E96: Adobe acquires Figma for $20B, TPB SPAC, FedEx CEO's recession warning, macro picture & more

Sacks’ forecast was that Figma’s annual recurring revenue (ARR) would reach roughly $1.5–2.0 billion within about two years after end‑2023, i.e., by late 2025 or very early 2026. This is clear from the episode transcript, where he walks through Figma’s ARR ramp and then says Adobe is paying ~25× end‑of‑next‑year (2023) ARR and that “within say two years after that” Figma would be at $1.5–2B of ARR. (podscripts.co)

What we know today:

• Independent estimates put Figma at about $600M ARR at the end of 2023, not the ~$800M 2023 ARR Sacks was assuming. (auditshq.com)
• As a now‑public company, Figma reports revenue, not total ARR, in its SEC filings and earnings releases. Recent results show:
  • Q1–Q3 2025 revenue totaling about $752M, with Q3 2025 revenue of $274.2M, which management describes as an “annual revenue run-rate of over $1.0 billion.” (investor.figma.com)
  • Figma’s updated full‑year 2025 guidance is $1.044–1.046B in revenue, implying a revenue (and likely ARR) level around ~$1B, not yet at $1.5B+ by late 2025. (y94.com)
• Figma’s IPO S‑1 and 10‑Q filings define ARR and give customer counts by ARR bands (e.g., number of customers over $10k and over $100k ARR), but do not disclose a single aggregate ARR figure for 2024–2025 that we could directly compare to the $1.5–2B target. (sec.gov)

Because:

1. The prediction window has not fully elapsed (we are still before “very early 2026”), and
2. Figma has not published a total ARR number for late 2025 that would definitively confirm or refute the $1.5–2B range,

we cannot say yet whether the prediction ultimately proves right or wrong. Available data suggest Figma is well below $1.5B ARR as of late 2025, but it is not mathematically impossible for ARR to grow substantially into early 2026, and the exact ARR figures are undisclosed.

Given both the remaining time in the forecast window and the lack of a published aggregate ARR metric, the correct status is **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right, wrong, or permanently ambiguous.

Chamath predicted that Adobe’s proposed $20B acquisition of Figma, announced in September 2022, would ultimately receive regulatory approval and close. In fact, the opposite occurred.

On December 18, 2023, Adobe and Figma publicly announced that they had mutually agreed to terminate the merger agreement, explicitly citing that there was “no clear path to receive necessary regulatory approvals” from the European Commission and the UK Competition and Markets Authority. (news.adobe.com) News coverage from multiple outlets (CNBC, Associated Press, Forbes, TechCrunch, Ars Technica) confirms that the $20B deal was abandoned due to regulatory pushback and that Adobe paid Figma a $1B termination fee. (cnbc.com)

Figma’s later move to file for an IPO and its SEC filings further describe the Adobe deal as an “abandoned merger” terminated in December 2023, underscoring that it never closed. (sec.gov)

Because the acquisition did not receive final regulatory approval and did not close, Chamath’s prediction that “this thing is going to close” was wrong.

Adobe’s proposed $20 billion acquisition of Figma, announced in September 2022, was not completed. On December 18, 2023, Adobe and Figma issued a joint statement saying they had mutually agreed to terminate the merger agreement, citing “no clear path to receive necessary regulatory approvals” from the European Commission and the UK Competition and Markets Authority.(news.adobe.com)

Major coverage from outlets such as CNBC, Forbes, The Guardian, and TechCrunch confirms that the deal was abandoned and that Adobe is paying Figma a $1 billion termination/breakup fee.(cnbc.com)

Because the prediction was that the deal “will successfully close (i.e., will not be blocked or abandoned)” and the deal was in fact terminated and never closed, the prediction is wrong.

Evidence since 2022 shows a large, war‑linked shock to global food security that plausibly pushed tens of millions of additional people into serious hunger, in line with the low end of Friedberg’s range, but not the extreme 300–400 million figure.

Key points:

• The UN’s State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2023 report estimates 735 million people were chronically undernourished in 2022, about 122 million more people than in 2019. It explicitly attributes this rise to multiple crises, including COVID‑19, climate extremes, and the repercussions of the war in Ukraine on food and fertilizer prices.(who.int)
• SOFI’s forward‑looking analysis projects that by 2030 there will be almost 600 million chronically undernourished people, around 119 million more than in a scenario with neither the pandemic nor the Ukraine war, and about 23 million more than in a scenario where the war in Ukraine did not occur. This implies the war’s contribution alone is on the order of tens of millions of extra undernourished people, not hundreds of millions.(nutritionconnect.org)
• The Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) finds that people facing acute food insecurity at crisis or worse levels (IPC Phase 3+) rose from 193 million in 2021 to 258 million in 2022, with the report stating that economic shocks including the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine (through higher food, fuel, and fertilizer prices) became major drivers of hunger.(wfp.org) By 2024, nearly 300 million people in 53 countries were in acute food crisis, a further increase, again driven by conflict, economic shocks, climate events, and reduced aid.(theguardian.com)
• On the fertilizer‑specific mechanism Friedberg emphasized, FAO/AMIS analysis indicates that global fertilizer trade volumes were not severely curtailed over the medium term; by 2024 total fertilizer trade was actually slightly higher (about 2 million tonnes) than in 2020–2021, even though prices spiked in 2022 after the invasion.(scribd.com) Food commodity prices also peaked in March 2022 and then fell; by mid‑2025 global cereal prices were more than 20% below that peak, and FAO was forecasting record global cereal production for 2025.(reuters.com) This undermines the most catastrophic fertilizer‑shortage scenario.

Putting this together:

• Direction and order of magnitude (low end): The data support the claim that the Ukraine war and associated input‑price shocks produced an additional tens of millions of people suffering serious, long‑lasting hunger relative to a no‑war baseline. UN projections that isolate the Ukraine war’s effect (~23 million extra chronically undernourished by 2030) sit squarely in the "tens of millions" range Friedberg mentioned.(nutritionconnect.org)
• Upper bound clearly too high: There is no evidence that the war‑and‑fertilizer channel has created an extra 300–400 million people consuming near‑starvation rations, and global fertilizer trade and cereal output recovered more than feared. The extreme upper end of his range has not materialized and is inconsistent with current projections.
• Measurement caveat: Friedberg defined starvation as under 1,200 calories per day for a year, but global monitoring uses different thresholds (undernourishment, severe food insecurity, IPC phases). That makes an exact numerical test impossible, but all available metrics point to increases on the scale of tens of millions, not hundreds of millions.

Overall, the core prediction that the Ukraine war’s food and fertilizer shock would add at least tens of millions of people to the global ranks of the starving or severely hungry is supported by subsequent UN analyses, even though his most alarming figure of 300–400 million additional starving people has not occurred and now looks exaggerated.

Evaluating the prediction against outcomes through late 2025:

• Path and level of rates. Chamath said the Fed would take short‑term rates to about 4.5–5.0%. In reality, the federal funds target range reached 4.25–4.50% by December 2022, then peaked at 5.25–5.50% in July 2023 and stayed there through the end of 2023 and into mid‑2024, before easing in late 2024–2025.(forbes.com) He slightly under‑shot the eventual peak (5.5% vs. his 4.5–5%), but correctly anticipated that rates would end up roughly around 5%, not stay near zero or top out in the 3s.

• “Higher and longer than people expect.” In mid‑2022, fed funds futures priced a peak around the low‑3% range in early 2023 followed by cuts.(investing.com) By December 2022, markets still expected cuts by late 2023 even as economists were revising terminal‑rate forecasts up toward ~5.25–5.5%.(bankrate.com) Instead, the Fed took rates above 5% and held them at 5.25–5.50% from July 2023 through July 2024, only beginning to cut later.(cnbc.com) That is broadly consistent with his claim that rates would go higher and stay elevated longer than markets were then pricing.

• Economic impact in 2023. The normalized summary adds “noticeable slowdown or recessionary impact in 2023,” but Chamath’s actual quote only says the high rates “will have an impact to the economy.” There clearly was impact, especially in interest‑sensitive sectors: 2023 existing home sales fell 18.7% from 2022 to their lowest level since 1995, largely because mortgage rates surged to two‑decade highs.(pbs.org) However, at the aggregate level the U.S. did not fall into recession in 2023. Real GDP grew 2.5% for the year, faster than 2022, with very strong Q3–Q4 growth, and unemployment remained low.(bea.gov) Commentators later described 2023 as a “soft landing” or even an economic “miracle,” precisely because the widely predicted deep recession never arrived.(wamc.org) So if one interprets his prediction as an outright 2023 recession, that part would be wrong; if one sticks to his actual wording (“an impact”), it is correct but somewhat underspecified.

• Impact in 2024–2025 “not that great.” By 2024–2025, this part holds up well. Real U.S. GDP grew about 2.9% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024, with continued positive growth into 2025 and unemployment around 4–4.3%, indicating a still‑solid expansion rather than a prolonged slump.(bea.gov) The IMF’s 2024 Article IV report explicitly notes that the disinflation from the Fed’s 525 bps of tightening came at a “relatively light toll” on activity, with output and employment above pre‑pandemic expectations and inflation headed back toward 2%.(imf.org) That matches his view that, by 2024–2025, the economic damage from the high‑rate period would no longer be “that great.”

Overall:

• He was directionally accurate on the level of rates (around 5%) and clearly correct that they would end up higher and stay elevated longer than markets initially expected.
• High rates did materially hit sensitive sectors like housing, so his claim of an “impact” is true, though the normalized paraphrase overstates this as a macro recession that never occurred.
• His forward‑looking assessment that by 2024–2025 the impact would be relatively modest is consistent with actual outcomes: growth remained positive, unemployment only slightly higher, and inflation largely contained.

Taking the prediction as a whole—especially the core macro call of a ~5% “higher‑for‑longer” Fed and limited long‑run damage—the forecast is best judged mostly right, with the caveat that the 2023 recession/slowdown component (as phrased in the normalized version) did not materialize.

Evidence from major international institutions shows that the world experienced a slowdown and high inflation after mid‑2022, but not a global recession starting in late 2022.

Key points:

• The IMF’s World Economic Outlook and subsequent updates report that global real GDP grew by roughly 3.5% in 2022 and about 3.0–3.2% in 2023–2024, i.e., the world economy kept expanding, albeit more slowly. (archive.yardeni.com)
• The OECD’s November 2022/early‑2023 outlook projected global growth of about 3.1% in 2022 and 2.2% in 2023, explicitly stating that their baseline scenario was not a global recession but a significant slowdown. (marmomacchineinternational.com)
• In early 2023, the IMF upgraded its outlook and stated that output would be more resilient than previously expected and that a global recession would probably be avoided, reinforcing that the expected outcome was slowdown, not worldwide recession. (industryslice.com)
• The IMF’s own definition and historical list of global recessions (based on declines in per‑capita world GDP and other global indicators) recognize recessions in 1975, 1982, 1991, 2009 and the COVID‑19 recession of 2020—but do not list any new global recession beginning in 2022 or 2023. (en.wikipedia.org)
• While some major economies did enter recession or technical recession (for example, Germany in 2023 and the U.K. in the second half of 2023), these were country‑specific downturns within an overall growing world economy, not a synchronized global recession. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the "world headed for a global recession" scenario did not materialize—global growth slowed but remained positive, and leading institutions explicitly say a global recession was avoided—the prediction that a global recession would begin around late 2022 is best classified as wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which recognized a constitutional right to same‑sex marriage nationwide, has not been overturned or limited in a way that ends nationwide legal recognition of same‑sex marriage. The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned Roe v. Wade and Casey, but it did not address Obergefell, and subsequent Supreme Court terms (2022–2025) have not included any decision reversing Obergefell.

Post‑Dobbs discussion has included concerns and speculation from some justices and commentators about revisiting substantive due process precedents, but no majority opinion has moved to overturn Obergefell. The Court has decided some related religious‑liberty cases (e.g., 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis in 2023) that refined the interaction between LGBTQ rights and the First Amendment, but these decisions left the underlying right to same‑sex civil marriage intact.

Given that more than three years have passed since the podcast (September 17, 2022) and more than three Supreme Court terms have elapsed after Dobbs without any reversal of nationwide legal recognition of same‑sex marriage, the prediction that “gay marriage is [not] at any risk of being overturned by the Supreme Court” has been accurate so far. Therefore, the prediction is best scored as right as of the current date.

Chamath predicted in September 2022 that the Russia–Ukraine war would not end quickly but "drag on for a really long time." That implied many more months and likely years of continued conflict rather than a rapid Russian collapse or a near‑term negotiated settlement.

As of November 30, 2025:

• The large‑scale Russo‑Ukrainian war that began on 24 February 2022 is still formally characterized as ongoing (“2022–present”) by major reference sources, with active combat and no peace treaty or stable ceasefire in place.【(en.wikipedia.org)
• Russia continues to occupy roughly one‑fifth of Ukraine’s territory, with estimates around 18–20% of the country under Russian control as of 2025.【(en.wikipedia.org)
• Major named operations and offensives in 2024–2025 (e.g., the Pokrovsk offensive, Novopavlivka offensive, Kupiansk offensive, and Huliaipole offensive) are explicitly described as ongoing, underscoring that large‑scale fighting is still happening more than three years after the full‑scale invasion began.【(en.wikipedia.org)
• Recent reporting in late November 2025 describes large Russian drone and missile barrages on Kyiv and other cities, with continuing casualties and infrastructure damage, again confirming that the war has not been resolved by a settlement or decisive collapse.【(reuters.com)
• Analyses marking the war’s third year describe it as a prolonged war of attrition that has "settled" into long‑term grinding conflict after the 2023 counteroffensive, not as a short, concluded campaign.【(kyivindependent.com)

Because the war has continued for years after September 2022, with no quick negotiated peace and no sudden, war‑ending collapse of Russian forces, Chamath’s broad directional prediction—that the conflict would drag on for a long time—has been borne out by events.

Available market data show that equity volatility did not stay unusually high for a prolonged period (≥1 year) after September 2022, and in fact normalized faster than many late‑2022 outlooks anticipated.

Key evidence:

1. Volatility levels fell sharply in 2023 vs. 2022

   • The average level of the Cboe Volatility Index (VIX) in 2022 was 25.64, about 30% above its long‑term average and the sixth‑highest yearly average ever, reflecting persistently elevated implied volatility that year. (gia.com)
   • In 2023, VIX behavior changed dramatically: it averaged 16.85, with implied volatility “drifting lower” over the year. Realized volatility of the S&P 500 was 13.10% in 2023. (gia.com)
   • S&P Dow Jones Indices similarly notes that by late 2023 the S&P 500’s annualized daily volatility was a “relatively low” 13.6%, and that trailing one‑year volatility had decreased across all 11 sectors between mid‑2023 and late‑2023. (indexologyblog.com)
     These levels are near or below long‑run norms and are not consistent with a regime of sustained, unusually high, choppy volatility for another full year.

2. Price action was a strong, sustained rally, not a long choppy sideways market

   • After the 2022 bear market (S&P 500 total return ‑18.11%), the index delivered +26.29% in 2023 and +25.02% in 2024, producing the best two‑year gain of the 21st century. (slickcharts.com)
   • This pattern—large, mostly trending gains with only brief volatility spikes (e.g., the regional banking stress in March 2023)—is not what investors typically describe as markets remaining “highly volatile and choppy” for an extended period.

3. Consensus expectations in late 2022 actually leaned toward continued volatility, which did not fully materialize
   Several major houses in late 2022 expected elevated volatility into 2023:

   • JPMorgan projected that market volatility would “remain elevated (VIX averaging ~25)” with another equity drawdown and a likely retest of 2022 lows in 1H23. (tker.co)
   • Rothschild & Co’s survey of broker forecasts notes that at end‑2022, brokers projected flat U.S. equity returns for 2023, with volatility expected to remain elevated and some predicting a retest of the 2022 lows. (rothschildandco.com)
   • Northern Trust’s 2023 outlook similarly described 2023 as a “turbulent” and volatile year, even while expecting some tempering later on. (businesswire.com)

   In reality, VIX did not average around 25 in 2023; it averaged ~16.9, well below both 2022 levels and the long‑term mean. (gia.com) Volatility subsided sooner, not “for much longer,” than many of these contemporaneous expectations.

Given (a) the clear drop in both implied and realized volatility by 2023, (b) the strong, relatively smooth upward trend in major equity indices starting in late 2022, and (c) the fact that consensus late‑2022 forecasts already anticipated more persistent volatility than actually occurred, Chamath’s claim that the choppy, high‑vol regime would persist for “much longer than people think” (on the order of at least another year) does not match subsequent market behavior. Hence the prediction is wrong.