DOJ targets Nvidia, Meme stock comeback, Trump fundraiser in SF, Apple/OpenAI, Texas stock market

The prediction claimed that after the first 2024 Trump–Biden debate in late June 2024, Joe Biden would perform so poorly that Democrats would that same month replace him with Gavin Newsom, leading to a Trump vs. Gavin Newsom general election.

What actually happened:

• The first 2024 Trump–Biden presidential debate took place on June 27, 2024, hosted by CNN in Atlanta.
• Joe Biden remained the presumptive Democratic nominee through the end of June 2024; there was no June "hot swap" to Gavin Newsom.
• Biden later announced he would not seek re‑election on July 21, 2024, and endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris. Major media and party reports through late July 2024 document Harris, not Newsom, consolidating support and becoming the Democratic nominee; Gavin Newsom never became the party’s presidential nominee.
• The 2024 general election was not a Trump vs. Gavin Newsom matchup; the Democratic ticket was led by Kamala Harris.

Because Biden was not replaced in June 2024, and Gavin Newsom did not become the Democratic nominee or Trump’s opponent, the specific prediction is wrong.

Jason predicted that in November 2024 the Democrats would be “demolished” in a landslide loss to Donald Trump, conditional on not significantly changing course or replacing Biden.

What actually happened:

• Joe Biden withdrew from the race on July 21, 2024 and endorsed Kamala Harris, who became the Democratic nominee in early August, so the party did replace Biden and alter course. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In the November 5, 2024 election, Trump defeated Harris 312–226 in the Electoral College and by roughly 1.5 percentage points in the national popular vote (about 77.3M vs. 75.0M votes). (en.wikipedia.org)

On the key “landslide” aspect, multiple post‑election analyses explicitly characterize Trump’s win as not a landslide: the Council on Foreign Relations notes that, by either Electoral College or popular-vote standards, the 2024 result was far from historic blowouts like 1936, 1964, 1972, or 1984. (cfr.org) Trump’s popular‑vote margin is described as modest and one of the narrower wins in modern history. (aljazeera.com)

So while Jason was directionally right that the Democrats would lose the presidency, his specific prediction of a landslide “demolition” did not come true, and the conditional (“if they don’t replace Biden”) was also violated. Overall, the prediction is best judged wrong.

Evidence shows that within 30 days of June 7, 2024, Trump publicly softened his anti‑EV stance and expressed support for electric vehicles:

• At a rally captured in a June 7, 2024 clip, Trump said he was "a big fan of electric cars" and of Elon Musk, while still emphasizing that people should also have the option of gas cars.(zerohedge.com)
• On June 20, 2024, coverage of an Arizona rally quoted Trump again saying he was "a big fan of electric cars" and praising Tesla and Musk, explicitly framing this as a shift in his position on EVs and sustainability.(electrifynews.com)
• Subsequent reporting in July 2024 by Reuters and others described these June remarks as Trump saying he was "a big fan of electric cars" and a fan of Elon, treating them as a notable change from his prior anti‑EV rhetoric.(reuters.com)
• By contrast, earlier coverage of his 2024 campaign repeatedly stressed that he had "made no secret his disdain for electric vehicles" and was vowing to end what he called an EV "mandate," underscoring that the June comments were a softening rather than a continuation of his prior line.(business-standard.com)

Because these supportive/softened statements about EVs occurred in mid‑June 2024—well within 30 days of June 7, 2024—the prediction that Trump would "come out magically in support of EVs" in that timeframe is best scored as right.

Biden’s status condition was effectively met during the relevant period. Jason said this on June 7, 2024, and conditioned the prediction on Biden not being “swapped out.” Biden did not announce his withdrawal until July 21, 2024, and Kamala Harris was not formally made the Democratic nominee until August 6, 2024, so throughout most of the 30–60 day window (July 7–August 6) Biden was still the presumptive nominee.

Within roughly 40 days of June 7, at least ten very high‑profile figures—clearly better known to the general public than Chamath Palihapitiya, David Sacks, or Doug Leone—publicly backed Trump:

• Elon Musk explicitly endorsed Trump on X on July 13, 2024, shortly after the assassination attempt, saying “I fully endorse President Trump and hope for his rapid recovery.” (slaynews.com)
• Bill Ackman formally endorsed Trump on X on July 14, 2024, after the same shooting. (washingtonpost.com)
• Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz, co‑founders of Andreessen Horowitz, publicly said in a July 16, 2024 podcast that they were supporting and voting for Trump, explaining why they preferred his policies to Biden’s. (techcrunch.com)
• At the Republican National Convention (July 15–18, 2024), multiple mainstream celebrities endorsed Trump from the stage, including Hulk Hogan, Kid Rock, Dana White, Amber Rose, and Savannah Chrisley. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The same coverage notes Azealia Banks appearing at a Trump rally in support of him during the summer as well. (fox5atlanta.com)

Counting Musk, Ackman, Andreessen, Horowitz, Hogan, Kid Rock, Dana White, Amber Rose, Savannah Chrisley, and Azealia Banks gives at least ten individuals whose mainstream name recognition is, by ordinary standards, substantially higher than the three VCs Jason named. These endorsements occurred between July 13 and the RNC (July 15–18), squarely inside the 30–60 day post–June 7 window, while Biden was still the presumptive nominee. Given that both the timing and the volume/visibility of endorsements match what Jason forecast, the prediction is best scored as right, acknowledging that "extremely high‑profile" is somewhat subjective but clearly satisfied by figures like Musk and Hogan.

Evidence indicates that both products did, in fact, sell out of their initial available inventory shortly after launch:

1. Tesla Mezcal

   • Tesla announced its $450 Tesla Mezcal around June 6, 2024; coverage notes that it "has since sold out" shortly after being announced and listed for sale on Tesla’s site. (autos.yahoo.com)
   • Multiple reports on the mezcal’s first release state that the initial batch sold out quickly in June and then later returned to the store for a holiday restock. (barrons.com)
   • Secondary-market listings and specialist retailers describe it as a limited release that is sold out from Tesla, with bottles reselling at a premium, reinforcing that Tesla’s own inventory was exhausted rapidly. (poshmark.com)
     Together, these show the initial Tesla Mezcal run sold out soon after launch, consistent with the prediction.

2. All‑In branded liquor (Besties All‑In Tequila)

   • The All‑In Podcast later launched a limited-release spirits line, The Besties All‑In Tequila. A TechCrunch report on June 24, 2025 notes that the tequila, launched that Saturday night, "promptly sold out" according to liquor e‑commerce sites. (techcrunch.com)
   • The All‑In podcast’s own Wikipedia entry likewise records that the June 2025 tequila release (7,500 numbered bottles) sold out within 48 hours. (en.wikipedia.org)
     This directly matches the claim that the forthcoming All‑In liquor would quickly sell through its available inventory.

Since both the Tesla Mezcal and the All‑In tequila sold out their initial production runs shortly after launch, Sacks’s prediction that both products would quickly sell out is right.

The prediction claimed that the 2024 Atlantic hurricane season (the season following the June 7, 2024 episode) would produce hurricanes that were, in aggregate, larger, stronger, and more frequent than in any previously recorded Atlantic season.

What actually happened in 2024:

• The 2024 Atlantic season had 18 named storms, 11 hurricanes, and 5 major hurricanes, with an Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE) of about 161.5. It was extremely active and the third‑costliest season on record, but not record‑breaking in overall activity or intensity metrics. (en.wikipedia.org)

Comparison with previous top seasons:

• 2005 had 28 named storms, 15 hurricanes, 7 major hurricanes, and ACE ~245.3, with multiple Category 5 storms; it remains one of the most intense and active seasons ever recorded. (en.wikipedia.org)
• 2020 had 30 named storms (record), 14 hurricanes, 7 major hurricanes, and ACE ~180.3; it is explicitly described as the most active Atlantic hurricane season on record by number of storms. (en.wikipedia.org)

Thus, while 2024 was well above average and very destructive, its storm counts and ACE were lower than those of 2005 and 2020 and did not set all‑time records for frequency or overall energy. It therefore did not produce hurricanes that were, in aggregate, larger/stronger/more frequent than any previously recorded season. The probabilistic forecast he referenced did not “play out” in that strongest possible sense, so the normalized prediction is wrong.

Evidence from NOAA and related climate analyses shows that the broad conditional setup Friedberg described largely occurred, and the main real‑world consequence he warned about did materialize.

1. Sea surface temperatures in the Atlantic/MDR

   • NOAA and other analyses note that the Atlantic Main Development Region (MDR) was at record‑warm levels going into the 2024 season, with SSTs in May–June already comparable to, or above, what is normally seen near the peak of the season. (climate.gov)
   • CSU’s post‑season assessment attributes the 2024 hurricane environment in August–October to “extremely warm Atlantic sea surface temperatures” combined with cool‑neutral ENSO, producing record‑low vertical wind shear and extremely favorable late‑season conditions. (newsmediarelations.colostate.edu)
   • However, a detailed climate review for August 2024 reports that the MDR had its second‑warmest August on record, not the absolute warmest. (yaleclimateconnections.org) This means Friedberg’s phrase “record sea surface temperatures in the August to October time frame” is slightly overstated if interpreted as “calendar‑month all‑time record” for August, though daily and sub‑regional SSTs were still near record and exceptionally high.

2. Multiple massive Atlantic hurricanes making U.S. landfall in 2024

   • The 2024 Atlantic hurricane season was “extremely active and destructive,” with 18 named storms, 11 hurricanes, and 5 major hurricanes; NOAA and the NHC classify it as the third‑costliest Atlantic season on record. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • NOAA’s season wrap‑up notes that five hurricanes made landfall on the continental U.S., two of them as major hurricanes. (nesdis.noaa.gov) Those included:
     • Hurricane Helene (Category 4 at Florida landfall), which devastated the Big Bend region and parts of the Southeast and is described as one of the costliest and deadliest U.S. hurricanes on record. (en.wikipedia.org)
     • Hurricane Milton (Category 5 over the Gulf; Category 3 at Florida landfall), with over $34 billion in damage and widespread destruction in Florida and neighboring states. (en.wikipedia.org)
     • Additional U.S. hurricane landfalls included Beryl (Texas, Category 1), Debby (Florida, Category 1), and Francine (Louisiana, Category 2), all of which caused significant flooding and damage. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • CSU explicitly links the late‑season hyperactivity and these intense storms to the extremely warm Atlantic SSTs and low shear environment during August–October 2024. (newsmediarelations.colostate.edu)

Bottom line:
The Atlantic did remain anomalously and in many respects record‑warm into the peak of the 2024 season, and this environment did in fact produce multiple massive hurricanes from the Atlantic that struck the continental U.S. in 2024, notably Helene and Milton, plus several other hurricane landfalls. While the “record” wording for August MDR SST is not strictly perfect (it was second‑warmest by at least one metric), the core prediction—that continued extraordinary Atlantic warmth would yield multiple major U.S. hurricane impacts in 2024—was borne out. Hence the prediction is best judged as right, with a minor caveat on the precise SST superlative.

The prediction explicitly concerns long‑term outcomes over the next 20–40 years from 2024 (i.e., roughly 2024–2044 or even out to 2064). As of today (2025‑11‑30), at most ~1–2 years have elapsed since the prediction window began.

Whether “economic incentives” (e.g., cheaper clean energy, new technologies) will, by 2044–2064, significantly push back on global warming relative to the current trajectory cannot be determined yet. Climate system responses and policy/market shifts that would validate or falsify this prediction unfold over decades, not a year or two. Current global temperature and emissions data only speak to very short‑term trends and say little about whether long‑run technological and economic dynamics will ultimately “do wonders” to mitigate warming.

Because:

• The forecasted timeframe (20–40 years) has not remotely elapsed, and
• No reasonable, evidence‑based assessment can yet be made about what the world will look like by 2044–2064 in terms of warming and technology-driven mitigation,

the prediction’s accuracy is too early to judge.

Jason described the Texas Stock Exchange (TXSE) plan as: file SEC registration documents later in 2024, start facilitating trades in 2025, and host its first new listing in 2026, based on contemporaneous reporting that BlackRock- and Citadel-backed TXSE intended exactly that timeline. (business-standard.com) In reality, TXSE did not file with the SEC in 2024; instead, TXSE Group announced that the exchange had filed for registration around February 1, 2025, alongside news that it had raised about $161 million in capital. (news.bloomberglaw.com) Later, on September 30, 2025, the SEC approved TXSE to operate as a national securities exchange, with public statements now projecting that trading will begin in early 2026 rather than 2025, and that first listings are targeted for 2026. (reuters.com) Because the predicted 2024 filing and 2025 trading milestones were both missed, the overall timeline Jason gave has already failed, even though the goal of first listings in 2026 remains in place and cannot yet be fully evaluated.

As of November 30, 2025, it is too early to conclusively judge this multi‑year prediction.

Key points:

• Timeframe: Chamath framed this around what happens "over the next few years". Only ~1.5 years have passed since June 2024, and Apple’s flagship AI initiative (Apple Intelligence, new Siri, deeper on‑device features) is still in a staggered rollout, with several major Siri/agentic capabilities delayed into 2026 and beyond.(9to5mac.com) The full consumer impact of those features on upgrade behavior isn’t observable yet.

• No clear AI supercycle yet: Some early data suggest no obvious, already‑realized AI supercycle. For example, an October 2024 analyst note reported that indicators showed iPhone sales for the first AI‑centric cycle were roughly on par with the prior year, and that people were not yet treating AI as a major draw for upgrades.(9to5mac.com) A March 2025 report based on Morgan Stanley’s work similarly argued that delays and limitations in Apple Intelligence had dented enthusiasm and that a hoped‑for supercycle was being tempered into a more gradual upgrade path.(applemust.com) A UBS/Barron’s analysis in 2025 also found that Apple Intelligence had not yet spurred widespread upgrading, with the average iPhone age still around 37 months.(barrons.com) These support the direction of Chamath’s skepticism, but they only cover the initial phase, not the full "few years" horizon.

• But iPhone sales have recovered and AI is a factor: At the same time, iPhone sales have been strong in 2024–2025. Apple’s July–September 2024 quarter showed iPhone revenue up about 6% year‑over‑year, with management and analysts explicitly linking part of the boost to the AI‑branded iPhone 16 lineup, even as they cautioned that sustained enthusiasm was uncertain.(apnews.com) By Q3 2025 (Apple’s 2025 fiscal quarter), the company reported record revenue and double‑digit iPhone growth, while heavily emphasizing ongoing AI investments and Apple Intelligence as a driver of its product roadmap.(businessinsider.com) This indicates AI is helping demand, but it does not clearly confirm or refute the notion of a multi‑year “supercycle” or eventual disappointment relative to internal expectations.

• Apple’s expectations and "disappointment" are opaque: The prediction hinges not just on whether a classic supercycle happens, but on whether Apple ends up disappointed with AI‑driven incremental iPhone sales relative to its own expectations. Apple has not published a quantitative target for AI‑induced upgrades that would let outsiders clearly say “they missed.” Public commentary so far mixes optimism about AI with cautious language about gradual adoption and staggered feature rollouts, which is not the same as explicit disappointment.

Because the core claim is about behavior and company sentiment over several years, and much of Apple’s more advanced on‑device AI functionality (and corresponding user response) is still ahead in 2026+, current evidence is insufficient to say the prediction is definitively right or wrong. Hence the status is best labeled inconclusive (too early).