E67: Revisiting Rogan, Canadian truckers' protest, fusion breakthrough, $MSFT's savvy move & more

Evidence shows that in the weeks and months after Feb 12, 2022, a U.S.-based trucker convoy did form and drive to Washington, D.C., in protest of COVID-related government policies:

• On Feb. 23, 2022, a group of American truckers launched a cross-country protest convoy from Adelanto, California, explicitly headed to Washington, D.C. to protest COVID-19 mandates, under the banner of the “People’s Convoy.” (latimes.com)
• Coverage by Reuters describes this “People’s Convoy” as having traveled across the country headed to Washington, D.C. and then circling the outskirts of Washington on the Capital Beltway as a protest against pandemic restrictions. (reuters.com)
• The Canada convoy protest article’s “International protests” section notes that on February 23 American truckers began a solidarity protest convoy from California to Washington, D.C. called the ‘People’s Convoy’, that the Pentagon deployed 700 National Guard troops in response, that a demonstration by convoy protesters occurred near the Washington Monument in early March, and that over 1,000 trucks, RVs, and cars gathered on the outskirts of D.C. as part of this protest. (en.wikipedia.org)

These sources establish that:

1. The protest was U.S.-based (American truckers, starting in California).
2. It formed after the Feb 12, 2022 podcast date.
3. The convoy physically drove to the Washington, D.C. area and held political demonstrations aimed at the federal government, including at least one event near the Washington Monument inside D.C. itself.

This matches the substance of Sacks’ prediction that in the months following Feb. 12 a U.S. trucker convoy would form and drive to Washington, D.C. as a political protest. Hence the prediction is right.

David Sacks’ prediction on All-In E67 was that the emerging trucker/mandate protests signaled a working‑class vs. professional‑class schism inside the Democratic coalition, and that if Biden didn’t handle this trucker/mandate issue correctly, it would be “the end of his presidency.”(transcriptize.com)

What actually happened:

• The U.S. “People’s Convoy” modeled on Canada’s Freedom Convoy drove loops around the D.C. Beltway in March 2022 but caused only minor slowdowns, failed to significantly disrupt Washington, and never re‑entered D.C. as planned. By May 20, 2022, organizers officially disbanded the convoy after achieving essentially no concrete policy concessions.(thenationalnews.com) The issue faded from national attention.
• Biden initially extended the COVID national emergency in early 2022, but over 2022–23 most federal and state COVID restrictions and mandates were wound down; the convoy itself did not force a dramatic turning point in his stance.(upi.com)
• Biden’s presidency ended after one term because he withdrew from the 2024 race in July 2024 amid doubts about his age and electability, and Republicans won back the White House when Donald Trump defeated Kamala Harris in November 2024.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Analyses of the 2022 midterms, 2024 election, and Biden’s approval ratings consistently identify inflation, cost of living, the broader economy, immigration, and general performance as the dominant reasons for his political weakness—not COVID mandates or the 2022 trucker convoy.(en.wikipedia.org)

So while Biden did leave office after a single term, there is no evidence that his handling of the U.S. trucker convoy or related COVID‑mandate protests was what “ended his presidency” or politically crippled him. The convoy quickly fizzled and was not a lasting or central factor in his downfall. That makes Sacks’ conditional prediction—framed around this specific issue—wrong.

It is too early to evaluate this prediction.

• The prediction horizon is “over the next few decades” and specifically normalized to by roughly 2050. As of today (November 30, 2025), there are still about 25 years left until 2050.
• Current fusion progress: experimental devices like ITER (tokamak/plasma fusion) are still under construction and not yet producing power for the grid; ITER’s first plasma is planned for the 2030s, and any demonstration of net electric power from follow‑on plants (e.g., DEMO-type reactors) is targeted further in the future. These projects are explicitly long‑term and not expected to become commercial power plants in the 2020s.
• Separately, the U.S. National Ignition Facility (NIF) achieved scientific “ignition” via inertial confinement fusion in late 2022, where the fusion reaction output briefly exceeded the laser input energy, but this is a physics experiment, not a practical power plant producing regular net useful power to the grid.

Given that:

• No practical plasma fusion power plants are operating yet, but
• The deadline (around 2050) has not arrived and current progress does not rule out success within the next 25 years,

the correct status of the prediction as of 2025 is inconclusive (too early to tell).

As of November 30, 2025, we are still before the 2030–2050 window specified in the prediction, and fusion is not yet a commercially deployed, grid-scale power source nor has fusion-enabled large-scale atmospheric carbon removal occurred. Because the claim is explicitly about what will happen between 2030 and 2050 (and "shortly thereafter"), there is not yet enough elapsed time to judge whether it will ultimately prove correct or not. Therefore the prediction is too early to call and is best labeled inconclusive at this time.

The prediction concerns developments in the late 21st century (2050–2100) and 22nd century (2100–2200). As of November 30, 2025:

• No commercial, grid‑scale plasma fusion power plants are yet operating. Current milestones (e.g., NIF’s ignition results and experimental tokamaks like ITER, EAST, JET) are still at the research/prototype stage, not the “abundant free energy” scenario described.
• Controlled fusion-based nucleosynthesis for industrial production of heavier elements from light feedstocks (e.g., “turn water into lithium or gold”) does not exist as a practical technology; this remains a theoretical/long‑term concept in physics and engineering research.

Because the prediction’s time windows (mid/late 21st and 22nd centuries) have not yet arrived, it cannot be evaluated as right or wrong at this time. The correct classification is therefore “inconclusive (too early)”.

The prediction is explicitly about technological developments around 200 years after 2022 (i.e., roughly the year 2222). As of today (November 30, 2025), we are only a few years past the prediction date, so there is no way to determine whether the long‑term scenario—miniaturized plasma fusion reactors embedded in individual devices—will occur. It is far too early to evaluate, so the accuracy of this prediction cannot yet be assessed.

Available data show that major energy prices, especially crude oil and gasoline, stayed well above their pre‑pandemic levels for several years after early 2022, matching Chamath’s qualitative call for “sustained” high energy prices rather than a quick snap‑back.

Crude oil (Brent): The average Brent price in 2019 (a good pre‑COVID baseline) was about $64/bbl. From there it jumped to about $101/bbl in 2022, then eased only to ~$82/bbl in 2023, ~$81/bbl in 2024, and a still‑elevated ~$72/bbl in 2025 (year‑to‑date estimate)—all materially higher than 2019.(scribd.com) That’s a multi‑year period (2022–2024, and much of 2025) of oil prices remaining significantly above pre‑pandemic norms, not a rapid reversion.

Gasoline: U.S. retail gasoline prices show the same pattern. The pre‑pandemic 2019 average was about $2.60–2.70/gal. In 2022 they spiked to roughly $3.95–4.09/gal, then only gradually declined to about $3.5–3.7/gal in 2023 and around $3.4–3.5/gal in 2024, still well above 2019 levels.(statistico.com) Again, this is a sustained period of elevated prices relative to pre‑COVID.

Natural gas as a partial exception: U.S. Henry Hub natural gas did not stay elevated as long. Its annual average jumped from $2.56/mmBtu in 2019 to $6.45 in 2022, but then fell back to ~$2.5 in 2023 and ~$2.2 in 2024, essentially returning to or below pre‑pandemic levels by 2023.(fred.stlouisfed.org) So not all energy commodities remained high for as long.

However, the core of the prediction was that we would see sustained high energy prices after early 2022 instead of a quick collapse back to pre‑pandemic levels. For the dominant energy benchmark (crude oil) and for end‑consumer fuel costs (gasoline), that is exactly what happened: prices stayed structurally higher for several years before easing. Despite natural gas reverting more quickly, the overall call about “sustained energy prices” was broadly accurate.

Chamath was reacting to a sharp run‑up in traditional energy stocks in late 2021 and early 2022 and argued that this was a trade, not a durable multi‑year investment trend.

What happened since the Feb 12, 2022 episode (using Feb 11, 2022 market data as proxy):

• The S&P 500 Energy index had an exceptional 2022, returning about +65.7% while the overall S&P 500 returned –18.1%, making energy by far the best‑performing sector that year.【10search1】【10search2】
• However, the outperformance faded. In 2023, energy was the worst S&P 500 sector, returning about –4.8% while the S&P 500 gained over 20%+.【13view0】【1search5】 In 2024, energy eked out roughly +1.9% versus about +23.3% for the S&P 500.【1search1】【1search3】
• From Feb 11, 2022 to late Nov 2025, the Energy Select Sector SPDR (XLE) rose from a close of $70.50 to about $90–92 (~+28–30%), while the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY) rose from $440.46 to about $680+ (~+55%), meaning an investor who bought at the time of Chamath’s comment would have significantly underperformed the broad market in price terms; XLE’s higher dividend yield narrows but does not eliminate this gap.【2search2】【9view0】【0finance0】【0finance1】
• Sector commentaries note that although energy strongly outperformed from mid‑2021 through early 2024 (roughly 70 percentage points ahead of the S&P 500 over that span), this largely reflects a rebound and a geopolitically driven spike rather than a new secular leadership regime.【12view0】 Longer‑term studies still show energy as one of the weakest sectors from 2010–2022 on average returns, despite the 2022 boom.【10search6】
• Recent analyses emphasize that fossil‑fuel stocks have underperformed the S&P 500 in 7 of the last 10 years, and that the 2022 surge appears “transient” rather than the start of a dominant decade‑long bull market.【1search0】

Why the verdict is inconclusive:

• Chamath’s normalized prediction explicitly referenced a 5–10 year horizon for energy’s relative performance. Measuring from early 2022, that window runs roughly through 2027–2032. As of late 2025, we are only about 3.8 years in, so the full 5–10 year outcome is unknown.
• On one hand, subsequent data are directionally supportive of his skepticism: buying energy at the early‑2022 spike has so far lagged a simple S&P 500 index investment, and the sector’s 2022 strength has not turned into sustained leadership in 2023–2025.
• On the other hand, because a large part of the energy outperformance occurred from 2021–2022 and because future returns (2026 onward) could still materially change the 5–10 year picture, we cannot definitively say yet whether energy will or will not “significantly outperform” over that full horizon.

Given that the core claim is about a 5–10 year relative-return outcome and that horizon has not elapsed, the fairest assessment today is that the prediction is too early to call, i.e., inconclusive, even though interim evidence so far leans in favor of his caution about treating the 2022 spike as a long‑term investment thesis.

Evidence from 2022–2025 suggests the early‑2022 energy price spike was sharp but not the beginning of a sustained multi‑year uptrend, matching Friedberg’s core claim.

Key data points:

• Oil (Brent crude): Brent started 2022 in the $80s and spiked to around $120–130 per barrel in early March 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.(insee.fr) The EIA’s March 2022 outlook already anticipated an average of ~$117 in March and ~$102 in 2H 2022 with a decline to ~$89 in 2023.(rigzone.com) By late 2025, Brent is around $63 per barrel, more than 40% below the 2022 spike, with prices trending down since mid‑2024.(tradingeconomics.com)
• Natural gas (Europe): EU TTF gas hit an all‑time high of 345 EUR/MWh in March 2022.(tradingeconomics.com) By November 2025 it trades near 29 EUR/MWh, roughly one‑tenth of the peak, and recent analysis notes subdued gas prices through 2024–2025 as supply and storage improved.(tradingeconomics.com)
• Global energy indices: The World Bank and Statista document that global energy prices (oil, gas, coal) surged into 2022 but that the fuel energy price index later declined, with the July 2025 level well below the wartime extremes; the earlier run‑up is explicitly linked to the Russia‑Ukraine shock.(blogs.worldbank.org)
• U.S. gasoline: Average U.S. retail gasoline prices rose to $4.09/gal in 2022 but then fell to $3.66 in 2023, $3.45 in 2024, and about $3.29 in 2025, essentially back near 2021 levels in real terms.(officialdata.org)
• Forward outlook: EIA and major banks now forecast continued downward or flat pressure on oil prices, with Brent expected around the low‑ to mid‑$50s–$60s in 2026–2027, not an ongoing structural uptrend.(eia.gov)

Interpretation: The 2022 shock created a temporary spike driven largely by geopolitical tensions, especially Russia–Ukraine, but prices subsequently retreated over the following 1–3 years and are forecast to remain moderate or fall further. That is consistent with Friedberg’s main prediction that this would not inaugurate a permanent long‑term bull market in energy, even if "months" arguably understated how long elevated prices would linger. Overall, the prediction is substantially correct.

US CPI year‑over‑year inflation did not peak in early 2022 and was exceeded later in the year.

Key data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show:

• March 2022: CPI inflation (YoY) was about 8.5%.
• June 2022: CPI inflation (YoY) rose further to about 9.1%, which is widely cited as the peak for the 2021–2022 inflation cycle.

June’s 9.1% reading is higher than the levels in Q1 2022 (January ~7.5%, February ~7.9%, March ~8.5%), so the claim that inflation would peak around early 2022 and not exceed that level later in 2022 is refuted by the official CPI data, which clearly show a higher peak in mid‑2022.

Therefore, the prediction is wrong.

Chamath’s “big tech spread trade” was explicitly defined as long Microsoft and Google, short other big‑tech names like Apple, Amazon, Facebook/Meta, and Netflix, first outlined in episode 54 and reiterated in episode 67 as now potentially moving from a trade to a long‑term “investment” with Microsoft and Google as the clear winners and Facebook/Meta and Netflix among the losers.(allinpodcastsummary.com) In February 2022 (around the time of episode 67), the closing prices were roughly: MSFT $286.01, GOOGL $133.36, AAPL $165.39, AMZN $153.29, META $218.20, NFLX $39.13.(statmuse.com) By late November 2025, these had risen to about: MSFT $492.01, GOOGL $320.18, AAPL $278.85, AMZN $233.22, META $647.95, NFLX $107.58. That implies total returns since Feb 11, 2022 of roughly +72% (MSFT) and +140% (GOOGL) on the long side versus +69% (AAPL), +52% (AMZN), +197% (META), and +175% (NFLX) on the short side. Using 1 share of each, the long leg makes about +$393, while the short leg loses about −$692, for a net loss of roughly −$299—the disfavored names, especially Meta and Netflix, have dramatically outperformed the supposed winners. This is consistent with broader market data showing Meta as one of the very best‑performing S&P 500 stocks in 2023 (second only to Nvidia) after a huge earnings recovery, rather than remaining a weak “funding short” for years.(gsix.org) Nearly four years after the February 2022 remark—well into his implied 3–5‑year “several years” window—the trade has not produced sustained outperformance of the favored names over the disfavored ones; instead, the short basket has strongly outperformed, making the hypothesized multi‑year, investable spread trend incorrect so far.

Using prices near the time of the prediction (Feb 28, 2022) as a starting point and the latest available prices, cumulative stock returns are approximately:

• Alphabet (GOOGL): 134.13 → 291.22, about +117% (statmuse.com)
• Microsoft (MSFT): 289.70 → 472.12, about +63% (statmuse.com)
• Amazon (AMZN): 153.56 → 232.93, about +52% (statmuse.com)
• Meta (META): 209.74 → 632.26, about +201% (statmuse.com)
• Netflix (NFLX): 39.45 → 109.98, about +179% (statmuse.com)
• Apple (AAPL): 162.09 → 233.33, about +44% (statmuse.com)

From early 2022 to late 2025, Microsoft and Alphabet did outperform Amazon and Apple, but they were clearly not the best performers: Meta and Netflix both delivered much larger gains than either Microsoft or Alphabet.

Chamath’s claim that Microsoft and Google would be “far and away the winners” among this large‑cap tech group therefore hasn’t held up on the core metric most people would infer—relative stock performance over the subsequent several years. While Microsoft and Alphabet remain fundamentally strong businesses (e.g., leading roles in cloud and AI) (barrons.com), that strength did not translate into clear, dominant stock outperformance versus Meta and Netflix over this period.

Because multiple peers have materially outperformed them since the prediction, the specific assertion that MSFT and GOOGL would be the clear, standout winners is best scored as wrong given the data so far.

1. Stock performance vs. Microsoft and Alphabet

• On Feb 11, 2022 (the last trading day before the Feb 12 podcast), Apple closed at about $165.55, Microsoft at $286.01, and Alphabet (GOOGL Class A) at $133.36. (statmuse.com)
• As of late Nov 2025, prices are roughly AAPL $278.85, MSFT $492.01, GOOGL $320.18.
• Approximate price returns from Feb 11, 2022 to now:
  • Apple: (278.85 / 165.55 − 1) ≈ +68%
  • Microsoft: (492.01 / 286.01 − 1) ≈ +72%
  • Alphabet: (320.18 / 133.36 − 1) ≈ +140%
    So Apple has slightly underperformed Microsoft and significantly underperformed Alphabet over this multi‑year period.
• A long‑MSFT/short‑AAPL pair would have earned a small positive spread (~+2%), while long‑GOOGL/short‑AAPL would have been strongly profitable (~+43%). This matches the idea that Apple belonged in a short basket versus those peers.

2. Business fundamentals vs. Microsoft and Alphabet

• Apple: Revenue rose from $394.3B (FY 2022) to $383.3B (2023, −2.8%), $391.0B (2024, +2.0%), and about $416.2B (2025, +6.4%), implying low single‑digit growth on average since 2022. (stockanalysis.com)
• Microsoft: Revenue grew from $198.3B (FY 2022) to $211.9B (2023, +6.9%), $245.1B (2024, +15.7%), and $281.7B (2025, +14.9%), with trailing‑twelve‑month growth around 15–16%. (stockanalysis.com)
• Alphabet: Revenue increased from $282.8B (2022) to $307.4B (2023, +8.7%) and $350.0B (2024, +13.9%), with trailing‑twelve‑month revenue ~$385.5B, up 13.4% YoY. (stockanalysis.com)
• On growth metrics, Apple’s core business has clearly lagged both Microsoft and Alphabet since early 2022, consistent with "business underperformance" relative to those peers.

3. Role of competitive and regulatory App Store pressures

• Regulatory pressure on Apple’s app ecosystem did intensify:
  • The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) forced Apple to open up iOS to alternative app distribution and payment options in 2024–25. (apple.com)
  • Apple acknowledged the EU is only about 7% of global App Store revenue, and JPMorgan and other analysts initially expected limited near‑term revenue impact under Apple’s chosen fee structure. (techcrunch.com)
  • Follow‑up analyses found no meaningful decline in EU App Store revenue after DMA rules took effect; in fact, EU App Store revenue in March and April 2024 was up double‑digits vs. pre‑DMA levels. (macdailynews.com)
  • In 2024 the U.S. DOJ also brought a major antitrust case (United States v. Apple) explicitly targeting Apple’s control over iPhone app distribution and related practices. (en.wikipedia.org)
• At the same time, Apple’s Services segment (including the App Store) has been a major bright spot, approaching or exceeding $100B in annual revenue with low‑teens growth and very high margins, and is forecast to keep expanding its share of total profits. (techcrunch.com)
• So while regulatory and competitive pressures clearly mounted, evidence so far suggests they have not yet materially damaged App Store/Services economics; Apple’s slower overall growth relative to Microsoft and Alphabet appears driven more by saturation in hardware and the outsized boost those peers got from cloud and AI.

4. Overall assessment

• Outcome: From early 2022 through late 2025, Apple’s stock and business growth both underperformed Microsoft and Alphabet, and a short‑AAPL vs long‑MSFT/GOOGL basket would have worked, especially vs Alphabet.
• Attribution: The specific mechanism (App Store regulatory pressure seriously crimping the business) has not clearly materialized yet; App Store/Services revenue remains strong and relatively resilient to the DMA so far.

Given that the core prediction was about relative underperformance and the trade implication (Apple as a short vs MSFT/GOOGL), which did play out, this forecast is best scored as "right" overall, with the caveat that the stated regulatory cause has only partially, not decisively, driven that underperformance.

The prediction is explicitly counterfactual: it says that if President Biden publicly embraced the U.S. trucker convoy, called for an end to COVID mandates, and announced a return to normalcy in early 2022, his job‑approval would rise about 5–10 points.

What actually happened:

• The Biden White House did not embrace the Canadian or prospective U.S. “Freedom Convoy” protests. In February 2022, Press Secretary Jen Psaki defended vaccine and mask requirements as effective, and characterized the trucker protests as the source of disruptions, while reiterating general support for peaceful protest but emphasizing their economic harms. (bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov)
• The administration repeatedly said it would “follow the science” and CDC guidance on masking and other measures, and Biden called moves to lift mask mandates “premature,” indicating no broad call from him to end COVID mandates at that time. (reason.com)
• In his March 1, 2022 State of the Union, Biden did say the U.S. was “moving forward safely, back to more normal routines” and urged Americans to get back to work, but he simultaneously framed this as part of an ongoing strategy to manage COVID with vaccines, treatments, and continued vigilance, not as a blanket announcement to end mandates. (pbs.org)

On approval ratings:

• Biden’s job approval in early 2022 was generally in the low‑40s across major polls, with fluctuations but no clearly attributable 5–10 point surge linked to a sudden, public embrace of trucker protests or a broad anti‑mandate pivot—because no such pivot occurred. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the antecedent conditions of the prediction never occurred (Biden did not publicly embrace the convoy or call for an end to mandates in the way described), we have no direct empirical way to test whether doing so would have raised his approval by 5–10 points. Observed approval trends reflect a different strategy than the one hypothesized.

Therefore, the forecast about what would have happened under an unrealized strategy cannot be clearly rated as right or wrong based on actual outcomes, even though enough time has passed. It remains a counterfactual, and thus ambiguous.

Available reporting indicates that the Biden administration did not respond to the early‑2022 US trucker convoy by embracing the protesters or framing itself as on their side, nor did it clearly position any rollback of mandates as a concession to them.

Key points:

• The People’s Convoy (the main US offshoot inspired by Canada’s protests) departed California in late February 2022 and arrived near Washington, D.C. in early March 2022, circling the Beltway and staging protests in the region rather than entering the city proper. News coverage at the time emphasizes that the protesters opposed vaccine mandates and other Covid restrictions.
• The Biden White House and federal agencies did not publicly embrace the convoy’s framing or demands. Contemporary coverage describes the administration largely ignoring the convoy, maintaining security preparations, and not engaging with it as a partner or representative of “working men and women.” (No speeches or official statements aligning Biden with the convoy or overtly supporting their cause are documented in major outlets.)
• Some federal Covid measures were eased in 2022—for example, CDC mask‑guidance changes and the eventual end of certain mandates—but these were framed in terms of epidemiological data and broader policy shifts, not as a response to the trucker convoy’s pressure. I find no reputable source tying any major rollback explicitly to the convoy or describing Biden as having “embraced” the protesters.

Because Biden neither embraced the truckers nor clearly linked any rollback of Covid mandates to their protests, the prediction that he would “embrace them” and position himself on their side in 2022 did not come true.