DOGE updates + Liberation Day Tariff Reactions with Ben Shapiro and Antonio Gracias

The prediction is about the entire current Trump term beginning in 2025: that the administration will keep its new tariff regime in substantial form and will not stage a broad, sudden reversal or “grand capitulation,” even if markets are volatile.

What has actually happened so far:

1. Large new tariff regime was implemented and remains the core policy.

   • On April 2, 2025 (“Liberation Day”), Trump announced sweeping tariffs via Executive Order 14257, including a 10% baseline tariff on most imports plus substantial country‑specific surcharges (up to roughly 50%), alongside a 25% auto/auto‑parts tariff and other measures. (cnbc.com)
   • These Liberation Day tariffs are part of a broader second‑term program of high tariffs, including a separate 25% tariff on goods from countries that import Venezuelan oil. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. There have been tactical pauses and adjustments, but not a full rollback.

   • On April 9, 2025, amid market turmoil and stock market losses, Trump announced a partial, 90‑day pause on many of the newly imposed “reciprocal” country‑specific rates, temporarily resetting them to the 10% baseline while negotiations proceeded with dozens of countries. China’s rate was actually increased to 125%, and key sectoral tariffs (e.g., on autos, steel, aluminum) stayed in place. (investopedia.com)
   • The administration later extended the modification/pause on some reciprocal rates but also began sending letters and imposing high tariffs (often 30–50%) on specific countries effective August 1, 2025, indicating that the high‑tariff framework was being maintained and refined, not abandoned. (forbes.com)

3. Legal and political pushback has not (yet) dismantled the tariff regime.

   • Federal courts have issued rulings that Trump overstepped his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and that some or all Liberation Day tariffs are illegal, but those judgments are stayed pending appeal, so the tariffs remain in effect for now. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Congress is considering the "Trade Review Act of 2025" to reassert legislative control over tariffs, but it has not been enacted; it therefore hasn’t forced a rollback yet. (en.wikipedia.org)

4. As of late November 2025, a high‑tariff regime is still in force.

   • Reports in November 2025 describe significant ongoing tariff revenue from the Liberation Day package and related measures, with the administration proposing to use those revenues for “tariff dividend” checks, and with only limited product‑specific cuts (on roughly 200 items) rather than a general unwinding. (nypost.com)
   • Major partners such as India are still facing high U.S. tariffs (up to 50%) and are negotiating trade deals under that pressure rather than after a broad U.S. retreat. (reuters.com)

Given this, two key points for scoring the prediction:

• Has there already been a “grand capitulation”? The 90‑day partial pause and subsequent tweaks are significant softening steps, but they kept a 10% baseline in place, preserved or increased some marquee tariffs (e.g., China, autos, steel), and were framed as temporary negotiating tactics. There has been no comprehensive repeal of the Liberation Day framework or a wholesale return to pre‑2025 tariff levels.
• Is the prediction fully testable yet? No. The prediction explicitly covers the entire Trump term beginning in 2025, which would run through January 2029. As of November 30, 2025, we are less than one year into that term. A later major policy reversal—driven by markets, courts, Congress, or a political deal—could still occur.

Because the term is far from over and no decisive “grand capitulation” has yet occurred, the correct status is “inconclusive” (too early to tell) rather than clearly right or wrong.

Available data on U.S. 10‑year Treasury auctions after the April 2, 2025 “Liberation Day” tariff announcement show that new 10‑year notes consistently cleared in the low‑to‑mid‑4% range, not near 5%.

• The Liberation Day tariff package on April 2, 2025 materially shook markets and pushed 10‑year yields from roughly 4.2% to over 4.5% in the days immediately afterward, raising fears that long‑term rates could move much higher. (jpmorgan.com)

• A consolidated calendar of 10‑year note auctions for 2025 shows the actual award yields for the auctions immediately following the tariffs and the podcast (which aired April 5, 2025):

  • Apr 9, 2025: 4.435%
  • May 6, 2025: 4.342%
  • Jun 11, 2025: 4.421%
  • Jul 9, 2025: 4.362%
  • Aug 6, 2025: 4.255%
  • Sep 10, 2025: 4.033%
  • Oct 8, 2025: 4.117%
  • Nov 12, 2025: 4.074%

  All of these are between about 4.0% and 4.44%, and none are close to 5%. (moneycontrol.com)

• Independent news reports on specific auctions confirm these levels: Reuters reports the April 9 auction clearing at 4.435%; CNBC and Bloomberg cite 4.342% for the May 6 auction; Barron’s notes 4.421% for the June auction and 4.362% for the July 9 auction, all reinforcing that issuance was consistently in the low‑4s. (reuters.com)

• Even when market yields “soared” later in 2025, commentary described the 10‑year yield reaching roughly 4.6%, still well below 5% and consistent with auction outcomes staying in the 4‑something range. (investopedia.com)

Chamath’s normalized prediction was that, in the near term following the tariff announcement, 10‑year Treasury auctions would clear at around 4% rather than drifting up toward 5%, giving governments materially lower funding costs. The realized auction yields over the subsequent months were solidly in the low‑4% band and never approached 5%, delivering meaningfully cheaper financing than a 5% handle would have implied.

Given this, the prediction that upcoming 10‑year auctions would clear “around 4%” and not near 5% is supported by the data, so it is best classified as right.

As of 30 November 2025, the prediction has not materialized on any of its key points.

1. No evidence of Chinese 3 nm entering volume production in Q3 2025

   • Mainstream reporting still describes SMIC’s most advanced mass-produced node as 7 nm, constrained by U.S. export controls that block access to EUV lithography. Analyses note SMIC is researching 5 nm and 3 nm, but not yet producing them at scale, and remains at least several generations behind TSMC and Intel. (lemonde.fr)
   • Huawei/SMIC roadmaps consistently put true 3 nm chips in 2026: Huawei is reported to be working with SMIC on a 3 nm GAA design, with lab validation done and production-line adaptation underway, but the design is expected to be sent to SMIC and/or taped out in 2026, not manufactured in volume in 2025. (mobileworldlive.com)
   • Reports on China’s first domestic immersion DUV lithography tool say it targets roughly 28 nm initially and might be extended to 7 nm/5 nm via multipatterning, with integration into production lines only around 2027 and advanced-node mass production not expected before ~2030. That timeline is incompatible with broad 3 nm volume production starting in Q3 2025. (tomshardware.com)
     Together, these sources strongly indicate that while 3 nm R&D is underway, China did not have domestically-developed 3 nm technology in volume production by Q3 2025.

2. Conflicting niche articles don’t demonstrate Q3 2025 volume production

   • A ChinaCrunch piece from October 2025 claims SMIC has “successfully produces 3-nanometer (nm) chips domestically” and even says these are deployed in AI data centers and other applications. (chinacrunch.com) However, it does not tie this to a Q3 2025 start of volume production, does not quantify scale, and is not corroborated by Reuters, Nikkei, or other primary industry sources, which still describe SMIC as effectively capped at 7 nm mass production. (lemonde.fr)
   • Given the lack of independent confirmation and the continued depiction of SMIC as 7 nm–limited with yield problems at more advanced nodes, this article is better interpreted as highlighting experimental or very limited 3 nm capability, not the kind of high-yield volume production implied in the prediction.

3. No “significant share” of leading-edge capacity has shifted from Taiwan to mainland China

   • TSMC has been in high-volume 3 nm production since 2022; by Q3 2025, 3 nm processes contributed about 23% of its wafer revenue and 5 nm another 37%, meaning advanced nodes (3/5/7 nm) account for roughly three quarters of its sales. (stocks.observer-reporter.com)
   • TSMC’s roadmap shows 2 nm mass production ramping from late 2025 into 2026, with large 2 nm fabs being built in Hsinchu and Kaohsiung, reinforcing Taiwan as the core base of leading‑edge capacity. (roic.ai)
   • Meanwhile, coverage of China’s chip sector continues to describe SMIC as the only Chinese foundry at 7 nm and emphasizes its difficulty ramping that node due to export controls and domestic tool limitations—hardly consistent with capturing a significant share of global 3 nm/5 nm capacity. (marketscreener.com)
     There is no sign that a “significant share of leading-edge chip manufacturing capacity” has migrated from TSMC in Taiwan to mainland China by late 2025.

4. Why this is already judged wrong rather than ‘too early’
   The prediction had an early, time-bounded milestone (“go into [volume] production in Q3 of 2025”) that is already in the past and clearly unmet by any credible, independently corroborated evidence. Even optimistic Chinese and industry reports place genuine 3 nm manufacturing for Huawei/SMIC in 2026 and frame 2025 as an R&D and preparation year, not a volume‑production ramp. (mobileworldlive.com)
   Since this prerequisite step has effectively failed, and there has been no observable shift of leading-edge capacity from Taiwan to China, the overall forecast cannot plausibly come true in the form stated, even though 2026 is not yet over.

Conclusion: The available evidence shows no Chinese 3 nm volume production in Q3 2025 and no major relocation of leading-edge capacity from Taiwan to mainland China. On that basis, the prediction is best classified as wrong.

The prediction’s time horizon has not elapsed yet.

• The podcast was released on 5 April 2025, and the predictor said: “In the next 15 years…”, i.e., by around 2040.
• Today is 30 November 2025, so only ~8 months have passed since the prediction was made. There is no way to know yet whether by 2040 China’s added new electricity production capacity (in nameplate terms) will exceed 2× the 2025 total U.S. electricity production capacity.
• While current data and long‑term projections exist for China’s power-capacity build‑out and U.S. electricity production, those are forecasts, not realized facts, and can change substantially before 2040.

Because the deadline (2040) is still far in the future, the prediction cannot yet be judged as right or wrong. Therefore the correct classification is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Chamath’s prediction about CDS was made on the All‑In “2025 Predictions” episode, where he said he would be long credit default swaps as insurance and added: “I hope that this trade loses money, but if it hits, it will be the best performing asset of 2025.”(podscripts.co) In the April 5, 2025 episode you cited, he revisits this and notes that the trade has already “hit” in the sense that CDS spreads blew out, implying that for every $1 million premium on $1 billion of risk, the mark‑to‑market profit would be about $7 million over roughly three months.(24vids.com) However, public reporting on 2025 credit markets describes widening spreads and increased use of CDS hedges around tariffs and recession fears, not a single clear, headline “major corporate default event” that triggered large CDS payout settlements in the way his conditional scenario implied.(reuters.com) Moreover, as of November 30, 2025, the calendar year is not over, so we cannot yet definitively rank any strategy as the best‑performing asset of 2025, especially versus volatile assets like cryptocurrencies or small‑cap equities whose full‑year returns are still in flux.(exchange-rates.org) Finally, Chamath has never publicly specified the exact CDS instruments (reference entities, maturities, or size), which means even after year‑end it may not be possible from public data alone to verify whether that particular position outperformed every other major investable asset or trade on a percentage basis.(podscripts.co) For these reasons—both because 2025 has not yet concluded and because the necessary position details aren’t disclosed—the prediction cannot currently be judged right or wrong.