NBA Gambling Scandal, Tesla Trillion Dollar Vote, Billionaire Tax, Amazon Robots, AWS Outage

As of November 30, 2025, the proposed one‑time 5% wealth tax on California billionaires exists only as a proposed initiative, commonly called the 2026 Billionaire Tax Act or California Billionaire Tax Act. Organizers filed it with the California Attorney General on October 21–22, 2025 and are just beginning to gather signatures to qualify it for the November 2026 ballot.(seiu-uhw.org)

Current reporting and campaign materials describe the measure’s substance and signature requirements but do not indicate that:

1. Voters have yet voted on it (it has not appeared on any ballot), or
2. Any court has ruled on its constitutionality or blocked it from taking effect (it has not even been enacted).(axios.com)

Some policy analysis pieces explicitly say that the tax would likely face constitutional challenges in the future, but they describe anticipated litigation, not any decided case.(californiapolicycenter.org)

Because the key contingencies in Friedberg’s prediction—voters approving the amendment and courts then finding it unconstitutional so it never goes into effect—have not yet occurred or been tested, there is not enough information to declare the prediction right or wrong at this time.

As of November 30, 2025, the SEIU-backed “2026 Billionaire Tax Act” has only recently been filed with the California Attorney General and is still in the early procedural phase. It is undergoing the 30‑day public review, after which proponents will have up to 180 days to gather roughly 875,000 signatures to qualify for the November 2026 ballot.(insidesalt.com)

Coverage of the initiative consistently frames SEIU‑UHW’s stated purpose as replacing Medicaid/Medi‑Cal funding lost due to recent federal cuts and averting a health‑care crisis, with revenue directed 90% to Medi‑Cal and 10% to K‑12 education.(apnews.com) These reports describe messaging around protecting health care and education, not an explicit strategy of baiting opponents so they can be politically “destroyed.”

Because the next election cycle in which this measure would be on the ballot is November 2026, that campaign has not yet begun in earnest. There is not yet evidence of systematic SEIU or allied campaigns using the measure to target and politically damage high‑profile figures who publicly denounce it (for example, no documented attack‑ad campaigns or coordinated hit pieces tied to specific denouncers as of now).

Given the short time between the podcast (October 24, 2025) and today, and the fact that the 2026 election cycle is still ahead, it is too early to determine whether Friedberg’s prediction about the initiative’s primary use as political bait will ultimately prove correct.

As of November 30, 2025, there has been no California ballot measure approved by voters establishing a billionaire wealth/wealth-tax of the kind described, no subsequent court invalidation of such a voter‑approved tax, and therefore no follow‑on legislative tax package using that voter approval as justification.

Key points:

• California has had proposals and discussions about wealth or high-earner taxes (e.g., various ideas from legislators and activists), but no enacted, voter-approved billionaire wealth tax that was then struck down in court is documented in the news or in official state records by this date.
• Because the contingent sequence in Chamath’s prediction (1) voter approval, (2) judicial overturning, then (3) legislative action, has not even begun, we cannot yet say whether the legislature will later respond in the way he predicts.

Since the triggering events have not occurred and the relevant election cycles (e.g., November 2026) are still in the future, the correctness of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated, so the status is “inconclusive (too early)”.

California’s Proposition 55 (the 2016 California Children’s Education and Health Care Protection Act) already extends the higher income‑tax rates on high earners through 2030; any further extension beyond 2030 requires a new measure. (calbudgetcenter.org)

As of November 30, 2025:

• The California Teachers Association and allied groups have filed and are campaigning for a new initiative, The California Children’s Education and Health Care Protection Act of 2026, intended to permanently extend the Prop 55 high‑earner tax and place it on the November 2026 ballot. (cta.org)
• The California Secretary of State lists this measure (initiative no. 25‑0016) as a proposal pending review by the Attorney General, meaning it has not even reached the signature‑gathering completion stage, let alone appeared on a ballot or been approved by voters. (sos.ca.gov)

Because no law or ballot measure has yet been enacted to extend the Prop 55 tax rates beyond their current 2030 sunset, and the decisive 2026 vote has not occurred, we cannot say whether Friedberg’s prediction that “they’re going to get that passed” is right or wrong at this time.

As of November 30, 2025, California has not yet imposed or collected a one‑time 5% wealth tax on billionaires. What exists is a proposed ballot initiative, the 2026 Billionaire Tax Act, which would levy a one‑time 5% tax on the net worth of Californians worth over $1 billion and is currently in the signature‑gathering / qualification phase for the November 2026 ballot. (forbes.com)

News coverage and the campaign’s own materials all describe this as a proposal that still needs sufficient signatures and then voter approval before it could become law; none report that it has been enacted or that any such tax has been collected. (apnews.com)

Because the conditional trigger in the prediction (“If California successfully imposes a one‑time 5% wealth tax on billionaires and collects it”) has not occurred yet, we cannot evaluate whether the state will later repeat or extend such taxes. The prediction therefore remains too early to judge and is best classified as inconclusive at this time.

As of November 30, 2025, California has not yet implemented any billionaire wealth tax, so Chamath’s conditional, longer‑term prediction cannot be meaningfully judged.

• The main current effort is the 2026 Billionaire Tax Act, a proposed statewide ballot initiative to impose a one‑time 5% tax on net worth above roughly $1–1.1 billion, targeting around 200 billionaires. It has only been filed and is in the signature‑gathering phase for the November 2026 ballot; it is not law and has not taken effect. (seiu-uhw.org)
• An earlier legislative attempt, AB 259 (2023–2024), would have created an ongoing wealth tax with a structure that did push the threshold down over time (initially taxing net worth above $1 billion, then extending to wealth above $50 million after 2026). However, AB 259 failed in committee on February 1, 2024 and never became law. (calmatters.digitaldemocracy.org)

Chamath’s normalized prediction was: if California’s billionaire wealth‑tax framework is implemented and sustained, the threshold will eventually be lowered below $1 billion. Since no such framework has been enacted or sustained yet, we can’t evaluate whether the threshold would later be pushed down in practice. The necessary precondition for the prediction to be tested has not occurred, so the outcome remains unknown.

The prediction is explicitly about what will happen “over the coming years” starting from October 24, 2025, so only about five weeks of real time have passed—far too little to judge multi‑year migration and tax‑base effects.

Available data up to 2023–2024 show trends before the prediction, not what happens after it:

• New York State tax department migration tables show that millionaire address changes spiked in 2020 and then declined toward pre‑Covid rates by 2022–2023, suggesting no ongoing acceleration in high‑earner flight as of the latest official data. (tax.ny.gov)
• A July 2025 Fiscal Policy Institute analysis finds that the top 1% of New Yorkers increased in number between 2019 and 2022 and that high‑earner migration rates had largely returned to normal, with no statistically significant evidence that recent state tax hikes caused unusually high millionaire out‑migration. (fiscalpolicy.org)
• Other analyses highlight a longer‑run loss of income and residents from New York to states like Florida and Texas, and a shrinking share of U.S. millionaires in New York, which has already reduced potential tax revenue. However, these effects are measured over 2010–2022 or the past decade, not the post‑October‑2025 period the prediction refers to. (cbcny.org)

Because (1) the claim is about a future, multi‑year "exodus" driven by the current roughly 17% top combined income‑tax burden, and (2) there has not yet been enough time for new, post‑prediction migration/tax‑base data to be collected and analyzed, it is too early to determine whether Jason’s forecast will prove correct. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early) rather than right or wrong at this point.

The prediction was explicitly about severe long‑term business deterioration and DraftKings/FanDuel being effectively 'toast', driven by the rise of platforms like Polymarket.

As of late November 2025 (about five weeks after the October 24, 2025 podcast), both DraftKings and Flutter (FanDuel’s parent) remain large, actively traded companies: DraftKings is around $33 per share and Flutter around $209 per share, implying substantial market value and far from a collapse. Their stocks have sold off and faced downgrades in 2025, with analysts citing margin pressure, higher taxes, and emerging competition from prediction markets, but this is framed as earnings headwinds and reduced price targets, not business failure. (investors.com) Industry coverage still describes DraftKings and FanDuel as the two dominant U.S. sportsbook operators with roughly 70% market share, even as prediction markets like Kalshi and Polymarket gain traction. (ainvest.com)

Polymarket and other prediction platforms have clearly spooked investors—e.g., DKNG and FLUT dropped sharply after news of a $2 billion ICE investment in Polymarket, and reports explicitly link some of the share-price pressure to prediction‑market competition. (sccgmanagement.com) However, the incumbents are also actively adapting by entering prediction markets themselves (e.g., DraftKings’ Railbird acquisition and planned ‘DraftKings Predictions’, FanDuel’s planned ‘FanDuel Predicts’ app with CME), which cuts against the idea that their competitive position is already largely eroding and irrecoverable. (insidebitcoins.com)

Given the very short time elapsed and the fact that both firms are still leading players with significant revenue, market share, and strategic options, it is too early to say that they have suffered the kind of long‑term, existential deterioration implied by the prediction. The available evidence supports increased risk and pressure, not that they are definitively 'toast', so the outcome is best classified as inconclusive at this point.

As of November 30, 2025, it’s too early to judge this prediction.

Chamath’s timeframe was "within the next several years" from October 24, 2025, so only about a month has elapsed—well short of the horizon implied by the statement.

Current market structure only shows partial steps toward what he describes:

• Multi-asset trading platforms like QuantConnect already let users trade across several traditional asset classes (equities, futures, forex, options, cryptocurrencies) from a single environment, but they do not natively integrate regulated event‑betting/prediction markets into the same retail account with unified margin as described. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Regulated prediction markets such as Kalshi focus on event contracts and don’t function as unified brokers for stocks, options, and crypto within one shared-margin account. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Crypto‑native prediction platforms like Polymarket similarly center on event markets and are not fully integrated, mainstream multi‑asset brokerage apps that combine equities, options, and prediction markets under one KYC/AML umbrella. (en.wikipedia.org)
• New infrastructure efforts like The Clearing Co aim to let brokerages bolt prediction markets onto existing offerings (stocks, crypto, etc.), but they are still in licensing/early-launch stages and have not yet produced the sort of dominant, unified end‑user app Chamath envisions. (wsj.com)

So, while no clear, dominant platform yet matches his full vision, the specified multi‑year window has barely begun. The correct status today is therefore inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than right or wrong.

As of 30 November 2025, available market‑share data shows that AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have not yet converged to anything close to a 33/33/33 split in public cloud infrastructure, but Chamath’s claim was explicitly about where they will “eventually” end up in a mature, steady‑state market. That time horizon has clearly not arrived, so the prediction cannot yet be judged true or false.

Recent analyst estimates for global cloud infrastructure (IaaS+PaaS) continue to show AWS in the lead, Azure gaining, and GCP a distant third: for example, 2024–2025 reports from firms such as Synergy Research and Canalys put AWS at roughly the low‑30s percent share, Azure in the mid‑20s, and Google Cloud around low‑ to mid‑teens, with the remainder split among other providers (Alibaba Cloud, Oracle, IBM, etc.). These numbers confirm that:

• The market is still meaningfully not three‑way equal; GCP is far from AWS/Azure’s scale, and a non‑trivial “other” category still exists.
• The industry itself is still evolving rapidly, including major AI‑driven and specialized cloud services, which makes it hard to claim we’ve reached the “mature, non‑AI public cloud infrastructure market” he was talking about.

Because the prediction is about the eventual end state of a market that is still in flux decades before any plausible maturity, the correct assessment today is that it’s too early to tell whether the market will converge to the ~33/33/33 split Chamath forecast. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early).

Public information shows that at Tesla’s November 6, 2025 annual shareholder meeting, shareholders approved Elon Musk’s new “trillion‑dollar” compensation package with roughly 75% of votes cast in favor, according to preliminary results reported by multiple outlets.(kpbs.org)

Before the vote, however, there was significant, visible opposition that made outright rejection at least a live possibility:

• Major proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis both formally recommended that investors vote against the package, calling it excessively large and dilutive.(businessinsider.com)
• Norway’s sovereign wealth fund (one of Tesla’s largest shareholders) publicly announced it would vote against the deal, and other large funds and unions organized campaigns opposing it.(theguardian.com)
• Tesla’s own board chair, Robyn Denholm, warned in a pre‑meeting letter and media appearances that the company risked losing Musk if the plan was not approved, underscoring that the board itself viewed rejection as a real risk, not a remote theoretical possibility.(reuters.com)

Chamath’s statement was probabilistic and qualitative: that there was a risk / “meaningful chance” the package could be voted down, not that it would be voted down. A single observed outcome (approval) does not let us retrospectively measure the true ex‑ante probability to check whether that “meaningful chance” assessment was numerically accurate. At the same time, the documented opposition and warnings show there clearly was some genuine risk, but the eventual 75% approval margin could be read as evidence that the actual probability of failure may have been relatively low.

Because the claim is about the size of an ex‑ante probability and not about a definitive outcome, and because the realized vote result alone cannot confirm or falsify the exact probability he implied, the prediction cannot be cleanly scored as right or wrong. The fairest evaluation is ambiguous: enough time has passed and we know the outcome, but we still cannot determine from available evidence whether his “meaningful chance of rejection” assessment was quantitatively correct.

As of now (November 30, 2025), Tesla’s humanoid robot Optimus is still in relatively early development and prototyping:

• Tesla has shown several Optimus prototypes and small-batch units, but there is no credible reporting that anything close to 1,000,000 units have been produced or deployed.
• There is also no record of Optimus (or any other Elon Musk–associated humanoid robot line) being shipped to or operating on Mars; current and near-term Mars missions use traditional rover/lander platforms, not humanoid robots.

Because the condition in Chamath’s prediction refers specifically to where the first million robots are deployed (Mars vs. Earth), and that milestone has not occurred yet, there is no way to assess the truth of the prediction at this time. It could still be right or wrong in the future, but currently it’s too early to tell, so the status is inconclusive.

By November 30, 2025, there is no evidence that state-level “algorithmic discrimination” laws like Colorado’s SB 24-205 have resulted in AI models being legally required to embed DEI-style ideological constraints or “bias layers” in the way the prediction describes.

What these laws actually do so far:

• Colorado’s AI law (SB 24-205 / Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act) creates a duty of reasonable care for developers and deployers of high‑risk AI systems to avoid “algorithmic discrimination,” and requires risk management programs, impact assessments, notices, and disclosures. It treats violations as deceptive trade practices, but it does not prescribe specific ideological content or DEI-style balancing rules inside models. (linklaters.com)
• The law’s compliance date has been delayed from February 1, 2026, to June 30, 2026, giving more time for possible amendments; its framework remains focused on discrimination risk, not mandated DEI ideology. (linkedin.com)
• The statute explicitly targets high‑risk decision systems (employment, credit, housing, etc.), and commentary notes that general-purpose conversational AI used mainly to provide information with a policy against discriminatory content can fall outside the “high‑risk” scope. (americanbar.org)
• Other emerging state efforts (e.g., California AB 2930 on automated decision tools) similarly focus on preventing discriminatory outcomes and requiring assessments and transparency, not on embedding DEI ideological layers in mainstream foundation models. (employmentlawwatch.com)

On the federal side, there have been proposals to preempt state AI laws for a decade, and separate California laws addressing catastrophic AI risk and transparency for frontier models, but again, these do not mandate DEI-style ideological constraints in models. (washingtonpost.com)

Because:

1. The key state laws are not yet in force (Colorado’s core regime starts mid‑2026),
2. No law currently requires mainstream AI systems to hard‑code DEI-style ideological constraints as a condition of legality, and
3. The prediction is explicitly about where things will ultimately lead “if it’s not stopped,” with no clear time horizon,

there is not enough elapsed time or concrete regulatory outcome to say the prediction is either right or wrong. It remains a speculative, long‑term causal claim about regulatory drift, so the proper judgment as of now is inconclusive.