycle decline in salience. Because the claim is about a trend across multiple future cycles, and we are still within the first cycle after the prediction, it is too early to determine whether it will prove correct or not. Therefore the status has to be marked as inconclusive (too early).

Evidence since the 2024 election shows that while top Republicans have de‑emphasized a formal national abortion ban, they have actively pursued significant federal abortion restrictions, contradicting the prediction that they would “know not to touch this” and leave the issue primarily to the states.

On the “national ban” side, the 2024 Republican National Committee platform—crafted with Trump’s backing—dropped its longstanding call for a federal abortion ban and instead framed abortion as an issue for the states, a notable shift after four decades of federal-ban language.​ (axios.com) Trump and his running mate JD Vance repeatedly said during and after the 2024 campaign that abortion policy should be left to the states, distancing the ticket from a one‑size‑fits‑all national ban.​ (politifact.com) There has also been no new, leadership-driven 15‑week national ban enacted in the 119th Congress, even though some Republicans and the Republican Study Committee continue to signal interest in that kind of bill.​ (ncregister.com) This partially aligns with the prediction’s claim about avoiding a national ban.

However, GOP leaders have very much “touched” abortion at the federal level through major nationwide restrictions, especially via funding and insurance rules:

• In January 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14182, “Enforcing the Hyde Amendment,” which ended federal funding for elective abortions, revoked Biden-era orders expanding access to abortion-related care, and directed federal agencies to implement stricter anti-abortion funding policies nationwide.​ (en.wikipedia.org)
• The large GOP “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” budget/tax package that passed the House in May 2025 includes a provision to stop federal payments to Affordable Care Act plans that cover abortions except in limited cases (rape, incest, life of the mother), a sweeping national restriction on abortion coverage tied to federal subsidies.​ (en.wikipedia.org)
• Ongoing negotiations over extending ACA premium subsidies in late 2025 have been nearly derailed because congressional Republicans are demanding tighter abortion restrictions on all subsidized insurance plans, going beyond current Hyde rules; Democrats and reporters describe these abortion demands as the main sticking point in the deal.​ (washingtonpost.com)
• House Republicans also reintroduced measures like the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act, a federal criminal law governing care in the context of abortions, backed by well over 100 GOP cosponsors and party leadership.​ (en.wikipedia.org)

Because national Republican leaders have, post‑2024, made federal abortion policy a live issue—pursuing broad, nationwide restrictions via executive action and major legislation, and using abortion rules as leverage in core budget and health-care negotiations—the claim that the issue is “over” and that Republicans would largely avoid federal abortion restrictions has not held up. The absence of a new enacted national gestational ban does not offset the substantial federal restrictions they have actively sought and, in some cases, implemented, so the prediction is best judged wrong overall.

As of November 30, 2025, Florida has held only one recent statewide abortion-rights referendum: the November 5, 2024 Amendment 4 measure, which would have allowed abortion until fetal viability (around 23–24 weeks) and received about 57% support—below the 60% supermajority required for passage. (en.wikipedia.org) This measure concerned viability/24 weeks, not a 15‑week limit.

Available reporting on Florida’s abortion law and ballot measures shows no subsequent statewide initiative that offers a 15‑week abortion limit as a compromise proposal; instead, the legislature has moved to further restrict the citizen‑initiative process after the near‑pass of Amendment 4, making future amendments harder to qualify for the ballot. (en.wikipedia.org) Because the specific contingency Sacks described—“if they went back with a 15‑week proposal in a future referendum”—has not actually occurred, there is no real‑world result against which to test his claim that such a measure would likely clear 60%. The prediction therefore cannot yet be evaluated for correctness.

Available post‑Dobbs data show that states with near‑total abortion bans have experienced measurable net out‑migration that economists directly attribute to those bans. An NBER study summarized by Econofact and CBS finds that, in the year after implementation, the 13 total‑ban states lost about 4.3 people per 10,000 residents specifically because of the bans, totaling roughly 128,700 additional net out‑migrants, with the effect growing to about 36,000 residents per quarter and projected to reach about a 1% population loss over five years if sustained. (econofact.org) These effects are strongest for single‑person households, indicating that younger adults are disproportionately the ones leaving, which aligns with coverage noting tens of thousands of young, largely single people moving out of ban states. (them.us) That satisfies the “noticeable out‑migration … attributable in part to those bans” portion of the prediction.

There is also evidence that these bans are hurting states’ ability to attract and retain workers. Survey research from the University of Houston shows most people—especially liberals and moderates—are reluctant to move to states with abortion bans; for example, 82.3% of liberals and 41.6% of moderates reported aversion to relocating to such states. (uh.edu) A 2025 Forbes analysis reports that employers in ban states face growing talent shortages: states with bans are losing an estimated 36,000 residents per quarter, and among people with postgraduate education, 13% reported moving because of abortion restrictions and 14% said they’d applied for an out‑of‑state job or knew someone who had, with more than 60% of 18–25‑year‑olds saying they would probably or definitely not live in a state that bans abortion. (forbes.com) Additional coverage of the same NBER work emphasizes that these outflows are concentrated among younger, potentially more educated workers, raising concerns about economic impacts and labor supply in ban states. (them.us)

While the absolute population losses so far are modest relative to total state populations and rely on statistical attribution, the evidence by late 2025 clearly supports Jason’s qualitative claim: abortion‑ban states are seeing detectable out‑migration linked to the bans, and these laws are making it harder for those states to attract and retain workers.