Dueling Presidential interviews, SpaceX's big catch, Robotaxis, Uber buying Expedia?, Nuclear NIMBY

Available data show no clear, discrete shift in either polls or betting/forecast odds that can be tied to the mid‑October interviews, matching Jason’s view that things were effectively “baked in.”

• Timing of the interviews: Trump’s economic interview with Bloomberg at the Economic Club of Chicago was on October 15–16, 2024, and Harris’s first Fox News interview with Bret Baier taped/aired on October 16 on Special Report.

  • Trump–Bloomberg interview coverage: AP and others describe the event in Chicago on Oct. 15.【2†turn2search7】
  • Fox News and media coverage confirm Harris’s Fox interview airing at 6 p.m. ET on Oct. 16, drawing 7.8M viewers.【1†turn1search0】【1†turn1search3】

• Polling averages barely moved around that window:

  • A Newsweek summary of aggregators notes that as of mid‑October Harris led nationally by 2.4 points (48.5–46.1) in 538’s average, down only 0.2 points from her 2.6‑point lead on October 8. RealClearPolitics had her lead falling from 2.0 to 1.7 points over that same span—tiny changes well within normal noise.【5†turn5search0】
  • The underlying national polls from early–mid October through about October 22 show a mix of Harris+ and Trump+ results clustered in the mid‑40s to low‑50s, with no obvious break after October 15–16; the race remains essentially a statistical tie or low‑single‑digit Harris edge before and after those dates.【5†turn5search12】
  • A RealClearPolitics analysis instead describes October as a whole as showing Harris’s national lead shrinking from 3.6% in September to 1.7% in October, emphasizing a gradual month‑long drift, not a sudden shift tied to specific mid‑October media hits.【5†turn5search1】

• Forecast models show only slow, ongoing drift:

  • A snapshot of FiveThirtyEight’s forecast from early October already had Trump slightly favored in the Electoral College (54–46) despite Harris leading ~1.5 points in the popular vote, illustrating that the underlying odds were close and drifting before the interviews.【5†turn5search2】
  • Later commentary from 538 and RealClearPolitics throughout late October continues to describe a slow erosion of Harris’s position rather than any distinct post‑interview inflection point.【5†turn5search1】【5†turn5search3】

• Prediction markets were already moving toward Trump before and simply continued afterward:

  • On Polymarket, Trump’s odds had already surged to about 55.8% vs 43.8% for Harris by October 10–11, i.e., before the Bloomberg and Fox interviews.【4†turn4search4】
  • The Polymarket page and later coverage note that by October 18, Trump’s odds were around 60%, with reporting focusing on large bets from a small number of traders and even a Polymarket investigation into whether the move was essentially a “mirage,” not on any media interview effects.【4†turn4search4】【4†turn4search15】
  • On Kalshi, reporting later in October shows Trump drifting up into the ~60% range over the course of the month; Kalshi’s own October 24 blog post talks about Harris at 40% and emphasizes that 12 days is a long time and odds will keep changing, but does not identify a sharp repricing around October 15–16.【4†turn4search9】【4†turn4search8】

• Context of other events:

  • Analyses of the race emphasize a broader “bad October” for Democrats, with accumulating factors (earlier interviews like Harris’s October 8 View appearance, economic concerns, and ongoing campaign dynamics) driving a slow tightening rather than any single mid‑October media moment.【5†turn5search1】【1†turn1news13】

Because (1) national polling averages shifted by only a few tenths of a point in the week spanning the interviews, (2) major forecast models continued a pre‑existing gradual drift rather than a step change, and (3) prediction‑market moves toward Trump were already underway and largely attributed to big bettors and other factors rather than these interviews, there’s no strong evidence that the Trump–Bloomberg and Harris–Fox interviews materially changed election probabilities or polling. That aligns with Jason’s claim that voter views were essentially already baked in by mid‑October 2024.

Kamala Harris’s interview with Bret Baier on Fox News aired on October 16, 2024, where she tried to distance herself from President Biden and sparred with Baier over immigration and other issues, but coverage treated it as a tough, contentious exchange rather than a breakthrough performance.(cnbc.com)

On October 15, the day before the interview, 538’s national polling average had Harris leading Trump by about 2.4 points (48.5%–46.1%), with RealClearPolitics showing a 1.7‑point Harris lead; in 538’s swing‑state averages she held razor‑thin leads in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Nevada, while Trump led narrowly in North Carolina, Georgia, and Arizona.(newsweek.com) That’s the baseline immediately before the Baier interview.

By October 29—roughly two weeks after the interview—Newsweek reported that Trump’s national numbers had improved relative to the prior week: 538 now had Harris ahead by only about 1.4 points (48.1%–46.6%), down from a 1.7‑point lead just a week earlier, and RealClearPolitics had Trump ahead nationally by 0.5 points (48.1%–47.6%).(newsweek.com) In the swing states, 538 showed Harris and Trump essentially tied in Wisconsin, with Trump slightly ahead in Pennsylvania and Nevada and leading more clearly in North Carolina, Georgia, and Arizona; RealClearPolitics showed Trump ahead in all seven battleground states.(newsweek.com) Relative to the pre‑interview picture, this is, if anything, movement in Trump’s direction, not evidence that Harris closed the gap.

The final election results confirm that Harris did not close the gap in any meaningful sense: Trump won the Electoral College 312–226 and the national popular vote 49.8%–48.3%.(en.wikipedia.org) Polling aggregates on election eve still had Harris only modestly ahead nationally (by less than a point on average) and Trump favored or narrowly ahead in key swing states, a pattern consistent with the eventual outcome.(en.wikipedia.org)

Across the weeks after the Baier interview and leading up to November 5, there is no sign of a durable improvement in Harris’s standing versus Trump; her national edge shrank and her swing‑state position either stagnated or deteriorated slightly. That aligns with Sacks’s prediction that the Fox interview would not improve her standing or help her close the gap with Trump in the weeks before the election.

As of November 30, 2025, the conditions Friedberg specified for the prediction have not occurred, and his "next couple of years" timeline from October 18, 2024 has not yet elapsed.

1. No “routine” 10× reuse of Super Heavy boosters yet
   Public flight records show that Starship has conducted about ten–eleven integrated test flights so far. Some Super Heavy boosters have been reflown (e.g., the booster for Flight 9 previously flew on Flight 7; the booster for Flight 11 previously flew on Flight 8), but no Super Heavy has anything close to 10 flights yet. (supercluster.com)

2. No hour‑scale turnaround; cadence is still weeks to months
   Launch-tracking data list the fastest turnaround between Starship system flights at roughly 37 days, not ~1 hour, and each individual booster/ship pair is used only occasionally, with long periods of inspection and modification between flights. (nextspaceflight.com)

3. $10/kg to LEO is still aspirational, not realized
   Current analyses of early Starship operations suggest effective launch costs on the order of tens to hundreds of dollars per kilogram—e.g., modeling around ~$90–100/kg with modest reuse—and industry writeups talk about projected or long‑term possibilities for $10–20/kg, not actual achieved prices. (nextbigfuture.com)
   Musk and commentators explicitly describe the ~$10/kg number as a future goal dependent on very high reusability and mass production, not something SpaceX is charging or achieving in 2025. (nextbigfuture.com)

Because:

• The prerequisite state Friedberg described (routine ~10‑flight reuse with ~1‑hour turnaround) has not been reached; and
• His timeline of "over the next couple of years" from October 2024 extends to roughly late 2026,

we cannot yet say whether his conditional claim about eventual $10/kg under those conditions is right or wrong. The correct status as of now is that it remains untested and too early to judge.

The prediction is about long‑term potential, not about reaching 100M+ subscribers by a specific year.

1. Current Starlink scale vs. the prediction

   • SpaceX confirmed Starlink passed about 4 million customers in late September 2024, matching the baseline figure discussed on the podcast. (techcrunch.com)
   • Public data and reporting show growth to roughly 8–8.5 million users by late 2025, far short of the 100M+ range discussed in the prediction. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Condition on satellite‑to‑phone availability
   The prediction explicitly hinges on “if we can get satellite to phone and you can get Starlink more broadly available”. As of late 2025, Starlink has begun satellite‑to‑phone services (e.g., text messaging in partnership with mobile carriers) but does not yet have fully broad, mature satellite‑to‑phone coverage for mass‑market data and voice; this is still being built out via spectrum deals and new satellite technology. (washingtonpost.com)

3. No clear falsification window
   The claim is framed as “over time… this could be a 100 million subscriber business… it could be the largest subscription business in the history of humanity.” Since no time horizon is specified and the key prerequisite (ubiquitous satellite‑to‑phone) is still emerging, we cannot yet say whether Starlink will or will not eventually reach 100M+ subscribers and become the largest subscription business by count.

Because the claim is explicitly conditional and open‑ended in time, and Starlink is still far from 100M subscribers but growing quickly, the correct evaluation as of November 30, 2025 is “inconclusive (too early to tell).”

Factual status as of 30 Nov 2025

• Starlink has nowhere near 500 million paying subscribers. Public figures show ~8 million users as of November 2025, up from about 4 million in September 2024 and ~6 million by mid‑2025. 【1search13】
• Several telecom services already exceed 500 million paying subscriptions:
  • China Mobile has around 1.0 billion mobile subscriptions as of September 2024. 【2search0】 
  • Reliance Jio and Bharti Airtel are also in this range: Jio passes 500 million mobile subscribers around September 2025, 【1search2】 and Airtel exceeds 600 million by September 2025. 【2search13】
• Among the typical consumer digital subscriptions discussed on tech podcasts, none is at 500M yet: Netflix has about 302M paid memberships as of January 2025, 【3search19】 and Spotify has about 281M paying subscribers as of September 2025. 【3search26】

Why this makes the prediction ambiguous

Jason’s normalized prediction is that Starlink could become the first product in history to reach ~500M paying subscribers.

1. If “product” includes telecom/mobile services, then the statement about being first is already impossible: mobile operators like China Mobile had well over 500M paying subscribers long before this podcast episode (and still do), so Starlink cannot ever be the first 500M‑subscriber product under that broad definition. On this reading, the prediction is effectively wrong. 【2search0】【1search2】
2. If he meant a narrower class of “consumer subscription products” (e.g., Netflix/Spotify‑style digital services, but excluding telcos), then no one has yet reached 500M, and Starlink is still far below that level (~8M). Whether Starlink eventually becomes the first in this narrower category is still unknowable as of late 2025, so the prediction would be too early to score. 【1search13】【3search19】【3search26】

Because we cannot tell which category Jason intended (broad “any paid subscriber product,” where it’s already clearly false, vs. a restricted “tech subscription app/service” category, where it’s still open), the truth value of the prediction cannot be determined even though enough time has passed to falsify one interpretation.

Hence the prediction is best scored as "ambiguous" rather than definitively right, wrong, or merely too early.

As of November 30, 2025, it’s too early to know whether the U.S. will ultimately see large‑scale deployment of SMRs or whether NIMBY opposition will be the decisive factor preventing it.

Key points:

• No large-scale SMR deployment yet, but multiple first-wave projects are advancing. As of 2024–2025, operational SMRs exist only in Russia and China; none are in commercial operation in the United States.(en.wikipedia.org) The first U.S. deployments are still targeted for late this decade or the early 2030s—e.g., Holtec’s plan for SMR‑300 units at the Palisades site in Michigan by 2030 as part of a 10 GW North American SMR fleet in the 2030s; TerraPower’s Natrium demonstration plant at Kemmerer, Wyoming, which has broken ground on non‑nuclear facilities and received key state and NRC environmental approvals; and Dow/X‑energy’s Xe‑100 SMR project in Seadrift, Texas, now under NRC construction‑permit review.(reuters.com) These show a serious build‑out attempt is underway, but it is still pre‑deployment.

• So far, the main obstacles have been economics and project risk, not local NIMBY backlash. The highest‑profile SMR project to be canceled in the U.S., NuScale’s Carbon Free Power Project in Idaho, failed primarily due to escalating costs and insufficient utility subscription, not community opposition.(markets.financialcontent.com) Early advanced‑nuclear sites like Kemmerer, WY (TerraPower), Dow’s industrial site in Seadrift, TX (X‑energy), and planned tech‑driven SMR projects (e.g., Amazon/Energy Northwest’s Xe‑100 project in Washington) have generally emphasized local economic benefits and report cooperative local or state engagement rather than sustained NIMBY‑driven blockage.(terrapower.com)

• Public opinion is moving toward more support for nuclear, not away from it. Recent Gallup and related polling in 2024–2025 finds that a clear majority of Americans (around 55–61%) now favor the use of nuclear energy, the highest support in over a decade, even if people remain more cautious about plants in their direct vicinity.(news.gallup.com) This undercuts the blanket claim that “no one wants a nuclear plant in their backyard,” though localized resistance could still emerge as siting diversifies beyond existing industrial or coal‑plant locations.

• The time horizon of the prediction is effectively multi‑decadal. SMR vendors, utilities, tech companies, and the U.S. Department of Energy are all planning deployments stretching through the 2030s (e.g., Holtec’s ~10 GW SMR fleet, DOE tenders supporting multiple SMR consortia, Google and others signing long‑term SMR MOUs), which, if realized, would constitute the very kind of large‑scale build‑out Sacks said “is not going to happen.”(reuters.com) But because these projects are still in permitting, early construction, or financing stages, their eventual success or failure can’t yet be judged.

Given that:

• large‑scale U.S. SMR deployment has not yet occurred,
• substantial evidence of future large‑scale deployment efforts now exists, and
• NIMBY opposition has not yet clearly emerged as the dominant limiting factor (compared with cost, regulation, and technology risk),

there isn’t enough outcome data to say Sacks is clearly right or clearly wrong. The prediction remains inconclusive (too early) rather than demonstrably correct or refuted.

As of 30 November 2025, there has been no widely reported, serious nuclear power plant accident in the United States since the Three Mile Island partial meltdown in 1979, which is still cited as the country’s worst commercial nuclear accident (INES Level 5).(en.wikipedia.org) More recent U.S. nuclear issues include a tritium-contaminated water leak at Minnesota’s Monticello plant in 2022, which regulators characterized as minor with no offsite health impact,(en.wikipedia.org) and a variety of low‑level operational events logged in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s event notification reports (e.g., for 2025) that are classified as non‑emergencies and do not involve harmful radioactive fallout affecting surrounding communities.(nrc.gov) Broader coverage of nuclear energy in 2024–2025 focuses on license extensions (e.g., Turkey Point), reactor restarts (e.g., Palisades, Three Mile Island Unit 1), and SMR approvals rather than on any major accident releasing dangerous fallout on nearby (often working‑class) communities.(theguardian.com) Because Sacks’s prediction is explicitly open‑ended ("inevitably" / "at some point in the future"), and no qualifying U.S. accident has occurred since he made it on 18 October 2024, it has not been falsified or confirmed yet. Therefore the correct status is inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than right or wrong.

The prediction is explicitly about what will be needed over the next 10–20 years starting from 2024: that nuclear (uranium-based) power will have to provide a substantial share of new generation capacity to meet projected demand, and that renewables alone won’t be sufficient.

That time window runs roughly from 2024 to 2034–2044, so as of the current date (2025-11-30) we are only about one year into the 10–20 year horizon. It is far too early to assess whether, by the end of that period, actual policy, build-out, and grid mix will or will not conform to this claim.

Because the prediction is about a structural outcome over a decade or more, rather than an event on a specific near-term date, there is not yet enough information to determine correctness either way. Therefore the status is inconclusive (too early to tell).

The prediction is explicitly framed as playing out "over the coming years and decades," so only about one year of that horizon has elapsed since the October 18, 2024 podcast—far too little time to judge a decades‑scale forecast.

Early evidence does support parts of Friedberg’s premise: China is aggressively expanding nuclear capacity (over 100 reactors operational/under construction/approved and plans for many more, including advanced designs), putting it on track to surpass the U.S. in nuclear generation in the 2030s. (chinadailyhk.com) Meanwhile, U.S. deployment of new reactors has been slower, and analysts often describe China as 10–15 years ahead in nuclear build‑out. (itif.org) However, the U.S. is also moving to accelerate advanced nuclear (e.g., recent White House actions, microreactor programs, and plans for new AP1000 fleets), which cuts against a clear "Luddite state" narrative at this stage. (whitehouse.gov)

Because the core claim is about what "most of the world" and the U.S. will look like many years from now, and current signals could still reverse or accelerate, the forecast cannot yet be classified as definitively right or wrong.

The prediction’s explicit horizon is “over the next decades” and refers to structural, long‑run shifts in the global economy as it becomes more digital and automated. As of November 30, 2025, only about one year has elapsed since the podcast (October 18, 2024), whereas “decades” implies something like 20–30+ years (e.g., into the 2040s–2050s). There is not nearly enough time elapsed to judge:

• whether countries with cheaper, more abundant electricity systematically achieve superior economic performance in a clearly attributable way, and
• whether the United States suffers negative economic consequences relative to competitors due specifically to being slower in achieving low‑cost, abundant power.

These are long‑term comparative outcomes that can’t be reliably evaluated on a ~1‑year timescale, regardless of any short‑term data on energy prices, deployment of renewables or nuclear, or GDP growth. Therefore, the correct classification today is “inconclusive (too early)”.

The prediction explicitly sets a 5–10 year horizon from the time of the statement (roughly 2029–2034) for substantial advances in compute‑driven materials/specialty chemicals and the emergence of many new non‑nuclear, higher‑energy‑density businesses. As of today (November 30, 2025), we are only about one year into that window, so the timeframe the predictor specified has not yet elapsed. While there is active work in computational materials science, battery chemistry, and related areas, it is too early to judge whether the scale and business impact he forecast ("a lot of businesses" and a substantial increase in generally available energy density from non‑nuclear technologies) will materialize by 2029–2034. Therefore, the correctness of this prediction cannot yet be determined.

The prediction is explicitly about a future condition: when AI and broader technological innovation in the U.S. become genuinely constrained (“rate limited”) by energy. Chamath further frames this in a multi‑decade horizon (“by the time that you are rate limited by energy”). As of November 30, 2025, two key facts make this impossible to judge:

1. AI is not yet clearly “rate limited” by energy in the sense described. There are growing concerns about AI’s energy usage and data centers straining grids, but these have not yet become the dominant hard cap on AI progress; the main constraints remain capital, talent, hardware, and regulation. This means the condition “by the time you are rate limited by energy” has not decisively arrived.
2. The prediction’s timeframe extends well beyond 2025. It concerns what the energy landscape will look like when/if that energy constraint finally bites, which Chamath suggests could be in the next couple of decades. That point has not yet been reached, so we cannot test whether there is indeed a “plethora of solutions” versus a single bottleneck technology.

Because the triggering scenario (AI being truly rate‑limited by energy) has not clearly occurred yet and the relevant time window has not elapsed, the prediction cannot be evaluated at this time.

The prediction is conditional and medium‑term: it says that if China can get large‑scale electricity down to about $0.05/kWh while U.S. power stays around $0.20/kWh, the U.S. will lose economic competitiveness relative to China.

As of late 2025, that core price-gap condition has not been met at the economy‑wide level:

• Recent cross‑country comparisons put average industrial electricity prices around $0.10/kWh in China and $0.08/kWh in the U.S. in 2025, i.e., the U.S. is not at $0.20 and is actually slightly cheaper for industrial users on average. (rhnuttall.co.uk)
• Detailed Chinese tariff tables show typical industrial non–time-of-use prices in major provinces in the 0.65–0.81 RMB/kWh range (roughly $0.09–$0.11/kWh at current exchange rates), again far above $0.05/kWh for standard industrial loads. (china-briefing.com)
• U.S. data for 2024–2025 show national retail averages roughly in the $0.13–$0.19/kWh band for commercial/residential users, while industrial averages are closer to $0.08–$0.09/kWh, not $0.20/kWh. (uschamber.com)

There are narrow cases in China where subsidized rates for AI data centers approach the posited level: several inland provinces offer a 50% discount on industrial tariffs, bringing power for qualifying AI data centers to about 0.4 RMB/kWh (~$0.056/kWh). (tomshardware.com) But this is:

1. Targeted to a specific sector and region, not the whole economy; and
2. Not paired with a persistent, economy‑wide U.S. price of ~$0.20/kWh for comparable large‑scale users (U.S. wholesale prices are closer to $0.04/kWh, and large industrial customers typically negotiate single‑digit‑cent tariffs). (reuters.com)

Because the hypothetical price configuration (China ≈$0.05, U.S. ≈$0.20 for large‑scale users) has not actually occurred across the two economies, we cannot empirically test the second part of the prediction (that the U.S. would then lose economic competitiveness). Moreover, Friedberg’s original wording was more of a counterfactual warning than a time‑stamped forecast that this configuration would definitely happen by 2025.

Given that:

• The relevant condition has not clearly materialized; and
• The time horizon he referred to (“over the coming years”) extends beyond 2025,

it’s too early, and the scenario too unmet, to label the prediction as right or wrong. Hence the status is best classified as "inconclusive".

The prediction was that, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron/Loper Bright decision, the California Coastal Commission’s scope and authority would be ‘peeled back’ and ‘dialed down’ over the ensuing years.

In June 2024, the Supreme Court decided Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, expressly overruling Chevron and ending the federal doctrine of automatic judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, reinforcing a broader anti‑regulatory legal environment. (mayerbrown.com) Although that ruling formally concerns federal, not state, agencies, the prediction was about downstream political and regulatory effects on the California Coastal Commission.

Since the podcast (October 2024), there have in fact been concrete legal and regulatory moves that reduce the Commission’s authority in important contexts. In January 2025, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a wildfire state of emergency and issued Executive Order N‑4‑25, using his emergency powers under Government Code section 8571 to suspend CEQA and all California Coastal Act permitting requirements for rebuilding structures destroyed or damaged by the Los Angeles and Ventura County fires. (ceqadevelopments.com) This order temporarily removes the Commission’s permitting jurisdiction over a large set of coastal rebuild projects.

When the Commission issued guidance attempting to continue applying statutory Coastal Act exemption criteria to those projects, Newsom responded with Executive Order N‑14‑25 (January 27, 2025), explicitly clarifying that all Coastal Act requirements, including those exemption provisions, were suspended and directing the Commission not to issue guidance or take any action suggesting that Coastal Act permitting procedures still applied to covered rebuilds. (dailyjournal.com) Environmental and legal analyses summarize that this series of executive orders (N‑2‑25, N‑4‑25, N‑9‑25, N‑14‑25, later N‑20‑25) effectively removes state coastal permitting requirements for wildfire rebuilding in the affected coastal areas, with Commission staff acknowledging that the Coastal Act will not impede those rebuilds. (la.surfrider.org) This is a clear, formal dialing‑down of the Commission’s authority in a substantial portion of the coastal zone, implemented through regulatory and executive changes after Loper Bright.

Parallel political efforts have also targeted the Commission. Representative Kevin Kiley introduced the Coastal Commission Accountability Act, which would require California to automatically comply with federal coastal decisions, stripping the Commission of much of its autonomous regulatory power under the Coastal Zone Management Act; while this federal bill has not (yet) been enacted, it illustrates ongoing, post‑Chevron attacks on the Commission’s authority. (sfgate.com) At the same time, some litigation has upheld the Commission’s powers (for example, a 2025 tentative ruling in Sable Offshore’s Santa Ynez pipeline dispute that sustained the Commission’s cease‑and‑desist order and rejected the company’s challenge to the agency’s authority), showing that its core legal framework remains intact. (reuters.com)

Netting this out, however, the prediction was not that the Commission would be abolished, but that its scope and authority would be reduced in the years following the Chevron/Loper Bright decision. The post‑2024 emergency executive orders suspending Coastal Act permitting and ordering the Commission to stand down in large wildfire‑affected coastal areas are significant, real‑world examples of its authority being ‘peeled back’ and ‘dialed down’ via legal and regulatory action in that period. Although the changes are targeted and partly temporary, they align with the substance and timing of the forecast. On balance, the prediction is best classified as right, with the caveat that the long‑term, statewide extent of any structural weakening is still evolving.

The prediction explicitly concerns what will happen over the subsequent presidential term (2025–2029) if Donald Trump loses the 2024 election. As of November 30, 2025, we are less than one year into that four‑year window, so it is not yet possible to evaluate whether lawfare will have “significantly” increased over the entire term.

While one can already point to various high‑profile investigations and lawsuits involving political figures and major business leaders during 2025, the prediction is about the overall pattern through 2029. Because that period is still ongoing, any judgment now would be speculative rather than factual.

Therefore, the correct classification at this time is “inconclusive (too early)”: there has not yet been enough time in the 2025–2029 term to determine whether Sacks’s long‑horizon prediction is right or wrong.

The prediction was explicitly conditional: only if the Biden–Harris–aligned governing coalition was not electorally defeated in 2024 would legal and regulatory “lawfare” against Elon Musk and others continue or intensify in the 2025–2029 term.

In reality, that condition did not occur:

• In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump (Republican) defeated Kamala Harris (Democrat), 312–226 in the Electoral College, and took the popular vote as well. Trump was subsequently certified by Congress and inaugurated as president on January 20, 2025, replacing the Biden administration. (en.wikipedia.org)

Given this, the antecedent of Sacks’s conditional prediction (“if they’re not defeated…”) is false in the actual world. That means we cannot empirically observe what the Biden–Harris coalition would have done had it remained in power for the 2025–2029 term. Any claim about whether they would have continued or intensified “lawfare” is now counterfactual and not verifiable from real-world developments.

Because the necessary condition for testing the prediction never obtained, its truth or falsity cannot be determined, even though enough time has passed. Hence the outcome is best categorized as ambiguous, not right or wrong.

The 2024 U.S. presidential election ended up close, not a landslide, which aligns with Sacks’s basic conditional framing (“either Trump in a landslide, or it’s very close”).

What actually happened:

• Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris with 312 electoral votes to 226.
• He won 49.8% of the popular vote vs. 48.3% for Harris, a national popular-vote margin of about 1.5–1.6 percentage points.
• Key tipping‑point states like Pennsylvania were decided by roughly 1.7 points, indicating a narrow underlying contest despite Trump sweeping the battlegrounds.

These figures come from official-style tallies and summaries of the 2024 results, which consistently report Trump’s 312–226 Electoral College win and sub‑2‑point popular‑vote margin. (en.wikipedia.org) Post‑election analyses explicitly characterize 2024 as “close, not a landslide” and warn that calling it a landslide is misleading, pointing to the tight popular vote and small margins in the decisive states. (goodmorningamerica.com) Even Trump‑focused retrospectives describe his victory as “decisive” but “not a landslide,” again emphasizing that the win was solid but not overwhelming in historical terms. (en.wikipedia.org)

Comparing to Sacks’s statement:

• He did not flatly predict that Trump would win in a landslide; he said that, as of that moment, Trump was the only candidate who looked like he could get a landslide.
• He then added: “Otherwise, it’s going to be very close.”
• In reality, no landslide occurred, and the election outcome matches the “very close” branch of his conditional: a narrow national margin and close tipping‑point state, widely described by analysts as a close election rather than a landslide.

Because (1) the race was in fact close in the sense used by election analysts, and (2) no non‑Trump landslide materialized that would contradict his “only Trump could get a landslide” framing, Sacks’s prediction is best judged as right on the main point he was making about the 2024 election’s likely shape.