E84: Markets update, crypto collapse, Russia/Ukraine endgame, state of the podcast

Chamath’s prediction had two main components:

1. Duration of liquidity withdrawal / QT

   • The Federal Reserve began balance-sheet runoff (quantitative tightening) in June 2022 and has been shrinking its securities holdings continuously since then. Fed reports note that securities holdings had fallen by about $1.8–2.1 trillion from June 2022 through late 2024 and March 2025, explicitly dating the start of runoff to June 2022 and describing it as an ongoing process. (federalreserve.gov)
   • By late 2025, reporting describes this as a roughly three‑year QT program that is now ending or about to end. (ft.com)
   • So his statement that it would take “three years” of slowly running off excess money is broadly consistent with how long QT actually lasted.

2. Timing of the equity bear‑market bottom (~18 months later)

   • The S&P 500’s 2022 bear market is widely documented as having bottomed on October 12, 2022, with a decline of about 25% from the January 2022 peak. (campaignforamillion.com)
   • Subsequent analyses in 2025 describe a bull market that began from that October 12, 2022 low, with the bull run approaching its three‑year anniversary and gains of roughly 80–90% since that trough—confirming that October 12, 2022 is treated in hindsight as the cycle low. (reuters.com)
   • Chamath said in June 2022 that “the bottom doesn’t happen for another 18 months,” which would point to roughly late 2023. In reality, the low occurred about 4 months after his comment, and the index did not set a lower low in late 2023; there were only corrections within an ongoing bull market.

Overall assessment

• The QT duration part of the call is roughly right (about three years of balance-sheet runoff).
• The core market-timing claim—that the equity bear-market bottom was still ~18 months away—was clearly wrong, as the bottom had already occurred by October 2022 and has held for several years.

Because the prediction as quoted explicitly ties the drawn‑out QT process to an equity bottom “another 18 months” out, and that key timing element failed, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, despite being directionally accurate on the length of QT.

Evidence since mid‑2022 shows that broad U.S. residential real estate did not experience the kind of follow‑on “carnage” or large further price declines Sacks was anticipating.

• The S&P CoreLogic Case‑Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index peaked around June 2022, then fell only about 5% through January 2023 before rebounding. By July 2023 it had already fully erased that dip and reached a new all‑time high, and it went on to post a long streak of consecutive record highs through late 2024. (spglobal.com)
• Articles summarizing the index show home prices hitting yet another record high in June 2024, with prices nationally up 5.4% year‑over‑year. (cnbc.com) A June 2024 analysis likewise notes continued national price gains rather than a major downturn. (nasdaq.com)
• By 2025, transaction data show record or near‑record median sale prices, not a sustained crash: e.g., the national median existing‑home price hit an all‑time high of about $435,300 in June 2025, and March 2025 also set a record high for that month. (nypost.com) The main problems in housing have been low affordability and weak sales volumes, not deep nationwide price declines.

So while some other asset classes did suffer significant pain after mid‑2022—most notably:

• Bonds, with the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index posting about a –14% loss in 2022, its worst year on record, and a historically rare stretch of weak bond returns over 2022–2024. (statmuse.com)
• Commercial office real estate, where U.S. office building prices have dropped roughly 37% from 2019 levels and another 11% in 2024 alone, with vacancy rates near records. (businessinsider.com)

…the specific, emphasized part of the prediction—that the “carnage” in growth stocks would rotate into major asset classes like residential real estate and cause further significant drops there—did not occur at the national level. National home prices are higher today than at the time of the prediction. On that basis, the prediction is best judged wrong.

From June 2022’s peak of 9.1% year-over-year CPI inflation, the subsequent U.S. CPI prints for the next five months were:

• July 2022: 8.5%
• August 2022: 8.3%
• September 2022: 8.2%
• October 2022: 7.7%
• November 2022: 7.1%

These values, taken from BLS-based monthly inflation summaries, all fall within the 7–9% range during the roughly 3–5 months after late June 2022. (statistico.com)

Since Chamath predicted that the next 3–5 CPI prints would be “very, very bad” in the 7–9% range, and the July–November 2022 CPI year-over-year rates indeed stayed between about 7% and 9%, the prediction was right.

Friedberg’s statement was explicitly conditional on U.S. residential real estate prices falling roughly 30% from then‑current levels. National data show that this trigger has not occurred. Zillow’s Home Value Index shows the typical U.S. home value in December 2022 was only about 0.7% below its June 2022 peak, not anywhere near 30%. (zillow.com) Redfin estimates the total value of U.S. housing fell about 4.9% from June to December 2022, again far short of a 30% price collapse. (foxbusiness.com) The National Association of Realtors reported that the median existing‑home price hit a record for 2023 and remained at or near record highs in 2024 and mid‑2025, with June 2025’s national median around $435,300. (pbs.org) Case‑Shiller data and subsequent reporting show home prices still rising year‑over‑year (albeit slowly) into 2025, not falling on a crash scale. (wsj.com) Even in particularly weak markets such as San Francisco, peak‑to‑trough nominal declines have generally been in the 10–15% range, not 30%. (nypost.com) Meanwhile, mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates, while ticking up for some FHA/VA borrowers, remain low by historical standards and far from a 2008‑style crisis. (mba.org) Because the antecedent of his conditional prediction (a ~30% national home‑price correction) has not happened, we have no empirical basis to judge whether the consequent (widespread serious financial problems for Americans driven by that price drop plus high rates and inability to refinance) would have occurred. The correct evaluation is therefore that the prediction is inconclusive rather than right or wrong.

Using the standard U.S. benchmarks, this prediction has not come true.

• Official recession dating (NBER): The National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee shows the last U.S. recession ended in April 2020, with expansion ongoing from May 2020 onward and no new peaks or troughs announced since then.(nber.org) Quarterly NBER-based recession indicator data likewise remain at 0 ("no recession") through at least Q3 2025.(ycharts.com)
• GDP performance: BEA data show real GDP grew in 2022, 2023, and 2024 (about 1.9%, 2.5%, and 2.8% respectively), with solid positive quarterly growth from mid‑2022 through end‑2024.(apps.bea.gov) A compiled quarterly series shows only one negative quarter after the pandemic (Q1 2025 at –0.3%), with preceding and subsequent quarters positive, so even the "two consecutive negative quarters" rule of thumb is not met in the period after the June 24, 2022 prediction.(visualcapitalist.com)
• Contemporary assessments: Major forecasters and analysts have repeatedly characterized the outcome as a soft landing or continued expansion rather than a recession, noting that the economy “defied recession fears” and remained on course for growth despite aggressive Fed tightening.(goldmansachs.com)

Given that more than three years have passed since the June 2022 prediction, the Fed did tighten aggressively, and yet no NBER‑defined recession or broadly recognized downturn occurred in the “near term” afterward, the best judgment is that Sacks’s call for an imminent U.S. recession was wrong.

Available data on U.S. national average retail gasoline prices show that they never reached $7 per gallon on a nationwide average during the post‑mid‑2022 inflation and energy-price cycle.

Key points:

1. Peak national average price in 2022

   • The U.S. national average regular gasoline price peaked at around $5.01–$5.02 per gallon in mid‑June 2022, according to AAA and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
   • AAA’s historical data and contemporaneous reporting consistently refer to this ~$5 level as a record high; there is no record of a $7 national average.

2. Subsequent trajectory (2022–2025)

   • After the June 2022 peak, national average gas prices declined through late 2022 and fluctuated mostly in the $3–$4+ range thereafter, depending on the period, per AAA and EIA datasets covering 2023–2025.
   • While some local markets (especially in parts of California) at times saw posted prices near or above $7/gal at individual stations, the U.S. average price never approached $7.

3. Match to the prediction wording

   • Chamath said: “We could have $7 gas... Broadly, broadly, we could have $7 gas all throughout the country.”
   • This clearly implies a broad, nationwide average level around $7/gal, not isolated high-priced stations or specific metro areas.
   • Since the nationwide average never exceeded roughly $5.02/gal through November 30, 2025, this scenario did not materialize.

Because the required condition—a roughly $7-per-gallon nationwide average—has not occurred at any point up to the current date, the prediction is wrong.

Chamath tied his forecast to the Fed removing roughly $3–5T of liquidity. The Fed’s own balance‑sheet data show total assets peaked around $8.9T at end‑March 2022 and had fallen only to about $6.7T by June 11 2025 and about $6.5T by November 2025, a reduction of roughly $2.2–2.4T since runoff began in June 2022, and QT is scheduled to end December 1 2025, so the envisaged $3–5T balance‑sheet shrinkage never occurred. (federalreserve.gov) Despite that, US equities did not lose trillions more in value from mid‑2022 onward. One widely cited series shows total US stock‑market capitalization around $50.8T at end‑2021 and $40.3T at end‑2022 during the bear market, but then above $60T by late 2024 and roughly $68–71T by October 2025, well above mid‑2022 levels rather than $3–5T lower. (exodnexrn.blob.core.windows.net) The S&P 500 closed around 3,900 in late June 2022, dipped to a low near 3,577 in October 2022, then went on to record highs above 6,800 by October 2025, implying a large net gain rather than an additional 20–30% downside from mid‑2022. (statmuse.com) Valuation and index data show that 2022 delivered a roughly 19% full‑year drop in the broad FT Wilshire 5000 and an initial valuation compression, but by 2025 US tech and growth stocks were trading at forward P/E multiples (for example, Nasdaq’s forward P/E near 29 in Q3 2025) above their 10‑year averages, not 20–30% below prior baselines. (wilshire.com) Because neither the projected 3–5T of Fed balance‑sheet runoff nor the sustained combination of at least that much equity‑market wealth destruction plus an extra 20–30% valuation decline from mid‑2022 actually materialized, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

The prediction had two key parts: (1) that by roughly mid‑2023 the U.S. would be “in the middle of a recession,” and (2) that venture capital availability would be down about 75%, implying startups needed 3–4 years of runway.

1. U.S. recession call (mid‑2023)
By standard benchmarks this did not happen:

• The NBER recession indicator is 0 (no recession) for every quarter from 2021 through at least the end of 2023, including Q2 2023 and Q3 2023. (ycharts.com)
• Real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.0–2.1% in Q1–Q2 2023 and 5.2% in Q3 2023, indicating solid expansion rather than contraction. (bea.gov)
• For the full year 2023, real GDP grew 2.5% and unemployment averaged 3.6%, with commentators explicitly noting that widely expected 2023 recession fears “proved unfounded.” (en.wikipedia.org)

So the core timing claim that the U.S. would be “in the middle of a recession” about a year after June 2022 is clearly false.

2. Venture capital availability down ~75%
There was a sharp VC downturn, but the size was smaller than the predicted 75% in broad aggregates:

• Globally, Q2 2023 venture funding was down about 49% year‑over‑year, and total funding in H1 2023 was down about 51% vs H1 2022. (news.crunchbase.com)
• Another analysis using PitchBook data reports global VC funding in H1 2023 down 48%, with the U.S. and Europe each down on the order of ~65–70% from earlier levels, depending on the comparison baseline. (benzinga.com)
• By 2024, global VC activity was still ~55% below its 2021 peak, showing a prolonged but not 75% collapse from the high‑water mark. (barrons.com)
• U.S. VC fundraising in 2023 was reported at under $70B, roughly a 60% drop from peak levels rather than 75%. (reddit.com)

So the direction (big funding crunch) was correct, but the ~75% figure is an overstatement for the market as a whole.

Overall evaluation
Because the prediction hinges on both being in the middle of a U.S. recession by mid‑2023 (which clearly did not occur) and on a roughly 75% drop in capital availability (where the actual decline was large but closer to 50–65% in broad measures), the combined forecast did not come true. Hence the result is “wrong.”

Key elements of Chamath’s call were borne out, but others were clearly off, making the overall prediction mixed rather than cleanly right or wrong.

Parts that aged well

• Not “2–3 hikes and a few months”: From March 2022 to July 2023 the Fed hiked rates 11 times, taking the federal funds rate from near zero to 5.25–5.50%, far more than the “2 or 3” hikes he said people were counting on. These elevated rates persisted into 2025, with only gradual expectations of cuts. (forbes.com)
• Multi‑year macro adjustment, not a quick blip: U.S. inflation peaked around 8% in 2022 and only dropped back toward ~3% in 2023–25, still above the Fed’s pre‑COVID norm, implying a multi‑year disinflation and policy‑tightening process rather than a few‑month event. (officialdata.org) Global growth through 2023–25 has been notably weaker than the 2010s, with the World Bank describing the early‑2020s as the worst half‑decade of growth in 30 years. (worldbank.org) This matches his broad idea of a drawn‑out adjustment to excess liquidity and debt.
• Russia–Ukraine war not quickly “overcome”: The war is still ongoing in late 2025, with active major offensives such as the Novopavlivka and Huliaipole operations and continued Russian territorial gains, and no final peace settlement in place. (russiamatters.org) This supports his claim that the conflict would be a prolonged overhang rather than a brief headline cycle.

Parts that did not materialize as he framed them

• No new U.S. recession so far: Chamath talked about having to work through “a recession,” but as of November 2025 the NBER’s business‑cycle chronology still shows the last U.S. recession ending in April 2020, with no subsequent recession dated yet. (nber.org) Instead, the U.S. economy has experienced a slowdown but continued expansion.
• Market experience unlike a 2000–03 style four‑year “sheer hell”: The S&P 500 fell about 25% from its January 2022 high to its October 2022 low (a classic bear market), but then recovered strongly. By 2024 and 2025 it was setting repeated all‑time highs, reaching over 6,100 in June 2025 and around 6,600 in October 2025, driven in part by an AI‑related boom. (forbes.com) That is very different from the drawn‑out 2000–03 bust with multi‑year depressed equity prices.

Why this is classified as ‘ambiguous’

His central contrast—that the 2022 bear market and macro shock were the start of a multi‑year adjustment involving sustained tightening, sticky inflation, and an ongoing war, not something “fixed” in 5–6 months—looks broadly correct. But his more specific analogies and components (a clear new recession and a 2000–03‑style, four‑year grind for markets) did not occur; instead, the U.S. stayed in expansion and equities entered a powerful new bull market relatively quickly.

Because substantial parts of the prediction are validated (multi‑year adjustment, extended tightening cycle, long war) while other concrete elements are clearly wrong (no new U.S. recession; markets not stuck in a 2000–03‑like slog), the overall forecast cannot be cleanly judged as simply right or wrong. Hence the ‘ambiguous’ rating.

Chamath’s prediction was that the post‑2021 downturn, driven by excess debt, recession, and the Russia–Ukraine war, would resemble the 2000 dot‑com bust in duration and take on the order of four years of grinding pain to work through, rather than resolving within a few quarters.

In reality, the U.S. did not experience a prolonged, dot‑com‑style recession. After the brief COVID recession ending in April 2020, the NBER has not dated any new recession through at least mid‑2024, meaning the subsequent period has been classified as an ongoing expansion. (congress.gov) U.S. real GDP grew each year from 2022 through 2024 (roughly 1.9% in 2022, 2.5–2.9% in 2023, and about 2.6–2.8% in 2024), with unemployment staying in the 3.5–4.2% range, consistent with a soft‑landing rather than a multi‑year recessionary grind. (tradingeconomics.com)

Financial markets also recovered much faster than a four‑year bust. The S&P 500 fell about 25% from its January 2022 high to an October 2022 low, but by June 8, 2023 it had rallied more than 20% off that low, exiting bear‑market territory. (en.wikipedia.org) The index then gained roughly 24% in 2023 and another ~23–25% in 2024, setting new all‑time highs and closing above 5,000 in February 2024 and 6,000 in November 2024, with a further record high near 6,875 in October 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) The Nasdaq likewise surpassed its 2021 peak by February 2024, driven by AI‑related tech strength. (reuters.com) This pattern is a relatively quick bear‑market-and-recovery sequence, not a drawn‑out four‑year equity bust like the early 2000s.

Crypto markets, which had collapsed in 2022, also rebounded strongly instead of remaining in a long winter. Bitcoin exceeded its 2021 all‑time high in March 2024 and went on to set higher peaks, including a run to around 90,000–109,000 in early 2025. (coindesk.com) That is again inconsistent with a multi‑year period of unrelenting pain comparable to 2000–2003.

The Russia–Ukraine war did persist into late 2025, with active fighting and only evolving peace‑framework talks, so that specific risk did not “resolve in a few quarters.” (theguardian.com) However, Chamath’s central quantitative claim was about the duration and character of the macro downturn and market bust, and on those dimensions the world saw a relatively fast recovery and soft landing rather than four years of sheer hell.

Given the lack of a multi‑year recession and the strong, early return to record highs in both stocks and crypto, the prediction that the post‑2021 downturn would resemble the four‑year dot‑com bust is best classified as wrong.

From mid‑2022 through 2024 there was a clear surge of U.S. regulatory and prosecutorial activity against crypto entities and individuals, matching Friedberg’s forecast of “a lot of action … over the next couple of years.”

Evidence:

• The SEC made crypto a top enforcement priority. Cornerstone Research reports a record 46 crypto‑related SEC enforcement actions in 2023—up 53% from 2022—followed by 33 more in 2024; 2024 also saw nearly $5 billion in crypto-related monetary recoveries, by far the highest ever. (cornerstone.com) An SEC FY 2023 enforcement release highlights major crypto cases (FTX/Sam Bankman‑Fried, Terraform Labs/Do Kwon, Celsius, Kraken, Genesis/Gemini, Nexo, NFT issuers, etc.). (sec.gov)
• The DOJ ramped up prosecutions through the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team (NCET), established in 2022 and actively bringing cases such as Bitzlato (unlicensed exchange processing over $700M in illicit funds) and Tornado Cash founders (money laundering and sanctions‑evasion charges). (justice.gov) High‑profile criminal actions included the FTX/Bankman‑Fried prosecution, which ended in conviction in 2023 and a 25‑year sentence in March 2024, and the Binance case, where founder Changpeng Zhao pled guilty and Binance agreed to a $4.3B settlement. (en.wikipedia.org)
• State‑level authorities also pursued large crypto matters. For example, the New York Attorney General secured a $2B settlement from bankrupt crypto lender Genesis in 2024, one of the largest state crypto enforcement resolutions. (theguardian.com)

Across SEC, DOJ/NCET, and state regulators, the 2022–2024 period saw dozens of actions per year, several multibillion‑dollar settlements, and landmark criminal prosecutions. That level and breadth of enforcement activity fits well with the prediction of a large volume of regulatory and prosecutorial actions over the ensuing “couple of years,” so the prediction is right.

The core mechanisms Sacks predicted for winter 2022–23 largely did not materialize.

1. Energy shortages and Putin’s leverage
   Europe certainly faced a serious energy price shock, but not the widespread physical shortages implied. EU gas storage was filled to ~95% before winter, a mild season plus demand reduction cut consumption sharply, and Europe got through winter without major blackouts or rationing of household heating.(iea.org) In parallel, the EU rapidly diversified away from Russian gas under the REPowerEU plan, with Russian pipeline supplies collapsing from about 155 bcm in 2021 to roughly 62 bcm in 2022 and 28 bcm in 2023, and Russian fossil fuels’ share of EU imports plunging thereafter.(en.wikipedia.org) By May 2023, the EU energy commissioner was publicly saying that Putin’s attempt to blackmail Europe with energy had failed, precisely because Europe had managed the winter and accelerated diversification.(energynow.ca) In other words, Russia lost long‑term leverage over Europe’s energy system rather than gaining it.

2. “Real fracture in the Western alliance”
   There were notable protests and political stresses over energy prices (e.g., large demonstrations in Prague against high bills and sanctions), which showed domestic discontent.(euronews.com) But at the level of governments and alliances, the predicted fracture did not occur. Through and after that winter, the EU and NATO continued to pass new sanctions packages, send increasingly heavy weapons, and admit or advance new members (Finland and then Sweden) – all signs of institutional cohesion, not breakdown. Survey work for the European Council on Foreign Relations in January 2023 found that, one year into the war and just after the first wartime winter, “cracks in the Western coalition have got smaller rather than larger,” with Europeans “surprisingly united” on supporting Ukraine and seeing the EU as as strong or stronger than before the invasion.(ecfr.eu) A separate analysis summarised this as the West regaining “unity and purpose,” noting that Europeans felt they had weathered the difficult winter and could sustain their stance against Russia.(voanews.com)

3. Overall assessment
   Winter 2022–23 did bring economic pain and some social unrest, but it did not significantly increase Putin’s leverage over Europe, and it did not cause the kind of visible, structural fracture in the Western alliance that Sacks predicted. If anything, that winter reinforced a strategic shift away from Russian energy and coincided with polling and policy evidence of continued or even strengthened Western unity on Ukraine. Taken against the specific claims in the quote, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

Evidence since mid‑2022 indicates that nationalist and right‑wing populist forces have generally strengthened, and that the Ukraine war’s economic and political fallout has been one of the catalysts, consistent with Friedberg’s prediction.

Political‑science analyses from the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) conclude that the Russian invasion of Ukraine produced major economic insecurity (energy shock, inflation, looming recession) and that radical‑right populist parties "seized the opportunity" to instrumentalize war‑related economic anxieties—especially energy prices and cost‑of‑living—to advance anti‑elite, national‑interest‑first narratives.(populismstudies.org) This directly matches the idea that the war would act as a further catalyzing event rather than reversing nationalist trends.

Empirically, nationalist and far‑right parties have made notable gains across Europe after 2022. Giorgia Meloni’s national‑conservative Brothers of Italy won power in 2022, giving Italy its most right‑wing government since World War II.(en.wikipedia.org) A survey of 2022–24 results notes strengthened positions for nationalist or far‑right parties such as Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, the Sweden Democrats, Hungary’s Fidesz, Germany’s AfD, and Austria’s FPÖ, describing this as part of a broader nationalist rise.(debuglies.com) A 2025 overview by Le Monde similarly describes Europe three years into the invasion as weakened by anti‑system and far‑right movements, with Russia exploiting energy‑price discontent and insecurity.(lemonde.fr)

Case studies tie these gains explicitly to war‑related economic fallout. In France, ECPS finds that Marine Le Pen successfully pivoted to a social‑populist and economic‑nationalist message centered on energy and rising prices linked to the war, and that these issues were paramount for 2022 voters—helping her radical‑right party despite earlier pro‑Putin associations.(populismstudies.org) Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament elections notes that in Germany, internal polling showed the Ukraine war and “securing peace” as the top voter concern, and that parties most critical of the war effort (AfD and the Wagenknecht alliance) outperformed governing pro‑war parties, framed as “Europe votes against the Ukraine war.”(theamericanconservative.com) Other commentary and reporting in 2024–25 describe a “rising far right” across Europe and link its appeal partly to economic strain from the energy crisis triggered by the war.(theguardian.com)

Scholars caution that the effect is heterogeneous—some radical‑right parties did not gain everywhere, and multiple factors (COVID aftershocks, long‑term economic stagnation, migration) also drive nationalism.(populismstudies.org) But Friedberg’s claim was qualitative and directional: that the "slow march of nationalism will continue" and the Ukraine war would be "another catalyzing event." The post‑2022 record shows continued or heightened nationalist politics in many countries, with clear evidence that the war’s economic and security fallout has been used by nationalist actors and has shaped voter concerns. That makes the prediction broadly accurate rather than refuted by events.

Available evidence through late 2025 shows that the United States has not shifted to a posture where European NATO members are expected to bear essentially all (near 100%) of the financial cost of their own defense against Russia.

• US still pays the largest share of NATO defense. NATO data and independent analyses show that in 2024–2025 the US accounts for roughly 60–70% of total NATO military spending—around $980–$997 billion out of about $1.5–$1.6 trillion—far more than all European allies combined.(ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
• Common NATO budgets remain shared, not shifted to Europe. For NATO’s joint civil/military/ investment budgets, the US and Germany each contribute about 16%; the US does not expect Europe to cover nearly all of these costs.(ft.com)
• US-funded European posture persists. The European Deterrence Initiative and related deployments in Europe continue to be funded out of the US Department of Defense budget, underscoring ongoing American financial responsibility for deterring Russia in Europe.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Policy changes aim at burden sharing, not US withdrawal from paying. NATO has raised its target from 2% to 5% of GDP by 2035 for all allies, including the United States, and leaders repeatedly reaffirm an “ironclad” US Article 5 commitment rather than signaling that Europe must self-fund its defense entirely.(en.wikipedia.org)

European countries are clearly being pushed to spend more, but the factual pattern in budgets, initiatives, and official communiqués shows continued heavy US funding rather than a move toward Europeans paying anything close to 100% of the cost of their defense. Therefore, Sacks’s prediction has not come true as of November 30, 2025.

Joe Biden did not ultimately run for re‑election in 2024. Although he formally announced a re‑election bid on April 25, 2023 and became the presumptive Democratic nominee after winning the primaries, he later withdrew from the 2024 presidential race on July 21, 2024, ending his campaign and stating he would focus on serving out the remainder of his term instead of seeking a second one.(en.wikipedia.org) In his withdrawal letter and subsequent Oval Office address, Biden said it was in the best interest of his party and the country for him to stand down, and framed the decision around defending democracy and the nation’s future.(aljazeera.com) Reporting at the time made clear that party concerns over his age, electability, and poor debate performance were central pressures pushing him to step aside.(reuters.com) Biden then endorsed Kamala Harris, who became the Democratic nominee, while Biden retired when Donald Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2025.(en.wikipedia.org) This matches the core of the prediction: that Biden would ultimately choose not to seek a second term and would announce that he was not running again, even though the podcast did not anticipate that he would first launch a re‑election campaign and only later withdraw.

The prediction was that the 2024 U.S. presidential election would feature Ron DeSantis as the Republican nominee and Gavin Newsom as the Democratic nominee.

In reality, the general election held on November 5, 2024 featured Donald Trump as the Republican nominee and Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee.(en.wikipedia.org) Joe Biden initially ran and became the presumptive Democratic nominee, but he later withdrew in July 2024 and endorsed Harris, who was then formally nominated by the Democratic Party; Newsom was never the nominee.(en.wikipedia.org) On the Republican side, Ron DeSantis ran in the primaries but dropped out after Trump’s dominant performance in early contests, and Trump secured the nomination.(en.wikipedia.org)

Because neither DeSantis nor Newsom was their party’s 2024 presidential nominee, the prediction is wrong.

Ron DeSantis did run for president in the 2024 election cycle, announcing his candidacy for the Republican nomination on May 24, 2023 and later suspending his campaign on January 21, 2024, after a poor primary showing. (en.wikipedia.org) However, he did not become the Republican nominee and therefore could not, and did not, win the 2024 general election—let alone by a “landslide.” The prediction bundled two claims (that he would run and that he would win in a landslide); since the second, outcome-defining part is clearly false, the overall prediction is wrong.

There are three conditional predictions here, and only one of the conditions actually occurred; the others never happened, so we cannot strictly mark them right or wrong.

1. If Biden runs as the Democratic nominee, any Republican wins.
   In reality, the 2024 general election was Joe Biden (D) vs. Donald Trump (R), and Biden won the presidency (Democrats retained the White House).
   Under the condition that did happen (Biden as the nominee), Sacks’s prediction that “any Republican wins” is wrong.

2. If it’s DeSantis vs. Newsom, DeSantis wins.
   This matchup never occurred: Ron DeSantis did not become the GOP nominee, and Gavin Newsom was not the Democratic nominee. Because the underlying condition failed, this part of the prediction cannot be evaluated against reality and remains counterfactual.

3. If it’s Newsom vs. Trump, Republicans could lose (Newsom probably defeats Trump).
   This matchup also never occurred: Newsom did not run as the Democratic nominee, so this too is counterfactual and not testable.

Overall: Part (1) is clearly falsified by the 2024 result, but parts (2) and (3) are untestable counterfactuals. Because the user bundled all three into a single prediction, the combined evaluation is ambiguous: one tested component is wrong, while the others never faced real-world verification. If we evaluated only the scenario that actually occurred, it would be wrong, but as a set of branching scenarios, the overall judgment is best labeled "ambiguous".