E33: Apple's hypocrisy, America's math failure, crypto's regulatory correction, Clubhouse's future, UFOs & more

Public reporting shows that Antonio García Martínez was hired by Apple in April 2021 and fired in May 2021 after an internal employee petition about passages from his book Chaos Monkeys.(en.wikipedia.org) In subsequent statements, García Martínez said he was fired “in a snap decision,” called Apple’s public statement about his departure defamatory, and indicated Apple had been fully aware of his book and persona during hiring.(appleinsider.com)

Crucially for this prediction:

• Articles about the incident note that García Martínez signed a strict non‑disclosure agreement regarding the terms of his departure and that he would not discuss details beyond characterizing the firing as sudden.(appleinsider.com)
• Contemporary commentary speculated that Apple might eventually pay him a “hefty sum” or that he should sue and win, but these are clearly opinion pieces, not reports of an actual lawsuit or settlement.(macdailynews.com)
• There is no public record (news coverage, court filings, or biographical summaries) of García Martínez suing Apple or of any settlement amount, let alone one “around $10 million.” Later profiles and his Wikipedia biography also do not mention any legal action or payout from Apple.(en.wikipedia.org)

Given the NDA and absence of any reliable reporting on whether he received any settlement, the existence and size of a payout are not publicly knowable. It’s possible there was some confidential severance or settlement; it’s also possible there was none. Because we cannot establish from available evidence whether he received a settlement “of roughly $10 million,” the prediction’s truth value cannot be determined from public sources, even though several years have passed. Therefore the appropriate classification is ambiguous.

Public reporting shows that Antonio García Martínez was hired by Apple in April 2021 and fired in May 2021 after an internal employee petition about passages in his book Chaos Monkeys; he publicly called Apple’s statement about his departure defamatory and said he was seeking to resolve the matter with the company.(macworld.com) In subsequent coverage and in his own later public biography, the incident is described only as his brief hiring and firing; there is no mention of any lawsuit he filed against Apple or of a settlement amount.(en.wikipedia.org) In a May 20, 2021 AppleInsider piece about a Twitter Spaces conversation, García Martínez explicitly referenced being under a strict non-disclosure agreement regarding his exit from Apple and did not provide any details about legal claims or compensation, which is consistent with a private resolution but does not reveal whether a settlement was reached or its size.(appleinsider.com) Given that more than four years have passed and no credible source has reported on a specific settlement figure (let alone one near $10 million), we cannot verify Jason Calacanis’s estimate; however, because any agreement would likely be confidential, the absence of public information doesn’t prove the prediction wrong either. Therefore, with sufficient time elapsed but key facts non-public, the prediction’s accuracy cannot be determined and is best classified as ambiguous.

Antonio García Martínez was hired by Apple in April 2021 and fired weeks later after an internal employee petition; he publicly stated he was fired in a “snap decision,” claimed Apple’s statement was defamatory, and noted that he was bound by a strict NDA when discussing the situation in later interviews. (macdailynews.com)

A broad search of news coverage, commentary, and material related to #AppleToo and Apple employment disputes from 2021–2025 shows reporting only on his hiring and firing, and his public complaints, but no public record of any lawsuit he filed against Apple or any disclosed settlement or payout amount specific to his termination. (businessinsider.com) Given that severance packages and any potential settlements can be confidential and are often covered by NDAs, the absence of reporting does not definitively prove that he did or did not receive a large financial recovery, nor what the total dollar figure was.

Because there is no verifiable public information on how much money, if any, García Martínez ultimately obtained from Apple specifically as a result of his firing (beyond ordinary short‑tenure compensation), it is impossible to confirm or falsify Chamath’s quantitative prediction that his total Apple‑related recovery would be “on the order of $20 million.” The outcome is therefore best classified as ambiguous rather than right or wrong.

Biden’s 2021 tax agenda and the early Build Back Better drafts did include significant proposed increases in capital gains taxes for high‑income investors (e.g., raising the top rate from 20% to 25%, aligned with a higher 39.6% ordinary rate).(roselawgroupreporter.com) However, these capital‑gains hikes were stripped out in later negotiations and never enacted; the House‑passed and final Inflation Reduction Act omitted the capital‑gains rate increase.(www2.dugganbertsch.com) As of the 2025 tax year, federal long‑term capital gains are still taxed at 0%, 15%, and 20% (plus the unchanged 3.8% NIIT for high earners), with only the income thresholds indexed for inflation.(kiplinger.com)

On the corporate side, Biden’s American Jobs Plan originally proposed raising the federal corporate rate from 21% to 28%.(taxfoundation.org) But Congress never enacted any increase: subsequent Build Back Better drafts dropped the corporate rate hike, and later tax laws left the 21% statutory corporate rate from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in place.(www2.dugganbertsch.com)

So Chamath was correct that there was insufficient support to pass the large capital‑gains increase, but incorrect that the corporate rate would “probably go to 25%” – it stayed at 21%. Because the normalized prediction conjunctively asserts both outcomes (no big cap‑gains hike and a corporate rate around 25%), the overall prediction is best scored as wrong, albeit for a mix of one accurate and one inaccurate component.

Chamath’s prediction hinged on two linked ideas: (1) that the U.S. inflation spike and excess demand were mostly short‑term, stimulus‑driven and would have “worked [their] way through the system” by fall 2021, and (2) that markets would then revert to the familiar low‑inflation regime where tech/growth leadership resumes.

By fall 2021, the opposite of the first part had happened:

• U.S. CPI inflation was still accelerating, not fading. Year‑over‑year CPI was already above 5% by June–September 2021 (5.39% in both June and September) and then climbed to 6.22% in October, 6.81% in November, and 7.04% in December 2021—its highest annual rate since the early 1980s. (inflation.eu) That is inconsistent with the idea that the short‑term spike had largely “worked through” by fall.
• Policymakers and commentators explicitly abandoned the “transitory” framing by late 2021. Fed Chair Jerome Powell told Congress it was time to “retire” the word transitory and admitted the Fed had expected inflation to be much lower by then but that supply constraints and inflation pressures were far more persistent than forecast. (congress.gov) Analysts and investors likewise warned that U.S. inflation, which hit 6.8% in November 2021, was no longer transitory and was “here to stay” for some time. (localnews8.com)

On the market‑style side, growth/tech stocks did regain leadership over value in the back half of 2021: a Nasdaq/YCharts review notes that value outperformed in the first half of 2021, but in the second half growth outpaced value and finished the year 8.7 percentage points ahead. (nasdaq.com) That aspect of his story (a reversion toward the long‑running pattern of growth leadership) broadly materialized.

However, the clear, falsifiable portion of his prediction was that the inflation and pent‑up demand shock would be mostly over by fall 2021, returning the economy to the prior low‑inflation, normalized‑demand environment. The data show that, by fall 2021, inflation was still rising to multi‑decade highs and was widely recognized as persistent rather than short‑lived. That core macro call was therefore wrong, even though growth stocks did resume outperforming later in 2021.

The prediction tied a renewed bull market in U.S. growth stocks to a short‑term demand spike subsiding by fall 2021, implying that once inflationary/demand pressures faded, “good times” would sustainably return for growth stocks relative to their spring 2021 inflation‑scare levels.

1. Condition didn’t really occur: U.S. CPI inflation rose from ~5% year‑over‑year in May 2021 to 6.2% in October and about 7.0% in December 2021, with broad‑based price pressures in energy, goods, and services. This indicates that the demand/inflation surge did not clearly subside by fall 2021; instead, it intensified into late 2021. (inflation.eu)

2. Growth stocks had only a brief spike, then a major bear market: As a proxy for large‑cap U.S. growth, QQQ (tracking the Nasdaq‑100) closed May 2021 at about $325 and rose to around $385–$390 by November–December 2021, a solid gain from the spring 2021 "inflation scare" levels. (statmuse.com) However, QQQ then suffered a ~35% drawdown from its late‑December 2021 peak to a low in November 2022. (assetsanalyzer.com) The broader Nasdaq Composite likewise entered a bear market from its November 2021 record high, falling roughly one‑third by late 2022. (nasdaq.com)

3. High‑beta growth/speculative names fared even worse: ARKK, a concentrated innovation/growth ETF, is a reasonable stand‑in for the kind of aggressive growth Chamath often discussed. It traded around $111 in May 2021, rose to about $120 in October 2021, but then collapsed to roughly $31 by December 2022—far below its spring 2021 levels. (digrin.com) That path is inconsistent with “good times are back” or a lasting bull phase starting in fall 2021.

4. Net assessment:

   • The stated trigger (a temporary demand spike fading by fall 2021) did not materialize; inflation stayed high and then accelerated.
   • Broad growth indexes (e.g., Nasdaq‑100) did briefly make new highs into late 2021 but then entered a deep bear market within months rather than a sustained, unambiguous bull phase from that point.
   • More speculative growth (ARKK‑style) ended up dramatically worse than during the spring 2021 scare.

Given these outcomes, the real world path did not match the scenario Chamath was describing: growth stocks did not transition into a clear, durable bull market with substantially better performance than spring 2021 once we reached fall 2021. On balance, this makes the prediction wrong, even allowing for some ambiguity about exact definitions of “growth stocks” and timeframe.

Evidence shows that the University of California not only extended its suspension of SAT/ACT requirements but has formally ended the use of standardized tests in undergraduate admissions and has maintained that stance through at least the 2026–27 application cycle.

Key points:

• In May 2020, the UC Board of Regents voted to suspend SAT/ACT requirements through 2024, with the possibility of eliminating them entirely by 2025 if no suitable replacement test was found.(universityofcalifornia.edu)
• In May 2021, UC settled the Smith v. Regents lawsuit by agreeing to a test‑free policy (no SAT/ACT consideration in admissions or scholarships) through at least 2025, preventing any reversion to test‑optional use of the exams.(publiccounsel.org)
• In November 2021, the UC Board of Regents was told that faculty could not find any acceptable alternative test; UC leaders then announced a final decision to end standardized testing for admissions and not to develop a replacement test. Provost Michael Brown stated that “UC will continue to practice test‑free admissions now and into the future.”(forbes.com)
• Coverage in 2021–2022 (EdSource, CBS Los Angeles, Times Higher Education and others) consistently describes UC undergraduate admissions as test‑free going forward, with no plans to bring back SAT/ACT requirements, though leaders left a narrow theoretical door open if some entirely new, equitable test were invented in the future.(edsource.org)
• As of 2025, UC and CSU are still described in current reporting as "test‑free" systems; they do not consider SAT/ACT scores at all for undergraduate admissions, even as many private universities (e.g., Brown, Princeton, Stanford) have reinstated test requirements.(thecollegesage.com)

Sacks’ prediction was: from a supposedly temporary pause (“not bringing back the requirements until at least 2025”), standardized test requirements for UC undergrad admissions would in practice never return. By late 2021 UC had gone beyond a pause to a formally test‑free, no‑replacement policy, and by late 2025 there has been no reinstatement and active confirmation that admissions will remain test‑free for the foreseeable future.

While one can never prove “never” in a literal, infinite‑time sense, all institutional decisions and current policy confirm that the SAT/ACT requirement did not come back when the suspension window ended and has instead been effectively made permanent. Under the usual standards for evaluating such forecasts, this prediction is best classified as right.

Available evidence shows Callin did not publicly launch within a few weeks of May 22, 2021.

Multiple independent sources state that Callin publicly launched on iOS in early September 2021:

• TechCrunch reported that Callin, David Sacks’ “social podcasting” app, launched on iOS and announced its Series A funding on September 2, 2021.​(techcrunch.com)
• David Sacks’ own Medium post, “Meet Callin, the First Social Podcasting Platform,” dated September 2, 2021, explicitly says, “Today is the public launch of Callin” and that it is available in Apple’s App Store.​(medium.com)
• An app metadata tracker lists the Callin iOS app release date as August 31, 2021, with subsequent updates through 2023.​(appshunter.io)

From May 22, 2021 to August 31, 2021 is about 14 weeks, far beyond the ordinary meaning of “a few weeks” (typically on the order of 2–4 weeks). There is no evidence of an earlier public launch window in June 2021; instead, all public references point to late August/early September 2021 as the first App Store release and public launch.​(vcnewsdaily.com)

Given that the prediction (as normalized) was that Callin would be ready for public launch within a few weeks of May 22, 2021, and the actual public launch occurred roughly three months later, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

Jason made the prediction on episode E33, released May 22, 2021, that the All‑In hosts would “do something in person in September” with their fan base.

However, all available documentation of the All‑In live-events timeline shows their first public, ticketed in‑person gathering with fans as the inaugural All‑In Summit in Miami Beach, held May 15–17, 2022, not in September 2021. Both the All‑In podcast and Jason Calacanis’s biographical write‑ups describe this 2022 Miami event as the show’s first All‑In Summit / in‑person fan event. If they had done a prior fan event in September 2021, these sources would not characterize the May 2022 summit as the first. (en.wikipedia.org)

Searches across news coverage, event listings, and fan discussions also turn up no evidence of any All‑In-branded, in‑person fan event (live show, meetup, or mini‑summit) in September 2021; the live-events franchise is consistently described as beginning in 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)

Given that:

• Jason specifically tied the plan to September 2021, and
• the first documented in‑person fan event didn’t occur until May 2022,

the prediction that the hosts would hold an in‑person event with fans sometime in September 2021 did not come true.

On May 22, 2021, Chamath made this comment in the middle of a sharp crypto selloff: the total crypto market cap had just fallen from around $2.5T to roughly $1.56T, with Bitcoin near $37.5k after crashing from about $64k a month earlier. (amp.cnn.com)

Since then, markets went through a deep "crypto winter" in 2022, when total crypto market cap fell below $1T and ended 2022 around $829B—much lower than at the time of his prediction. (80.lv) However, that downturn did not mark a lasting secular decline:

• By October 5, 2025, total crypto market cap reached a new all‑time high around $4.35T—well above both the pre‑crash peak and the May 2021 levels—and even after a correction in November 2025, it remains in the ~$3.1–3.2T range. (cryptorank.io)
• Bitcoin rose from about $37.5k on May 22, 2021 to new highs above $120k in mid‑2025, and is still around the $90k level in late 2025—multiples of its price at the time of the prediction, despite large drawdowns along the way. (statmuse.com)

Beyond prices, the structure and adoption of crypto markets expanded substantially:

• The U.S. SEC approved 11 spot Bitcoin ETFs in January 2024, including BlackRock’s iShares Bitcoin Trust (IBIT), which became the most successful ETF launch in history and surpassed $50B AUM in 2024; spot BTC ETFs collectively held over 1.3M BTC by late 2025. (techcrunch.com)
• In March 2025, the U.S. created a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and a broader Digital Asset Stockpile, formalizing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as national‑level reserve and strategic assets. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, the market did exactly what his normalized prediction describes: the May 2021 pullback was followed by a severe but temporary downcycle, after which crypto entered a larger growth phase with new price highs, a much larger total market, and significantly deeper institutional and governmental integration. Over a 4.5‑year horizon, this supports the view that it was "the beginning of the beginning" of a longer‑term growth cycle rather than the start of terminal decline. Therefore, the prediction is best classified as right.

Evidence shows Friedberg’s pattern call played out.

• Before the May 2021 crash, bitcoin’s then–all‑time high was about $64,800 on April 14, 2021. (en.wikipedia.org) In mid‑May 2021, during the drawdown he was discussing, the price fell to around $30,000, matching his description of a plunge from the mid‑$60k range to the low/mid‑$30k area. (en.wikipedia.org)
• After that decline, bitcoin rebounded and set a new record high near $69,000 in November 2021, clearly surpassing the prior ~$64.8k peak (Forbes, Bloomberg, and others report intraday highs around $68.9k–$69k on November 10, 2021). (forbes.com)
• In later cycles, bitcoin went on to make much higher all‑time highs, first by again exceeding $69k in March 2024, and later reaching about $109,500 on May 21, 2025, far above any 2021 level. (techcrunch.com)

Friedberg’s prediction was that the May 2021 crash would likely be a good entry point because bitcoin tends to crash, recover, and eventually “goes back up, reaches a new peak.” The subsequent move from roughly $30k up to new highs near $69k later in 2021—and then to even higher highs in 2024–2025—matches that pattern and validates the specific claim that bitcoin would eventually rally past its prior all‑time high.

China side of the prediction

Since the podcast (May 2021), China has moved from partial restrictions to a comprehensive legal ban on above‑ground Bitcoin use:

• On 24 September 2021, the People’s Bank of China declared that all cryptocurrency transactions are illegal financial activities, explicitly including Bitcoin, and banned financial institutions, payment companies and internet platforms from facilitating crypto trading or related services. Overseas exchanges were also barred from serving mainland users. This effectively shut down legal, regulated crypto trading and payment activity in mainland China. (theguardian.com)
• China also ordered a crackdown on crypto mining, driving miners and exchanges offshore and removing Bitcoin from the formal, regulated financial system. (euronews.com)
• As of 2025, the People’s Bank of China continues to state that virtual‑currency business activities are illegal financial activities and reiterates that trading and related services remain banned, even while acknowledging some underground mining/speculation. This confirms the ban is still in force and focused on suppressing legal, above‑ground usage. (reuters.com)

So, while underground and offshore use persists, the legal/official use of Bitcoin in mainland China has been effectively stopped, matching the first part of Jason’s prediction.

Western countries side of the prediction

In contrast, Western governments have not "stopped" Bitcoin usage; instead they have moved toward regulation and even integration:

• The European Union adopted the Markets in Crypto‑Assets (MiCA) regulation, a comprehensive framework governing issuance, trading, and custody of crypto‑assets, in force since late 2024. MiCA explicitly regulates rather than bans Bitcoin and other crypto, enabling licensed service providers across the EU. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Under MiCA, European firms like Bitpanda and major banks such as BBVA have obtained licenses to offer Bitcoin trading and custody services to retail clients, demonstrating that legal, mainstream Bitcoin use is being facilitated, not shut down. (cincodias.elpais.com)
• In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority in 2025 reversed its earlier stance and allowed retail access to regulated Bitcoin and Ether ETNs on the London Stock Exchange, again tightening rules but not prohibiting Bitcoin. (ft.com)
• In the United States, instead of banning Bitcoin, the federal government has moved toward formal integration, including establishing a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and broader digital‑asset stockpile, explicitly positioning the U.S. as aiming to be a global crypto hub. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Global overviews of crypto bans show that complete prohibitions are concentrated in countries like China, Algeria, Nepal, and others, with no blanket bans across major Western economies (U.S., Canada, EU, UK, Australia, etc.). Western approaches are generally restrictive/regulatory rather than prohibitive. (euronews.com)

Given that (1) China has indeed eliminated legal, above‑ground Bitcoin use in mainland financial channels, while (2) governments in the U.S., EU, UK and other Western countries have not banned Bitcoin but instead regulated or even adopted it, Jason’s prediction matches the subsequent reality.

Therefore the prediction is right.

Jason’s prediction had two concrete parts, both to occur within 2–3 years of May 2021 (by roughly May 2023–May 2024):

1. The U.S. would launch a central bank digital currency (CBDC).

   • The Federal Reserve’s own CBDC page states that the Fed has made no decision to pursue or implement a CBDC and is only exploring the concept. (federalreserve.gov)
   • In March 2024, Fed Chair Jerome Powell told the U.S. Senate that the United States is “nowhere near recommending or let alone adopting a [CBDC] in any form.” (cointelegraph.com)
   • Later, in January 2025 (after the prediction window), President Trump signed Executive Order 14178 explicitly prohibiting U.S. agencies from establishing, issuing, or promoting a CBDC, which confirms that no CBDC had been launched up to that point. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • FedNow, launched as an instant payments service, is explicitly stated by the Federal Reserve not to be a digital currency or CBDC. (cointelegraph.com)
     Together, these show that no U.S. CBDC was launched by May 2023–May 2024 (or even by late 2025).

2. A roughly 10% extra tax on other (non‑CBDC) cryptocurrencies to push people into the U.S. CBDC.

   • U.S. crypto is taxed under the normal capital‑gains and income tax system (short‑term taxed as ordinary income; long‑term at 0%, 15%, or 20% depending on income), with various reporting rules, but there is no special ~10% surcharge targeting non‑CBDC crypto transactions. (weex.com)
   • Overviews of U.S. virtual‑currency law and tax treatment describe registration, reporting, and enforcement measures, but again no distinct higher tax tier on crypto because it is “non‑CBDC.” (en.wikipedia.org)

Since (a) the U.S. did not launch a CBDC within 2–3 years of May 2021 and (b) no 10% penalty tax on non‑CBDC crypto was introduced in that period (or afterward), Jason’s prediction did not come true.

The prediction specifies a ~15‑year horizon from 2021 (i.e., until around 2036). As of late 2025, that window is far from over, so the outcome cannot yet be determined.

Current evidence:

1. U.S. dollar’s reserve status: IMF COFER data and mainstream coverage show the U.S. dollar is still the dominant global reserve currency, with roughly 57–58% of disclosed foreign‑exchange reserves at the end of 2024 and in early 2025. Other major currencies (euro, yen, pound, renminbi) collectively make up much of the balance, but none has displaced the dollar; the system is gradually diversifying but remains dollar‑centric. (reuters.com) This means the first part of the prediction (dollar no longer the world’s reserve currency) has not yet come true, but it also has not been falsified because the deadline is 2036.

2. Bitcoin as (un)official reserve currency: Central banks and governments hold some Bitcoin, but on a very small scale relative to FX reserves and gold. Current estimates put government/sovereign holdings around a few hundred thousand BTC (roughly 2–3% of supply), largely from law‑enforcement seizures or small policy experiments (e.g., El Salvador, Bhutan, Argentina), not from broad, coordinated central‑bank reserve strategies. (mexc.fm) In 2025 the U.S. did create a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve using seized coins, and several countries are exploring Bitcoin in their reserve mix, but Bitcoin is still far from being the primary or widely recognized unofficial global reserve currency; the role remains speculative and marginal versus the dollar, euro, and gold. (chaincatcher.com)

Because:

• The time horizon (to ~2036) has not elapsed, and
• The predicted shift could still occur in the remaining years,

the correct classification as of November 2025 is "inconclusive" (too early to tell) rather than right or wrong.

Available evidence up to November 29, 2025 shows that governments, including the U.S. and China, have not been able to stop Bitcoin as a global system, even though they have significantly regulated or restricted its use.

Key points:

1. Bitcoin network is operating at record strength. In April 2025, Bitcoin’s hash rate (a measure of the total computing power securing the network) hit an all‑time high of ~838–974 exahashes per second, indicating a very robust, globally distributed mining ecosystem rather than a system that has been shut down or crippled. (coindesk.com)

2. China’s ban has not extinguished Bitcoin activity. China imposed a comprehensive ban on crypto trading and mining in 2021. Yet reporting in 2025 shows that Bitcoin mining in China has rebounded, with underground or semi-tolerated operations giving China an estimated ~14% share of global Bitcoin mining and as much as 15–20% of global capacity, despite the official ban. (reuters.com) The People’s Bank of China continues to reiterate that crypto activities are illegal, but this has not eliminated Bitcoin’s presence; it has mainly pushed it into more opaque channels. (reuters.com)

3. Several countries ban Bitcoin, but only locally, not globally. A number of states (e.g., Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Morocco, Nepal, North Korea) still maintain full prohibitions on Bitcoin use or trading. (cryptoupturn.com) However, these are national restrictions; they have not stopped Bitcoin from functioning globally, nor prevented people in those countries from accessing it via technical workarounds.

4. Major economies have moved toward regulation and even accumulation, not eradication. In the United States, Bitcoin is legal and treated as property for tax purposes, with exchanges required to comply with AML and KYC rules. (bitrue.com) In 2025, the U.S. went further by creating a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve via executive order, explicitly recognizing Bitcoin as a kind of “digital gold” and instructing that seized government BTC be held as reserve assets rather than sold. (whitehouse.gov) The U.S. also enacted the GENIUS Act to regulate stablecoins, indicating a strategy of integration and oversight rather than prohibition of core crypto infrastructure. (en.wikipedia.org)

5. Policy reversals haven’t stopped Bitcoin’s existence. El Salvador, which made Bitcoin legal tender in 2021, rescinded its legal-tender status in 2025 after mixed results and external pressure. (en.wikipedia.org) This is a significant policy change but does not affect whether the Bitcoin network itself continues to operate globally—which it does.

Overall, more than four years after the 2021 prediction, Bitcoin remains globally accessible, its network security is at record levels, and even the most restrictive governments have not managed to eliminate it—only to constrain local usage. That aligns with Chamath’s claim that “there was nothing that they could do to stop it before” and “there’s nothing that they can do to stop it now,” interpreted as an assertion that states cannot fully shut down Bitcoin as a functioning global system.

Friedberg’s prediction has three main parts: (1) a growing wave of progressive/decarceration-focused DAs in major cities, (2) those DAs causing a lot of “carnage” (significantly higher crime, deaths, destruction), and (3) an eventual political backlash once the public reacts.

1. Trend of progressive prosecutors. There was a prior national wave of reform‑oriented prosecutors elected in large jurisdictions (Boston, Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, Austin, etc.), especially from 2016–2020, and they did frame themselves as aiming to reduce incarceration. (governing.com) But after 2021 this wave did not simply keep expanding “in every major city”: some new progressives were elected (e.g., Pamela Price in Alameda County, José Garza in Travis County), yet several high‑profile figures resigned, were recalled, were removed or lost reelection (Kim Gardner in St. Louis, Chesa Boudin in San Francisco, Pamela Price in Alameda, Mike Schmidt in Portland, Andrew Warren in Tampa). (en.wikipedia.org) So the movement continued but also clearly hit headwinds, rather than an unbroken, accelerating trend across “every major city.”

2. Claim that these DAs would cause major increases in crime, deaths, and destruction. The best available empirical work directly undercuts this causal claim:

   • A multi‑city study led by University of Toronto researchers found no evidence that jurisdictions with progressive prosecutors had larger homicide increases than those with traditional prosecutors in 2015–2019 and 2018–2021; if anything, homicide rose slightly less in progressive‑prosecutor cities. (americanprogress.org)
   • A follow‑up study using data from 2014–2023 for 62 large cities similarly found that homicide and other violent‑crime trends did not differ systematically by prosecutor type; homicides rose nationwide through 2021 and then began to fall in cities with all kinds of prosecutors, and robbery actually declined faster in progressive‑prosecutor cities. (americanprogress.org)
   • National FBI data show that after a pandemic‑era spike in murders in 2020–2021, homicides declined in 2022, 2023 and 2024, with the murder rate in 2024 at its lowest in nine years, even though many progressive DAs remained in office. (washingtonpost.com) Major cities like Baltimore, Philadelphia and New Orleans saw murders fall by over 50% from 2021 to 2025, again without a simple alignment to whether they had a progressive DA. (washingtonpost.com)
   • City‑level examples often cited as “progressive DA” jurisdictions show the same pattern: San Francisco’s homicides and overall violent crime dropped sharply by 2023–2024; Chicago’s homicides fell in 2022 and 2023 from their 2021 peak. (axios.com)

   Taken together, current research strongly suggests that the homicide surge was a national phenomenon tied to broader social and pandemic‑related factors, and that progressive/decarceration‑oriented DAs were not the driver of “carnage.” In other words, the key causal part of Friedberg’s prediction—that electing these DAs would cause significantly higher serious crime and deaths—has been empirically falsified.

3. Prediction of an eventual backlash. This part did occur. There has been a substantial, organized backlash against progressive prosecutors and decarceration policies:

   • Voters recalled Chesa Boudin in San Francisco in 2022 and Pamela Price in Alameda County in 2024, both after heavy criticism that they were too lenient. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Republican governors and legislatures in several states created mechanisms aimed explicitly at “rogue” or progressive prosecutors, such as Texas’s House Bill 17 allowing removal of DAs who decline to prosecute certain offenses, and Georgia’s Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission with power to discipline or remove local DAs. (houstonchronicle.com)
   • Florida’s governor suspended reform‑oriented state attorneys Andrew Warren and Monique Worrell; Warren then lost his 2024 election bid to the DeSantis‑appointed replacement, while Worrell only regained office in 2024 after a contested suspension. (en.wikipedia.org)

   At the same time, the backlash has not wiped out the movement. Some prominent progressive DAs, like Larry Krasner in Philadelphia and José Garza in Austin/Travis County, have won reelection by large margins, and Worrell herself was reelected despite her suspension. (axios.com) So there is backlash, but it coexists with continued voter support for progressive prosecutors in some cities.

Because the prediction hinges centrally on the idea that the election of progressive, decarceration‑focused DAs would cause a wave of increased crime, death, and destruction, and the best available data strongly contradict that causal link while showing crime falling again even where such DAs remain, the overall prediction is best judged wrong, despite its partially correct anticipation of political backlash.