The prediction is explicitly framed as playing out "over the coming years and decades," so only about one year of that horizon has elapsed since the October 18, 2024 podcast—far too little time to judge a decades‑scale forecast.

Early evidence does support parts of Friedberg’s premise: China is aggressively expanding nuclear capacity (over 100 reactors operational/under construction/approved and plans for many more, including advanced designs), putting it on track to surpass the U.S. in nuclear generation in the 2030s. (chinadailyhk.com) Meanwhile, U.S. deployment of new reactors has been slower, and analysts often describe China as 10–15 years ahead in nuclear build‑out. (itif.org) However, the U.S. is also moving to accelerate advanced nuclear (e.g., recent White House actions, microreactor programs, and plans for new AP1000 fleets), which cuts against a clear "Luddite state" narrative at this stage. (whitehouse.gov)

Because the core claim is about what "most of the world" and the U.S. will look like many years from now, and current signals could still reverse or accelerate, the forecast cannot yet be classified as definitively right or wrong.