E72: Impact of sanctions, deglobalization, food shortage risks, macroeconomic outlook and more

Chamath predicted that Russia and Ukraine would reach a ceasefire within 2–3 weeks of March 19, 2022 (by early–mid April 2022). In reality, peace talks in March and April 2022, including meetings in Turkey and the broader Istanbul process, produced no ceasefire or peace agreement, and fighting continued.(theguardian.com) A UN-backed proposal for an Easter truce from 21–25 April 2022 was explicitly rejected by Russia and never implemented, so even a short nationwide pause in combat was not agreed.(en.wikipedia.org) Subsequent reporting and analyses up through 2025 consistently describe the war as ongoing with no overall ceasefire in place, despite various later negotiation attempts.(aljazeera.com) Therefore, his time-bound prediction of a ceasefire by mid-April 2022 did not come true.

By mid‑April 2022, the war had not moved toward a ceasefire or an end to active fighting. Instead, Russia launched the large-scale Battle of Donbas offensive on 18 April 2022, marking the start of the second strategic phase of the invasion and continuing intense combat through at least September 2022. (en.wikipedia.org) The siege of Mariupol likewise continued well past mid‑April, with major combat operations only ending in mid‑May and the city’s fall on 20 May 2022. (en.wikipedia.org) A proposed Easter ceasefire for 21–25 April 2022 never took effect because Russia refused the truce, so no temporary, let alone permanent, ceasefire was in place around that time. (en.wikipedia.org) Moreover, independent timelines and analyses note that large-scale hostilities continued through 2022 and beyond, with the full‑scale war still ongoing years later. (theweek.com) Given that there was neither a ceasefire nor an end to the active phase of the war in the near term after 19 March 2022, Chamath’s prediction that it was “really, really close to this being done” was incorrect.

Available data show a severe global food crisis in 2022, but not "widespread famine globally" by the end of 2022.

Key points:

• The 2023 Global Report on Food Crises finds that in 2022 about 258 million people in 58 countries faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+), with 376,000 people in IPC Phase 5 “Catastrophe” across seven countries (Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Haiti, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). It explicitly notes that while there were risks of famine in localized parts of Somalia and Yemen in 2022, these famine scenarios did not materialize. (twn.my)

• UN and humanitarian agencies in 2022 repeatedly warned of a “real risk” of multiple famines driven by the Ukraine war, high food prices, conflict and climate shocks, but were describing risk and brink-of-famine conditions, not an actually realized, globally widespread famine. (newstodaynet.com)

• The IPC/UN system’s technical definition of famine (Phase 5) requires extreme thresholds for hunger, child malnutrition and mortality. Contemporary reporting explains that Phase 5 “Catastrophe/Famine” and pre‑famine conditions do not automatically equal an official famine declaration, which remained limited and highly localized, not global, in 2022. (apnews.com)

• Humanitarian action and partial stabilization of grain markets (including the Black Sea Grain Initiative restarting Ukrainian exports in July 2022) helped ease the worst price spikes and avert some of the projected famine outcomes, even though hunger still worsened substantially. (en.wikipedia.org)

In sum, while the Russia–Ukraine war and sanctions/export disruptions clearly deepened a global hunger and food‑price crisis in 2022, the specific prediction that this would “almost certainly lead to widespread famine by the end of this year” did not come true in the sense normally used by UN and IPC assessments. The outcome was extensive acute food insecurity and localized Phase‑5 conditions, not a broadly distributed, officially recognized global famine. Therefore, the prediction is best classified as wrong.

By roughly March 2023 (one year after the March 19, 2022 episode), multiple UN agencies were describing the global food situation as an ongoing humanitarian emergency involving hundreds of millions of people with insufficient caloric intake.

Key evidence:

• The World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO issued a joint "Hunger Hotspots" warning on 21 September 2022, stating that “the world faces its largest food crisis in modern history” and that 345 million people across 82 countries were facing acute food insecurity, up from 282 million at the end of 2021. Acute food insecurity at these levels explicitly involves people unable to meet minimum food requirements and at risk of starvation without assistance. (wfp.org)
• The 2023 Global Report on Food Crises found that in 2022, about 258 million people in 58 countries were in IPC Phase 3 or worse (crisis, emergency, or catastrophe), the highest figure in the report’s history. IPC Phase 3+ is defined as food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition severe enough to threaten lives and livelihoods—i.e., large-scale humanitarian crisis conditions. (fsinplatform.org)
• The FAO/UN “State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023” report estimated that 691–783 million people faced chronic hunger in 2022 (midpoint ~735 million), about 122 million more than in 2019, and that about 2.4 billion people experienced moderate or severe food insecurity, with roughly 900 million severely food insecure. These categories represent people who cannot reliably obtain enough food for an active, healthy life—i.e., widespread underconsumption of calories. (fao.org)

Interpretation:

• Friedberg’s normalized prediction was that within a year the global food-supply situation would be a humanitarian disaster with “hundreds of millions” starving / lacking sufficient calories.
• By late 2022 and into 2023, authoritative metrics show:
  • Hundreds of millions of people in acute food insecurity (≈258–345 million depending on the metric and cutoff). (fsinplatform.org)
  • Many hundreds of millions more in chronic hunger and severe food insecurity (total clearly in the “hundreds of millions” range).
  • UN agencies explicitly characterizing this as the largest global food crisis in modern history, i.e., a humanitarian disaster. (wfp.org)

It is true that global hunger was already very high before March 2022 and some indicators plateaued between 2021 and 2022 rather than exploding further, so the incremental deterioration in that exact 12‑month window was less dramatic than some feared. (nutritionconnect.org) However, the core factual claim—that within about a year the world would be in a humanitarian food crisis involving hundreds of millions of people lacking adequate calories—matches how UN agencies were describing conditions by late 2022/early 2023.

Given this, the prediction is best scored as right on its main substantive point, with the caveat that it somewhat overstated how much worse things would get relative to an already severe baseline.

Within the year after the March 19, 2022 podcast (i.e., by roughly March 2023), the U.S. did not experience an “economic tsunami” or severe macroeconomic downturn, even though sanctions and the war clearly imposed notable costs.

What actually happened:

• Growth: Real U.S. GDP still grew in 2022 by about 2.1% and then by 2.5% in 2023, indicating continued expansion rather than collapse. (bea.gov) Quarterly data show solid growth into late 2022 (e.g., Q4 2022 at a 2.9% annual rate). (apps.bea.gov)
• Jobs: Unemployment in March 2023 was about 3.5–3.6%, near 50‑year lows and far from crisis levels, with employment and labor-force participation continuing to improve through 2022–23. (bts.gov)
• Inflation shock (real but not a collapse): CPI inflation did spike to 9.1% year‑over‑year in June 2022 and was still 5.0% by March 2023, a significant cost‑of‑living hit. (bls.gov) Analyses attribute a substantial portion of that elevated U.S. inflation specifically to the invasion of Ukraine and associated energy/commodity effects from the conflict and sanctions (e.g., Moody’s Mark Zandi estimated several percentage points of U.S. inflation were due to the war/sanctions channel). (en.wikipedia.org)
• Overall assessment: Major institutions and analysts later characterized the U.S. economy in 2023 as resilient, with recession fears proving overblown and inflation easing while growth and employment remained strong. (cbpp.org)

So while sanctions and the war clearly produced meaningful negative effects for the U.S. (notably higher inflation and tighter monetary policy), the predicted severe blowback—an “economic tsunami” causing a major U.S. economic breakdown within a year—did not materialize. Overall, the prediction is best classified as wrong in its core claim about the magnitude of the damage to the U.S. economy.

The prediction ties two conditions together for 2022: (1) the U.S. entering a recession, and (2) gasoline prices reaching roughly $7–$10/gal in at least some areas.

Gasoline prices:

• In 2022, the national average gasoline price hit a record above $5/gal, with California’s average over $6/gal by early June, and some locations far higher.
• Reporting from CBS News, based on GasBuddy and AAA data, listed seven California stations charging more than $7.25/gal as of June 2, 2022, including prices in the high $7s and low $8s.citeturn2search3
• A Los Angeles Times article noted that while California’s average was around $6.34/gal on June 6, 2022, a Mendocino station was charging $9.60/gal for regular—squarely in the predicted $7–$10 range.citeturn2search10 So the gas-price part of the prediction was accurate.

Recession in 2022:

• In the U.S., the standard arbiter of recessions is the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Its business‑cycle chronology shows the last peak in activity in February 2020 and a trough in April 2020, with no later peaks or troughs announced—meaning the NBER has not dated any new recession after April 2020.citeturn3search8
• A Congressional Research Service summary (updated October 3, 2024) explicitly notes that after the April 2020 trough, “NBER has not announced any peaks in economic activity in the intervening years,” implying a continued expansion rather than a recession in 2022.citeturn3search7
• While real GDP did contract in the first two quarters of 2022, major coverage at the time pointed out that most economists did not expect NBER to classify the first half of 2022 as a recession, citing strong employment and continued growth in consumer spending.citeturn3search4

Because no official U.S. recession was recorded in 2022, the core macroeconomic part of the forecast failed, even though the gas-price scenario materialized. As the prediction was a single conjunctive claim (recession and $7–$10 gas), its overall status is wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, there has been no Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. The situation is characterized instead by ongoing coercion, military exercises, and preparations on both sides.

Evidence:

• The Council on Foreign Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker describes the Taiwan situation as an ongoing confrontation and source of “heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait,” but does not report that China has initiated an invasion or war to seize the island. (cfr.org)
• China has conducted large-scale, increasingly aggressive military drills around Taiwan—e.g., the Joint Sword-2024 exercises (May and October 2024) and large 2025 exercises around Taiwan and its offshore islands—but these are explicitly described as drills and coercive shows of force, not an actual invasion or attempt to occupy Taiwan. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Analyses in 2025 from think tanks and military observers focus on China’s capability-building and intimidation (e.g., amphibious capability, airborne forces, new landing barges) and on whether China might invade by 2027, making clear that such an invasion remains hypothetical and risky rather than something that has occurred. (taipeitimes.com)

Chamath’s prediction was that, after seeing the consequences of Western sanctions on Russia, a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan would effectively be “off the table” as a realistic option for the foreseeable future. Over the 3½ years since March 2022, China has not chosen to invade, despite:

• Growing military capabilities and preparations aimed at Taiwan. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Strong political rhetoric and explicit refusal to rule out the use of force. (reuters.com)

We cannot directly observe internal CCP decision-making, so we can’t prove that invasion is literally “off the table” in their minds. However, the falsifiable part of the claim—that China would not actually invade in the near-to-medium term following Russia’s sanctions experience—has, up to late 2025, been borne out by events.

Given that:

• Sufficient time (over three years) has passed to test the “foreseeable future” horizon reasonably,
• No invasion has occurred, and
• The main observable implication of the prediction (restraint from invasion despite pressure and capability growth) matches reality,

I classify the prediction outcome as right under the information available as of November 30, 2025.

Chamath’s call was for a 1.5–2 month “melt up” in broad equities starting mid‑March 2022, conditional on no major escalation in the Russia‑Ukraine war (e.g., nuclear or clear chemical-weapons shock).

What actually happened:

• The S&P 500 did rally strongly in the second half of March 2022, finishing the month up about 3.8% overall.(statmuse.com)
• But in April 2022 the S&P 500 fell about 8.9%, its worst month since March 2020; the Nasdaq dropped roughly 13.3% in the same month, also its worst since the financial crisis.(statmuse.com)
• From the S&P 500 close on March 18, 2022 (about 4,463) to May 3, 2022 (about 4,175), the index was down roughly 6%, and by May 19, 2022 it had fallen to about 3,901, more than 12% below the March 18 level and flirting with bear‑market territory.(statmuse.com)
• Major commentary at the time described April as a brutal month for stocks driven by aggressive Fed tightening and recession fears, not as a sustained melt‑up.(axios.com)

On the conditional clause (no major escalation in the war): during that 1.5–2 month window, there were unconfirmed or disputed reports of possible chemical‑weapon use in Mariupol, which Western officials said they were urgently investigating, but experts and officials stressed that the evidence was inconclusive at the time.(cnbc.com) There was no widely recognized nuclear or clearly verified large‑scale chemical attack that triggered a discrete "shock" event of the sort he highlighted.

Putting it together: the war condition he specified was effectively met, yet instead of a sustained 1.5–2 month melt‑up, U.S. (and broader) equities experienced a sharp downturn, with April 2022 one of the worst months for the S&P 500 since the pandemic crash. That makes this prediction wrong.

The condition on which Chamath based the prediction — no major nuclear-type escalation in the Russia–Ukraine war — was met: multiple later retrospectives note that, despite frequent nuclear rhetoric and drills, no nuclear weapons have been used in Ukraine as of 2025.(nationalsecurityjournal.org)

However, U.S. equity markets did not show “really constructive dynamics” for the following 1.5–2 months (roughly late March through mid‑/late‑May 2022):

• The episode aired March 19, 2022. Around that time, Chamath argued for a near‑term market “melt up” due to reduced uncertainty and a potential peace framework, implying a constructive rally ahead.(allinpodcastsummary.com)
• The S&P 500 did rally into late March (March 2022 return +3.8%), with the index rising from 4,463.12 on March 18 to 4,530.41 on March 31.(statmuse.com)
• But in April 2022, markets reversed sharply: the S&P 500 fell about 8.7–9% for the month, and the Nasdaq Composite plunged about 13.5%, one of its worst months and leaving the Nasdaq in bear‑market territory.(statmuse.com)
• Through May 2022, conditions remained stressed. The Nasdaq was down another ~2% for May, and the S&P 500’s intraday decline from its January high briefly exceeded 20% on May 20, leading major outlets to describe it as flirting with a bear market before a late‑day bounce.(statmuse.com)

Given that the next 1.5–2 months after the March 19 episode were dominated by large drawdowns, extreme volatility, and a near‑bear‑market move, rather than a sustained “constructive” or melt‑up environment, the prediction about market dynamics over that window did not come true.

What was predicted
Chamath suggested that in 2H 2022: (1) U.S. inflation would start to be tamed, and (2) the economy was strong enough that Fed funds around ~2–2.5% would both be sustainable and consistent with strong GDP growth (i.e., that this sort of rate level would be enough while the economy still grew well).

What actually happened

1. Inflation path in 2H 2022

   • CPI inflation peaked at 9.1% year‑over‑year in June 2022.(cnbc.com)
   • From that peak it did start to fall in the second half of 2022: by December 2022 the annual CPI rate was 6.5%, with month‑to‑month changes much smaller and even slightly negative in December.(usinflationcalculator.com)
     So it is fair to say inflation began to come off the boil in 2H 2022, though it was still far from the Fed’s 2% goal and remained “elevated” by policymakers’ own description.

2. Interest rates versus that inflation

   • On July 27, 2022 the Fed raised the federal funds target range to 2.25–2.50%.(cnbc.com)
   • Less than two months later, on September 21, 2022, it hiked again to 3.00–3.25%, explicitly noting that inflation “remains elevated” and that further increases were expected.(federalreserve.gov)
   • By December 2022, the target range was 4.25–4.50%, and the Fed signaled it would keep rates high through 2023.(cnbc.com)
   • Through 2023 the effective federal funds rate was around 5.3% at its peak, before beginning to be cut in late 2024–2025.(modigin.com)

   This shows that 2–2.5% was nowhere near sufficient to control inflation in practice. The Fed rapidly moved rates well above that range and had to hold them there for an extended period while inflation gradually returned closer to target.

3. Economic growth and strength

   • Real GDP fell in Q1 and Q2 2022 (‑1.6% and ‑0.6% annualized), but then rebounded: real GDP grew 3.2% in Q3 2022 and about 2.6–2.7% in Q4 2022 (annualized).(apps.bea.gov)
   • For the full year 2022, real GDP grew 2.1%; from Q4 2021 to Q4 2022 it rose about 0.9–1.0%.(bea.gov)
   • Growth remained solid in subsequent years: BEA data show real GDP growth of about 2.9% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024, even while the Fed funds rate was around 5% for much of that period.(bea.gov)

   So the “economy is still quite strong” part was broadly right: the U.S. economy handled not only 2–2.5% rates, but much higher rates without falling into a deep recession.

Why the prediction is graded as wrong

• The crucial forward‑looking claim wasn’t just that growth would be OK; it was that inflation would start to be tamed in 2H 2022 and that the U.S. could “actually support 2–2.5% interest rates and still actually grow really well” — implying a world where that kind of rate level would be sufficient to bring inflation under control while growth stayed strong.
• In reality, inflation did start to decelerate in 2H 2022, but it remained very high (6–8% y/y) during that period, and the Fed concluded it needed to push rates far above 2–2.5% (into the 4–5%+ range) and hold them there for a prolonged period to make real progress toward its 2% target.(bls.gov)
• The economy did prove strong enough to grow with much higher rates, which contradicts the implicit notion that something like 2–2.5% was the tough but sufficient level the economy had to bear.

Because the central, actionable part of the call — that bringing inflation under control would involve and be compatible with Fed funds around 2–2.5% — was clearly falsified by subsequent events, the overall prediction is best judged wrong, despite getting the broad direction of inflation (down) and growth (still positive) roughly right.

Chamath framed his view as a short‑term “melt‑up,” saying that after the March 2022 rebound he expected markets to have constructive dynamics for roughly the next month to two months and that from there markets were “probably” headed up. ⁠(dailyhodl.com) Using the S&P 500 as a broad proxy for “the stock market,” the index closed at 4,463 on March 18, 2022 (the last trading day before the March 19 episode), rose modestly over the next two weeks, but then fell below that level: it was down to 4,393 by April 15 and 4,131 by April 29, and further to 3,901 by May 20. ⁠(fedprimerate.com) Over the 1–2 month window he specified, the net direction of the market was clearly downward rather than upward, so the prediction did not come true.

Evidence since 2022 supports Friedberg’s core claims that (a) private-market startup valuations would reprice materially downward from early‑2022 levels, (b) revenue/valuation multiples would compress back toward pre‑COVID norms rather than stay at 2020–2021 extremes, and (c) this reset would be sustained rather than a brief dip.

Key points:

• Large and continuing reset from 2021–early‑2022 highs: CB Insights’ valuation reports describe a “full‑blown reset” of private tech valuations by Q4 2022, with the reset continuing into 2023 and especially hitting later-stage companies. (cbinsights.com) PitchBook’s 2022 data (summarized by Mazanti) likewise shows late‑stage startups “hit the hardest” and a clear downtrend starting in late 2022. (mazantipulse.com) Carta’s Q4 2023 State of Private Markets report shows late‑stage median pre‑money valuations down ~42% from early‑2021, Series E+ valuations less than half their 2021–2022 levels, elevated down‑round rates, and 409A marks often flat or down—clear signs that private valuations reset meaningfully lower than early‑2022. (carta.com)

• Multiples/macro pricing back near pre‑COVID norms: PitchBook’s 2024 Annual US VC Valuations Report shows the median price/sales multiple for recently public VC‑backed tech companies fell from 20x+ in 2021 to about 6x and has stayed in a 4.5–6x range since mid‑2022, close to pre‑pandemic medians (roughly 4.5–7.7x). (scribd.com) Because private growth‑stage valuations are benchmarked heavily to these public comps, this is strong evidence that the sector’s pricing has reverted to something like pre‑COVID norms rather than staying at bubble‑era 2021 levels.

• Reset has persisted instead of snapping back: Multiple datasets show that, even by 2024–2025, valuation levels remain far below 2021 peaks. A 2025 analysis of enterprise SaaS funding using PitchBook data reports late‑stage VC median pre‑money valuations of about $74M in 2025 vs $278M in 2021 (a ~73% decline), characterizing this as a “valuation reset” executives must accept, not a brief blip. (developmentcorporate.com) Global and U.S. VC funding in 2024 is still well below 2021—Barron’s notes overall VC activity in 2024 is about 55% below the 2021 peak, with AI as a notable exception. (barrons.com) Q4 2023 Carta data also emphasizes that 2023’s deal volumes and capital raised resemble 2018–2019 pre‑pandemic conditions more than 2020–2021, indicating a structural, longer‑lasting shift rather than a short‑lived panic. (carta.com) Q2 2025 venture‑capital trend reports still speak of a “valuation reset” and show seed and Series A medians declining year‑over‑year as investors apply stricter pricing anchored to lower public comps. (premium.f1gmat.com)

• Nuances (do not overturn the prediction): Early‑stage valuations never corrected as sharply and in some cases remain above 2019 medians, and AI‑focused startups have often enjoyed elevated valuations and multiples relative to the rest of the market. (carta.com) But Friedberg’s statement concerned overall private‑market pricing and the direction and persistence of the repricing; on that, the broad VC market has indeed moved away from 2021‑style 50–100x revenue multiples and stayed much closer to pre‑COVID norms for several years.

Given the substantial and enduring drop in private startup valuations and revenue/price‑to‑sales multiples from their 2021–early‑2022 extremes back toward pre‑COVID ranges, and the fact that this lower‑multiple regime has persisted through at least 2024–2025 rather than proving transient, the prediction is best classified as right (while acknowledging pockets of exception such as AI and relatively stickier early‑stage rounds).

Evidence from broad U.S. equity indices shows there was no quick, full rebound in the weeks after the March 19, 2022 podcast date, and that elevated volatility and repricing persisted:

• The S&P 500’s prior record close was about 4,796 on January 3, 2022. It was around 4,463 on March 18, 2022, rose modestly to ~4,545 on April 1, then fell to ~4,132 by April 29, well below the January high.(statmuse.com) This pattern is inconsistent with “everything’s going to bounce back in a few weeks.”
• The selloff deepened: by June 16, 2022 the S&P 500 had dropped to about 3,667 (over 20% below its January peak), putting it firmly in bear‑market territory, with year‑to‑date returns around –20% by the end of June.(spglobal.com) That is a continued repricing phase, not a transient dip.
• Volatility stayed elevated: the VIX in April–June 2022 frequently ran in the low‑ to mid‑20s and often above 30, well above the typical “average” 13–19 range, and 2022’s average VIX level (~25.6) was much higher than in calmer years.(fred.stlouisfed.org)

Because there was no rapid, durable snap‑back to prior highs in the following weeks and volatility remained elevated for months, Friedberg’s prediction that the early‑2022 drawdown would not be merely transient and would not fully reverse in a quick rebound was right.

In reality no Russia‑Ukraine peace deal was signed in 2022: early negotiations in March–April 2022 ultimately failed, and later analyses describe those talks as having collapsed without agreement, with Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba explicitly denying that any March 2022 peace deal was concluded.(en.wikipedia.org) During those talks, global equity markets did in fact rally on peace hopes: on March 29, 2022, European and U.S. stocks rose sharply, with Reuters and others attributing the move to apparent progress in Russia‑Ukraine peace negotiations and Russia’s pledge to scale back operations near Kyiv; the S&P 500 closed that day at 4,631.60 as part of a multi‑day rally.(investing.com) Once it became clear that negotiations were stalling and no deal was forthcoming, markets reversed: the S&P 500, which had peaked around that late‑March level, fell about 9% in April alone and ended April 29 at 4,131.93—below its mid‑March levels, thereby giving back the war‑related rally and more within a few weeks.(statmuse.com) Over the remainder of 2022, global equities declined substantially further, with the MSCI World Index down 17.7% for the year and the S&P 500 finishing 2022 about 19% below its starting level, well under its March peace‑talks highs.(en.wikipedia.org) Given that (a) the relevant branch of the conditional—that the peace process collapses—did occur, and (b) equity markets not only surrendered the prior peace‑talks rally but then declined significantly further in the ensuing months, Friedberg’s conditional prediction about the direction and magnitude of market moves in the “no‑deal” scenario is best judged as having been right.

1. Condition (“if there is no peace deal…”)
   Early Russian–Ukrainian negotiations in spring 2022 (Istanbul talks, etc.) did not produce a lasting peace agreement, and the full‑scale war has continued through 2024–2025.(en.wikipedia.org) This means the condition for the prediction (“no peace deal in the near term following March 2022”) was met.

2. Russian escalation and heavy bombing of Ukrainian cities
   After March 19, 2022, Russia conducted extensive strikes against Ukrainian cities, consistent with the forecast:

• March–April 2022 saw major attacks such as the Mariupol theatre airstrike (March 16), the Kyiv Retroville shopping‑centre missile strike (March 20), the Kramatorsk railway‑station missile attack (April 8), and repeated cluster‑munition bombardments of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, all hitting urban civilian areas.(en.wikipedia.org)
• From autumn 2022 onward, Russia launched large, repeated missile and drone salvos on cities and energy infrastructure across Ukraine (Kyiv, Lviv, Zaporizhzhia and others), with power plants and dense urban areas struck and large parts of the grid disabled.(en.wikipedia.org)
  This clearly matches the prediction of an escalation featuring “heavy bombing of Ukrainian cities.”

3. Increased political pressure on the U.S. to escalate its military role
   As Russian attacks intensified and atrocities became visible, political pressure on Washington to do more militarily rose sharply:

• President Zelenskyy repeatedly appealed for stronger U.S. and NATO action, including additional aircraft and air defenses, both in private calls with lawmakers and in his March 16, 2022 address to the U.S. Congress, where he urged creation of a no‑fly zone or, failing that, advanced systems and planes.(pbs.org)
• U.S. and allied debates over a Western‑enforced no‑fly zone—explicitly rejected by the Biden administration because it would mean direct combat with Russian forces—became a major political issue; lawmakers such as Senator Rob Portman and others publicly advocated “closing the skies” over Ukraine.(theguardian.com)
• Opinion polling cited in the no‑fly zone analysis found large majorities of Americans in favor of a no‑fly zone when asked in early March 2022, underscoring mass‑political pressure for more direct military measures.(en.wikipedia.org)
  While the Biden administration ultimately resisted direct intervention (no U.S./NATO troops or aircraft in combat), it did respond to this environment by steadily escalating the scale and sophistication of U.S. military aid (artillery, HIMARS, air defense systems, tanks, long‑range missiles) as part of a broader NATO effort.(nato.int)
  This is consistent with the prediction’s narrower claim that intensified Russian attacks would “step up the pressure” on Washington to increase its military involvement.

4. Heightened risk of the conflict “spinning out of control”
   Strategic analysts and officials repeatedly warned in 2022–2023 that the combination of Russia’s invasion and NATO’s growing military support for Ukraine significantly raised the danger of inadvertent or deliberate escalation into a wider NATO–Russia war, including nuclear use:

• The Atlantic Council’s work on escalation management in Ukraine explicitly states that Russia’s invasion and NATO’s response “increase the possibility of purposeful or inadvertent escalation in Europe.”(atlanticcouncil.org)
• Detailed studies of the proposed no‑fly zone stressed that enforcing it would likely mean U.S. and Russian forces shooting at each other, with a serious risk of nuclear confrontation; senior U.S. officials publicly cited this escalation risk as the main reason for rejecting the idea.(en.wikipedia.org)
• CSIS analyses document how Russian nuclear signaling and Western responses around Ukraine created significant concern about nuclear escalation, prompting efforts to build “off‑ramps” in crisis management.(csis.org)
  Thus, while the war has not yet “spun out of control” into direct NATO–Russia combat, expert and governmental assessments confirm that the risk of such an outcome rose markedly—matching the predictor’s framing (“could still spin out of control,” not that it necessarily would).

5. Overall assessment
   Given that: (a) no peace deal was reached in the near term; (b) Russia did escalate with sustained, heavy bombing of Ukrainian cities; (c) this escalation generated intense political pressure in Washington and among allies for riskier forms of U.S./NATO military involvement; and (d) the perceived risk of uncontrollable escalation between Russia and NATO materially increased, the conditional prediction closely matches subsequent events.

Accordingly, the prediction is best evaluated as right.

The condition of the prediction largely occurred, but the outcome did not.

• Condition (war + disrupted planting + deterioration):
– Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022 and continued through the 2022 spring planting season and beyond, severely affecting agriculture and food security.(fao.org)
– Ukraine’s 2022 sowing campaign was completed on reduced area: about 13.4 million hectares of spring crops were sown—95% of the (already cut) projected area and roughly 80% of the previous year’s area, with major portions of land inaccessible due to the war.(ukrinform.net)
– The conflict caused substantial disruption to global grain and fertilizer markets, driving up prices and raising widespread concerns about food shortages and a global food crisis.(maxapress.com)
Taken together, this matches the normalized condition: the war persisted through the planting season and related agricultural/food‑market conditions deteriorated significantly, even though Ukraine still managed a partial planting.

• Outcome ("very serious recession" in the U.S. within a year):
– Instead of entering a deep recession, the U.S. economy continued to expand. Real GDP grew about 1.9–2.1% in 2022 and 2.5% in 2023, with quarterly growth positive from mid‑2022 onward.(bea.gov)
– The labor market remained strong: the unemployment rate stayed in the mid‑3% range (around 3.6–3.8%) through late 2023, a historically low level, and employment kept rising.(bls.gov)
– The National Bureau of Economic Research, which is the standard arbiter of U.S. business cycles, dates the last recession’s trough to April 2020 and has not declared any new recession since; analyses of the 2025 GDP dip still describe the expansion as ongoing.(nber.org)

Because the specified adverse conditions from the war and agricultural disruption did materialize to a significant degree, but the U.S. did not transition from a slowdown into a “very serious recession” in the following year, the conditional prediction’s implication about the U.S. economy is false. Therefore the prediction is scored as wrong.

Evidence since 2022 clearly shows that the US and its allies have elevated sanctions and other economic tools, and have begun to frame “economic security” and economic statecraft much more centrally in formal strategies.

• Doctrines and toolkits have shifted toward economic statecraft.

  • The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy and follow‑on policy speeches emphasize modernizing export controls, investment screening (including possible outbound investment controls), and other economic measures to protect technology and shape geopolitical outcomes, integrating these tools into core national security planning. (studylib.net)
  • A 2023 US Senate hearing explicitly framed sanctions, export controls, and investment screening as key instruments “advancing national security and foreign policy,” and highlighted that the response to Russia’s invasion “centered” on these tools in coordination with allies. (congress.gov)
  • The UK’s 2023 Integrated Review Refresh introduces an Economic Deterrence Initiative aimed at strengthening sanctions implementation and enforcement and describes new economic‑security measures (critical minerals, semiconductor strategy, supply‑chain and investment protections) as part of its national security posture. (gov.uk)
  • The EU’s 2023 European Economic Security Strategy explicitly addresses risks from the “weaponisation of economic dependencies” and economic coercion, and outlines a toolkit of FDI screening, export controls, anti‑coercion measures, and (now) outbound‑investment scrutiny as part of a new economic‑security framework. Analysts note this is a significant step for an EU that previously tended to keep economics and security separate. (eeas.europa.eu)
  • Think‑tank assessments describe the Russia sanctions response as creating “new precedents for economic statecraft”—including coordinated blocking of Russian central‑bank reserves and sweeping export controls—indicating a qualitative shift in how Western governments use economic levers as core tools in crisis response. (atlanticcouncil.org)

• Corporate and CSR‑driven pressure has indeed become a major (if partly informal) pillar.

  • Following the invasion, more than 1,000 global companies curtailed or withdrew operations from Russia; Yale’s CELI list and similar trackers were explicitly used as reputational and CSR pressure tools to push firms to exit, and are often cited as part of the broader “sanctions” environment rather than purely private choices. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Ukraine’s International Sponsors of War list was designed as a non‑legal but reputational instrument to stigmatize companies still doing business with Russia and thereby reduce Moscow’s fiscal and technological capacity—again entwining corporate behavior with allied economic‑pressure campaigns. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Academic and market analyses find that companies which fully exited Russia tended to be rewarded in terms of investor perceptions, stakeholder trust, and reputational standing, reinforcing CSR‑based incentives to align with sanctions and political pressure. (corpgov.law.harvard.edu)

• However, calling this a fundamental rewrite driven by “effectiveness of sanctions + CSR” goes beyond what the evidence can cleanly establish.

  • Long before 2022, US foreign policy was already heavily sanction‑centric. A Bush Center analysis notes that between 2000 and 2021 the US sanctioned more than 9,000 individuals and entities, and that nearly 5,000 more were added after the 2022 invasion—arguing the US already relied “excessively” on sanctions and export controls, and needs to diversify its tools. This suggests a strong continuity of a sanctions‑heavy approach, even if 2022–25 marked an escalation and systematization rather than a wholly new doctrine. (bushcenter.org)
  • Senior US officials now talk about “restrictive economic statecraft” becoming more common, but also explicitly insist sanctions should be used sparingly and as a “force multiplier,” not a stand‑alone strategy—indicating that, in doctrine, they remain one set of tools among many rather than the sole organizing principle of foreign policy. (bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov)
  • The UK government explicitly characterizes its 2023 integrated review changes as an “evolution not a revolution”, even as it adds new economic‑deterrence measures, which cuts against the claim of a fully “rewritten” playbook. (gov.uk)
  • Corporate behavior is mixed: although hundreds of major brands have exited Russia, studies and official data show that most foreign firms have not fully left and that nearly 2,000 multinationals still operating in Russia paid over $20 billion in taxes in 2023, materially supporting its budget. That indicates CSR‑driven pressure is powerful but far from universally decisive. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • There is also substantial debate over how effective the Russia sanctions have been. Congressional testimony and think‑tank work point out that Russia’s economy shrank far less than early Western predictions and has adapted in important ways, even as sanctions constrained specific sectors like advanced technology. This makes it hard to say that clear, widely perceived “effectiveness” of sanctions alone has driven a wholesale doctrinal rewrite. (congress.gov)

Because:

• economic tools and coordinated sanctions have clearly become more structured, prominent, and institutionally embedded in US/EU/UK strategies since 2022;
• but sanctions were already central before the war, with current officials and documents often framing changes as incremental “evolution,” not a brand‑new doctrine; and
• the role of corporate/CSR‑driven pressure is large but only partially formalized in official foreign‑policy “doctrines,” with uneven corporate participation and controversial assessments of sanctions’ effectiveness,

it is ultimately a judgment call whether the foreign‑policy “playbook” has been “fundamentally rewritten” in the precise way Chamath describes. Reasonable analysts can marshal evidence both for a significant shift and for strong continuity.

Given that this hinges on qualitative interpretation of phrases like “fundamentally rewritten” and on contested assessments of sanctions’ effectiveness and corporate behavior, the prediction cannot be scored as clearly right or clearly wrong on the available evidence. Hence the result is best classified as ambiguous.