Evidence since mid‑2022 indicates that nationalist and right‑wing populist forces have generally strengthened, and that the Ukraine war’s economic and political fallout has been one of the catalysts, consistent with Friedberg’s prediction.

Political‑science analyses from the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) conclude that the Russian invasion of Ukraine produced major economic insecurity (energy shock, inflation, looming recession) and that radical‑right populist parties "seized the opportunity" to instrumentalize war‑related economic anxieties—especially energy prices and cost‑of‑living—to advance anti‑elite, national‑interest‑first narratives.(populismstudies.org) This directly matches the idea that the war would act as a further catalyzing event rather than reversing nationalist trends.

Empirically, nationalist and far‑right parties have made notable gains across Europe after 2022. Giorgia Meloni’s national‑conservative Brothers of Italy won power in 2022, giving Italy its most right‑wing government since World War II.(en.wikipedia.org) A survey of 2022–24 results notes strengthened positions for nationalist or far‑right parties such as Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia, the Sweden Democrats, Hungary’s Fidesz, Germany’s AfD, and Austria’s FPÖ, describing this as part of a broader nationalist rise.(debuglies.com) A 2025 overview by Le Monde similarly describes Europe three years into the invasion as weakened by anti‑system and far‑right movements, with Russia exploiting energy‑price discontent and insecurity.(lemonde.fr)

Case studies tie these gains explicitly to war‑related economic fallout. In France, ECPS finds that Marine Le Pen successfully pivoted to a social‑populist and economic‑nationalist message centered on energy and rising prices linked to the war, and that these issues were paramount for 2022 voters—helping her radical‑right party despite earlier pro‑Putin associations.(populismstudies.org) Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament elections notes that in Germany, internal polling showed the Ukraine war and “securing peace” as the top voter concern, and that parties most critical of the war effort (AfD and the Wagenknecht alliance) outperformed governing pro‑war parties, framed as “Europe votes against the Ukraine war.”(theamericanconservative.com) Other commentary and reporting in 2024–25 describe a “rising far right” across Europe and link its appeal partly to economic strain from the energy crisis triggered by the war.(theguardian.com)

Scholars caution that the effect is heterogeneous—some radical‑right parties did not gain everywhere, and multiple factors (COVID aftershocks, long‑term economic stagnation, migration) also drive nationalism.(populismstudies.org) But Friedberg’s claim was qualitative and directional: that the "slow march of nationalism will continue" and the Ukraine war would be "another catalyzing event." The post‑2022 record shows continued or heightened nationalist politics in many countries, with clear evidence that the war’s economic and security fallout has been used by nationalist actors and has shaped voter concerns. That makes the prediction broadly accurate rather than refuted by events.