E94: NFT volume plummets, California's overreach, FBI meddling, climate change & national security

Based on available data through November 30, 2025, the forecast horizon (“within a few years” of September 1, 2022, i.e., roughly by 2025–2026) is not fully over yet, so the prediction can’t be definitively scored.

What we can observe so far:

• Direct McDonald’s corporate employment: Multiple sources summarizing McDonald’s 10‑K filings show about 150,000 employees in 2022, 2023, and 2024, i.e., essentially flat since the time of the prediction rather than "dramatically lower."(macrotrends.net)(stockanalysis.com)(financhle.com) A recent analysis notes that the big reduction in direct headcount (over 400,000 in 2013 to about 150,000 in 2024) mostly happened before 2022 as McDonald’s shifted to an "asset‑light" franchising model.(merca20.com) So there was a large long‑run drop, but not a new steep post‑2022 collapse.

• System‑wide jobs including franchisees: McDonald’s itself only directly employs a minority of the people working in its restaurants; over 95% of locations are franchised.(merca20.com) Summaries of Statista and company data indicate that, counting franchise crews, McDonald’s system employs over 2 million people worldwide as of 2024, similar to figures cited for 2021–2022.(grokipedia.com)(nativeassignmenthelp.co.uk) That suggests total human jobs tied to McDonald’s have not fallen sharply since 2022 and may even have grown slightly with store expansion.

• Recent hiring and expansion: In mid‑2025 McDonald’s announced plans to hire up to 375,000 U.S. workers in the summer of 2025, in support of opening 900 additional U.S. restaurants by 2027, indicating continuing large‑scale frontline hiring rather than a collapse in jobs.(apnews.com) In Spain, McDonald’s announced in 2025 that it would create about 10,000 new jobs in four years as it opens more than 200 restaurants through 2028.(as.com) These moves are hard to reconcile with a near‑term, dramatic drop in human employment at the chain.

• Automation trend: There is clear investment in kiosks, AI, and other automation, and a 2025 article emphasizes that McDonald’s has been cutting direct employees over the past decade while relying more on franchises and technology.(merca20.com) However, these technologies so far appear to be reducing headcount per store and shifting jobs off McDonald’s balance sheet, not making McDonald’s jobs rare in the way implied by "you’ll know a lot fewer people that work at McDonald’s."(grokipedia.com)

Given that:

• The time window Chamath described (out to ~2026) has not finished, and
• Available numbers through 2024–2025 show no post‑2022, dramatic system‑wide drop in human jobs at McDonald’s, with many signs of continued mass hiring,

it is too early to declare the prediction definitively right or wrong. On present evidence, the trend so far is running against the prediction, but because his stated timeframe still extends into 2026, the fairest scoring as of November 30, 2025 is: inconclusive (too early to tell).

Available evidence as of November 30, 2025 shows that McDonald’s is testing and selectively deploying automation and robotics, but has not shifted its franchise model to what Chamath described (corporate renting a full suite of robots to new franchisees so they can run with ~33–50% fewer workers).

Key points:

• McDonald’s has opened a highly automated test restaurant near Fort Worth, Texas, using conveyor belts, heavy reliance on app/kiosk ordering, and other automation. But reporting and employee accounts emphasize that it still has a kitchen staff and a team size comparable to a traditional store, meaning it is not running with half or a third of the workers, and it is framed as a concept/test site rather than the new standard for all franchises. (cbsnews.com)
• Across the system, McDonald’s has widely deployed self-service kiosks, mobile ordering, automated beverage dispensers, and some automated kitchen systems (including robotic fryers in test locations), which can reduce certain labor needs but are being added piecemeal, not as a uniform, robot-centric package leased from corporate. (scribd.com)
• A major AI/automation initiative—automated drive‑thru order taking with IBM—was ended in 2024 without systemwide rollout, suggesting that even prominent automation pilots are still experimental and reversible, not settled core franchise infrastructure. (restaurantbusinessonline.com)
• Public descriptions of the McDonald’s franchise model and franchise disclosure materials indicate that franchisees are expected to buy their own equipment (with McDonald’s sometimes co‑investing in strategic initiatives), not that corporate is bundling and renting a standardized fleet of robots as part of the franchise fee. (docslib.org)

Putting this together, the specific scenario Chamath predicted—every new franchisee paying the same basic fee but receiving a corporate‑owned, rented “bevy of robots” that lets them operate with roughly 33–50% fewer employees than a 2022 McDonald’s—has not materialized by late 2025. Automation is advancing, but in a more incremental, uneven way and without the distinctive rental-robot franchise package.

However, Chamath’s normalized time horizon was “in the foreseeable future (roughly within a decade from 2022).” Since it is only about three years since the prediction, there are still roughly seven years left in that window. McDonald’s continues to invest in automation and AI as part of its long‑term strategy. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the core predicted structure (robot suite rental + 33–50% staff reduction) has not yet appeared, but the stated decade‑long timeframe has not expired, the correct status as of now is **“inconclusive (too early).”

The prediction sets a time window of 5–10 years from September 1, 2022, i.e. roughly September 2027–September 2032, for “tens of millions” of manual labor jobs (like fast-food prep) to be gone due to robotics and AI.

As of November 30, 2025, we are only about 3¼ years past the episode date, which is before the earliest point (5 years) in the stated 5–10 year window. Even if we could precisely measure global job losses from automation today, the prediction is about what will have happened by 2027–2032, not by 2025.

Current evidence suggests that automation and AI are starting to transform some manual and routine service jobs (e.g., various trials of burger-flipping robots, automated fryers, kiosks, and drive‑thru automation), but there is no robust data yet showing that tens of millions of such jobs have already disappeared specifically due to robots/AI; most analyses still characterize the large‑scale displacement as a future risk rather than a completed fact. However, this does not resolve whether the claimed scale of job loss will materialize by 2027–2032.

Because the forecast period has not arrived or completed, and the claim concerns outcomes that may still occur in the remaining years of that window, it is too early to judge the prediction as right or wrong.

There is now a California fast‑food–specific minimum wage: AB 1228 raised the minimum for workers at large fast‑food chains (60+ locations) to $20/hour starting April 1, 2024, up from the statewide $16 floor, with a Fast Food Council empowered to adjust it further. 【2†turn2search7】【3†turn3search1】 That is slightly different from the $15→22 path Sacks discussed, but it is the policy closest to what he was describing.

Employment effects ("employ less of this labor relative to what they would have absent the law"):

Support for the prediction

• A 2025 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper finds that California fast‑food employment fell about 2.7–3.6% from Sept 2023 to Sept 2024 relative to the fast‑food sector in other states, implying roughly 18,000 fewer jobs than in a no‑law counterfactual. 【3†turn3search2】【3†turn3search7】 This directly supports the claim that covered chains employed fewer low‑wage workers than they otherwise would have.
• Industry‑commissioned analyses using BLS data (e.g., Berkeley Research Group, Employment Policies Institute) also report on the order of 10,000–16,000 fast‑food jobs lost in California between mid‑2023 and mid‑2024, with results framed as an effect of the $20 wage. 【2†turn2search3】【3†turn3search9】【2†turn2search10】

Evidence against or questioning the prediction

• Multiple studies from UC Berkeley’s Institute for Research on Labor and Employment and related researchers (including a 2025 policy brief) report no detectable negative effect on fast‑food employment or hours from the $20 wage, while finding substantial wage gains and only modest price increases. 【3†turn3search5】【3†turn3search6】【3†turn3search8】【3†turn3search3】【3†turn3search4】
• News coverage and official summaries highlight this split: some outlets emphasize the NBER job‑loss estimates, 【3†turn3search1】【3†turn3search7】 while others cite the Berkeley findings to argue there has been little or no employment contraction. 【3†turn3news15】

Because credible, methodologically serious studies reach opposite conclusions on whether fast‑food employment is below its no‑law counterfactual, the job‑loss component of Sacks’s prediction cannot be judged definitively true or false.

Automation effects ("rely even more heavily on automation"):

• Several reports and industry/advocacy studies state that, in response to the $20 minimum, California fast‑food and quick‑service restaurants have accelerated adoption of self‑service kiosks, AI drive‑thru systems, and kitchen robotics, explicitly as a way to offset higher labor costs. 【2†turn2search3】【2†turn2search4】【3†turn3search9】【2†turn2search8】 Broader restaurant‑industry coverage also notes increased use of kiosks, AI voice assistants, and robots, particularly in high‑wage markets like California. 【2†turn2news16】
• However, automation in fast food was already a strong nationwide trend driven by technology and post‑pandemic labor constraints, and there is no rigorous, causal study that cleanly isolates how much additional automation in California’s large chains is attributable specifically to AB 1228 versus these broader forces.

Given:

• The mixed, conflicting evidence on whether fast‑food employment in California is lower than it would have been without the law, even in formal econometric work, and
• The largely anecdotal and non‑causal evidence on how much the law, specifically, increased automation above the existing trend,

we cannot say with confidence that Sacks’s prediction has clearly come true or clearly failed. Enough time and data have passed to study the issue, but the results are genuinely contested and the automation effect is not well quantified. On balance, the prediction’s status is ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.

Sacks’ claim has two parts: (1) the California GOP would need to move toward the center to make progress, and (2) any such meaningful repositioning and accompanying electoral gains would take generations, not just one or two election cycles after 2022.

What has actually happened so far (through the 2024 cycle):

• Democrats still dominate statewide and the legislature. In 2022, Democrats again won every statewide office and kept supermajorities in both legislative chambers; Republicans held only 18 of 80 Assembly seats and 9 of 40 Senate seats. (manatt.com)
• In 2024, Republicans modestly improved their legislative standing (Assembly: 18→20 seats; Senate: 9→10), but Democrats still hold very large majorities (60–20 in the Assembly, 30–10 in the Senate). This is incremental, not a transformational breakthrough in a strongly Democratic state. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Statewide partisan balance remains heavily Democratic. In the 2024 presidential vote, the Democratic nominee (Kamala Harris) still carried California by about 20 points (58.5%–38.3%), even though the state shifted rightward compared with 2020. That is still consistent with California being roughly a +20–30 Democratic state at the top of the ticket. (en.wikipedia.org)
• No clear centrist repositioning of the party itself. An example: in 2023, California Republican Party delegates rejected proposed platform changes that would have softened the party’s language on same-sex marriage and abortion, keeping more hardline stances instead of moving toward the state’s center on key social issues. (metroweekly.com)

These facts suggest that, as of late 2025, the California GOP has not undergone a major centrist shift, nor has it achieved large-scale, rapid electoral gains—outcomes that would contradict Sacks’ view that quick post‑2022 turnaround was unrealistic.

However, Sacks’ core prediction is explicitly long‑term: that meaningful repositioning and substantial progress would take generations (multiple decades), not just one or two cycles. Only one full post‑2022 cycle (2024) has occurred so far, and we are nowhere near the multi‑decade horizon he was talking about. Because the timescale he specified has not elapsed, we cannot yet say whether his long‑run claim is ultimately right or wrong.

So, while current evidence is consistent with his prediction (no rapid centrist shift or major GOP resurgence), it is still too early to render a definitive judgment on a forecast that was about outcomes over decades.

Sacks argued that because high natural gas prices were shutting fertilizer plants and constraining food‑grade CO2, Germany was “about to run out of beer” around Oktoberfest 2022.

What actually happened:

• Oktoberfest 2022 went ahead after a two‑year COVID hiatus and drew about 5.7 million visitors.(amp.dw.com)
• Festival statistics report that attendees consumed roughly 5.6 million liters of beer at the 2022 Oktoberfest, only moderately below 2019 levels, with no mention of significant beer shortages or taps running dry.(oktoberfesttours.travel)
• Contemporary coverage of Oktoberfest 2022 highlighted sharply higher beer prices and production costs due to energy and raw‑material inflation, not an inability to supply beer.(wsls.com)
• EU and German brewers did warn in September 2022 that a CO2 shortage was looming as fertilizer plants curtailed output, and that this could mean “less beer flowing in the coming months,” but these were framed as risks and cost pressures, not an actual collapse of beer availability in Germany at that time.(brusselstimes.com)

Given that millions of liters of beer were served at Oktoberfest 2022 and there are no credible reports of Germany experiencing a severe beer shortage or anything close to “running out of beer,” the prediction did not come true.

Evidence since September 2022 shows that climate‑change‑driven extreme weather has indeed continued to cause significant disruptions to food production, prices, and supply chains:

• The strong 2023–2024 El Niño produced widespread droughts, floods, and heat waves that "negatively affected" agriculture and fishing worldwide, causing shortages and rising prices for staples such as rice, palm oil, sugar cane, soybeans, and corn. (en.wikipedia.org)
• A 2024/2025 UN regional food security report for Latin America and the Caribbean concludes that climate variability and extreme weather (droughts, floods, storms) are reducing agricultural productivity, disrupting food supply chains, and increasing prices, threatening progress on hunger and malnutrition. (paho.org)
• The World Food Programme (2025) warns that storms, floods, and droughts are displacing people, disrupting agricultural systems, and breaking up supply chains, and explicitly links these impacts to rising food insecurity as the climate warms. (wfp.org)
• Industry analyses in 2025 describe extreme weather as "wreaking havoc" on harvests, creating ingredient shortages, and disrupting logistics (e.g., low river levels in Europe), with the result that extreme weather is reshaping global food supply and causing ongoing supply chain chaos. (foodnavigator.com)
• Commodity‑specific reporting shows major climate impacts on key crops: for example, analysts attribute the more‑than‑doubling of cocoa and coffee prices largely to unusual rainfall patterns and higher temperatures in major producing regions, and warn of continued food price volatility driven by extreme weather. (theguardian.com)
• Broader assessments (e.g., UN/UNICEF and media syntheses) repeatedly find that climate‑amplified droughts, floods, and heat waves are a growing driver of food price spikes and food insecurity, alongside conflict and economic shocks. (reuters.com)

Taken together, these sources show that in the quarters and years following September 2022, climate‑change‑driven extreme weather has continued and has had critical, measurable impacts on agricultural output, food prices, and the functioning of global and regional food supply chains. This aligns closely with Friedberg’s prediction, so it is best classified as right.

Chamath predicted that by 2030 the average U.S. cost of electricity would be about double its 2010 level (roughly a 100% nominal increase). In 2010, the average U.S. residential retail electricity price was about 11.5¢/kWh; by 2024 it was about 16.5¢/kWh (~43% above 2010), and early‑2025 data put average retail prices around 18¢/kWh (~57% above 2010), well short of a doubling so far. (eia.gov) However, the target year of the forecast is 2030, which has not occurred as of November 30, 2025, and official projections only provide a range of possible future price paths rather than a settled outcome. (latitudemedia.com) Therefore it is too early to determine whether prices in 2030 will end up roughly double those in 2010.

As of November 30, 2025, it is not yet possible to definitively judge a prediction about whether the world will fail to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or 2060, because those target years are still in the future.

What we can say:

• Many major economies and companies have adopted net‑zero targets for around mid‑century, e.g. the EU, US, UK, Japan and others have 2050 net‑zero commitments, and China has announced a 2060 carbon‑neutrality goal. These targets are typically enshrined in policy documents or national plans, but assessments by groups like the UN and the International Energy Agency consistently conclude that current policies and implemented measures are insufficient to be on a firm pathway to global net‑zero by 2050.
• However, the prediction is about the outcome (whether global net‑zero will actually be reached) and asserts that it is “not possible” and that there are “zero credible plans” to do so. Whether the world ultimately hits or misses net‑zero by 2050/2060 depends on technological progress, policy changes, and global coordination over the next 25–35 years—none of which can be definitively resolved today.

Given that:

• The relevant dates (2050, 2060) have not arrived,
• There remains substantial uncertainty about future policy, technology, and behavior,

the only reasonable classification today is inconclusive (too early). The prediction has not yet been clearly shown to be right or wrong.

Chamath's claim is that within roughly 3–5 years of September 2022, California-style interventionist policies in energy and the broader economy would be clearly seen to have failed and to have worsened the problems they were meant to solve.

As of late 2025, the picture is mixed. Economically, California remains an economic powerhouse: its GDP reached about $3.9–4.1 trillion by 2023–24, making it the 4th–5th largest economy in the world and accounting for roughly 14% of U.S. GDP, with growth rates comparable to or above many large economies. (ppic.org) Clean‑tech, AI and other high‑value sectors are strong, and forecasts expect growth to modestly outpace the U.S. again by 2025–26. (newsroom.ucla.edu) That is not consistent with an obvious economic collapse attributable to these policies.

On energy and climate metrics, California has expanded clean power rapidly: by 2023–25, renewables supplied around 57% of in‑state electricity, with clean energy (including nuclear and hydro) reaching about three‑quarters of CAISO grid demand at times, and the state remains a national leader in solar build‑out. (en.wikipedia.org) Greenhouse‑gas emissions have fallen roughly 14% since its cap‑and‑trade program began, and that program has been extended and is credited with helping California meet earlier emissions targets while funding tens of billions of dollars in climate projects and some bill credits. (latimes.com) The grid has faced stress in heat waves but has mostly avoided large rolling blackouts in recent years, helped by rapid deployment of battery storage and demand‑response measures. (en.wikipedia.org) These outcomes suggest the policies have had at least partial success on their own stated climate and reliability goals.

At the same time, serious downsides are evident. California now has among the very highest electricity rates in the U.S., roughly double the national average in 2024–25, creating a large price premium for households and businesses. (comparepower.com) The state also struggles with high costs of living, homelessness, and relatively weak recent job growth and high unemployment, which some analysts partly attribute to its regulatory and climate/energy policy mix, especially for blue‑collar and energy‑intensive industries. (thebreakthrough.org) Even sympathetic policy analysts argue for a reset rather than claiming the current model is clearly working for all residents. (thebreakthrough.org)

Because: (a) there is credible evidence of both meaningful climate/energy successes and significant cost and distributional problems, (b) whether the policies ‘work’ is ultimately a normative judgment on trade‑offs, and (c) the upper end of Chamath's 3–5‑year window (through 2027) has not yet elapsed, it is not possible to say in late 2025 that it is clearly established these policies ‘don’t work’ and have simply worsened the economic and energy ‘hellscape.’ The evidence so far is mixed rather than decisively confirming or refuting his strong claim, so the prediction is best scored as inconclusive at this time.