E12: Biden wins, Pfizer vaccine, markets rip, Trump's next act, COVID endgame scenarios & more

The prediction was that (1) the Trump campaign’s post‑election 2020 legal challenges would almost all fail, and (2) Joe Biden would in fact take office as the next U.S. president on Inauguration Day 2021.

1. Outcome of Trump’s post‑election lawsuits
   After the 2020 election, Trump’s campaign and allies filed 62 lawsuits in multiple states challenging election procedures, vote counting, and certification. Nearly all of these suits were dismissed or dropped for lack of evidence or standing; only a single narrow ruling in Pennsylvania, about the deadline for first‑time voters to provide ID to cure their ballots, initially went in Trump’s favor and did not affect the overall result. (en.wikipedia.org) This matches Sacks’s claim that the legal challenges were “very, very unlikely” to prevail and that they would overwhelmingly fail.

2. Whether Joe Biden became president on Inauguration Day 2021
   Joe Biden was inaugurated as the 46th president of the United States on January 20, 2021, and his presidency ran from January 20, 2021, to January 20, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) That is exactly the Inauguration Day and office‑taking Sacks was forecasting.

Because the lawsuits did indeed almost all fail and Biden did take office on January 20, 2021, the prediction is right.

Evidence clearly supports parts of the prediction but not the whole normalized version.

1. Did Trump, by the 2024 cycle, publicly and repeatedly claim the 2020 election was stolen/rigged? Yes. After the 2020 election Trump repeatedly asserted that it was "rigged" or "stolen," and he never stopped. A tally of his false statements during the transition period shows dozens of uses of "rigged" and "stolen," and later reporting notes that he continued to insist the 2020 election was stolen in subsequent years. 【9search29】 The article on attempts to overturn the 2020 election likewise notes that he kept claiming massive fraud, saying it was the "crime of the century" and asserting "I say I won the election" into 2022 and beyond. 【9search28】 FactCheck.org’s review of his January 20, 2025 inaugural remarks records him again calling 2020 "totally rigged." 【1search3】 PolitiFact describes him as running in 2024 "on the myth that he won in 2020," quoting him in a June 2023 Fox News interview saying, "First of all, I won in 2020 by a lot." 【1search4】 PBS and PolitiFact coverage of his 2024 win likewise emphasize that the "Big Lie" about a stolen 2020 election remained central to his politics. 【0search1】 Taken together, this clearly satisfies the stolen/rigged-election portion of the prediction.

2. Did he tie this to the timing of COVID‑19 vaccine announcements? Immediately after Pfizer’s November 9, 2020 announcement that its COVID‑19 vaccine appeared more than 90% effective, Trump claimed without evidence that Pfizer and the FDA waited until after the election for political reasons. In tweets on November 9–10 he wrote that Pfizer and others would "only announce a Vaccine after the Election" and that "the @US_FDA and the Democrats didn’t want to have me get a Vaccine WIN, prior to the election, so instead it came out five days later.” 【4view0】【10search2】 FactCheck.org and AP both document these claims in detail. 【4view0】【5view0】 A related AP fact check quotes another tweet where he warned of "MASSIVE BALLOT COUNTING ABUSE" and added, "just like the early vaccine, remember I told you so!" explicitly pairing his vaccine-timing grievance with his election-fraud narrative. 【5view0】 The Washington Post reported that these accusations against FDA and Pfizer were seen inside the administration as likely to "fuel baseless conspiracy theories that the election was stolen from Trump." 【10search0】

So, in late 2020, Trump clearly did what Sacks anticipated in spirit: he used the post‑election Pfizer timing as part of a broader story that the system was conspiring against him and that the election was illegitimate.

3. Was that vaccine‑timing argument a repeated talking point around the 2024 election cycle? Here the evidence is much weaker. Coverage of Trump’s 2023–24 campaign and his broader rhetoric emphasizes his claims about mail-in ballots, voting machines, and generalized fraud, not repeated references to Pfizer’s November 2020 announcement as a core justification for saying the election was stolen. 【9search28】【0search1】【1search4】

The Pfizer-timing allegation itself has persisted within his political orbit: in 2025, the House Judiciary Committee (run by Trump allies) subpoenaed former Pfizer vaccine chief Philip Dormitzer to investigate whether Pfizer delayed trial results until after the 2020 election, explicitly framing the issue as possible election interference. 【8view0】【3news5】 That shows the suspicion remained politically salient, but news reports do not clearly document Trump personally and repeatedly using vaccine timing as a standard part of his 2024 stolen-election narrative the way he invoked other fraud claims.

4. Overall assessment

• Clearly true: By and during the 2024 election cycle, Trump was publicly and repeatedly claiming that the 2020 election was rigged/stolen, and this claim was central to his 2024 campaign and subsequent presidency. 【9search28】【1search3】【1search4】
• Clearly true (but earlier in time): In November 2020 he explicitly alleged that Pfizer and the FDA timed vaccine news to hurt his reelection chances, and he linked this "early vaccine" grievance to impending "massive ballot counting abuse," tying vaccine timing into his broader narrative of being cheated. 【5view0】【10search0】
• Not clearly supported: That, specifically around the 2024 election cycle, he "publicly and repeatedly" invoked the vaccine timing as a key justification for his stolen-election claims. Available reporting on his 2024 rhetoric does not highlight this as a recurring theme. 【9search28】【0search1】

Because one part of the normalized prediction (repeated stolen-election claims) is strongly borne out while the other part (their being tied, repeatedly and specifically in the 2024 cycle, to vaccine announcement timing) is not well documented, the fairest overall judgment is "ambiguous" rather than fully right or fully wrong.

On the specific, testable parts of Friedberg’s prediction, U.S. society largely reverted to pre‑2020 norms within a couple of years of vaccines and cheap testing becoming widely available.

1. Large venues: masks and temperature checks

• By early–mid 2022, nearly all state and local general indoor mask mandates had been lifted, including for businesses and sports/entertainment venues; remaining requirements were mostly limited to healthcare, long‑term care, and a few specialized settings.(aarp.org)
• Washington, D.C., for example, explicitly ended its mask mandate for businesses, retail, gyms, restaurants, bars, and sports and entertainment venues as of March 1, 2022.(justia.com) This is inconsistent with the idea that such venues would keep mask requirements in place “permanently” or for many years after vaccines.
• High‑profile attractions that had used temperature checks (e.g., Walt Disney World) ended these screenings in May–June 2021, well before 2022, and did not reintroduce them as a standing policy.(blogmickey.com) Local examples from school and community sports by 2021 already show football games dropping temperature checks and other entry restrictions.(abc13.com) By 2025, routine temperature checks at big events are rare rather than a persistent norm.

2. K‑12 schools: routine COVID testing

• In August 2022, the CDC updated its K‑12 operational guidance and stated that it no longer recommended routine screening testing in schools, suggesting instead that screening be limited to higher‑risk activities or times of elevated transmission.(chalkbeat.org) This is the opposite of making regular testing a permanent, routine feature of schooling.
• Pediatric and school‑health groups (e.g., CHOP’s PolicyLab) similarly advised that weekly or routine testing was “no longer a necessary routine practice,” recommending only voluntary or targeted testing.(inquirer.com)
• Many large school testing programs were wound down entirely. Shield Illinois, a major state K‑12 testing initiative, performed its last SARS‑CoV‑2 assay on June 30, 2023.(en.wikipedia.org) District‑level guidance for 2023–24 (e.g., Douglas County School District in Colorado) explicitly treats COVID like a routine illness and states that staff will not require testing for students or staff to return after illness, nor monitor test or vaccination status.(dcsdk12.org)

3. Overall societal trajectory

• By 2023–25, COVID‑19 is generally managed as an endemic respiratory illness: federal programs for universal free home tests have been ended or scaled back, and most institutions operate without special entry screening or routine testing.(govfacts.org) While a few lasting changes remain (e.g., some masking in healthcare settings, more attention to ventilation), the specific scenarios Friedberg emphasized—temperature checks and mask requirements as ongoing norms at large venues, and routine testing of K‑12 students—did not become permanent or long‑term standard practice.

Because these concrete elements of the prediction are broadly contradicted by actual U.S. policy and behavior by 2022–2025, the forecast is best classified as wrong.

Chamath argued in November 2020 that the U.S. would not get back to more than roughly 80% of pre‑COVID social and economic normality until sometime in 2022 (maybe 2023), largely because scaling vaccine production and distribution would take that long.

However, multiple indicators show the U.S. was already above that ~80% threshold by mid– to late‑2021, well before 2022:

• Economic activity: Real U.S. GDP had already returned to and surpassed its pre‑pandemic level by Q2 2021, according to Brookings’ analysis of BEA data. (brookings.edu) Full‑year 2021 GDP growth was 5.7%, the fastest since the 1980s and a sharp rebound from 2020. (thenationalnews.com) While the labor market wasn’t perfectly restored, BLS data show unemployment averaging 4.2% in Q4 2021 (vs. 3.5% in late 2019) and employment still a few million jobs short—but clearly well past 80% of the way back. (bls.gov)

• Mobility and social behavior: Google Community Mobility–based analyses show retail and recreation mobility in the U.S. had returned to around baseline by April 2021, and transit‑station mobility was back near baseline by July 2021. Workplaces remained about 20% below baseline through early 2022, but with retail, recreation, grocery/pharmacy, and transit at or near 100%, the overall mix of social and economic activity was well above 80% of pre‑COVID norms by mid‑2021. (pcghealthpolicy.com) Air‑travel volumes tell a similar story: by summer 2021 TSA checkpoint counts were routinely around 2 million passengers per day, only ~20–25% below 2019 levels. (statista.com)

• Vaccination and lifting of restrictions: Vaccine rollout was far faster than implied in the prediction. By August 2, 2021, 70% of U.S. adults had received at least one dose of a COVID‑19 vaccine, and about half the total population was fully vaccinated. (cnbc.com) On May 13, 2021, the CDC said fully vaccinated people could resume most indoor and outdoor activities without masks or distancing in non‑health‑care settings, essentially telling them they could return to pre‑pandemic behaviors except where local rules still applied. (hoganlovells.com) Many states lifted most business capacity limits and mask mandates during spring–summer 2021, enabling near‑normal social and commercial life in large parts of the country. (hr.dickinson-wright.com)

While some sectors (e.g., offices in big cities, some international travel, certain hospitality niches) and specific metrics lagged into 2022, the overall combination of GDP, employment, mobility, travel, and daily social activity in the U.S. had clearly surpassed an 80% recovery level months before 2022 began. That contradicts his timeline that such a level of normality would not be reached until 2022 or later.

Conclusion: Because the U.S. crossed a reasonable “80% of normal” threshold for both economic output and everyday social activity by mid– to late‑2021, Chamath’s prediction that this would not happen until 2022–2023 was wrong.

Evaluation timeframe

• The prediction was made in November 2020, about conditions "by next summer" (i.e., Northern Hemisphere summer 2021) and the following few months.

1. Was COVID-19 a “distant bad memory” and no longer a major active concern by summer 2021?

• On 15 July 2021, the WHO Emergency Committee explicitly concluded that the COVID‑19 pandemic still constituted a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and advised continuing intensive global response measures. (who.int)
• WHO situation reports from July 2021 show ~3.8 million new cases and ~69,000 deaths in a single week globally, with cases and deaths rising again, driven by variants such as Delta. (who.int)
• In the U.S., the highly transmissible Delta variant became dominant by early July 2021, leading to a major surge in cases; CDC reinstated indoor masking recommendations for vaccinated people by July 27, 2021. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Many regions (e.g., Eastern Mediterranean) were still in community transmission with millions of cumulative cases and hundreds of thousands of deaths as of late July 2021. (emro.who.int)

Given that the disease was surging, emergency status was formally maintained, and new restrictions were being reintroduced, COVID-19 clearly had not become a distant memory or ceased to be a major concern in daily life by summer 2021.

2. Did we just have 1–2 quarters of transition before normalcy?

• International bodies in 2021 were already warning of a “long, uneven and uncertain ascent” and a “Great Divergence” in recovery, not a brief 3–6 month transition back to normal. The IMF’s 2021 analysis projected that over 150 economies would still have per‑capita incomes below 2019 levels in 2021, with substantial output losses persisting through at least 2025. (imf.org)
• Subsequent waves (notably Omicron starting late 2021) and the fact that WHO did not lift the PHEIC designation until May 2023 confirm that the disruptive phase of the pandemic lasted years, not 1–2 quarters. (paho.org)

So the duration and intensity of the pandemic’s impact were significantly underestimated.

3. Did social life snap back with a big partying/dating surge?

• There was a pronounced short‑term rebound in some high‑income, highly vaccinated places, especially in the U.S.:
  • The phrase “Hot Vax Summer” became widely used in 2021 to describe expectations of a surge in dating, partying, and in‑person socializing after vaccination; media and social‑media usage of the term peaked in summer 2021. (covidlexicon.net)
  • Dating apps and nightlife in many U.S. cities saw strong activity as restrictions briefly eased.
• However, this surge was localized and short‑lived, and was followed quickly by renewed concern and restrictions as Delta cases and hospitalizations climbed again in mid‑ to late‑summer 2021. (en.wikipedia.org)

This means the “everyone will want to party” part had some truth in specific contexts, but it did not characterize the whole world or mark an enduring end to COVID‑related worries.

4. Did the global economy “snap back very fast”?

• While there was a rebound in global GDP in 2021, leading institutions emphasized that the recovery was partial, uneven, and scarring:
  • The IMF’s 2021 reports stress that recoveries were “diverging dangerously” across and within countries, with tourism‑dependent and low‑income economies lagging badly and facing long‑lasting damage. (imf.org)
  • The majority of countries were expected to remain below their pre‑pandemic income trajectories for years.

So the idea of a rapid, broad‑based global snap‑back was overly optimistic.

Overall judgment

• Core claims that COVID would be a distant memory by summer 2021 and that only 1–2 quarters of transition would be needed are clearly falsified by the ongoing global emergency status, major new waves, continued restrictions, and prolonged economic and social disruption.
• A narrow sub‑prediction—a temporary surge in partying/dating as vaccines rolled out in some rich countries—was directionally correct, but this does not rescue the overall forecast, which was about the end of COVID as a major concern and a quick, broad return to normal.

Conclusion: the prediction is mostly wrong in its main substance and timing, despite getting one secondary effect (a brief partying rebound) partly right.

Summary of the prediction
Sacks suggested that a few years after 2020, COVID-19 would be so far in the rear‑view mirror that:

1. People would see it as something we were overly afraid of, and
2. They would even question why it caused so much political damage to Trump (i.e., why he lost).

By late 2025, enough time has passed to judge this. The evidence shows parts of the prediction came true (COVID largely normalized for many people) while the hindsight minimization he anticipated is only partial and strongly partisan, and mainstream analysis still treats COVID as a central, legitimate reason for Trump’s loss. Hence the overall call is mixed/ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.

1. Is COVID “in the rear‑view mirror” for many people by the mid‑2020s?

Yes, largely.

• Emergency phase ended and daily life normalized: The U.S. federal COVID‑19 public health emergency and associated flexibilities officially expired on May 11, 2023, marking an end to the formal emergency phase and a shift to treating COVID more like an endemic respiratory illness. (oig.hhs.gov)
• Public concern has dropped sharply: A large Pew survey conducted in October 2024 found that only 21% of Americans see the coronavirus as a major threat to U.S. public health, down from 67% in 2020. A majority (56%) say COVID-19 is now “not something we really need to worry about much,” and just 4% report regularly wearing masks. (pewresearch.org)
• Many think the pandemic phase is over: A 2025 YouGov poll reports that 51% of Americans say COVID-19 is no longer a pandemic; most describe their own infections as mild or moderate. (today.yougov.com)

On this narrow point—COVID as a dominating, day‑to‑day fear—Sacks’ intuition was substantially correct: for much of the public, COVID has moved into the background of ordinary life.

2. Do people now feel “we were too afraid” and that restrictions were excessive?

Partly, but in a strongly partisan and not overwhelming way.

• Enduring sense of seriousness and harm: The same Pew work finds that about three‑quarters of Americans say the pandemic took at least some toll on their lives, and large majorities know someone who was hospitalized or died. 84% in an Axios–Ipsos poll agree COVID has permanently changed their lives. (pewresearch.org)
• Most still see COVID as more serious than a cold/flu: As of late 2024, 56% say COVID-19 is worse than a cold or flu; 40% say it’s no worse. Similarly, 39% say we’re not taking it seriously enough, while 56% say it’s not something we need to worry about much. (pewresearch.org)
  → That is not a dominant consensus that fear was irrational; opinion is split.
• Clear partisan split on whether we overreacted: When asked about past restrictions, 62% of Republicans say there should have been fewer restrictions, versus only 15% of Democrats; most Democrats say rules were about right or should have been stronger. (pewresearch.org)
  → So there are “many people” (especially on the right) who now think the response went too far, but that view is far from universal.

So Sacks was partly right that a sizeable chunk of the population would later see the fear and restrictions as excessive—but that attitude is heavily partisan and counterbalanced by large groups who still regard COVID as a serious disease and think the response was broadly justified.

3. Do people now question why COVID hurt Trump politically / why he lost?

No, mainstream evidence still treats COVID—and his handling of it—as a central, obvious factor in his defeat.

• Academic studies: Peer‑reviewed political science research finds that COVID‑19 significantly reduced Trump’s electoral support, especially where health or economic impacts were salient. One Cambridge University Press article shows that information about the economic downturn and poor public‑health performance during COVID measurably depressed support for Trump. Another study using county‑level data concludes that higher COVID case counts decreased support for Trump and that, under plausible counterfactuals with fewer cases, he likely would have performed better electorally. (cambridge.org)
• Campaign and Republican diagnostics: Trump’s own campaign pollster Tony Fabrizio concluded in a post‑election autopsy that Trump lost largely because voters disapproved of his handling of the pandemic; voters who rated COVID as a top issue broke heavily for Biden. This assessment was echoed in reporting by outlets like The Washington Post and CNN. (washingtonpost.com)
• Ongoing media and political narratives: Retrospective analyses of the 2020 race—from mainstream magazines and 2024 election‑cycle coverage—continue to highlight COVID as the dominant challenge of Trump’s last year in office and a key reason he lost (especially his dismissiveness about the virus as deaths mounted). Biden and his allies still invoke Trump’s pandemic mismanagement in their narratives, indicating that the link between COVID and Trump’s loss remains widely accepted rather than puzzling. (time.com)

While some Trump supporters reject the legitimacy of the 2020 result and blame fraud, that is not the same as widespread confusion over why COVID hurt him. The prevailing scholarly and media consensus remains that the pandemic and his response to it were central, not mysterious, drivers of his defeat.

Overall assessment

• Accurate elements:
  By the mid‑2020s, COVID is no longer an acute, top‑of‑mind fear for most Americans; the emergency phase is over and daily life is largely normalized.

• Inaccurate or only partially realized elements:
  There is no broad, cross‑partisan sense that we were irrationally afraid, nor is there widespread puzzlement about why COVID politically damaged Trump. Many—especially Democrats and independents—still see COVID as a serious disease that justifiably shaped their 2020 vote, and mainstream analysis continues to treat Trump’s pandemic handling as an obvious, primary cause of his loss.

Because one core part of the prediction (normalization) came true while the stronger claim about hindsight minimization of fear and Trump’s loss did not clearly materialize beyond partisan subgroups, the fairest single label is “ambiguous” rather than fully right or wrong.

Burning Man 2021 did not take place as an official in‑person festival in Black Rock City. Organizers announced on April 27, 2021 that the event was canceled for the second year in a row due to COVID‑19 "uncertainties" and redirected efforts toward a 2022 in‑person return and virtual/alternative activities instead.(pbs.org) While thousands reportedly went to the playa for an unofficial, loosely organized “rogue burn,” this was explicitly not an official Burning Man event and therefore could not be the “greatest Burning Man ever” in the sense Jason described.(en.wikipedia.org)

At the same time, the general part of the prediction—that large in‑person festivals would resume by summer 2021—was broadly correct. For example, Lollapalooza returned to Chicago’s Grant Park at full capacity from July 29–August 1, 2021, drawing roughly 385,000 attendees over four days after being canceled in 2020.(chicagomag.com)

Because the prediction was specifically framed around Burning Man 2021 becoming “the greatest Burning Man ever,” and that core event was canceled rather than held at record scale, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, despite being partially right about the broader festival landscape.

Evidence after the January 5, 2021 Georgia runoffs shows that Friedberg’s prediction was essentially correct on both key points:

1. Most expensive Senate runoffs in U.S. history

   • OpenSecrets-based reporting found the Perdue–Ossoff race spent nearly $470 million and the Loeffler–Warnock race nearly $363 million, with both races individually surpassing the previous record for the most expensive Senate race (the 2020 North Carolina Senate race at about $299 million). (newsweek.com)
   • News coverage at the time explicitly described the Georgia runoffs as “the most expensive races in history” or record‑breaking Senate elections, confirming they set a new high-water mark. (newsweek.com)
   • Earlier analyses during the campaign also noted that spending on the runoffs alone had already “smashed” records and made Georgia “Exhibit A” for runaway Senate spending. (thefulcrum.us)
     Together, this confirms his claim that these would be “the biggest funding for a Senate runoff race in history, by far.”

2. Total spending and ad‑spending scale (> $100 million)

   • AdImpact’s post‑election analysis estimates that the two 2020 Georgia Senate runoffs saw a combined $507 million in advertising spending, with about $262 million in ads for Perdue–Ossoff and $245.6 million for Warnock–Loeffler. (adimpact.com)
   • Other contemporaneous reporting put overall spending on the runoffs (candidates + outside groups) at well over $370 million, again emphasizing that these runoffs were unprecedentedly expensive. (thefulcrum.us)
   • Friedberg’s specific ballpark for ads (“north of $100 million… maybe 100 to 200 million”) ended up being conservative—the actual ad spending was more than double his upper bound—but the core of his forecast was that spending would at least exceed $100 million and reach an extraordinary, record‑setting level. The realized figures clearly met and greatly surpassed that threshold.

Because the Georgia runoffs did, in fact, become by far the most expensive Senate runoffs in U.S. history and shattered the $100 million mark in total and advertising spending, Friedberg’s prediction is best classified as right, even though he underestimated just how extreme the final ad totals would be.

The condition of the prediction was met: Democrats won both Georgia Senate runoffs on January 5, 2021 (Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock), producing a 50–50 Senate in which Vice President Kamala Harris held the tie‑breaking vote, giving Democrats effective control of the chamber. (en.wikipedia.org)

However, U.S. equity markets did not fall 30–40% in the following six months:

• The S&P 500 (a standard proxy for “the market”) closed at 3,727.48 on January 5, 2021. (statmuse.com)
• By early July 2021, it was around 4,350+ (e.g., 4,352.34 on July 2 and 4,343.54 on July 6), implying a gain of roughly 16–17%, not a decline. (statmuse.com)
• Monthly data show the S&P 500 was positive or only slightly negative in each month from February through June 2021, with no crash anywhere near 30–40%. (statmuse.com)
• By year‑end 2021 the S&P 500 had logged 70 record closes and finished the year up about 27%, indicating a broadly bullish environment rather than a deep drawdown in mid‑2021. (cnbc.com)

Since the Democrats did gain Senate control as specified, but U.S. equities rose instead of dropping 30–40% over the subsequent six months, Friedberg’s conditional market prediction is wrong.

Sacks predicted that:

1. Donald Trump would pursue election court challenges for a few weeks after the election but effectively end them by U.S. Thanksgiving 2020 (November 26, 2020), meaning the contest of the result would be over by then.
2. Courts would ultimately rule against Trump or throw out his cases.

What actually happened:

• Trump and his allies continued significant legal efforts after Thanksgiving. For example, on November 27, 2020 (the day after Thanksgiving), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Trump campaign’s attempt to undo Pennsylvania’s vote certification, showing the campaign was still actively litigating key challenges beyond Thanksgiving. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Trump’s broader effort to overturn the election ran from early November well into December 2020 and January 2021, involving dozens of lawsuits, pressure on state officials, and attempts to get the Supreme Court to intervene; this was not effectively “over” by Thanksgiving. (en.wikipedia.org)
• A major post-Thanksgiving legal push was Texas v. Pennsylvania, filed December 8, 2020, at the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking to invalidate Biden’s wins in four states. The Court dismissed the case on December 11, 2020 for lack of standing—another prominent defeat, but clearly showing that the legal contest continued well beyond Thanksgiving. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Overall, Trump and his allies filed 60+ lawsuits related to the 2020 election and did not win any that could change the outcome; courts repeatedly dismissed or ruled against them, matching the part of Sacks’ prediction that courts would ultimately rule against Trump’s side. (en.wikipedia.org)

Assessment:

• The timing and “end by Thanksgiving” component of the prediction was clearly wrong: high‑profile court challenges and broader legal/political efforts to overturn the election were still very much active in December and even into January. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The courts‑will‑rule‑against-him component was correct, but it was coupled to the stronger claim that the contest would effectively be over by Thanksgiving.

Because the key claim about when Trump’s challenges would effectively end was false, the prediction as stated is best judged wrong overall, despite being right that the courts would ultimately reject his efforts.

Assessment

• Conditional prediction: If Donald Trump chooses to run for president in 2024, he will probably win the Republican Party’s presidential nomination.
• Reality:
  • Trump did choose to run in the 2024 election, formally announcing his candidacy on November 15, 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • He then won the 2024 Republican primaries decisively, securing far more than the required delegates. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Trump was officially nominated as the Republican presidential candidate at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee (July 15–18, 2024). (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the condition (he chooses to run) was met and the predicted outcome (he gets the Republican nomination again) occurred, the prediction is correct.

Conclusion Donald Trump ran in 2024 and became the Republican Party’s presidential nominee; therefore Sacks’s prediction is right.

Outcome: The prediction was wrong.

Chamath predicted a 0% chance that Donald Trump would run for president again in 2024. In reality, Trump did run in 2024, formally announced a 2024 presidential campaign, secured the Republican nomination, and was the Republican nominee in the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Key facts:

• Donald Trump formally announced his 2024 presidential campaign on November 15, 2022.
• He ran in, and won, the 2024 Republican primaries and became the Republican Party’s presidential nominee.
• Trump appeared on the ballot in the 2024 United States presidential election as the Republican nominee and won the election, securing 312 electoral votes and the presidency.

These points are documented in public election records and reporting on Trump’s 2024 campaign and the 2024 U.S. presidential election. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because Trump did run for president in 2024, a prediction of “0% chance he runs again in four years” is clearly incorrect.

Summary
The key components of Friedberg’s prediction did not materialize: Trump was based in Florida rather than New York, he did not buy or own a law firm, and credible estimates of his post‑presidency earnings are far below ~$100 million per month.

1. Where Trump was based after leaving office

• In October 2019, Trump formally changed his primary residence from New York City to Mar‑a‑Lago in Palm Beach, Florida.(en.wikipedia.org)
• After his first term ended on January 20, 2021, he went to live at Mar‑a‑Lago and operated his post‑presidency office from there, not from New York.(en.wikipedia.org)

2. Law firm ownership vs. heavy use of outside counsel

• Trump has relied on numerous independent law firms—Kasowitz LLP, van der Veen, Hartshorn & Levin, Blanche Law, McGuireWoods, Squire Patton Boggs, among others—to defend him and his allies across civil, criminal, and congressional matters.(cnbc.com)
• His leadership PAC, Save America, has paid these firms tens of millions of dollars; by 2022 it had spent at least $16 million on legal services in that year alone, and in total more than $60 million on legal fees since creation.(en.wikipedia.org)
• There is no credible reporting that Trump bought or effectively owns a law firm; instead, he is a major client who hires many separate firms and even carries legal debts to them.(thedailybeast.com)

3. Scale of Trump’s post‑presidency income

• Forbes analyzed Trump’s finances and estimated that during his first three years out of office (2021–2023), he generated about $605 million in operating income total—i.e., roughly $16–17 million per month on average, not $100 million.(forbes.com)
• That income came largely from golf properties, Mar‑a‑Lago, licensing, speaking fees, and NFTs; his social‑media venture (Truth Social) actually lost money on an operating basis in 2022, though his equity stake had paper value.(forbes.com)
• Separately, Trump‑controlled entities like the Save America PAC raised hundreds of millions of dollars (e.g., $255.4 million by January 2021 and about $75 million in the first half of 2021), but those are political committee funds, legally distinct from Trump’s personal income and heavily used for legal and political expenses.(en.wikipedia.org)

4. Later windfalls don’t rescue the original claim

• Since his return to the White House in 2025, Trump and his family have reportedly made over $1 billion in profits from crypto‑related ventures and seen large gains from Trump Media & Technology Group, implying very high effective earnings over that later period.(reuters.com)
• However, those gains are: (a) tied to his second presidency, not his post‑presidency phase after 2021; and (b) irregular windfalls, not a documented, steady ~$100 million per month cash income to him personally.

Conclusion
Because Trump was based in Florida rather than New York, did not buy or own a law firm, and his best‑documented post‑presidency earnings are an order of magnitude below $100 million per month, Friedberg’s prediction is overall wrong.

Donald Trump left office on January 20, 2021 and subsequently created a new media enterprise, Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG), which owns the social media platform Truth Social. Truth Social was announced in October 2021 and publicly launched in February 2022; it is explicitly described as a social networking service founded by Trump and owned by his media company, which has since expanded into other media/streaming and related ventures. (en.wikipedia.org)

After leaving office, Trump also actively tried to act as a political kingmaker in the Republican Party:

• He issued a large number of endorsements in GOP primaries, and coverage of the May 2022 Ohio and Indiana primaries described them as the first big test of his status as the Republican Party “kingmaker” — a test that Associated Press analysis said he “passed” when his endorsed candidate J.D. Vance won the Ohio Senate primary. (wsls.com)
• Political reporting repeatedly framed him as a “kingmaker,” noting that Republican candidates in places like Arizona actively sought his backing and that Trump used rallies and endorsements to shape primary fields. (rollcall.com)
• His endorsements were pivotal in unseating several House Republicans who voted to impeach him in 2021, demonstrating his deliberate effort to reward loyalists and punish opponents inside the party. (en.wikipedia.org)

While commentators debated how effective he was as a kingmaker — some arguing he was less decisive than advertised (theguardian.com) — the prediction only claimed that he would launch a media business and try to become a GOP kingmaker. Both clearly occurred, so the prediction is right.

Summary Sacks predicted that, in the years after 2020, Donald Trump would (1) become a Republican kingmaker whose endorsement shapes primaries and (2) build a Fox‑News‑style media vehicle fused with his grassroots movement, so that Republicans risk primary challenges if they cross him. Both dynamics largely materialized, even though some details (like literally replacing Fox or every Republican needing his endorsement) were overstated.

1. Kingmaker status and primary leverage

• High-impact endorsement record. Analyses of the 2022 and 2024 cycles show Trump endorsements are both numerous and highly successful in GOP primaries. Ballotpedia/Axios and other trackers found his endorsees won around 90–95% of their 2022 primaries, with similar high win rates for 2024, especially among non-incumbents in contested races. Commentators explicitly described him as a GOP kingmaker whose backing is often decisive. (spectrumlocalnews.com)

• Republicans seeking or fearing his endorsement. Studies of 2022 primaries show Trump-endorsed candidates almost always won, and a large share of GOP candidates highlighted Trump or “MAGA/America First” branding in their materials, strongly suggesting they saw alignment with him as electorally valuable. (brookings.edu) Senior Republicans and analysts repeatedly note that his support is something most Republican candidates want, and that his backing can make or break a primary campaign.

• Primary threats against dissidents. Trump has repeatedly used or threatened primary challenges to discipline Republicans who cross him. High‑profile examples include:

  • Liz Cheney, who lost her 2022 Wyoming primary in a landslide to Trump‑backed Harriet Hageman after leading the Jan. 6 committee and voting to impeach him. (theguardian.com)
  • Georgia officials Brian Kemp, Brad Raffensperger and Chris Carr, all targeted by Trump for certifying Biden’s 2020 win; Trump backed challengers against them in 2022 (Perdue, Hice, Gordon). (gpb.org)
  • Ongoing or threatened challenges against figures like Rep. Thomas Massie and Sen. Thom Tillis, where Trump or his allies openly float primary opponents as punishment for insufficient loyalty. (apnews.com)
    In parallel, Sen. Lisa Murkowski has publicly said many GOP lawmakers are “afraid” of retaliation from Trump if they oppose him, explicitly mentioning fears of being primaried. (nypost.com)

• But not literally ‘every’ Republican. There are notable exceptions where Republicans have survived or thrived without Trump’s endorsement or even against his wishes:

  • Georgia Gov. Brian Kemp crushed Trump‑backed David Perdue by ~50 points in the 2022 GOP primary and went on to win re‑election. (gpb.org)
  • Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger beat Trump‑endorsed Jody Hice outright in the 2022 primary. (cnbc.com)
  • Sen. Lisa Murkowski won re‑election in Alaska in 2022 despite Trump’s active opposition and endorsement of Kelly Tshibaka. (cnbc.com)

  These counterexamples show that Sacks’s phrase “every Republican will need to go get his endorsement or they will be primaried” is too absolute. However, the broader pattern—Trump’s endorsement is highly prized, and many Republicans fear or face MAGA-aligned primary challengers if they oppose him—is accurate.

2. Fox‑News‑style media plus grassroots movement

• Creation of a Trump-centric media platform. In 2021–2022, Trump founded Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG) and launched Truth Social, a social network explicitly positioned as a pro‑Trump, “free speech” alternative to mainstream platforms. Major references (including Britannica and multiple language Wikipedias) describe Truth Social as a Trump‑owned Twitter‑like platform built in response to his bans from mainstream social media and heavily centered on his political movement. (en.wikipedia.org) TMTG itself markets Truth Social as the home for millions who have “rejected the pervasive censorship regime,” i.e., the core MAGA base. (tmtgcorp.com) That’s very close to “Fox News hybridized with a grassroots movement.”
• Expansion into streaming ‘news TV’ via Truth+. Beginning in 2024, TMTG rolled out Truth+, a live TV streaming platform integrated into Truth Social. Company releases and outside coverage describe Truth+ as an ultra‑fast TV streaming service carrying “pro‑freedom news networks like Newsmax, Real America’s Voice, OAN, and more,” plus a library of “non‑woke” content, marketed as an alternative to mainstream media. (globenewswire.com) This is essentially a Trump‑branded distribution hub for right‑wing cable news and commentary, tightly linked to his own social platform and movement.
• But not a full replacement or direct peer to Fox. Where Sacks overshot is in implying Trump would supplant Fox with a direct competitor on the same scale. Fox News remains overwhelmingly dominant in cable news: it has led all cable outlets in ratings for years, captured well over half of the cable news audience in 2024, and in 2025 is even challenging or surpassing the broadcast networks in prime‑time viewership. (press.foxnews.com) Truth Social/Truth+ have modest user bases and large financial losses; Politico reports TMTG lost over $400 million in the most recent year despite a meme‑stock valuation. (politico.com) So Trump did build a Trump‑centric media ecosystem that carries news and harnesses his grassroots—but it hasn’t displaced Fox as the premier right‑wing TV outlet.

3. Overall assessment

Taken together:

• Trump did become a central kingmaker in GOP politics, with a powerful, widely sought endorsement and a demonstrated willingness to sponsor or threaten primary challenges against Republicans who defy him.
• He did build a media vehicle—Truth Social plus the Truth+ streaming platform—explicitly tied to his MAGA grassroots movement and hosting pro‑Trump news content, serving as an alternative information ecosystem alongside Fox.
• The prediction’s language about “every” Republican needing his endorsement and about a full‑blown Fox replacement is overstated; some Republicans have survived without him, and Fox remains the dominant right‑leaning TV network.

But the core strategic picture Sacks sketched—Trump using a proprietary media platform plus a Tea‑Party‑style base to act as a GOP kingmaker whose favor or wrath shapes Republican primaries—has clearly come to pass. Hence the prediction is best classified as right, with some exaggeration in scope and absolutism rather than in direction.

Why this prediction is judged wrong

Jason’s claim (Nov 2020) was that any Trump‑backed media network trying to compete with Fox News would:

1. Fail to secure strong backing;
2. Look like a weaker, “Breitbart Lite” outlet; and
3. Shut down within 24 months of launch.

What actually happened:

1. Trump did launch a Trump‑branded media network in practice – Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG) with Truth Social at its core.

   • TMTG/Truth Social was announced in 2021 and Truth Social launched on Feb. 21, 2022 as an alt‑tech social media platform owned by Trump’s media company. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • That is clearly a Trump‑backed media operation (social network, news distribution, video, etc.), i.e., a media network in the broad sense.

2. It did secure substantial financial backing.

   • The planned SPAC merger with Digital World Acquisition Corp. (DWAC) was structured to provide roughly $1.25 billion in capital (about $300M from DWAC’s trust plus a $1B PIPE), a level of funding inconsistent with “will not be able to get the backing.” (globenewswire.com)
   • Even after PIPE commitments were later unwound, DWAC still had hundreds of millions of dollars in its trust, and the merged Trump Media entity ultimately went public and commanded a multi‑billion‑dollar market cap, with Trump’s stake valued around $4 billion in late 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • In 2024–25 TMTG reported hundreds of millions of dollars in annual losses yet was still able to announce a $400 million share buyback and pursue a $2.5 billion bitcoin‑treasury strategy and other crypto/ETF ventures—again indicating ample capital support rather than a failure to attract backing. (politico.com)

3. The core platform did not shut down within 24 months.

   • Truth Social launched in February 2022 and remains active as of late November 2025—over 3½ years later, well beyond the 24‑month window Jason predicted for shutdown. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • It is described as a small but ongoing platform (millions of monthly active users, continued app store presence, ongoing product and financial initiatives), not as a shuttered failure. (en.wikipedia.org)

4. Trump has also launched a TV‑style streaming platform without it collapsing (yet).

   • On July 7, 2025, Trump Media launched Truth+, a global TV streaming service carrying the conservative cable channel Newsmax and other video content, positioning itself in the same general conservative news/streaming space where Fox News and Fox Nation operate. (reuters.com)
   • Truth+ is only a few months old as of Nov. 29, 2025, so we can’t yet test the 24‑month shutdown claim for this specific platform—but its very launch, backed by a publicly traded company with hundreds of millions in cash and active capital‑raising plans, directly contradicts the idea that Trump “will not be able to get the backing for this network.” (reuters.com)

5. The only clearly Trump‑run product that did shut down quickly was a minor blog, not a Fox‑rival network.

   • Trump’s “From the Desk of Donald J. Trump” blog launched in May 2021 and was closed in less than a month due to low engagement. (truthout.org)
   • This was a simple blog page on his website, not a significant, well‑funded media network attempting to compete with Fox News; using it to claim the prediction came true would stretch the original context beyond reason.

Ambiguity about “compete with Fox News”

Jason’s original context was speculation that Trump would start a television or streaming news network to poach Fox’s audience. No standalone “Trump TV” cable channel has launched so far, so there is no direct one‑to‑one test of that narrow scenario. But the general factual assertions he made—Trump won’t get serious backing for a media network, and anything he does will die within 24 months—are clearly contradicted by the continued, well‑funded existence of TMTG/Truth Social and now Truth+.

Because the prediction’s key falsifiable components (no backing; shutdown within 24 months) have not held up when applied to Trump’s actual media ventures, the overall result is wrong.

Chamath’s prediction was that by December 15, 2020, Trump would effectively be “out” and the post‑election contest would “all be done.” In reality, Trump’s efforts to contest and overturn the 2020 election continued well past that date.

Key evidence:

• A comprehensive timeline of efforts to overturn the 2020 election notes the main phase of attempts ran from November 4, 2020 through January 7, 2021, explicitly covering all of December and stretching into early January. (en.wikipedia.org)
• On December 21, 2020, Trump met at the White House with Rep. Mo Brooks, other members of Congress, and his legal team to strategize using the January 6 congressional certification to overturn the election results—planning that clearly post‑dates December 15. (en.wikipedia.org)
• On December 23, 2020, Trump personally called the chief investigator in the Georgia Secretary of State’s office, urging the official to “find” fraud, another direct attempt to alter certified results occurring after December 15. (en.wikipedia.org)
• On January 2, 2021, Trump held the now‑infamous hour‑long call with Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, pressuring him to “find 11,780 votes” to overturn Biden’s win in Georgia—strong evidence that Trump was still actively contesting the election nearly three weeks after December 15. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because Trump’s legal, political, and behind‑the‑scenes efforts to overturn the election were ongoing and intensifying after December 15, 2020, the prediction that everything would be “done” and he’d be “out” by that date is incorrect.

Summary of prediction
Sacks predicted in November 2020 that:

1. Trump’s postelection lawsuits would mostly or entirely fail.
2. If the dispute reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court would rule against him.
3. At that point Trump would accept the result (even if he did not formally concede).

1. Lawsuits outcome

• The Trump campaign and allies filed dozens of postelection lawsuits in multiple states; virtually all were dismissed or withdrawn, with no court finding outcome-changing fraud.
  → This part of the prediction was right.

2. Supreme Court outcome

• Key efforts to get the Supreme Court to overturn or invalidate results (e.g., Texas v. Pennsylvania and emergency applications in Pennsylvania cases) were rejected; the Court declined to hear them or dismissed for lack of standing, and did not grant the relief Trump sought.
  → The Court effectively ruled against Trump’s position; this part was right.

3. Did Trump “accept the result”?
This is where interpretation becomes ambiguous:

• Trump never formally conceded and repeatedly and publicly asserted that the 2020 election was “rigged” or “stolen,” including after the Supreme Court rejections and after leaving office.
• He nevertheless did leave office on January 20, 2021, and the constitutional transfer of power to Joe Biden occurred on schedule, with the Trump administration cooperating on some key transition mechanics (e.g., GSA ascertainment in late November 2020, eventual use of transition resources).

Whether that counts as “accepting the result” depends on how you read Sacks’s words:

• If “accept” means de facto compliance with the Supreme Court outcome and the Electoral College result (i.e., no extra-constitutional attempt to stay in power once all legal avenues closed), then the prediction is substantially correct.
• If “accept” means acknowledging the legitimacy of the election outcome (stopping claims of fraud and publicly recognizing Biden as the rightful winner), then the prediction is wrong; Trump has continued to deny the legitimacy of the 2020 result.

Because Sacks explicitly allowed for “he may not concede, but he will accept the result,” and Trump’s subsequent behavior mixed formal compliance with persistent rejection of legitimacy, it is not possible to score this with a single clear label without importing a subjective definition of “accept.”

Conclusion

• Lawsuits mostly/entirely failed: right.
• Supreme Court, if reached, would rule against Trump: right.
• Trump would “accept the result”: depends on whether you focus on behavioral compliance (yes) or public acknowledgment/legitimacy (no).

Given this definitional ambiguity around “accept the result,” the overall assessment is ambiguous.

The condition of the prediction was met: the post‑election effort to overturn or invalidate the 2020 presidential result did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, most prominently in Texas v. Pennsylvania, which sought to throw out results in four Biden‑won states.

On December 11, 2020, the Court denied Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint for lack of standing, ending the case. Seven justices explicitly denied leave; Justices Alito and Thomas wrote separately that they would allow Texas to file the complaint but said they “would not grant other relief” and expressed no view on other issues. That means:

• On the jurisdiction/standing question, the split was effectively 7–2 against Texas/Trump (Alito and Thomas differing only on procedure). (en.wikipedia.org)
• On the actual relief Trump and Texas wanted (blocking or overturning the election results), all nine justices rejected it—Alito and Thomas expressly said they would give Texas no relief, and the other seven denied the case outright. (reason.com)

Sacks predicted that if the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the decision against Trump would be at least 7–2 and possibly 8–1 or 9–0. The real outcome was at least 7–2 against Texas/Trump on the key threshold issue and functionally 9–0 against granting them any relief, which fits his predicted range. Therefore, the prediction is right.

As of November 29, 2025, the City and County of San Francisco has not filed for municipal (Chapter 9) bankruptcy. Recent coverage of the city’s finances discusses large budget deficits and Mayor Daniel Lurie’s 2025–26 budget proposal with deep cuts and use of reserves, but makes no mention of any bankruptcy filing.

For example, reporting on the 2025–26 budget describes San Francisco’s fiscal stress and proposed service reductions, not a Chapter 9 process or petition.【1news15】 Likewise, up-to-date lists and discussions of U.S. Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcies (which include notable cases like Detroit, Stockton, and others) do not list San Francisco among the municipalities that have filed.【2search12】

Because Chamath’s prediction allowed 10 years from November 2020 (until November 2030) and we are only five years into that window, there is still time for the event to occur. The fact that it has not happened yet does not invalidate the prediction. Therefore, the correct status today is that it is too early to tell whether the prediction will ultimately be right or wrong.

The prediction window is 10–15 years from November 2020, i.e., until sometime between November 2030 and November 2035. As of November 29, 2025, only about five years have elapsed, so the time period for evaluating the prediction has not yet ended.

Available evidence indicates that the City and County of San Francisco has not filed for municipal (Chapter 9) bankruptcy since the podcast date:

• The city continues to issue new general obligation bonds and other debt instruments in 2024–2025, with detailed official statements posted by the Controller’s Office of Public Finance and EMMA, which would not be occurring in the same way if the city were in Chapter 9.
• San Francisco’s general obligation bond ratings as of late 2024 and 2025 remain in the AA/Aa range (Fitch AAA, Moody’s Aa1, S&P AA+), with only recent downgrades from Aaa/AAA—showing fiscal stress but clearly no default or bankruptcy event reported by the rating agencies or the city. (sf.gov)
• City financial reports describe deficits, revenue weakness, and use of layoffs and other measures to rebalance the budget, but do not mention any Chapter 9 filing or formal bankruptcy proceedings. (sfchronicle.com)

Because (1) San Francisco has not filed for municipal bankruptcy as of November 2025, and (2) there is still up to roughly ten years left in the prediction window, the correct classification today is “inconclusive (too early)”, not “right” or “wrong.”