E65: VC markup dynamics, Russia/US tensions over Ukraine, Altos Labs raises $3B, Stripe mafia & more

As of November 30, 2025, the United States and Russia have not gone to war directly over Ukraine. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the U.S. has provided extensive military and financial aid to Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Russia, but there has been no declared war or direct U.S.–Russia military conflict (e.g., U.S. and Russian forces openly fighting each other). This is consistently described in reporting as a Russian–Ukrainian war with Western support to Ukraine, not a U.S.–Russia war.

Because Chamath’s prediction is conditional (if the U.S. and Russia go to war over Ukraine, then global equity markets will effectively go to zero / experience a depression-level crash), and the condition has not occurred, we cannot evaluate whether his claimed market reaction would have happened. The fact that global equity markets did not go to zero after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is not directly relevant to the prediction as normalized here, since that invasion did not satisfy the stated condition of a direct U.S.–Russia war.

Therefore the correct status is inconclusive: the antecedent of the conditional prediction has not happened yet, so the truth of the prediction cannot be determined.

The prediction was that, during 2022, given U.S. economic volatility, the United States would be more likely than not to engage in some form of external military conflict if an opportunity arose, using conflict as a tool of political/economic cohesion.

Key 2022 events:

1. Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine (Feb 24, 2022) created an obvious "opportunity for conflict" involving a U.S. rival. The U.S. responded with massive sanctions and unprecedented military aid to Ukraine, but repeatedly and explicitly refused to enter the war directly (no deployment of U.S. combat troops to Ukraine, no U.S.-Russia direct fighting). President Biden and other officials publicly ruled out direct U.S. military engagement to avoid a wider war with Russia.

2. The U.S. continued limited overseas counterterrorism activities (e.g., the drone strike killing al‑Qaeda leader Ayman al‑Zawahiri in Kabul in August 2022, plus ongoing operations in Syria/Iraq), but these were extensions of long‑running missions, not new, large‑scale external wars introduced as a tool of domestic economic or political cohesion.

3. There was no new U.S. invasion, major new theater war, or formal entry into an existing interstate conflict in 2022. Policy and public messaging emphasized avoiding escalation with Russia while supporting Ukraine indirectly.

Given that the clearest “opportunity for conflict” (the Ukraine war) did not lead to direct U.S. military engagement, and no other major new external conflict was initiated for domestic cohesion reasons during 2022, the core forecast—that the U.S. would likely choose such a conflict under those conditions—did not come to pass.

Therefore, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

Friedberg’s prediction was that by the end of 2022 the United States would enter “some sort of conflict” (military or quasi‑military) abroad, with the “economic seed” for that conflict already planted.

Key facts:

1. No new formal U.S. war or direct interstate armed conflict began in 2022.
   After Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the U.S. and NATO explicitly refused to enter direct combat with Russia. President Biden repeatedly emphasized that American forces would not fight Russia in Ukraine, warning that a NATO–Russia clash would mean World War III. (scroll.in) There was continued limited U.S. use of force (e.g., airstrikes in Syria against Iran‑linked groups), but these were extensions of longstanding operations, not a clearly new, large external conflict sparked in 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. However, U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war was extremely deep and military in character.
   From early 2022, the U.S. became Ukraine’s dominant military supporter, sending tens of billions of dollars of weapons, ammunition, and other security assistance, including artillery, HIMARS, air-defense systems, and more. (en.wikipedia.org) Many analysts and officials (on both Western and Russian sides) have described the conflict as a proxy or quasi‑military war between NATO/the U.S. and Russia, with Ukraine as the primary battlefield, arguing this can be fairly characterized as a NATO–Russia proxy war. (link.springer.com) Other expert and institutional analyses explicitly push back on calling it a U.S. proxy war, framing it instead as Ukraine’s own defensive war supported by external aid. (debunk.org) Whether this level of indirect military engagement counts as the U.S. “entering some sort of conflict” is therefore contested and depends heavily on definitions.

3. Economic drivers were at most indirect.
   In the quoted segment, Friedberg explicitly links his prediction to economic conditions—weak productivity, trade issues, and the idea that policymakers might seek political and economic unity through conflict. (podscripts.co) The main 2022 conflict involving extensive U.S. involvement (Ukraine) was precipitated by Russia’s invasion and long‑running security disputes over NATO expansion, not by U.S. domestic economic stress. While energy prices, sanctions, and broader economic considerations quickly became central to the war’s global impact, the causal chain from U.S. economic weakness to U.S. conflict engagement is indirect at best and not cleanly demonstrable.

Why this is ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong:

• If you define “entering a significant external conflict” to require U.S. troops or a formal state of war / belligerency, then the prediction did not come true: U.S. leaders worked hard to avoid exactly that in 2022. (scroll.in) And no new U.S. war clearly traceable to economic motives began that year.
• If you accept that sustained, large‑scale arming, training, and intelligence support in what many describe as a proxy war constitutes a “quasi‑military” conflict, you could argue the prediction did come true in spirit, although the economic‑causation part remains weakly supported and speculative.

Because reasonable observers can and do disagree on whether this level of indirect involvement qualifies as the U.S. “being in some sort of conflict” and on how much economics versus security politics drove it, the fulfillment of the prediction turns on contested definitions and causal interpretations. That makes the outcome ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

What was predicted
Chamath said that for calendar year 2022, markets had “effectively now started to price in about five rate hikes this year… probably 5 25‑point rate hikes,” i.e., roughly five 25 bps increases in the federal funds rate.

What actually happened in 2022
In 2022, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds target range seven times, and most hikes were larger than 25 bps:

1. March 16, 2022: +25 bps (0.25%) hike, to 0.25–0.50%.
2. May 4, 2022: +50 bps hike, to 0.75–1.00%.
3. June 15, 2022: +75 bps hike, to 1.50–1.75%.
4. July 27, 2022: +75 bps hike, to 2.25–2.50%.
5. September 21, 2022: +75 bps hike, to 3.00–3.25%.
6. November 2, 2022: +75 bps hike, to 3.75–4.00%.
7. December 14, 2022: +50 bps hike, to 4.25–4.50%.

Across 2022, there were 7 hikes, and the total increase in the target range was 425 bps, not five 25 bps hikes (~125 bps).

Conclusion
Because the Fed raised rates more often (7 vs. ~5 times) and in larger increments (multiple 50–75 bps moves, not mostly 25 bps), the prediction that 2022 would see “probably 5 25‑point rate hikes” is incorrect.

The prediction was that during the post‑March‑2022 tightening cycle it would be very hard for the Fed to avoid triggering a U.S. recession before inflation was brought under control. In reality, the Fed raised the federal funds rate from near 0% to about 5.25–5.50% between March 2022 and July 2023, a historically sharp tightening. Inflation then fell steeply from its 2022 peak (e.g., PCE inflation dropping from around 7% in mid‑2022 to about 2.6% by December 2023, with projections and later data putting inflation in the 2–3% range through 2024) while GDP growth stayed positive and unemployment remained relatively low. (congress.gov) Multiple mainstream analyses describe this episode as a rare soft landing or even “immaculate disinflation” — a return of inflation toward target without a recession or major spike in unemployment. (en.wikipedia.org) As of late 2025, the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee has not declared any U.S. recession after the brief 2020 downturn, and the Fed’s recession‑indicator series (USRECQP) remains at 0 through at least Q3 2025, meaning no officially dated recession has followed the 2022 tightening so far. (nber.org) While some economists argue the economy may be slipping toward recession in 2025, even those discussions occur after inflation had already largely been reduced toward the Fed’s goal. (ft.com) Ex post, the feared recession triggered by the rate hikes before inflation was controlled has not (at least yet) occurred, so the substantive thrust of the prediction is best classified as wrong.

Claim interpreted: In Q1 and Q2 2022, multiple established, seemingly stable companies would shock investors by reporting earnings/guidance where revenue was ~20–30% below expectations, and would explicitly blame this on unforeseen supply‑chain constraints (e.g., not having product to sell).

What actually happened:

1. Supply‑chain issues did hurt revenues, but usually by single‑digit percentages.

   • Varex Imaging’s Q1 2022 revenue was below management’s expectations because raw‑material delays prevented shipment of more than $20M of product; revenue was $199M, down ~12% sequentially but up 12% year‑over‑year, i.e., not a 20–30% shortfall versus a normal baseline. (fool.com)
   • Nature’s Sunshine estimated that ingredient shortages cut its North American net revenue by about 5–8% of sales, again well under the 20–30% range. (fool.com)

2. Several firms explicitly cited supply‑chain problems but still grew or roughly met revenue expectations.

   • FIGS (medical apparel) said that erratic ocean transit times and delayed product arrivals limited its ability to keep core products in stock and pushed color launches out of Q1, leading to revenue growth that was “lower than expected”—yet net revenue still grew 26% year‑over‑year. (mlq.ai)
   • 3D Systems’ Q2 2022 results “came in below our expectations” and full‑year guidance was trimmed, with management citing continuing supply‑chain disruptions and logistics as key reasons; Q2 revenue was down 13.8% year‑over‑year, and the guidance cut was on the order of high single digits relative to the prior range, not 20–30%. (3printr.com)
   • Celestica’s 2022 filings describe significant global supply‑chain constraints (extended component lead times, etc.), but also note that strong planning and demand meant revenue still increased; the narrative is of margin and execution pressure, not catastrophic top‑line misses. (corporate.celestica.com)

3. Large, ‘stable’ retailers did not show the predicted kind of revenue shock.

   • Walmart’s Q1 2022 revenue actually beat analyst expectations (~$141.5B vs. ~$139B expected), while EPS missed due to higher supply‑chain and product‑mix costs. (effifinance.com)
   • Target’s Q1 2022 revenue likewise exceeded expectations ($25.17B vs. $24.48B consensus), with the shortfall in earnings, not sales, driven partly by supply‑chain and freight costs and inventory issues. (thestreet.com)
     These are precisely the kind of established, stable companies Friedberg likely had in mind; their problems showed up in margins and inventory clean‑ups, not 20–30% revenue holes versus expectations.

4. If a broad pattern of 20–30% revenue misses from surprise supply‑chain shortages had occurred across multiple stable firms in Q1–Q2 2022, it would likely be prominently documented. Targeted searches of earnings reports and commentary from that period show numerous mentions of supply‑chain constraints and some modest revenue underperformance, but not multiple cases of large, consensus‑shocking 20–30% top‑line misses explicitly pinned mainly on an inability to stock shelves.

Conclusion: While Friedberg was directionally right that supply‑chain constraints would continue to affect company results in early 2022, the specific, stronger claim—that multiple established, seemingly safe companies would report 20–30% revenue shortfalls versus expectations and blame them primarily on suddenly realized supply‑chain problems—does not match the available evidence. The impact was generally smaller and more commonly expressed in margin compression and modest revenue shortfalls, not the dramatic revenue misses he described.

Therefore, this prediction is best classified as wrong.

Evidence from multiple macro indicators and company‑level data lines up with Chamath’s timeline.

1. Global supply chains normalized around early 2023

• The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) fell from a peak of over 4 standard deviations above normal in December 2021 to -0.26 in February 2023, its first move below the pre‑COVID average since 2019. The Fed and multiple commentaries explicitly described this as supply chains having "returned to normal" by March 2023. (mdm.com)
• Industry analyses in early 2023 similarly reported that logistics networks and supplier delivery times were back to or better than normal by Q1–Q2 2023, especially in manufacturing and electronics. (reshoringmfg.com)
• The 2020–2023 global chip shortage is generally dated as having “mostly subsided” by 2023, with the auto industry largely recovered and global car production up, indicating a major bottleneck for electronics and autos had eased by then. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, this supports the claim that the acute phase of the global supply‑chain crisis of 2020–2022 was largely resolved by early 2023, which is within the late‑2022 / early‑2023 window Chamath gave.

2. Apple and Tesla specifically

• Apple suffered severe iPhone 14 Pro shortages in late 2022 due to China’s zero‑COVID policies and Foxconn disruptions, costing an estimated $1–1.5 billion in lost Black Friday sales and leading to widespread stockouts. (macrumors.com) On Apple’s earnings call discussing that period, Tim Cook said they had “significantly less” iPhone 14 Pro/Pro Max supply than planned but that “production is now back where we want it to be,” indicating that by early 2023 the worst of those constraints had been resolved and supply was back near normal. (tomsguide.com)
• Tesla ramped production to 1.37 million vehicles in 2022 and guided to 1.8 million in 2023. By early 2023, analysts were explicitly writing that Tesla and the broader EV market had “pivoted from being supply‑constrained to being demand‑constrained,” with price cuts used to stimulate demand rather than to clear constrained supply. (livemint.com) This shift implies that supply (factories, parts, logistics) was no longer the binding constraint by early 2023.

Given that: (a) global supply‑chain stress indices and sector reports show conditions back to normal or better by roughly February–March 2023, and (b) both Apple and Tesla were describing production and supply as essentially back in balance around that time (with Tesla even facing demand, not supply, as the main issue), Chamath’s prediction that the acute supply‑chain disruptions “will be worked out” by late 2022 / early 2023 for major firms like Apple and Tesla is substantively correct in timing and outcome.

Evidence suggests Chamath’s directional and timing call — that the acute, pandemic-era supply‑chain and CapEx disruptions hitting firms like Apple and Tesla would be largely worked out by early 2023 — was substantially correct, though his “6–9 month” phrasing was somewhat optimistic.

Key points:

• Global supply-chain stress metrics: The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) peaked at a record level in December 2021 and stayed very elevated through most of 2022, only gradually easing in the second half of 2022. By early 2023 it had dropped back toward, and then below, its historical average; by May 2023 it reached a record low, indicating that the bottlenecks that had driven the crisis were largely resolved. (ycharts.com) A later Reuters summary explicitly notes that supply-chain problems “plummeted before disappearing entirely in February 2023” according to the New York Fed’s measure. (reuters.com) This lines up closely with his “done by early 2023” expectation, even if the 6–9 month window from January 2022 (mid–late 2022) was too aggressive.

• Apple specifically: Apple suffered major iPhone 14 Pro/Pro Max shortages in November–December 2022 due to COVID‑related disruptions at its main Chinese assembly plant, enough that Apple issued a rare warning and then missed its Q1 2023 (holiday quarter) revenue expectations, citing supply constraints. (news.alphastreet.com) However, on the February 2, 2023 earnings call, Apple stated that “production is now back where we want it to be,” and that the December-quarter miss was principally due to those temporary constraints. (news.alphastreet.com) That indicates that by early 2023 Apple’s acute supply-chain problems from the pandemic era had largely been worked through.

• Tesla specifically: Tesla’s Q3 2022 update still described “logistics volatility and supply chain bottlenecks” as challenges, but already noted they were improving and that the main medium‑term constraint would be battery supply rather than generalized logistical chaos. (teslanorth.com) By March 25, 2023, its Berlin factory had ramped to 5,000 vehicles per week, and Tesla’s 2023 deliveries rose 38% over 2022 to 1.8 million vehicles, consistent with capacity and supply chains having normalized enough to support large-scale growth. (en.wikipedia.org) While Tesla continued to face cost and raw‑material issues, the systemic, pandemic-style bottlenecks Chamath was talking about had largely eased by early 2023.

• Semiconductors and the broader crisis: The separate global chip shortage that had severely constrained autos and electronics from 2020 onward is generally described as a 2020–2023 phenomenon; by 2023 the shortage had “mostly subsided” and global car production had begun to recover. (en.wikipedia.org) Likewise, the broader “2021–2023 global supply chain crisis” is dated as such, with conditions improving after 2023 even if some residual stresses persisted or re-emerged for other reasons (e.g., later geopolitical events). (en.wikipedia.org)

Putting this together: global indicators and company disclosures show that pandemic‑era supply‑chain disruptions did remain significant through most of 2022 (so a strict 6–9 month resolution from January 2022 was too optimistic), but they were substantially resolved and largely normalized by early 2023, in line with the Apple/Tesla guidance he referenced. On balance, that makes the core of his prediction — that these disruptions would not drag on for many years and would be mostly worked out by early 2023 — substantially correct.

Evidence shows that cellular reprogramming/Yamanaka-factor-based age reversal and Altos Labs did receive significant mainstream media coverage in early 2022, but the specific claim that it would be on the front cover of “a lot of” or multiple high‑profile magazines in 2022 is not borne out.

Mainstream attention in 2022 (this part of the prediction was correct):

• Scientific American ran a substantial feature on January 21, 2022 titled “Billionaires Bankroll Cell Rejuvenation Tech as the Latest Gambit to Slow Aging”, explicitly centered on Yamanaka factors, partial cellular reprogramming, and billionaire‑backed companies including Altos Labs. (scientificamerican.com)
• The Guardian published a long feature on February 17, 2022, “If they could turn back time: how tech billionaires are trying to reverse the ageing process”, focusing on Altos Labs, billionaire funding (Bezos, Milner, etc.), and cell rejuvenation research. (theguardian.com)
• The Economist ran “A $3bn bet on finding the fountain of youth” on January 22, 2022, detailing Altos Labs, Yamanaka factors, and cellular rejuvenation as a major science & technology piece. (livemint.com)
• Other mainstream and industry outlets (e.g., Financial Times, pharmaphorum) covered the Altos launch and its focus on cellular rejuvenation. (pharmaphorum.com)

Collectively, this shows high‑profile, general‑audience coverage of Altos Labs and Yamanaka‑factor‑based age‑reversal science in 2022, in line with Friedberg’s expectation that the field would get serious mainstream attention.

Front‑cover / multiple‑magazine claim (this is where the prediction fails):

• New Scientist ran an April 27, 2022 feature, “Growing younger: Radical insights into ageing could help us reverse it,” about radical new ideas on ageing and potential reversal; a New Scientist marketing email later listed this as one of their “most popular cover stories,” indicating it was indeed a cover story for at least one issue. (newscientist.com) This supports one notable magazine cover centered on ageing/rejuvenation science.
• However, The Economist’s own email to subscribers describes that same week’s “$3bn bet on finding the fountain of youth” piece as a Science & Technology article, while explicitly naming a different article (“the parable of Boris Johnson”) as the cover leader, implying the Altos/rejuvenation piece was not the magazine’s cover. (emailtuna.com)
• Searches for 2022 covers of broad general‑interest magazines (e.g., Time, The New Yorker, Wired, The Atlantic, etc.) and for phrases like “Altos Labs cover story” or “Yamanaka factors magazine cover 2022” turn up feature articles and news stories, but no clear evidence that multiple such magazines put Altos Labs or Yamanaka‑factor age reversal on their front covers.

Given:

• The general‑attention part of the prediction was clearly fulfilled (multiple major outlets ran detailed features on Altos and cellular reprogramming in early 2022), but
• The stronger, specific claim—that this would be on the front cover of “a lot of” / multiple high‑profile magazines within 2022—has evidence for at most one clear cover story (New Scientist) and no evidence for the broader wave of front‑page magazine coverage Friedberg forecast (and in at least one prime candidate, The Economist, we have positive evidence it was not the cover),

the overall prediction, as normalized, is best scored as wrong. The core media‑attention trend was right, but the distinctive “this will be the front cover of a lot of magazines this year” component did not materialize at the scale claimed.