Evaluating the prediction against outcomes through late 2025:

• Path and level of rates. Chamath said the Fed would take short‑term rates to about 4.5–5.0%. In reality, the federal funds target range reached 4.25–4.50% by December 2022, then peaked at 5.25–5.50% in July 2023 and stayed there through the end of 2023 and into mid‑2024, before easing in late 2024–2025.(forbes.com) He slightly under‑shot the eventual peak (5.5% vs. his 4.5–5%), but correctly anticipated that rates would end up roughly around 5%, not stay near zero or top out in the 3s.

• “Higher and longer than people expect.” In mid‑2022, fed funds futures priced a peak around the low‑3% range in early 2023 followed by cuts.(investing.com) By December 2022, markets still expected cuts by late 2023 even as economists were revising terminal‑rate forecasts up toward ~5.25–5.5%.(bankrate.com) Instead, the Fed took rates above 5% and held them at 5.25–5.50% from July 2023 through July 2024, only beginning to cut later.(cnbc.com) That is broadly consistent with his claim that rates would go higher and stay elevated longer than markets were then pricing.

• Economic impact in 2023. The normalized summary adds “noticeable slowdown or recessionary impact in 2023,” but Chamath’s actual quote only says the high rates “will have an impact to the economy.” There clearly was impact, especially in interest‑sensitive sectors: 2023 existing home sales fell 18.7% from 2022 to their lowest level since 1995, largely because mortgage rates surged to two‑decade highs.(pbs.org) However, at the aggregate level the U.S. did not fall into recession in 2023. Real GDP grew 2.5% for the year, faster than 2022, with very strong Q3–Q4 growth, and unemployment remained low.(bea.gov) Commentators later described 2023 as a “soft landing” or even an economic “miracle,” precisely because the widely predicted deep recession never arrived.(wamc.org) So if one interprets his prediction as an outright 2023 recession, that part would be wrong; if one sticks to his actual wording (“an impact”), it is correct but somewhat underspecified.

• Impact in 2024–2025 “not that great.” By 2024–2025, this part holds up well. Real U.S. GDP grew about 2.9% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024, with continued positive growth into 2025 and unemployment around 4–4.3%, indicating a still‑solid expansion rather than a prolonged slump.(bea.gov) The IMF’s 2024 Article IV report explicitly notes that the disinflation from the Fed’s 525 bps of tightening came at a “relatively light toll” on activity, with output and employment above pre‑pandemic expectations and inflation headed back toward 2%.(imf.org) That matches his view that, by 2024–2025, the economic damage from the high‑rate period would no longer be “that great.”

Overall:

• He was directionally accurate on the level of rates (around 5%) and clearly correct that they would end up higher and stay elevated longer than markets initially expected.
• High rates did materially hit sensitive sectors like housing, so his claim of an “impact” is true, though the normalized paraphrase overstates this as a macro recession that never occurred.
• His forward‑looking assessment that by 2024–2025 the impact would be relatively modest is consistent with actual outcomes: growth remained positive, unemployment only slightly higher, and inflation largely contained.

Taking the prediction as a whole—especially the core macro call of a ~5% “higher‑for‑longer” Fed and limited long‑run damage—the forecast is best judged mostly right, with the caveat that the 2023 recession/slowdown component (as phrased in the normalized version) did not materialize.