Fed Hesitates on Tariffs, The New Mag 7, Death of VC, Google's Value in a Post-Search World

The prediction is defined over the window from the podcast date (May 9, 2025) through the end of 2026, so there is still more than a year left in the forecast horizon as of November 30, 2025.

Evidence so far:

• The All-In team has run a major 200–500 person F1‑linked live event in Miami, with a live show at the Fontainebleau and trackside experiences over the 2025 Miami Grand Prix weekend. However, this is the reference event Jason is talking about ("run it back"), not an "additional" one after the prediction was made.(allin.com)
• After that episode, their public events and live productions include:
  • A series of “All-In Live from Miami” episodes and the Nico Rosberg "All-In Live from Miami" show, but those are recordings from the same F1 Miami live activation, not clearly separate 200–500 person events tied to a different major sporting event.(pod.wave.co)
  • An "All-In Live from Austin" taping (episode 245, April 3, 2025), which is a live show but not obviously tied to a major sporting event like F1 Austin, the Super Bowl, or the NBA Finals.(metacast.app)
  • Large non‑sports live events in San Francisco: the 2024 All-In Holiday Spectacular at the Palace of Fine Arts and the upcoming All-In Holiday Party on December 6, 2025. These are marketed as live show + afterparty experiences with casino games, DJs, etc., but they are holiday/Community events, not linked to a concurrent major sports event.(allin.com)
• The current events page and recent episode summaries on allin.com list the Holiday Party but do not advertise any additional live events tied to F1 Austin, F1 Las Vegas, the Super Bowl, or the NBA Finals (or similar), nor do they document that a Vegas or other live taping was explicitly structured as part of a major sporting event.(allin.com)

Because:

1. the prediction’s deadline (end of 2026) has not passed, and
2. there is no clear, documented post‑May‑9‑2025 live event tied to another major sporting event that would lock the prediction in as already true, we cannot classify it as either definitively right or wrong yet. The correct status as of November 30, 2025 is "inconclusive" (too early to tell).

Multiple independent sources confirm that the 2025 All-In Summit (the fourth summit after 2022, 2023, and 2024) was held as a physical, in‑person conference in Los Angeles from September 7–9, 2025. An event listing describes “The All-In Summit 2025” at the Shrine Auditorium and Expo Hall in Los Angeles running from September 7 to September 9, 2025, with on‑site programming, food, and networking, which clearly indicates an in‑person format. (eventbrowse.com) A wrap‑up video posted by IREN thanks the All-In Summit team for “a spectacular three days” connecting with business and technology leaders, further confirming that the event actually took place as an on‑site gathering. (iren.com) The All-In podcast’s own history (via a summary article) states that the 2025 summit was held in Los Angeles from September 7 to 9, listing it as the next annual summit after the 2022, 2023, and 2024 events—making it the fourth All-In Summit. (en.wikipedia.org) Together, these sources show that Jason’s prediction—that the fourth All-In Summit would be an in‑person event in Los Angeles on September 7–9, 2025—came true.

At the time of the podcast (9 May 2025), the federal funds target range was 4.25–4.50%, where it had been held since the end of 2024 after cumulative 100 bps of cuts that brought it to that level.(federalreserve.gov) Chamath’s normalized prediction was that the Fed would not cut rates below this 4.25–4.50% range through at least the 2026 U.S. midterms. However, the Fed cut the target range to 4.00–4.25% at its September 2025 meeting and then further to 3.75–4.00% at the October 29, 2025 meeting, clearly moving below the 4.25–4.50% band.(tradingeconomics.com) Multiple summaries of current policy state that as of November 2025 the target range remains 3.75–4.00%.(sezarroverseas.com) Because the Fed did in fact cut below 4.25–4.50% well before the 2026 midterms, the prediction is already falsified.

The prediction’s horizon is “over the next several years … through roughly 2030,” so as of November 2025 it is too early to judge definitively.

Early evidence is mixed:

• Large-company restructurings and journalistic analyses show meaningful cuts to middle management layers and rising spans of control, with firms explicitly citing efficiency drives and AI tools as contributors to a “Great Flattening.” (wsj.com)
• Surveys and forecasts (e.g., Gartner) anticipate that AI will significantly reduce middle-management roles in a portion of organizations by the mid‑2020s, reinforcing the idea that managers are highly exposed to AI-enabled coordination and decision tools. (shrm.org)

However, aggregate labor data do not yet show a broad collapse in management jobs relative to other white‑collar roles. U.S. employment in management occupations is roughly flat-to-slightly up through 2024–2025 and is projected by BLS to grow about 7% from 2023–2033, while projected job losses from AI and automation are clearest in clerical/office support and some sales/customer-service roles rather than management per se. (bls.gov)

Because (1) the main evaluation date of ~2030 has not yet arrived, and (2) existing data show some AI-driven thinning of middle management but not a clear, systemwide pattern that managers are the first white-collar category to be materially reduced relative to individual contributors, the prediction cannot yet be labeled right or wrong.

The prediction was that within 1–2 years Google/Alphabet would (a) make significant headcount reductions and (b) push a broad return‑to‑office (RTO) regime, framed as part of a more serious, AI‑driven corporate strategy.

1. Significant headcount reductions tied to AI
Since early 2025—after the podcast’s May 2025 release—Google has conducted multiple rounds of layoffs, cutting hundreds of roles across its Global Business Organization and its Pixel, Android, Chrome, Cloud, and related platforms-and-devices units, explicitly described as part of restructuring and automation and as reallocating resources toward AI work. (timesofindia.indiatimes.com)
In addition, about four weeks ago Google offered voluntary buyouts to roughly 7,500 employees across Google and YouTube, explicitly described as an adaptation to fast‑moving AI developments and regulatory pressure—an unmistakably “large” headcount reduction program at Alphabet’s scale. (sfchronicle.com)
Other reporting notes targeted cuts of AI contractors and continued trimming in 2025, again framed as part of Google’s AI strategy. (aimmediahouse.com) This satisfies the “large number of employees”/significant headcount reduction component of the prediction well within the 1–2‑year window.

2. Broad return‑to‑office push
In 2025 Google tightened on‑site requirements beyond the already‑existing hybrid policy. Multiple reports describe remote employees living within about 50 miles of a Google office being told to start working at least three days a week in‑office or accept a voluntary exit package / risk job loss, affecting major units such as Search, Ads, Commerce, Marketing, Research, and Core Engineering. (businesstoday.in)
Later in 2025, Google further restricted its “Work From Anywhere” policy so that even a single remote day in a week counts as a full week from the limited WFA allowance, while warning non‑compliant employees about potential disciplinary action. (fortune.com)
These moves don’t change the headline “three‑days‑in‑office hybrid” rule (which pre‑dated 2025) but do represent a broad, company‑level tightening and enforcement of RTO—especially for previously approved fully‑remote employees—consistent with “get people to return back to office.”

3. Explicitly framed as part of an AI‑driven competitive push
Across these actions, Alphabet leadership repeatedly frames both cost‑cutting and workplace changes as necessary to compete in AI:

• Coverage of 2025 layoffs and reorganizations explicitly says Google is eliminating jobs and reshaping divisions to channel funds into AI research and generative‑AI products. (businesstoday.in)
• Pichai and senior executives, in all‑hands meetings and public filings, stress that Google must drive higher productivity, be “more AI‑savvy,” and invest tens of billions more in AI/datacenter capex while keeping overall costs in check. (cnbc.com)
• The 7,500‑person buyout program is explicitly linked to adapting to fast‑moving AI developments. (sfchronicle.com)

Taken together, by late 2025 Google has already done what the prediction described: sizable headcount reductions plus a materially stricter, widely applied RTO stance, both justified as part of a more serious, company‑wide effort to respond to AI competition. Because these conditions are already met well before the upper bound of “mid‑2027,” the prediction is best scored as right rather than merely “inconclusive.”

The prediction explicitly concerns long‑run outcomes "in ten and 15 and 20 years" after the point of reduced investment capital, i.e., roughly in the 2035–2045 window. The episode itself is dated May 9, 2025, so as of today (November 30, 2025) at most about half a year has elapsed since the prediction was made, far short of the 10–20 year horizon.(allin.onpodcastai.com)

Because the claim is about whether China and Canada will ultimately stagnate and become “also‑ran” economies relative to more investment‑rich peers, there is not yet enough elapsed time or data to determine whether that long‑term scenario will materialize. We also cannot yet know whether the antecedent condition (persistently depressed risk capital over a decade or more) will actually hold.

Given the time frame and conditional nature of the claim, the correct status as of 2025‑11‑30 is "inconclusive (too early to tell)."

Friedberg’s claim was that, because exits are weak, LPs would cut commitments and “you’re going to see a reduction in venture dollars”, i.e., a normalization of VC capital to the real pace of growth and innovation.

What happened to venture funding into startups?
Global VC investment in 2024 was already stabilizing well below the 2021 peak but modestly up from 2023 (about $368B vs. $346B).(practiceguides.chambers.com) In 2025, the value of PE/VC‑backed rounds in H1 rose ~25% year over year ($189.9B vs. $152.2B in H1 2024).(spglobal.com) KPMG’s Venture Pulse shows Q1 2025 at $128.4B and Q2 2025 at $101.05B,(kpmg.com) and then Q3 2025 climbing to about $120.7B, marking the fourth consecutive $100B+ quarter globally.(kpmg.com) Crunchbase‑based analyses concur that Q3 2025 funding (~$97B) was up ~38% year over year and that each of the last four quarters exceeded $90B, the strongest run since 2022.(news.crunchbase.com)(infotechlead.com)(eqvista.com) On this standard metric (capital deployed into startups), there has not been a broad reduction; funding volumes have rebounded and are running higher than in 2023–2024.

What happened to LP commitments / VC fundraising?
KPMG also reports that global VC fundraising by funds was very weak: only $48.8B raised by the end of Q2 2025, putting 2025 on track to fall below 2024’s eight‑year low of $187.3B.(mondaq.com) That is consistent with LPs being more cautious and reducing new commitments to the asset class, even as existing dry powder and capital concentration into AI megadeals keep deployed “venture dollars” high.(kpmg.com)(kpmg.com)

Why this is ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong
If you interpret “reduction in venture dollars” as funds raised from LPs, then 2025 data so far supports his view: fundraising is materially down and likely to post a new cycle low, matching his story about LPs normalizing commitments.(mondaq.com) If you interpret it as capital invested into startups, the near‑term outcome has been the opposite: deal funding is up, with four strong quarters in a row, driven largely by AI and defense tech megadeals, and not yet “normalized” to a lower level.(news.crunchbase.com)(spglobal.com)(kpmg.com)

Because (a) his wording is ambiguous about whether he meant LP fundraising or capital deployed, (b) those two metrics have moved in opposite directions, and (c) only ~6–7 months of his “near‑to‑medium term” have elapsed, the prediction cannot be cleanly scored as fully right or fully wrong given the evidence available so far.