E27: The Great Inflation Debate, Amazon gets spicy on Twitter, rethinking supply chains & more

Evaluating each part of Chamath’s linked prediction:

1. “Spend, spend, spend” will drive higher inflation.
   • U.S. CPI inflation rose from around 1–2% in 2020 to a peak of 9.1% year‑over‑year in June 2022, the highest in about four decades, confirming a sharp post‑2021 inflation surge. (usinflationcalculator.com)
   • Research from the San Francisco Fed and others finds that pandemic fiscal support, including the American Rescue Plan, added several percentage points to core inflation relative to a no‑stimulus baseline, and excess savings from government transfers closely tracked the rise and fall of “excess” inflation. (en.wikipedia.org)
   Verdict on (1): directionally right – Biden‑era fiscal policy was one important driver of the inflation spike, even though supply shocks and other factors also mattered.

2. It will drive commodity prices higher.
   • The World Bank reported that energy prices in 2021 were expected to average more than 80% higher than 2020, with broad gains across energy, agriculture, and metals; prices remained elevated into 2022 before easing later. (worldbank.org)
   • U.S. energy components of the CPI (gasoline, fuel oil, etc.) showed year‑over‑year gains on the order of 40–60% by mid‑2022. (usinflationcalculator.com)
   Verdict on (2): right in the relevant “years following early 2021” window – commodity prices did in fact surge.

3. It will “suppress the wealth creation of the rich.”
   • Billionaire and top‑1% wealth increased dramatically during and after the pandemic. Oxfam’s analysis of Forbes data finds that 2021 saw the largest annual increase in billionaire wealth on record, driven largely by trillions in government support. (oxfamamerica.org)
   • A 2025 Oxfam‑linked report and related coverage show the top 10 U.S. billionaires’ combined wealth roughly doubled from about $976 billion in January 2021 to about $2.0 trillion by early 2025. (theguardian.com)
   • Federal Reserve Distributional Financial Accounts and subsequent summaries indicate that the top 1% share of U.S. wealth edged up, from roughly 30–31% pre‑pandemic to about 31% by 2025:Q2, while the bottom 50% share rose only modestly to about 2.5%. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • A San Francisco Fed letter on “pandemic excess wealth” finds that households accumulated about $13 trillion in excess real net worth by late 2021, driven mainly by financial assets—benefiting wealthier households the most—even though some of that excess wealth was later eroded when markets corrected. (frbsf.org)
   Verdict on (3): wrong – in absolute and relative terms, the rich saw very large wealth gains in the Biden era; there is no sign that their wealth creation was “suppressed” compared with recent history.

4. It will raise real earned income for people without significant investments, leading them to spend more.
   • Pandemic‑era relief and strong labor markets did initially boost disposable income and savings broadly. Fed researchers estimate U.S. households accumulated about $2.3 trillion in excess savings through mid‑2021, with the lower half of the income distribution still holding about $350 billion of that by mid‑2022, largely due to fiscal stimulus. (federalreserve.gov)
   • However, high inflation in 2021–2022 eroded those gains. Census data show that real median household income in 2024 was essentially flat vs. 2023, and some groups (e.g., Black households) saw real income declines; elevated prices “quashed” much of the apparent nominal income progress. (washingtonpost.com)
   • BLS data show that real average hourly earnings for private‑sector workers fell during the main inflation surge and only posted modest positive year‑over‑year gains again by 2023–2025, meaning many workers spent years with real pay below where it would have been on the pre‑pandemic trend. (bls.gov)
   • On the spending side, evidence suggests that high‑income households have come to dominate consumption. By 2024–2025, the top 10% of earners accounted for about 49.7% of all consumer spending, a record share, and their spending rose much faster than that of working‑class and middle‑class households, whose spending barely kept up with inflation. (wsj.com)
   Verdict on (4): mostly wrong – there was a temporary stimulus‑driven boost, but sustained increases in real earned income for non‑investors are weak, and recent consumption growth is increasingly led by the rich, not by people without significant assets.

Overall assessment:
Chamath correctly anticipated that large Biden‑era fiscal stimulus would coincide with higher inflation and a run‑up in commodity prices. But the more distinctive and core part of his thesis—that this “spend, spend, spend” era would shift the balance of wealth creation and real income toward those without investments and away from the rich—has been contradicted by subsequent data. Wealth at the top has surged, the top 1%’s share of wealth has not been meaningfully reduced, real income gains for lower‑asset households have been limited and uneven, and the economy has grown more—not less—dependent on high‑income consumers’ spending.

Because the key distributional predictions (3) and (4) have clearly not materialized, the overall forecast is best classified as wrong, despite being partially right on inflation and commodities.

Based on data up to November 30, 2025, no advanced economy like the United States, the euro area, Japan, or the U.K. has experienced hyperinflation (typically defined as 50%+ per month price increases) since Chamath’s 2021 statement.

• In the U.S., CPI inflation peaked at about 9% year‑over‑year in mid‑2022, which is historically high but nowhere near hyperinflation levels, and then fell back toward the Fed’s target range by 2023–2024.
• Similar patterns of elevated but not runaway inflation occurred in other advanced economies; none approached the Weimar Germany / Venezuela style collapses implied by true hyperinflation over 2021–2025.

However, his normalized claim is essentially structural and open‑ended in time: that in advanced tech‑heavy economies “true hyperinflation… will not occur” because it is “not even possible… anymore.” Whether such a strong, unconditional statement holds for all future years cannot be determined as of 2025; the absence of hyperinflation over ~4 years is evidence in its favor but not decisive proof that it is no longer possible.

Because the forecast concerns an effectively indefinite future state of the world and has not been falsified but also cannot yet be definitively confirmed, the correct classification as of now is “inconclusive (too early)”.

It’s too early in the 21st century to judge this prediction.

Key facts so far:

• As of 2025, the United States is still the world’s largest economy in nominal GDP, with about $30.5T vs. China’s $19.2T according to IMF-based estimates. China is #2. (avatrade.com)
• In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China is already the largest single economy, ahead of the U.S., and holds roughly 19–21% of world output vs. about 17–18% for the U.S. (statranker.org) That supports a trend toward greater Chinese economic weight, but not yet clear overall “dominance.”
• Global influence is increasingly bloc-based rather than purely about a single country. Recent analysis argues the world is splitting into a U.S.-centered and a China-centered economic bloc, with the U.S. bloc currently controlling about 68% of global GDP at market prices vs. 26% for the China bloc—implying continued very large U.S.-aligned influence. (ft.com)
• Long-run forecasts are conflicted:
  • Goldman Sachs-style projections expect China to surpass U.S. GDP around the 2030s and remain ahead for part of the century. (worldeconomics.com)
  • Other analyses (Capital Economics, Bloomberg Economics, Lowy Institute) now argue China may never sustainably overtake the U.S. at market exchange rates because of demographics, slowing productivity, and structural headwinds, or that any lead would be small and temporary. (capitaleconomics.com)

Because the prediction concerns the entire 21st century (“the inevitability of the 21st century”), and we are only about a quarter of the way through with major expert disagreement on whether China will ever clearly and durably surpass U.S. economic power, we cannot yet say the forecast is right or wrong. The evidence is mixed and the time horizon has not elapsed, so the outcome remains inconclusive.

The Ever Given grounded in the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 and was fully refloated/freed on 29 March 2021, ending the blockage after about six days total.(en.wikipedia.org)

Friedberg’s prediction (made on 27 March 2021) was that it would take “another week or two” to dig around the sand and use tugboats to free the ship—i.e., roughly 7–14 more days from that point. In reality, the ship was freed roughly 2 days later, on 29 March, well short of the predicted 1–2 week additional timeline.(en.wikipedia.org)

While his description of the method used (dredging sand/mud plus tugboats) matched what actually happened, the prediction we are evaluating is the timeframe, which was substantially off. Therefore, the prediction is wrong.

News reports and official accounts show that the Ever Given ran aground in the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 and was freed on 29 March 2021, meaning it remained stuck for about six days, not an additional 1–2 weeks from the date of the podcast on 27 March 2021. (en.wikipedia.org)

Multiple sources report that the ship was fully refloated and free to move in the canal on 29 March 2021 at about 15:05 local time, after intensive dredging of sand and mud around the bow and coordinated tugboat operations over several days. (theguardian.com)

Friedberg’s mechanism expectation (digging around the sand plus tugboats) matches what actually happened: dredgers removed tens of thousands of cubic meters of sand and mud while a flotilla of tugboats pushed and pulled the ship free. (theguardian.com)

However, his timing prediction — that it would take "another week or two" from late March 2021 — was clearly off, because the ship was freed roughly two days after the conversation date, not 7–14 days. Since the prediction included a specific time frame that did not occur, the prediction as stated is best judged wrong, even though the described method was broadly accurate.

Evidence shows that the predicted nickel‑driven doubling of Tesla vehicle prices never occurred.

• The event Chamath referenced did happen. Early in 2021, Russian producer Nornickel temporarily halted production at two of its main mines (Oktyabrsky and Taimyrsky) due to flooding, cutting a significant chunk of global nickel supply.(fr.wikipedia.org) This contributed to concerns about a nickel shortage.

• Even extreme nickel spikes translate to modest battery‑cost changes. The International Energy Agency estimated that doubling lithium or nickel prices would raise battery pack costs by only about 6%, and a simultaneous doubling of both would merely offset expected cost declines from scale—not remotely enough to double the vehicle price.(fortune.com) That already makes the mechanism behind the prediction implausible.

• Tesla prices rose, but by tens of percent, not ~100%. Around the time of the mine flooding, the Tesla Model 3 Standard Range Plus in the U.S. had a base price of $36,990 in February 2021.(electrek.co) Through a series of 2021 hikes, the same trim moved to about $39,990–$41,990 (roughly 8–13% above its early‑2021 low).(electrek.co) Higher‑end models (Model S/X/Y) also saw increases, but CarsDirect and other trackers show jumps on the order of a few thousand to low tens of thousands of dollars—typically 10–40%—not anywhere close to a doubling.(electrek.co)

• Nickel shock in 2022 caused only small price moves, not a doubling. In March 2022, nickel prices briefly went parabolic on the LME, more than doubling in hours during the nickel crisis tied to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.(theguardian.com) Tesla’s reaction was incremental: it added about $1,000 to the Model 3 Long Range and Model Y Long Range prices—taking, for example, the Model 3 LR from roughly $50k–$51k, not to $70k+.(insideevs.com) Again, nowhere near a 100% increase.

• Over time, many Tesla prices were cut back, not driven ever‑higher. In 2023 Tesla cut U.S. prices across the lineup by as much as ~20%, with Model 3 and Model Y trims reduced by thousands of dollars; a Model Y Long Range, for instance, dropped from $65,990 to $52,990.(cars.com) As of 2025, a new Model 3 variant in the U.S. is priced around $36,990—comparable to or below its pre‑flood price once you adjust for trims and incentives.(businessinsider.com) That is directionally opposite to the supposed sustained doubling.

• Tesla also reduced its exposure to nickel instead of remaining fully dependent on it. By October 2021 Tesla said it would move all standard‑range Model 3/Y vehicles globally to lithium‑iron‑phosphate (LFP) packs that contain no nickel or cobalt, in part because of nickel supply and price concerns.(techcrunch.com) In Q1 2022, the company reported that nearly half of the vehicles it produced used LFP batteries with no nickel at all.(cnbc.com) This strategic shift further undercuts the idea that a nickel shortage would—or could—cause Tesla car prices to double.

Given that (1) the Nornickel flooding did occur, but (2) Tesla’s retail vehicle prices never came close to doubling relative to their pre‑flood levels, and (3) the observed nickel price shocks resulted in only modest, and later partially reversed, price adjustments, Chamath’s prediction that “a flood in a nickel mine is going to cause the price of a Tesla to basically double” has clearly not come true.

Chamath was referring to a looming nickel shortage for EV batteries and said that within less than a year there would be a 37–40% deficit of the nickel needed. By late March 2022, available data show:

• In 2021 the global nickel market did move into deficit, but by about 160–170 thousand tonnes versus roughly 2.8 million tonnes of demand (around a 6% shortfall), not 37–40%. (ar2021.nornickel.com)
• For 2022, the International Nickel Study Group and industry analyses later estimated a small surplus, with production exceeding usage by about 100–115 thousand tonnes; again, not a large deficit. (think.ing.com)
• Other compilations of WBMS data likewise show only modest deficits or near-balance in 2022, with refined production and consumption differing by tens of thousands of tonnes, not by more than a third of required volumes. (news.metal.com)
• Forecasts around the time of his comment that did mention a 37% nickel deficit tied that number to 2030 scenarios (about a 2.2 million tonne shortfall by the end of the decade), not to conditions one year out. (forbes.com)
• Subsequent market developments have moved toward oversupply rather than extreme shortage, as rapid capacity growth in Indonesia has created a persistent nickel surplus and driven prices sharply lower. (reuters.com)

Given that no evidence supports anything close to a 37–40% nickel shortfall within a year of March 2021, his timing and magnitude were both off, even though there was a much smaller deficit and a temporary price spike.

As of November 30, 2025, there has not been a new U.S. nuclear power plant that has gone from project initiation to commercial operation within the post‑2021 period, so we do not yet have a full start‑to‑finish example to test whether “any new nuclear power plant” still inevitably takes “decades” under U.S. rules.

The most recent large U.S. nuclear builds are Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia. Preliminary construction for these AP1000 units began around 2009, and they entered commercial operation in July 2023 and April 2024 respectively—roughly 14–15 years from early construction to operation, and close to two decades from initial planning—illustrating very long timelines, but not providing a new, faster counterexample. (en.wikipedia.org)

Since Jason’s 2021 statement, several advanced reactor projects have been launched with sub‑decade targets from site selection to operation. TerraPower’s Natrium demonstration plant in Kemmerer, Wyoming was selected in 2021, purchased its site in 2023, began non‑nuclear construction in 2024, and currently targets grid operation around 2030–2031, implying roughly a 9–10 year span if the schedule holds—shorter than “multiple decades,” but the plant is not yet online. (terrapower.com) Until such projects actually reach commercial operation, we cannot say whether they truly broke the historic multi‑decade pattern.

Moreover, Jason’s normalized prediction is explicitly conditional on the “existing regulatory regime.” Since 2021 there have been significant statutory and executive changes aimed at speeding reviews: NEPA timelines were tightened via the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, and the 2024 ADVANCE Act directs the NRC to create expedited and more predictable licensing processes for new and advanced reactors. (nrc.gov) In 2025, presidential executive orders further instructed regulators to compress new‑reactor licensing timelines to roughly 18 months, explicitly trying to move away from multi‑decade approval cycles. (reuters.com) These changes mean the regulatory framework Jason was criticizing is no longer static.

Because (1) no post‑2021 U.S. nuclear project has yet completed the full permitting‑to‑operation cycle, and (2) the regulatory regime itself has been substantially revised since his statement, there is not enough realized history under stable rules to determine definitively whether his prediction about “decades” for any new plant has held or failed. Hence the outcome is best classified as inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than clearly right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, the traditional movie theater industry clearly still exists and has not "gone out of business."

• Major U.S. chains continue to operate at large scale. For example, Cinemark operates 497 theaters with 5,653 screens across the U.S. and Latin America as of March 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) Regal is not only open but investing in upgrades, such as converting its Edwards Greenway Grand Palace in Houston into an IMAX with Laser location in 2025. (houstonchronicle.com) AMC also continues to operate and even distributes some films, accounting for over $200M of the 2023 domestic box office via AMC Theatres Distribution. (the-numbers.com)
• The domestic theatrical market is still generating billions in annual revenue, indicating an active, not defunct, industry. The U.S. box office totaled about $9.9B in 2023 and $8.6B in 2024. (the-numbers.com)
• In 2025, big studio releases are still opening widely in theaters. Wicked: For Good debuted with $150M in North America alone, playing in 4,115 theaters, and helped push the 2025 domestic box office into the multi‑billion‑dollar range. (apnews.com)

While some specific theater brands (e.g., ArcLight) have closed or changed hands, other operators have taken over many of those locations, and the sector as a whole remains very much alive. (en.wikipedia.org) This matches Friedberg’s prediction that movie theaters would not simply disappear, even after the pandemic disruption.

By Memorial Day weekend 2021 (around May 27–31), the U.S. was in a much better place than during the winter peak, but COVID-19 was still clearly ongoing and substantially restricting normal life.

• Substantial continuing spread and deaths. Around May 28, 2021, the U.S. seven‑day average was about 17,887 new cases per day, and cumulative deaths had reached roughly 593,000, with more than 33 million infections recorded.(business-standard.com) That is not consistent with a disease being “over,” even in a purely practical sense.

• Restrictions were eased, but far from gone. On May 13, 2021, the CDC said fully vaccinated people could forgo masks in most indoor and outdoor settings, but still required masks in health‑care facilities, on public transportation, and wherever businesses or local rules mandated them, while unvaccinated people were still advised to mask and distance.(cnbc.com) Many states and cities maintained their own mandates and capacity rules through and beyond Memorial Day; for example, New Jersey only lifted its indoor mask rule for vaccinated people on May 28 and still required masks in schools, transit, and other high‑risk settings, while Delaware kept approval requirements for large events and had only just lifted its state mask mandate on May 21.(en.wikipedia.org) Nationwide, masks and other rules continued to shape daily activities.

• Key populations still unprotected and constrained. FDA and CDC only extended vaccine use to ages 12–15 in mid‑May 2021; children under 12 remained ineligible until late October 2021.(biontechse.gcs-web.com) Guidance at the time emphasized ongoing masking and distancing for unvaccinated children in schools, camps, and other group settings, meaning family life and education were still far from pre‑pandemic normal.(kvia.com)

• Later events confirm the pandemic was not “over.” Just two months after Memorial Day, the Delta variant surge forced the CDC on July 27, 2021 to reverse its May guidance and again recommend indoor masking for vaccinated people in areas of substantial or high transmission, underscoring that conditions had not stabilized into a post‑pandemic normal.(cnbc.com)

• Behavioral normalization was partial, not "largely" nationwide. Travel for Memorial Day 2021 was forecast to rebound to about 37 million travelers, still about 13% below 2019 levels, and public health officials were explicitly urging continued caution because “the pandemic continues.”(newsroom.aaa.com)

Taken together—ongoing significant case and death counts, broad yet uneven restrictions, large unvaccinated populations (especially children), and a major subsequent surge—the situation around U.S. Memorial Day 2021 does not match the prediction that COVID-19 would be effectively “over” in the United States in practical terms with life largely normalized and restrictions mostly lifted. The prediction is therefore wrong.

The prediction has two parts:

1. "In California, by April 15, 2021, Covid-19 vaccines will be available to all adults" – This is correct. California officially expanded eligibility to everyone 16+ starting April 15, 2021, as announced March 25 and implemented April 15 by the Governor’s office and Cal OES.​(gov.ca.gov)

2. "…and by May 15, 2021, every Californian who wants to be vaccinated will have been able to receive a Covid-19 vaccine dose" – This is not supported by the evidence and is overly optimistic.

   • State projections on March 25 explicitly said that even with expanded supplies it would take several months to vaccinate willing Californians, not one month after April 15.​(gov.ca.gov)
   • By May 4, 2021, Newsom’s office reported that only about 60% of eligible Californians had received at least one dose, and was still rolling out major initiatives (targeted clinics, at‑home vaccinations, free transportation, $85M for community‑based outreach) specifically to reach people who hadn’t yet been vaccinated, especially in hard‑to‑reach communities—i.e., many willing people still had not been served.​(gov.ca.gov)
   • On May 15, 2021, the Los Angeles Times noted that just over 50% of all California residents had received at least one dose, meaning roughly half the state was still unvaccinated at that point.​(latimes.com)
   • Later in 2021, California continued vaccinating millions more people; by late August or December, the state was only then reaching ~80–86% of eligible residents with at least one dose, indicating that the process of vaccinating willing Californians plainly extended well beyond mid‑May.​(gov.ca.gov)

Because a large number of Californians who eventually got vaccinated had not yet received a dose by May 15, and the state itself expected and observed that vaccinating the willing would take several months rather than one, the second (timeline) part of Chamath’s prediction did not come true. Overall, combining both clauses, the prediction is best scored as wrong.

Chamath’s prediction has two parts: long mine-permitting timelines and very near‑term metal shortages.

1. Permitting timelines (~20 years) in the Western Hemisphere
Multiple post‑2021 analyses still describe very long lead times for new large metal mines:

• S&P Global and the IEA report that a new copper mine typically takes about 16–17 years from discovery to first production, reflecting long periods for exploration, permitting, financing, and construction, with some projects stretching beyond 20 years. (cnbc.com)
• A mining commentary focused on North America notes that in Canada and the United States it can take up to 20 years to build a mine after consultations and permitting at federal and sub‑national levels. (mining.com)
• Canada’s Mining Association describes planning and approval for new projects as 10–15 years and says there’s broad consensus this must be shortened. (mining.ca)
  These sources indicate that, through the mid‑2020s, large Western‑Hemisphere metal mines still require on the order of 15–20 years to permit and develop. So this part of his view (that timelines are extremely long and remain so) is broadly accurate.

2. “Our shortages start in the next year” (i.e., by ~March 2022)
Here the timing is off:

• For copper, the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) estimates a refined market deficit of about 475,000 tonnes in 2021, less than 2% of demand—tight, but not a severe structural shortage. (mining.com)
• By late 2021, ICSG and S&P Global expected 2022 to be in surplus and “well supplied”, with a forecast refined copper surplus of roughly 300,000 tonnes, not a shortage. (spglobal.com)
• Major studies in 2022–2023 (S&P Global, IEA, International Energy Forum) warn that structural copper shortages are likely to begin around the mid‑2020s (as early as ~2025) and then widen sharply toward 2030–2035, threatening the energy transition if new mines aren’t built. That is, they project future deficits; they do not identify 2022 as the start of a sustained shortage era. (ief.org)
• For nickel used in EV batteries, 2021–2022 analyses (Rystad, others) generally forecast shortages emerging mid‑decade (2023–2026), not in 2022. (globalenergyprize.org) The dramatic March 2022 nickel price spike and LME trading suspension were driven largely by a short squeeze and Russia‑Ukraine war risk, rather than a sudden, broad physical shortage for electrification uses. (reuters.com)
• Throughout 2021–2022, clean‑energy deployment (EVs, solar, wind) continued to grow rapidly; the main bottlenecks widely reported were semiconductors and logistics, not an inability to procure copper or nickel at any price.

In other words, while markets were tightening and prices were rising, the consensus view and data do not show a clear, sustained copper/nickel shortage specifically constraining electrification beginning by March 2022. Structural shortages are now expected or beginning several years later than he claimed.

Because the long‑permitting part of the statement is basically correct but the central prediction—that significant metal shortages for electrification would start within about one year of March 2021—did not materialize on that timeline, the overall prediction is best judged as wrong.