Evidence from the 2024 cycle clearly shows that podcasts became very important channels for several high‑profile, non-establishment candidates, but it’s hard to prove they were the primary or dominant channel across “unorthodox candidates” as a class.

On the supportive side:

• NPR described Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s effort explicitly as a “podcast‑centric presidential campaign,” noting that he appeared on a “flurry of podcasts” (Joe Rogan, Jordan Peterson, Megyn Kelly, Russell Brand, All‑In, etc.) and quoting him saying podcasts let “dissident and insurgent candidates like myself…end‑run the corporate media monoliths” to reach large audiences without going on the networks. (nprillinois.org)
• Wired reported that RFK Jr. ran a digital‑first campaign heavily built on influencer collaborations and numerous podcasts, to the point that he was being positioned as a “podcast candidate.” (wired.com)
• TIME detailed how both RFK Jr. and Vivek Ramaswamy leaned heavily on podcasts: RFK’s Rogan appearance spiked his book sales, and Ramaswamy launched his own show and went on dozens of others as part of a deliberate media play to build name recognition. (time.com)
• Politico (summarized in Ramaswamy’s campaign profile) reported that he had appeared on over 150 podcasts by August 2023, calling it an “always‑on” media strategy that generated more online content than any competitor. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Research and reporting on Tenet Media and similar networks show podcasts being systematically used to push political narratives and feature insurgent right‑wing figures like Kari Lake and others, further underlining that podcasts became central infrastructure for outsider and fringe messaging in the 2024 cycle. (en.wikipedia.org)

On the limiting side:

• Even in 2024, candidates’ outreach ecosystems remained multi‑channel: social media (X, TikTok, YouTube), email/SMS, rallies, and occasional TV hits all mattered alongside podcasts. Major coverage still framed podcasts as one powerful alternative medium, not conclusively the dominant one for all unorthodox candidates.
• Broader analysis (e.g., the Washington Post, citing Pew) characterizes podcasts as highly influential and particularly important in spreading election‑related narratives, but stops short of showing that they overtook other digital platforms as the primary communication channel across outsider campaigns. (washingtonpost.com)

Because the available evidence strongly supports the direction of Sacks’s prediction (podcasts becoming a key way for unorthodox candidates to bypass traditional media) but does not decisively establish that they were the primary/dominant channel across such candidates, the outcome is best classified as ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.