Chamath’s prediction was that as RFK Jr.’s presidential bid gained attention, the “media industrial complex” would do its best to prevent his anti‑establishment message from getting out. That involves two hard‑to‑measure elements: (1) intent of large media and tech institutions, and (2) whether they actually kept his message from reaching people.

Evidence that could be read as supporting the prediction

• Major mainstream outlets gave limited, cautious coverage to some of his campaign events. For example, RFK Jr.’s June 2023 NewsNation town hall “garnered little to no press from mainstream news outlets” like CNN, CBS, MSNBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal, which a media reporter framed as part of a broader struggle over how to cover him without amplifying conspiracy theories. (vanityfair.com)
• RFK Jr. did relatively few live interviews on the biggest broadcast and cable news networks compared with historical third‑party/insurgent candidates; he later complained that ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC and CNN had collectively given him only two live interviews over 16 months while running many negative pieces, which he characterized as censorship and collusion with the DNC. (news.meaww.com)
• Some platforms and media figures explicitly declined to give him large live forums. CNN’s Jake Tapper said he would not host a CNN town hall with RFK Jr., citing his long record of vaccine misinformation. (vanityfair.com)
• Tech platforms removed or restricted some of his content under misinformation policies: YouTube removed multiple RFK Jr. vaccine‑related videos, and a federal appeals court later upheld Google/YouTube’s right to do so, rejecting his First Amendment claim that this was government‑directed censorship. (reuters.com) His campaign and allies also sued Meta over a 30‑minute pro‑Kennedy ad that was blocked on Facebook and Instagram; Meta called it a mistake and said the block was reversed quickly, but the lawsuit framed it as election interference. (reuters.com)
• Sympathetic commentators argued that mainstream, advertiser‑funded outlets were effectively “blocking” him because his attacks on corporate and state power run counter to their interests, which they cast as part of a broader “censorship” or “manufacturing consent” structure. (responsiblestatecraft.org)

All of this can be interpreted as the media and large platforms limiting or gatekeeping his message, especially on legacy broadcast and big social‑media channels.

Evidence that cuts against the prediction (his message did spread widely)

• Despite his complaints of being written off and censored, RFK Jr.’s 2024 campaign “thrived online.” A detailed Wired analysis notes that he was “suddenly everywhere” on social platforms, leaning heavily on podcasts, influencers, and TikTok/Instagram clips; he amassed over 1.6 million Instagram followers after his account was reinstated in June 2023, with TikTok videos routinely getting over a million views. (wired.com)
• He was covered extensively—albeit often critically—across mainstream and cable outlets, and he received a high‑visibility platform in March 2024 by delivering the independent response to the State of the Union, which drew about 25.4 million views across TikTok, X (Twitter), Instagram, and YouTube within 48 hours. (en.wikipedia.org) That level of reach is inconsistent with his message being successfully “prevented” from getting out.
• RFK Jr. himself has acknowledged that, despite what he calls unprecedented negative coverage by “corporate media,” public polling showed him with relatively high favorability at various points, implying that voters were hearing his message through alternative channels. (foxnews.com)

Why this ends up ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong

• The intent behind editorial decisions and platform‑moderation policies (public‑health standards vs. deliberate political suppression) can’t be definitively established from public evidence. Courts reviewing his Google/YouTube lawsuit, for example, found insufficient proof that the government coerced YouTube; they treated YouTube’s actions as private enforcement of its own rules, not state‑ordered censorship. (politico.com) Whether that still counts as the “media industrial complex” trying to suppress him is a subjective, ideological judgment.
• The outcome is mixed: he did face removals, limited access to some broadcast platforms, and heavily critical framing, but he also achieved enormous reach through social media, podcasts, and some mainstream venues, with tens of millions of views on key speeches and responses. (wired.com) That makes the strong form of the prediction—“prevent that message from getting out”—factually inaccurate if taken literally, yet partially resonant if interpreted as “many establishment outlets will try to minimize and heavily filter his exposure.”

Because the claim hinges on collective intent and a qualitative standard (“doing their best” to suppress) while the observable evidence supports both a suppression narrative and a thriving‑exposure narrative, the prediction cannot be cleanly classified as correct or incorrect. It is therefore best judged ambiguous rather than definitively right or wrong.