E127: Presidential Candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in conversation with the Besties

At the time of the May 2023 episode, the official 2023 Social Security Trustees projections (as summarized by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget) showed the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund depleting in 2033 and the combined OASDI funds becoming insolvent in 2034, matching his statement that insolvency was projected for roughly 2034–2035. (crfb.org) As of the latest 2024 and 2025 Trustees reports, Social Security still has positive trust fund balances; the OASI fund is projected to deplete in 2033 and the combined OASDI trust funds around 2034–2035, with some analyses noting that subsequent 2025 legislation may have moved the projected depletion for the main trust fund to about 2032. (ssa.gov) Because the trust fund has not yet been exhausted and the predicted years (early-to-mid 2030s) lie in the future, there is not yet a factual outcome to compare against, so the prediction about actual insolvency timing cannot currently be judged right or wrong.

The prediction window has not begun or completed yet, so it is too early to judge. Friedberg’s statement was conditional and time‑bounded: if the U.S. does not change its fiscal trajectory, there will be a “massive crisis… maybe it’s in five years or ten years” from 2023. That implies a rough window of 2028–2033. Today is 2025, which is before even the early edge of the 5‑year mark (2028). Regardless of current fiscal conditions or market stresses, the prediction explicitly gives up to a decade for the crisis to materialize. Because that period has not elapsed (and in fact has not yet started, if we take the lower bound literally), the accuracy of the prediction cannot yet be determined.

Within a month of the May 5, 2023 recording, Republicans and Democrats did ultimately reach a bipartisan agreement on the debt ceiling: the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 was introduced May 29, passed the House May 31, passed the Senate June 1, and was signed by President Biden on June 3, 2023, suspending the debt limit until January 2025. 【1†cite】 As a result, the antecedent of the normalized prediction ("if Republicans and Democrats fail to reach agreement on the U.S. debt ceiling") never occurred, so the conditional statement was never directly tested.

Empirically, the U.S. economy did not "go off a cliff" in that month. Analyses at the time judged the eventual deal’s macroeconomic drag to be small, with little expected impact on near‑term growth. 【0†cite】 The labor market in May 2023 remained strong, adding about 339,000 jobs with unemployment at 3.7%, and financial markets reacted positively once a deal was in view. 【2†cite】 Q2 2023 real GDP grew at an annualized rate of about 2.4%, exceeding expectations and indicating continued expansion rather than a sudden contraction. 【3†cite】

However, expert and official analyses made clear that if the debt ceiling had not been raised and the U.S. had actually defaulted, the economy likely would have suffered a severe negative shock: the White House Council of Economic Advisers, Brookings, Moody’s, and others warned of an "economic catastrophe," deep recession, and millions of job losses in a breach scenario. 【3†cite】【8†cite】 That consensus supports the plausibility of Sacks’s conditional claim that the economy could "go off a cliff" in the event of a genuine failure to agree.

Because the condition (no eventual agreement) never materialized, reality only shows that the worst‑case outcome didn’t happen, not whether his specific conditional forecast ("if no deal, then a cliff‑like shock is possible") was right or wrong. Thus the correct scoring is ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.

The prediction concerns the state of global primary energy production by the end of the 21st century (around the year 2100). As of today (November 30, 2025), we are only about a quarter of the way through the century, so there is no way to empirically determine whether global energy production will in fact be 5–10× the 2023 level by 2100. While models and forecasts of future GDP-per-capita and energy demand exist, they are speculative and cannot yet confirm or falsify the specific 5–10× claim. Therefore the accuracy of this prediction cannot currently be evaluated.

The prediction is explicitly time‑bound to “the middle of next decade” / around 2035. As of November 30, 2025, that date has not yet occurred, so it is too early to determine whether:

“a pretty serious material shortage for renewable sources”

will in fact constrain the scaling of renewable energy technologies globally.

Current literature and reporting do indicate potential future bottlenecks and risks in critical minerals (e.g., lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earths) needed for batteries, wind turbines, and other clean‑energy technologies, but these are forward‑looking risk assessments and scenario analyses, not evidence that a 2035‑era, global, systemic shortage has already materialized. Because the forecast’s key evaluation date is still about a decade away, the correctness of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated either as right or wrong.

Accordingly, the only defensible status at this time is that the prediction is too early to judge.

Evidence from the 2024 cycle clearly shows that podcasts became very important channels for several high‑profile, non-establishment candidates, but it’s hard to prove they were the primary or dominant channel across “unorthodox candidates” as a class.

On the supportive side:

• NPR described Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s effort explicitly as a “podcast‑centric presidential campaign,” noting that he appeared on a “flurry of podcasts” (Joe Rogan, Jordan Peterson, Megyn Kelly, Russell Brand, All‑In, etc.) and quoting him saying podcasts let “dissident and insurgent candidates like myself…end‑run the corporate media monoliths” to reach large audiences without going on the networks. (nprillinois.org)
• Wired reported that RFK Jr. ran a digital‑first campaign heavily built on influencer collaborations and numerous podcasts, to the point that he was being positioned as a “podcast candidate.” (wired.com)
• TIME detailed how both RFK Jr. and Vivek Ramaswamy leaned heavily on podcasts: RFK’s Rogan appearance spiked his book sales, and Ramaswamy launched his own show and went on dozens of others as part of a deliberate media play to build name recognition. (time.com)
• Politico (summarized in Ramaswamy’s campaign profile) reported that he had appeared on over 150 podcasts by August 2023, calling it an “always‑on” media strategy that generated more online content than any competitor. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Research and reporting on Tenet Media and similar networks show podcasts being systematically used to push political narratives and feature insurgent right‑wing figures like Kari Lake and others, further underlining that podcasts became central infrastructure for outsider and fringe messaging in the 2024 cycle. (en.wikipedia.org)

On the limiting side:

• Even in 2024, candidates’ outreach ecosystems remained multi‑channel: social media (X, TikTok, YouTube), email/SMS, rallies, and occasional TV hits all mattered alongside podcasts. Major coverage still framed podcasts as one powerful alternative medium, not conclusively the dominant one for all unorthodox candidates.
• Broader analysis (e.g., the Washington Post, citing Pew) characterizes podcasts as highly influential and particularly important in spreading election‑related narratives, but stops short of showing that they overtook other digital platforms as the primary communication channel across outsider campaigns. (washingtonpost.com)

Because the available evidence strongly supports the direction of Sacks’s prediction (podcasts becoming a key way for unorthodox candidates to bypass traditional media) but does not decisively establish that they were the primary/dominant channel across such candidates, the outcome is best classified as ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.

Evidence from the 2024 cycle indicates that long-form podcasts and other alternative, long-form online interviews were indeed a major way RFK Jr. got his message out and built what support he had, relative to traditional media.

Key points:

1. His campaign explicitly became “podcast‑centric.” Public radio reporting on his 2024 run literally described it as a “podcast‑centric presidential campaign,” noting that his media strategy relied on a flurry of podcasts including The Joe Rogan Experience, Jordan Peterson, Megyn Kelly, Russell Brand, and the All-In pod hosted by Sacks, Calacanis, Palihapitiya and Friedberg. These outlets were emphasized as a way to reach large audiences who are not tuning in to traditional news. (knkx.org) This is exactly the format and context Jason was talking about.

2. Analysts and reporters repeatedly labeled him the “podcast candidate” and tied his momentum to online shows. A Wired analysis described Kennedy’s bid as a digital‑first campaign driven by collaborations with influencers, many podcast appearances, and viral social media; it explicitly notes that this strategy positioned him as “the podcast candidate” and gave him unexpected momentum online even while mainstream outlets largely shunned him. (wired.com) A Washington Examiner piece similarly notes that his bid “picked up steam online after appearances on Rogan’s show and a host of other popular podcasts,” directly connecting those long-form interviews to increased interest in his candidacy. (washingtonexaminer.com)

3. His base and his own rhetoric emphasize podcasts/alt media over mainstream TV. PBS reporting on his events found that Kennedy and his supporters are disproportionately people who avoid mainstream media and instead rely on “podcasts and other alternative sources” for news; Kennedy himself contrasted baby boomers who watch MSNBC/Fox/CNN with younger voters who get information from podcasts and online alternatives. (pbs.org) In a Fox interview, he complained that major networks besides Fox rarely booked him and that a “monolithic media” aligned with the Democratic Party was telling Americans he couldn’t win, underscoring that he did not have traditional-media saturation and had to route around it. (aol.com)

4. Podcast exposure was treated as a significant driver of his polling and visibility. Coverage of Joe Rogan’s praise for RFK Jr. described Rogan’s huge audience (millions per episode) and framed that support as bad news for Trump because Kennedy’s campaign had already “picked up steam online” after those and other major podcast appearances. (washingtonexaminer.com) Politico later reported that endorsements and favorable treatment from major podcasters like Rogan and Russell Brand were aligned with Kennedy’s strategy of focusing on alternative/independent platforms and could boost his visibility and support late in the race. (politico.com) Another Politico piece noted he was “all over conservative media” including various right-leaning podcasts and was polling around 8–10% in key swing states at that time, suggesting those appearances were materially associated with his support levels. (politico.com)

5. He did, for a time, achieve unusually high interest for an insurgent/third‑party candidate. Throughout 2023, RFK Jr. posted strikingly strong favorability and vote-intention numbers for a non-major-party candidate: polls had him leading all major 2024 figures in net favorability, and some 3‑way matchups in late 2023 showed him at roughly 20–24% support nationwide or in key battlegrounds—levels rarely reached by modern third‑party contenders. (en.wikipedia.org) While that support shrank by Election Day (he ultimately finished under 1% of the popular vote), analysts consistently described that earlier surge as fueled by his online and podcast presence rather than by extensive positive coverage on mainstream TV.

Putting this together:

• Long-form podcasts and similar interviews were central, not peripheral, to RFK Jr.’s media strategy.
• Major outlets and campaign-watchers explicitly credited those podcasts with helping him gain online momentum and distinctive levels of early support, while also noting his marginalization on traditional TV news.
• His own comments and his supporters’ behavior confirm that many of his voters discovered and evaluated him via podcasts rather than legacy media.

So although his overall candidacy ultimately underperformed on Election Day, the specific prediction that long-form podcasts would materially raise interest in candidates like RFK Jr. and become an important driver of their public support—relative to traditional media—did come true in his case.

Chamath’s prediction was that as RFK Jr.’s presidential bid gained attention, the “media industrial complex” would do its best to prevent his anti‑establishment message from getting out. That involves two hard‑to‑measure elements: (1) intent of large media and tech institutions, and (2) whether they actually kept his message from reaching people.

Evidence that could be read as supporting the prediction

• Major mainstream outlets gave limited, cautious coverage to some of his campaign events. For example, RFK Jr.’s June 2023 NewsNation town hall “garnered little to no press from mainstream news outlets” like CNN, CBS, MSNBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal, which a media reporter framed as part of a broader struggle over how to cover him without amplifying conspiracy theories. (vanityfair.com)
• RFK Jr. did relatively few live interviews on the biggest broadcast and cable news networks compared with historical third‑party/insurgent candidates; he later complained that ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC and CNN had collectively given him only two live interviews over 16 months while running many negative pieces, which he characterized as censorship and collusion with the DNC. (news.meaww.com)
• Some platforms and media figures explicitly declined to give him large live forums. CNN’s Jake Tapper said he would not host a CNN town hall with RFK Jr., citing his long record of vaccine misinformation. (vanityfair.com)
• Tech platforms removed or restricted some of his content under misinformation policies: YouTube removed multiple RFK Jr. vaccine‑related videos, and a federal appeals court later upheld Google/YouTube’s right to do so, rejecting his First Amendment claim that this was government‑directed censorship. (reuters.com) His campaign and allies also sued Meta over a 30‑minute pro‑Kennedy ad that was blocked on Facebook and Instagram; Meta called it a mistake and said the block was reversed quickly, but the lawsuit framed it as election interference. (reuters.com)
• Sympathetic commentators argued that mainstream, advertiser‑funded outlets were effectively “blocking” him because his attacks on corporate and state power run counter to their interests, which they cast as part of a broader “censorship” or “manufacturing consent” structure. (responsiblestatecraft.org)

All of this can be interpreted as the media and large platforms limiting or gatekeeping his message, especially on legacy broadcast and big social‑media channels.

Evidence that cuts against the prediction (his message did spread widely)

• Despite his complaints of being written off and censored, RFK Jr.’s 2024 campaign “thrived online.” A detailed Wired analysis notes that he was “suddenly everywhere” on social platforms, leaning heavily on podcasts, influencers, and TikTok/Instagram clips; he amassed over 1.6 million Instagram followers after his account was reinstated in June 2023, with TikTok videos routinely getting over a million views. (wired.com)
• He was covered extensively—albeit often critically—across mainstream and cable outlets, and he received a high‑visibility platform in March 2024 by delivering the independent response to the State of the Union, which drew about 25.4 million views across TikTok, X (Twitter), Instagram, and YouTube within 48 hours. (en.wikipedia.org) That level of reach is inconsistent with his message being successfully “prevented” from getting out.
• RFK Jr. himself has acknowledged that, despite what he calls unprecedented negative coverage by “corporate media,” public polling showed him with relatively high favorability at various points, implying that voters were hearing his message through alternative channels. (foxnews.com)

Why this ends up ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong

• The intent behind editorial decisions and platform‑moderation policies (public‑health standards vs. deliberate political suppression) can’t be definitively established from public evidence. Courts reviewing his Google/YouTube lawsuit, for example, found insufficient proof that the government coerced YouTube; they treated YouTube’s actions as private enforcement of its own rules, not state‑ordered censorship. (politico.com) Whether that still counts as the “media industrial complex” trying to suppress him is a subjective, ideological judgment.
• The outcome is mixed: he did face removals, limited access to some broadcast platforms, and heavily critical framing, but he also achieved enormous reach through social media, podcasts, and some mainstream venues, with tens of millions of views on key speeches and responses. (wired.com) That makes the strong form of the prediction—“prevent that message from getting out”—factually inaccurate if taken literally, yet partially resonant if interpreted as “many establishment outlets will try to minimize and heavily filter his exposure.”

Because the claim hinges on collective intent and a qualitative standard (“doing their best” to suppress) while the observable evidence supports both a suppression narrative and a thriving‑exposure narrative, the prediction cannot be cleanly classified as correct or incorrect. It is therefore best judged ambiguous rather than definitively right or wrong.

Jason’s prediction was that mainstream media would “block” RFK Jr. “at every angle” and systematically hinder his exposure across all major channels.

Evidence does show hostile and sometimes gatekeeping treatment:

• In the very podcast episode, Jason says “the media is going to block this guy at every angle” while discussing a “media industrial complex” that wouldn’t let Kennedy’s anti‑establishment message spread. (podscripts.co)
• ABC News did a high‑profile interview with Kennedy in April 2023 but cut out large portions of his COVID‑vaccine comments and told viewers they had used “editorial judgment” because he made “false claims,” explicitly framing him as a major source of anti‑vaccine misinformation. (justthenews.com)
• Vanity Fair noted that his first national NewsNation town hall in June 2023 received “little to no press” from mainstream outlets such as CNN, CBS, MSNBC, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, which gave it zero online coverage. (vanityfair.com)
• CNN’s Jake Tapper publicly said he would not host a CNN town hall with Kennedy because he “spreads dangerous misinformation about childhood vaccines.” (vanityfair.com)
• CNN excluded Kennedy from its June 2024 Biden–Trump debate; he and his campaign alleged a conspiracy, but CNN’s stated criteria were neutral (ballot access for 270 electoral votes and at least 15% in four national polls), which he failed to meet. (theguardian.com)

However, the stronger claim—that the mainstream media systematically blocked his exposure “across all major channels”—is contradicted by extensive, ongoing coverage and platforming:

• Major outlets repeatedly interviewed and featured him. CBS News ran multiple interviews and segments about his campaign and its impact, treating him as a real (if controversial) player in 2024. (cbsnews.com)
• Fox News and Fox Business, both mainstream national channels, regularly hosted Kennedy and gave him friendly or at least substantial airtime; Kennedy himself said he was being “slammed” by corporate media even while appearing on Fox platforms. (theguardian.com)
• Prominent legacy outlets, including The New York Times, The Guardian, TIME, and others ran repeated features and news stories on his campaign, health history (e.g., the brain‑worm story), and controversies, as well as analyses of his voter appeal and spoiler effect. (theguardian.com)
• PolitiFact named his presidential bid the 2023 “Lie of the Year” for its constellation of conspiracy theories—highly negative but high‑visibility coverage that undercuts the idea he was ignored or silenced. (en.wikipedia.org)
• His campaign and message also reached tens of millions through high‑profile moments like a nationally discussed Super Bowl ad run by his super PAC and a widely watched “independent response” to the 2024 State of the Union, which amassed over 25 million views in 48 hours across major platforms. (en.wikipedia.org)

Overall, mainstream outlets were often adversarial and sometimes restrictive, especially around vaccine claims, and some events were under‑covered. But Kennedy still received substantial, recurring exposure on major TV networks, in leading newspapers and magazines, and via widely discussed national moments. Given that level of coverage, the specific prediction that the mainstream media would “block this guy at every angle” and shut him out “across all major channels” is overstated and does not match what actually happened.

Therefore, the prediction is wrong.

Jason’s prediction had three parts about future All‑In podcast episodes: (1) Nikki Haley will come on, (2) Donald Trump will come on, and (3) Joe Biden will not.

Here is what actually happened by November 30, 2025:

1. Donald Trump did appear as a guest.

   • The All‑In podcast released a special episode titled “In conversation with President Trump” dated June 20–21, 2024, with Trump listed as the guest and the Besties as hosts. (podscripts.co)
     → This confirms the Trump part of the prediction came true.

2. Joe Biden has not appeared as a guest (only discussed and invited).

   • In coverage of the Besties’ 2024 Trump fundraiser, Chamath Palihapitiya is quoted saying “We’ve asked President Biden, and we have not heard back,” describing their effort to get him on the show. (californiaglobe.com)
   • In the Trump interview episode itself, near the end, Jason and Sacks reiterate that Biden is invited, and Sacks says “We’ve asked. We’re waiting,” indicating no Biden appearance as of June 2024. (podcasts.happyscribe.com)
   • Public episode indexes and summaries through early 2025 list candidate interviews (RFK Jr., Vivek Ramaswamy, Chris Christie, Dean Phillips, and Trump) but no episode with Joe Biden as a guest. (podcastnotes.org)
     → As of the evaluation date, the Biden‑will‑not‑appear part is accurate.

3. Nikki Haley has not appeared as a guest.

   • The All‑In catalog and third‑party episode indexes list all the long‑form “in conversation with the Besties” political interviews (RFK Jr., Ramaswamy, Christie, Dean Phillips, Trump, etc.), but none list Nikki Haley as a guest. (podcastnotes.org)
   • Nikki Haley is discussed frequently on the show (for example, as a debate performer in episode E143), but only in third person; she does not appear in any guest/speaker list for an episode. (glasp.co)
   • No search results show an All‑In episode titled or described as an interview with Nikki Haley, despite extensive documentation of other candidate appearances. (podscripts.co)
     → In context—talking about the 2024 presidential‑candidate run on All‑In—this strongly indicates the Nikki‑Haley‑will‑come‑on part did not happen.

Because Jason’s statement was effectively a three‑part forecast — “Haley will come on, then Trump will, and Biden will not” — and one of the key parts (Haley appearing) failed, the overall prediction is wrong, even though the Trump and Biden components ended up correct.