E66: $FB's major pullback, Rogan/Spotify mess, Xi/Putin meetup and understanding supply chain issues with Bestie Guestie Ryan Petersen (Flexport CEO)

Evidence from mid‑to‑late 2022 shows many companies that relied on stressed supply chains reporting revenue misses or shortfalls with a lag relative to when their supply problems began, matching Friedberg’s prediction that “you don't actually see the revenue shortfall for a couple of quarters after the supply chain problems hit them.”

Some concrete examples:

• Ciena (optical networking) – In February 2022 Ciena slashed its fiscal Q1 2022 revenue guidance, explicitly citing later‑than‑expected delivery of key components and manufacturing disruptions. Management framed this as supply‑chain issues affecting their ability to ship product before quarter‑end, causing a revenue shortfall despite strong demand, and warned that component lead times would remain problematic through 2022.(fierce-network.com) This is an early case of exactly what Friedberg described: operational issues show up first, then missed revenue in reported results.

• Cisco (networking hardware) – For its fiscal Q3 2022 (reported May 18, 2022), Cisco missed revenue expectations and guided to an unexpected sales decline, while its CEO highlighted supply‑chain shortages and logistics constraints (including China lockdowns and port capacity limits) as major drivers.(cnbc.com) Cisco is emblematic of a company highly dependent on complex global supply chains whose revenue shortfall materialized after months of already‑known component shortages.

• Industrial equipment / warehouse automation (KION Group, Supply Chain Solutions segment) – KION’s 2022 Q1–Q3 report shows its Supply Chain Solutions segment swinging from strong profitability in 2021 to an adjusted EBIT loss in 2022, as supply‑chain disruptions reduced availability of key parts, caused project delays, and pushed up costs on long‑term fixed‑price contracts.(reports.kiongroup.com) Management notes that price‑adjustment clauses were only added to new contracts from mid‑Q2 2022, meaning disruptions and cost increases that started earlier in the cycle hit revenue and margins with a lag in 2022.

• Consumer goods examples in Q3 2022
  • Reed’s (beverages) reported that Q3 2022 net sales fell from $13.4M to $12.1M YoY primarily because delayed shipment of specific bottles shifted $3.8M of net sales out of the quarter.(globenewswire.com) That is a literal revenue shortfall from supply‑chain timing.
  • International Breweries’ Q3 2022 results show volume declines and a larger loss despite revenue growth, with management explicitly blaming ongoing supply‑chain constraints and inflation pressures for reduced volumes and profitability in the quarter.(nairametrics.com)

• Semiconductor and electronics supply chains feeding into a later revenue dip – A 2024 SEC filing from a semiconductor company describes the industry‑wide pattern: severe chip shortages through 2021 and the first half of 2022 led customers to over‑order and stockpile inventory; once shortages eased in the second half of 2022, those customers significantly decreased their ordering levels, leading to sequential revenue declines from Q4 2022 through mid‑2023.(sec.gov) This is exactly the dynamic Friedberg anticipated: earlier supply‑chain stress followed by revenue softness several quarters later.

• Macro survey data – The National Association of Manufacturers’ Q3 2022 survey found 78.3% of manufacturers listed supply‑chain disruptions as a primary business challenge, and more than half said inflation and higher input costs were making it harder to compete and remain profitable.(nam.org) This supports the idea that, across a wide swath of supply‑chain‑dependent firms, the financial impact of earlier disruptions was playing out in 2022 earnings.

While not every company in every sector missed revenue, the pattern Friedberg described—companies that rely heavily on disrupted supply chains eventually reporting noticeable revenue or order shortfalls 2–4 quarters after the operational problems—shows up repeatedly across networking hardware, industrial automation, consumer products, and semiconductors in mid‑to‑late 2022 and into early 2023. Given the breadth and timing of these cases, the prediction is best judged as right.

Chamath’s claim was that semiconductor-related supply constraints for companies like Apple and Tesla would be “reasonably well managed” and would ease substantially by Q4 2022 and into Q1 2023, reducing chip-driven supply-chain pressure in that window.

Apple

• Through 2021 and early 2022, Apple repeatedly described industry‑wide silicon shortages as its top operational issue, costing billions in lost sales and constraining products like iPad.(gurufocus.com)
• By the December 2022 quarter (fiscal Q1 2023), Apple’s iPad revenue was up 30% year‑over‑year partly because the prior year had faced “significant supply constraints,” whereas in the current quarter “we had enough supply to meet demand.”(barchart.com) This is a direct indication that chip‑related constraints on at least one previously constrained product line had eased.
• On the Feb 2, 2023 Q1 2023 earnings call, Tim Cook said that after Covid disruptions in November–December, Apple was “now at a point where production is what we need it to be” and that “the problem is behind us,” explicitly after referencing the prior three years of Covid and “silicon shortages.” He added that for the March 2023 quarter Apple was “in decent supply on most products.”(roic.ai)
  → This shows that by Q1 2023 Apple regarded the earlier silicon‑shortage constraints as largely resolved and supply generally adequate, i.e., chip‑related pressure had eased substantially.

Tesla

• In 2021, Elon Musk called that year a “supply chain nightmare,” highlighting semiconductors as a serious constraint, but by Q3 2022 the earnings call focused primarily on logistics bottlenecks (shipping and trucking capacity) and ramp costs in new factories (Berlin and Austin). Management said they were on track for ~50% production growth while merely “tracking supply chain risks,” with no emphasis that chips were the limiting factor.(fool.com)
• On the Jan 25, 2023 Q4 2022 earnings call, Tesla attributed margin pressure mainly to raw‑material inflation (especially lithium), ramp inefficiencies in new plants, and product mix; they also spoke about unwinding cost increases from “multiple years of COVID‑related instability” as the world moved toward a more deflationary environment. Again, semiconductors were not singled out as an ongoing production bottleneck.(news.alphastreet.com)
• In the Q1 2023 call, Tesla emphasized cost reductions in logistics and commodities and discussed being at the “maximum of pain” on commodity costs, while praising the supply-chain team for taking advantage of falling logistics rates. There was still no description of chip availability as a primary constraint, suggesting that by early 2023 the main pressures had shifted away from semiconductors.(rev.com)

Industry context

• The 2020–2023 global chip shortage hit autos and electronics hard, but by late 2022 several large chipmakers reported that demand had weakened and supply constraints were easing, leading to elevated inventories. Qualcomm’s Q4 2022 commentary explicitly mentioned “easing of supply constraints across the semiconductor industry” and weeks of excess inventory in the channel.(fool.com)
• Apple’s major assembler Foxconn had already said in February 2022 that it expected a “major improvement” in parts shortages in Q1 2022 and that “overall supply constraints” would ease in the second half of 2022, a trajectory that aligns with the subsequent industry and Apple commentary.(macdailynews.com)

Assessment By Q4 2022 and especially Q1 2023:

• Apple was publicly stating that the prior supply/silicon problems were “behind” them and that they were in good supply on most products, after earlier being heavily constrained.(roic.ai)
• Tesla’s main headwinds had shifted to logistics, factory ramp inefficiencies, and input‑cost inflation, with no ongoing focus on semiconductor shortages as a binding constraint.(fool.com)
• Industry‑wide, the semiconductor environment had clearly transitioned from acute shortage toward easing constraints and even oversupply in some segments.

Taken together, this fits Chamath’s normalized prediction that chip-related supply constraints for large players like Apple and Tesla would substantially ease by Q4 2022–Q1 2023. The remaining issues were largely non‑chip factors (Covid assembly disruptions, logistics, lithium prices, macro demand). Hence, the prediction is right in both timing and direction.

Chamath’s conditional forecast was that widespread excess inventory plus difficulty obtaining working capital would lead to a “pretty bad recession” in the subsequent period (roughly late 2022–2023).

1. Antecedent condition (inventory glut) largely happened

Retailers did end up with very large excess inventories after the supply‑chain chaos of 2020–21:

• U.S. retailers’ inventories rose by about $78 billion in 2022 to ~$740 billion, roughly a 12% increase, leaving many with an “inventory glut” that required markdowns, warehousing, and order cuts.(mckinsey.com)
• Major chains like Target, Walmart, Gap, Kohl’s, Dick’s Sporting Goods, etc. reported inventory up far more than sales (e.g., Target +43% YoY inventory) and saw margins and profits squeezed as they discounted and canceled orders.(esaroi.com)

So the premise that companies ended up with too much inventory and related working‑capital strain was broadly correct in sectors like retail and apparel.

2. But the predicted macro outcome (a “pretty bad recession” in 2022–23) did not occur

For the U.S. economy—the context of the All‑In conversation—the data show a slowdown but continued expansion, not a significant recession:

• Real U.S. GDP grew, not contracted: BEA estimates show real GDP up 1.9% in 2022 and 2.5% in 2023, with Q4‑to‑Q4 real growth of 3.1% from 2022 to 2023.(bea.gov)
• The unemployment rate returned to and stayed near pre‑pandemic lows. BLS analysis notes unemployment back near its pre‑COVID level in 2022 and still only 3.8% in Q4 2023, with the labor market described as “strong.”(bls.gov)
• The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, which is the standard arbiter of U.S. recessions, shows the last recession ending in April 2020; its list of announcements has no new peak or trough after that, meaning the period through 2023 is treated as an ongoing expansion, not a new recession.(nber.org)

Globally, major institutions also characterized 2023 as a marked slowdown but not a global recession. The OECD, for example, projected weak growth in 2023 (around 2.2%) and emphasized that its central scenario was “not a global recession,” with the U.S. and euro area slowing but still growing.(marmomacchineinternational.com)

3. Sectoral pain vs. macro recession

Excess inventories and higher rates did pressure company balance sheets and profits: retailers slashed prices, canceled billions in orders, and faced higher warehousing and capital costs.(rhsmith.umd.edu) But these stresses remained sector‑specific and did not propagate into a broad, deep, and prolonged contraction in output and employment of the kind conventionally labeled a “pretty bad recession.”

Because the key consequence Chamath described—a significant recession in the subsequent period—did not materialize in 2022–23 despite the inventory issues, the prediction is best classified as wrong.

Evidence as of late 2025 indicates that standalone VR headsets (including Meta Quest / Oculus) have not replaced traditional 2D computing (PCs, laptops, phones) as the dominant general‑purpose modality, and instead remain largely a gaming / entertainment and specialized-use category—consistent with Friedberg’s prediction.

1. Market size vs. mainstream 2D computing

• Global PC shipments in 2024 were on the order of 260–270 million units; smartphone shipments were around 1.2–1.3 billion units annually, continuing to dwarf VR hardware volumes.
• Industry reports put annual VR headset shipments in the low tens of millions at most, with Meta the clear leader but still orders of magnitude smaller than phones and PCs. Even in optimistic forecasts, VR/AR is projected to be a fraction of overall computing devices through the mid‑2020s.

2. Dominant uses of VR: gaming, entertainment, and niche professional cases

• Meta’s own positioning of the Quest line highlights gaming, fitness, social experiences, and media consumption as the primary use cases; productivity and general-purpose computing are secondary, experimental, or limited by comfort/UI constraints.
• While there are notable enterprise/professional deployments (training, simulation, design, collaboration), these are specialized verticals and do not displace laptops/monitors as the main daily computing environment for most workers.

3. VR has not become the default general-purpose computing environment

• The typical day-to-day workflows for knowledge workers, students, and consumers in 2023–2025 remain centered on laptops/desktops with 2D monitors and smartphones. Office suites, web browsing, coding, design, messaging, and social media are overwhelmingly done on 2D displays.
• Even where VR productivity apps exist (virtual desktops, 3D workspaces), adoption is a small niche relative to traditional setups, and there is no evidence of a broad shift where people spend the majority of their computing hours inside a headset.

4. Matches the substance of the prediction

• Friedberg’s claim had two parts:
  1. Headsets would not replace traditional 2D computing as the dominant modality over the coming years.
  2. They would instead be more like a niche entertainment device (Nintendo Switch–like).
• As of November 2025, both appear accurate: VR is still peripheral to mainstream computing and primarily used for entertainment/gaming plus specific professional niches, not as the universal replacement for monitors, laptops, or phones.

Given that more than three years have passed since the 2022 prediction and the computing landscape still fits his description, the prediction is best classified as right.

As of November 30, 2025, only about three years have passed since the February 2022 prediction, which framed the Xi–Putin alignment as the beginning of a long‑term decline in U.S. cultural and economic dominance over roughly a decade. That horizon has not elapsed, so it’s too early to decisively score the prediction.

On the economic side, current data do not yet show a clear decline in U.S. dominance:

• IMF‑based estimates indicate the U.S. share of world GDP (nominal) has risen from around 25% in 2020 to roughly 26–27% by 2024–2025, while China is still significantly smaller in nominal terms. (progressivepolicy.org)
• The U.S. dollar remains the primary reserve currency, accounting for about 57–58% of disclosed global FX reserves in 2024–2025—down only modestly from earlier levels, and still far ahead of the euro and yuan. (leap-insights.org)

On the cultural/soft‑power side, evidence also shows continued U.S. dominance rather than a clear downturn:

• The U.S. is ranked #1 in Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index in 2023, 2024, and 2025, with record high scores in 2024–2025, leading in overall influence and many cultural and scientific attributes. (brandfinance.com)
• China has risen to the #2 position in soft power, which supports the idea of a more multipolar environment, but this is growth in others’ influence rather than a confirmed structural collapse of U.S. dominance. (internationalinvestment.biz)

There are signs consistent with the direction of the prediction—e.g., gradual diversification away from the dollar, China’s growing economic and soft‑power weight, and tighter China–Russia/BRICS alignment—but these developments so far amount to incremental multipolarization, not a clearly measurable end of U.S. dominance.

Because:

1. The claimed timeframe (a structural decline over the 2020s) has not yet played out, and
2. Current quantitative indicators still show the U.S. at or near peak economic and soft‑power strength,

the fairest assessment at this point is “inconclusive” rather than clearly right or wrong.

As of late 2025, China has not yet achieved the clear global economic and cultural dominance implied in the prediction. In nominal GDP, the United States remains the world's largest economy (about $29.2T in 2024) ahead of China (about $18.7T).(databank.worldbank.org) Some PPP-based estimates put China's total output above that of the US, but this reflects size rather than overall dominance of the global financial system, where the US dollar and US capital markets still play the central role.(worldeconomics.com)

On the cultural/soft-power side, Brand Finance's Global Soft Power Index 2024 and 2025 rank the US first in soft power worldwide, with China rising to third in 2024 and second in 2025 but still clearly behind the US.(brandfinance.com) That is consistent with a China that is gaining influence but not yet the dominant global cultural power.

Since 2022, Russia under Putin has indeed deepened its partnership with China: they announced a 'no-limits' relationship in February 2022, have expanded long‑term oil and gas deals, and pushed bilateral trade to record highs of roughly $240–245 billion in 2023–2024, with Russia becoming China's largest crude oil supplier.(news.cgtn.com) Analysts generally describe this as an unequal partnership in which China holds the dominant position and Russia has become heavily dependent on Chinese markets and technology, rather than a relationship in which Russia is a primary driver of China's rise.(cnbc.com)

So far, the observable facts are: (1) China is a rising but not yet dominant economic and cultural power globally, and (2) Russia has become an important energy and trade partner for China but with limited evidence that it is 'playing a really important role' in making China the dominant global power. Because the prediction does not specify a time horizon beyond 'the coming years' and the underlying structural question (whether China will ultimately become the dominant economic and cultural power with Russia as a key enabler) remains unresolved, it is too early to definitively label the prediction as right or wrong.

Sacks’ prediction was that Democrats would fare poorly in the November 2022 elections, especially relative to expectations, and that the situation in early 2022 “does not bode well for the Democrats in November.”

What actually happened:

• Pre‑election expectations: Many forecasters and betting markets anticipated a strong Republican showing or “red wave,” with Republicans favored to win clear control of the House and a majority in the Senate. For example, one forecast predicted Republicans would end up with 219 House seats and 51 Senate seats, flipping both chambers, and analysts widely cited structural factors and the economy as favoring the GOP. (harvardpolitics.com)
• Actual results: In the 2022 midterms, Democrats held the U.S. Senate and gained a seat (net +1), while Republicans took the House by a very narrow margin (net GOP gain of 9 seats, far below historical midterm losses for a president’s party). Democrats also achieved a net gain of governorships and flipped multiple state legislative chambers, leading many analysts to describe the outcome as historically good for an incumbent president’s party and far better than expected. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Relative to expectations: Post‑election coverage across the political spectrum emphasized that the anticipated “red wave” failed to materialize and that Democrats exceeded expectations, with outlets explicitly using those phrases. (ussc.edu.au)

Because Democrats performed better than most public expectations—especially in the Senate and in state‑level races—rather than suffering a broad, expectation‑defying defeat, Sacks’ prediction about Democrats doing poorly in November 2022 is best classified as wrong.