As of November 30, 2025, there has not been a new U.S. nuclear power plant that has gone from project initiation to commercial operation within the post‑2021 period, so we do not yet have a full start‑to‑finish example to test whether “any new nuclear power plant” still inevitably takes “decades” under U.S. rules.

The most recent large U.S. nuclear builds are Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia. Preliminary construction for these AP1000 units began around 2009, and they entered commercial operation in July 2023 and April 2024 respectively—roughly 14–15 years from early construction to operation, and close to two decades from initial planning—illustrating very long timelines, but not providing a new, faster counterexample. (en.wikipedia.org)

Since Jason’s 2021 statement, several advanced reactor projects have been launched with sub‑decade targets from site selection to operation. TerraPower’s Natrium demonstration plant in Kemmerer, Wyoming was selected in 2021, purchased its site in 2023, began non‑nuclear construction in 2024, and currently targets grid operation around 2030–2031, implying roughly a 9–10 year span if the schedule holds—shorter than “multiple decades,” but the plant is not yet online. (terrapower.com) Until such projects actually reach commercial operation, we cannot say whether they truly broke the historic multi‑decade pattern.

Moreover, Jason’s normalized prediction is explicitly conditional on the “existing regulatory regime.” Since 2021 there have been significant statutory and executive changes aimed at speeding reviews: NEPA timelines were tightened via the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, and the 2024 ADVANCE Act directs the NRC to create expedited and more predictable licensing processes for new and advanced reactors. (nrc.gov) In 2025, presidential executive orders further instructed regulators to compress new‑reactor licensing timelines to roughly 18 months, explicitly trying to move away from multi‑decade approval cycles. (reuters.com) These changes mean the regulatory framework Jason was criticizing is no longer static.

Because (1) no post‑2021 U.S. nuclear project has yet completed the full permitting‑to‑operation cycle, and (2) the regulatory regime itself has been substantially revised since his statement, there is not enough realized history under stable rules to determine definitively whether his prediction about “decades” for any new plant has held or failed. Hence the outcome is best classified as inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than clearly right or wrong.