Last updated Nov 29, 2025
Sacks @ 01:18:53Inconclusive
conflictpolitics
If the United States chooses to strike Iranian assets directly in response to the Tower 22 attack, this will quickly escalate into a wider regional conflict involving active hostilities between U.S./allied forces and Iran or Iran-backed forces across at least Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen during the same conflict period (i.e., within months of such a strike).
Depending on the action they choose, we could very rapidly find ourselves engaged in a wider regional war on five different fronts. I mean, a war with Iran would involve us in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, where we're already bombing.View on YouTube
Explanation

The prediction was explicitly conditional: if the U.S. chose to strike Iranian assets directly in response to the Tower 22 attack, then a wider regional war would quickly erupt across at least Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

What actually happened:

  • The Tower 22 drone attack on a U.S. outpost in Jordan occurred on 28 January 2024 and killed three U.S. soldiers. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • In retaliation, beginning 2 February 2024 the U.S. launched a series of at least 125 airstrikes against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) elements and Iran‑backed militias in Iraq and Syria, not on Iranian territory itself. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • U.S. officials at the time repeatedly stressed that there were no plans to bomb Iran directly and that Washington sought to avoid a wider war with Iran, despite pressure from some lawmakers to hit targets inside Iran. (theguardian.com)
  • Separately, the U.S. and U.K. were already conducting and then continued airstrikes against Iran‑backed Houthi forces in Yemen over Red Sea shipping attacks, but this campaign predated Tower 22 and was framed as limited strikes against Houthis in Yemen, not a new multi‑front U.S.–Iran war. (en.wikipedia.org)

Within the months following Tower 22, there was no U.S. decision to strike Iranian territory itself in direct response to that attack, and there was also no clearly defined five‑front shooting war pitting U.S./allied forces directly against Iran or its forces simultaneously in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen as a result of such a decision.

Because the key antecedent in the prediction — a U.S. choice to hit Iranian assets directly (in practice, inside Iran) in response to Tower 22 — never occurred, the escalation scenario it described was never actually tested. Logically, that means we cannot say whether Sacks’s predicted outcome would have happened or not.

Therefore the prediction is best scored as inconclusive rather than right or wrong.