E164: Zuck's Senate apology, Elon's comp package voided, crony capitalism, Reddit IPO, drone attack

As of November 30, 2025, Congress has not yet passed any new amendment to Section 230 since FOSTA–SESTA in 2018; major overviews of Section 230 still list only the DMCA (1998) and FOSTA–SESTA (2018) as statutory changes to its liability protections, with no later amendments recorded.​(en.wikipedia.org)

The TAKE IT DOWN Act (signed May 19, 2025) creates federal obligations for platforms to remove non‑consensual intimate imagery and deepfake pornography, but both detailed coverage and the Section 230 article explicitly note that it does not directly amend Section 230; instead, it defines new illegal content categories whose distribution is outside Section 230’s protections.​(en.wikipedia.org) That means it is not the “narrow change in Section 230” Chamath was predicting, even though it increases certain obligations on platforms.

Multiple narrow, targeted Section 230 reform bills focused on large social media companies have been introduced in the 119th Congress—e.g., the Algorithm Accountability Act and S.3193, which would limit immunity for harms caused by recommendation algorithms on large platforms—but as of late November 2025 these bills are only at the “introduced / in committee” stage and have not been enacted.​(congress.gov) Other efforts, such as sunset or repeal proposals led by Senators Graham and Durbin or repeal amendments like S.Amdt.1250, likewise have not become law.​(theverge.com)

Chamath’s prediction allowed 2–3 years from February 2, 2024, i.e., until roughly early 2027. Since we are only about 1 year and 10 months into that window and no qualifying amendment has yet passed—but several live proposals remain under consideration—it is too early to say whether his forecast (that a narrow Section 230 liability increase for big social platforms will pass within that 2–3 year horizon) will ultimately be right or wrong.

Accordingly, the prediction is still in play, so the correct status as of November 30, 2025 is: inconclusive (too early to tell).

As of November 30, 2025, the prediction has not yet come true, but the stated horizon is still “the next few years” after February 2, 2024, so it’s too early to declare it wrong.

Key facts:

1. No enacted federal law has directly amended the text of Section 230 since FOSTA–SESTA (2018). The current Section 230 overview notes the new 2025 TAKE IT DOWN Act but explicitly says that law "does not directly alter Section 230," instead creating another category of illegal content outside its protection. Section 230’s core immunity provisions remain in place. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. TAKE IT DOWN Act (2025) is narrow and bipartisan, but not the kind of Section 230 amendment Chamath described. It targets non‑consensual intimate imagery and deepfake porn, passed the Senate by unanimous consent and the House 409–2, and was signed into law on May 19, 2025. However, reporting emphasizes that it avoids contesting Section 230 directly, instead relying on FTC enforcement and specific takedown obligations for that content category. (en.wikipedia.org) It is not a Christmas‑tree/omnibus budget rider, and it does not broadly "remove" liability protections for major social platforms.

3. Bills that would substantially curtail or sunset Section 230 are pending, not law. Examples include:

   • A bipartisan Durbin–Graham effort to sunset Section 230 in a few years, reintroduced in 2024–2025, which has not passed. (theverge.com)
   • The Algorithm Accountability Act (S.3193 in the 119th Congress), introduced November 18, 2025, to amend Section 230 and limit liability protection for certain large social media platforms; as of late November 2025 it is only at the “Introduced” stage. (congress.gov)

4. Section 230 is still in force and broadly operative. The up‑to‑date Section 230 summary lists these recent debates and carveouts and confirms that, despite political pressure and multiple reform bills, the basic immunity for user‑generated content remains intact. (en.wikipedia.org)

Comparison to the prediction:

• Chamath forecast a narrow, bipartisan amendment to Section 230 itself, likely as a rider on a larger omnibus/budget bill, that would “effectively remove the liability protection” for major platforms.
• To date, we see narrow, bipartisan online‑safety laws (like TAKE IT DOWN) and introduced but not enacted Section 230 reform bills. None match the full pattern he described: actual passage of a Section 230 amendment, tucked into a Christmas‑tree/omnibus spending bill, that significantly or broadly strips platforms’ liability shield.

Because his timeframe is “the next few years” and we’re only about 1 year and 10 months past the prediction date, there is still room for such an amendment to be passed. Thus, the correct status as of now is “inconclusive (too early)”, not "right" or "wrong."

As of November 30, 2025, the world has not yet reached the specific regime Jason described, but policy and product debates are actively moving in that general direction, and his time horizon (“in the coming years”) is still open.

Key facts:

• Federal baseline is still 13, not 15–16. The main U.S. law governing kids’ online privacy, COPPA, continues to focus on children under 13 and does not impose a general 15–16+ access rule for social media. Platforms typically respond by setting a nominal minimum age of 13, not 15 or 16. (ftc.gov)

• States have experimented with higher ages and parental consent, but these laws are fragile. Utah’s 2023–24 Social Media Regulation Act requires age verification and parental consent for minors under 18, but a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction blocking the law, finding it likely unconstitutional. (aaaa.org) Florida passed H.B. 3, banning accounts for kids under 14 and requiring parental consent for 14–15‑year‑olds, but a federal judge similarly halted enforcement as a First Amendment violation. (reuters.com) Virginia’s SB 854, effective January 1, 2026, will limit social media for under‑16s to one hour per day unless parents consent and will require age verification, but it is not yet in force and is already being challenged by NetChoice. (en.wikipedia.org) These moves show some policy momentum toward stronger parental-gatekeeping for teens, but not a stable, nationwide standard.

• Federal proposals fall short of a 15–16+ baseline. The bipartisan Kids Off Social Media Act, reintroduced in 2025 and advanced out of Senate committee, would ban users under 13 from social media and restrict algorithmic recommendations for those under 17, but it does not set a 15–16 minimum age for general access and has not yet become law. (congress.gov)

• Industry standards and handset enforcement have not converged on Jason’s model. Major platforms (Meta, TikTok, Snap, YouTube) still operate with a 13+ entry age, while layering on teen safety modes and some parental controls, rather than a hard 15–16+ cutoff. Meta now requires parental consent for certain features (like Instagram Live) for under‑16s in the U.S. and other countries, but not for having an account at all. (apnews.com) Apple has expanded Screen Time and App Store parental controls, letting parents gate apps (including social apps) and grant exceptions, but it does not impose a universal rule that 12–15‑year‑olds can only use mainstream social media with verified parental permission by default; it simply provides tools families may choose to enable. (apple.com)

• Net effect as of late 2025: There is clear movement toward more parental involvement and tighter teen controls, and a few state laws directly target under‑16 social media use, but these efforts are patchy, heavily litigated, and far from an accepted U.S.-wide policy or industry standard that “social media should start at 15 or 16” with mandatory parental permission for younger teens enforced by handset makers and platforms.

Because Jason explicitly framed this as something that might happen “where this all winds up” in the coming years, and because neither the predicted 15–16 baseline nor the enforcement model has clearly materialized yet (while remaining plausible given ongoing legislative and regulatory activity), the prediction cannot be judged definitively right or wrong at this point. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Evidence shows the prediction came true:

• The Tower 22 drone attack on a U.S. outpost in Jordan occurred on 28 January 2024, killing three U.S. soldiers and wounding dozens.(en.wikipedia.org)
• On 2 February 2024, the U.S. launched large-scale retaliatory airstrikes explicitly described as a response to the Jordan/Tower 22 attack. These strikes hit more than 85 targets across seven facilities used by Iran-backed militias and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force in Iraq and Syria.(defense.gov)

This matches Sacks’s forecast on all key points:

1. Retaliatory strike occurs – The Biden administration did carry out military retaliation.
2. Timing – The strikes began on 2 February 2024, just five days after the 28 January attack, well within the “ensuing weeks” window.(en.wikipedia.org)
3. Targets – The operations focused on Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq and facilities associated with the IRGC Quds Force, i.e., Iranian-linked assets, exactly in line with his described options (“militias in Syria and Iraq” and/or “Iranian assets”).(defense.gov)

Given the direct retaliatory strikes within days against Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, the prediction is accurate.

The prediction was explicitly conditional: if the U.S. chose to strike Iranian assets directly in response to the Tower 22 attack, then a wider regional war would quickly erupt across at least Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

What actually happened:

• The Tower 22 drone attack on a U.S. outpost in Jordan occurred on 28 January 2024 and killed three U.S. soldiers. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In retaliation, beginning 2 February 2024 the U.S. launched a series of at least 125 airstrikes against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) elements and Iran‑backed militias in Iraq and Syria, not on Iranian territory itself. (en.wikipedia.org)
• U.S. officials at the time repeatedly stressed that there were no plans to bomb Iran directly and that Washington sought to avoid a wider war with Iran, despite pressure from some lawmakers to hit targets inside Iran. (theguardian.com)
• Separately, the U.S. and U.K. were already conducting and then continued airstrikes against Iran‑backed Houthi forces in Yemen over Red Sea shipping attacks, but this campaign predated Tower 22 and was framed as limited strikes against Houthis in Yemen, not a new multi‑front U.S.–Iran war. (en.wikipedia.org)

Within the months following Tower 22, there was no U.S. decision to strike Iranian territory itself in direct response to that attack, and there was also no clearly defined five‑front shooting war pitting U.S./allied forces directly against Iran or its forces simultaneously in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen as a result of such a decision.

Because the key antecedent in the prediction — a U.S. choice to hit Iranian assets directly (in practice, inside Iran) in response to Tower 22 — never occurred, the escalation scenario it described was never actually tested. Logically, that means we cannot say whether Sacks’s predicted outcome would have happened or not.

Therefore the prediction is best scored as inconclusive rather than right or wrong.

Evidence shows that Sacks’s prediction substantially matches what happened:

• IPO timing and valuation level: Reddit priced its IPO on March 20, 2024 at $34 per share, at the top of a $31–$34 range, implying roughly $6.4 billion in equity value (about $5.4 billion on a narrower share-count basis). This is close to the earlier ~$5 billion rumor, i.e., in the same valuation ballpark rather than far above it. (fortune.com)
• Deal execution (no withdrawal or major re-cut): The offering went ahead as planned, priced at the top of the indicated range (not down-sized or repriced lower) and was reported to be 4–5x oversubscribed, consistent with a strong book and a clean execution by the underwriters. (reuters.com)
• Initial trading and market reception: On March 21, 2024, Reddit began trading on the NYSE under ticker RDDT. The stock opened well above the IPO price, traded up as much as ~70% intraday, and closed around $50.4–$50.5, roughly 48% above the $34 IPO price, giving it a market cap near $9.5–10 billion. Major outlets described this as a strong / robust debut and a positive signal for the tech IPO market. (cnbc.com)
• No material break below IPO price in the first days: Historical price data show that on March 22, 2024 (the second trading day), Reddit closed at $46.00 with an intraday low of $45.34, still well above the $34 IPO price. Later in April 2024 the lowest recorded price was about $37.35, which is still above the IPO level. Thus in the initial days—and in fact for many months—the stock never traded below its IPO price. (financecharts.com)
• Longer-term context (doesn’t negate the call): Although Reddit later became quite volatile and at one point in March 2025 fell about 60% from a peak above $200 to roughly $110, coverage still notes it remained well above its IPO price (up roughly 200% from the offering). This later decline doesn’t contradict Sacks’s more limited claim about the IPO’s pricing and early trading. (ccn.com)

Given that the IPO was priced near the rumored $5B equity value, executed without being withdrawn or significantly re-cut, and traded strongly without breaking below the IPO price in its early days, Sacks’s prediction is best classified as right.