E163: Market rips, Media RIFs, Texas defies Biden, Fintech reckoning, ARkStorm 2.0 & more

Chamath predicted that over the next 6–9 months from late January 2024, companies would realize consumers had less discretionary income and would respond by either cutting prices or lowering guidance/expectations.

1. Evidence that consumer discretionary capacity weakened in 2024

• By June 26, 2024, S&P Global reported that the S&P 500 consumer discretionary sector was the worst‑performing major sector (outside real estate) year‑to‑date, explicitly attributing this to depleted savings, still‑elevated inflation, rising credit‑card and auto delinquencies, and consumers who were “tapped” and “struggling.”(spglobal.com) This directly supports the idea that households’ effective discretionary income was lower.
• Adobe’s data on U.S. online sales from January–April 2024 showed spending up 7%, but driven disproportionately by cheaper products and private‑label goods, as households “prioritiz[ed] affordability” under pressure from housing, gas and food costs.(reuters.com) That is consistent with consumers trading down and having less true discretionary room.

2. Companies lowering expectations (guidance) in that window

• S&P Global’s April 15, 2024 sector‑risk analysis found that consumer‑discretionary companies were the most likely of any sector to lower earnings expectations in guidance between Jan. 1 and Mar. 31, 2024, citing examples like The Container Store and THOR Industries cutting sales forecasts amid softer demand and higher rates.(spglobal.com)
• On August 13, 2024 (about 6½ months after the podcast), Home Depot cut its full‑year profit and comparable‑sales guidance, explicitly blaming weaker consumer demand for home‑improvement projects due to high borrowing costs and macro uncertainty.(reuters.com)
• On August 21, 2024, Macy’s missed Q2 sales and lowered its full‑year sales outlook, with its CEO pointing to a “weakening consumer” and softer demand in categories like men’s clothing, home goods and handbags.(marketwatch.com)

3. Companies cutting prices / leaning on discounts and promotions

• Tesla cut U.S. prices on its Model Y, X and S by $2,000 in April 2024 after deliveries came in weak, a clear example of a major discretionary brand reducing prices to stimulate demand.(reuters.com)
• In May 2024, Walmart and Target both highlighted pressure on discretionary categories; Target said it would cut prices on 5,000 items to revive demand, while Walmart rolled back prices on roughly 7,000 products, aiming squarely at budget‑strained shoppers.(investopedia.com)
• By September 2024, industry data showed a sharp increase in promotions and advertised sale prices across major U.S. retailers (Walmart, Dollar General, CVS, Kroger, Albertsons, etc.), with Walmart more than doubling its digital promotions and emphasizing “rollbacks” to help cost‑conscious customers.(couponsinthenews.com)

4. Sector‑wide earnings pressure by Q3 2024

• For Q3 2024, S&P Global’s earnings review notes that consumer discretionary was among the weakest sectors for beating revenue and EPS expectations, reflecting “continued sector‑specific pressures” even as the broader S&P 500 grew earnings.(spglobal.com)

Taken together, the data for roughly February–October 2024 show: (a) consumers increasingly constrained and trading down, (b) a notable share of discretionary companies lowering guidance, and (c) widespread use of price cuts, promotions and discounting to support demand. That lines up closely with Chamath’s claim that as people’s discretionary income proved lower, companies would either cut prices or lower expectations, so the prediction is best classified as right.

On January 26, 2024, the S&P 500 closed at 4,890.97. This is our baseline level for “broad equity indices.” (statmuse.com)

Within the forecast window (July 26, 2025 to January 26, 2026):

• By July 2025, the S&P 500 was already in the low‑6300s; for example, on July 25 and 28, 2025 it closed around 6,388–6,390, roughly 30% above the January 26, 2024 level. (statmuse.com)
• News coverage in late July 2025 described the S&P 500 repeatedly setting record highs around 6,388, confirming a strong “melt‑up” phase. (cnbc.com)
• Most recently, on November 28, 2025, the S&P 500 closed at 6,849.09, about 40% higher than 4,890.97. (statmuse.com)

So far, reality is strongly consistent with Chamath’s view that 18–24 months later the market would be “materially higher” due to money on the sidelines re‑entering risk assets.

However, the prediction’s time window explicitly runs until late January 2026, which has not yet occurred as of November 30, 2025. A significant drawdown between now and January 26, 2026 could still change whether the market is “materially higher” at the end of the specified horizon. Because the full forecast period has not finished, the prediction cannot yet be definitively scored, even though it currently looks correct.

Therefore, the appropriate status is inconclusive (too early), with current evidence favoring that the prediction will end up being right if present levels roughly persist.

Using major U.S. equity indices as proxies, Chamath’s call that markets would be in a continuing melt‑up and be materially higher 18–24 months after Jan 26, 2024 is borne out by the data so far.

• Starting point (Jan 26, 2024):

  • S&P 500 closed at 4,890.97 on Jan 26, 2024. (statmuse.com)
  • Nasdaq Composite closed at 15,455.36 that day. (statmuse.com)

• Around 18 months later (late July 2025):

  • On Jul 25, 2025, the S&P 500 closed at 6,388.64, roughly 31% above its Jan 26, 2024 close. (statmuse.com)
  • On the same date, the Nasdaq Composite closed at 21,108.32, about 37% higher than Jan 26, 2024. (statmuse.com)
  • News reports note all three major U.S. indexes (S&P 500, Dow, Nasdaq) at or near record highs that week, consistent with a “melt‑up” characterization. (apnews.com)

• By ~22 months later (late Nov 2025, within the 18–24 month window):

  • The S&P 500 closed at 6,849.09 on Nov 28, 2025, about 40% above its Jan 26, 2024 level. (statmuse.com)
  • StatMuse shows the latest Nasdaq Composite level at 22,273.08, roughly 44% above its Jan 26, 2024 close. (statmuse.com)
  • Coverage in late Nov 2025 describes the S&P 500 and Nasdaq as up strongly year‑to‑date and near record highs, reinforcing the idea of an extended, valuation‑rich bull run rather than a flat or down market. (apnews.com)

Although the full 24‑month window (to late Jan 2026) has not entirely elapsed, the prediction’s key test—whether, when we look back 18–24 months from Jan 26, 2024, index levels are materially higher—is already clearly satisfied at both the 18‑month mark (July 2025) and ~22 months (Nov 2025). Major U.S. equity indices are substantially higher and have set repeated record highs over this period, which is exactly the scenario described as a continuing “melt up.”

Given that, the most reasonable classification with current data is “right.”

Evidence strongly supports that, so far, the U.S. has not repeated anything close to the 2020–2021 COVID-era combination of massive fiscal stimulus plus ultra-aggressive monetary easing, but the prediction’s open‑ended time frame (“for the foreseeable future / never again”) means it cannot be definitively judged yet.

On the COVID era:

• The CARES Act alone was a ~$2.2 trillion package—about 10% of U.S. GDP—with large direct cash payments to households, expanded unemployment benefits, and big support for firms and state/local governments. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Additional relief followed via the $2.3 trillion Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (including ~$900 billion in further COVID relief) and the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, both of which also featured direct payments and large temporary income supports. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In parallel, the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet from about $4.2 trillion pre‑pandemic to roughly $8–9 trillion through massive asset purchases (QE), creating several trillion dollars of new reserves in 2020–2021. (federalreserve.gov)

Since January 26, 2024 (prediction date) through November 30, 2025:

• There have been no new nationwide federal stimulus‑check programs or similar broad “airdrop” style payments. The IRS and fact‑checkers repeatedly state that, as of mid‑ to late‑2025, online claims about new $1,390–$2,000 federal stimulus checks are false, and that no new federal Economic Impact Payments have been authorized. The last federal payments relate to the 2021 American Rescue Plan; the final deadline to claim missed amounts via the Recovery Rebate Credit was April 15, 2025. (apnews.com)
• Any new federal tax legislation in this period (e.g., the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act proposal) is on the order of tens of billions, focused on credits and business provisions—not multi‑trillion, one‑off cash infusions comparable to CARES/ARP. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Large Biden‑era packages like the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, CHIPS and Science Act, and Inflation Reduction Act are substantial but structured as long‑term investment and tax‑credit programs, not sudden broad cash airdrops into household bank accounts. (en.wikipedia.org)
• On the monetary side, the Fed has been in tightening or at most mildly easing mode, not launching a new wave of QE. After ending pandemic‑era asset purchases in 2022 and starting quantitative tightening, it has gradually reduced its balance sheet from a ~$9 trillion peak to about $6.6–7 trillion, and only in late 2025 is it stopping further shrinkage rather than expanding again. Policy rates remain in the roughly 3.75–5% range after a series of modest cuts, far from the near‑zero/ZIRP stance of 2020. (congress.gov)

Implication:

• Empirically, from early 2024 through late 2025, there has indeed been no repeat of a 2020–2021‑style dual shock of multi‑trillion fiscal transfers plus emergency‑level QE and zero rates. This is consistent with Sacks’s thesis that “it’s never going to be quite the party that it was in 2020 and 2021.”
• However, his statement is effectively open‑ended (“never going to be like that again” / multi‑year foreseeable future), and we are less than two years out from the prediction. There is no defined end date by which the non‑occurrence of another such episode would make the prediction definitively true, so logically it remains too early to say it is right or wrong.

Because the observed data so far align with the prediction but the time horizon is not yet closed, the appropriate verdict is "inconclusive" rather than “right” or “wrong.”

Jason’s prediction was explicitly about a long horizon: “in our lifetime… I don’t think that’s happening for 20 years or so,” i.e., no repeat of the 2020–2021-style combo of near‑zero rates plus massive direct fiscal and monetary stimulus for roughly two decades. Evaluating this in November 2025 means only ~1.8 years of a ~20‑year forecast have elapsed, so the statement cannot yet be definitively confirmed or falsified.

Empirically, the specific 2020–2021 regime he referenced was quite extreme: policy rates were near zero in 2020–2021 (effective Fed funds about 0.37% in 2020 and 0.08% in 2021) while Congress and the Fed delivered over $5.5 trillion of COVID‑related relief through the CARES Act, PPP and Health Care Enhancement Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, and the American Rescue Plan, much of it in direct transfers and emergency programs. (ycharts.com)

Since the podcast (January 2024), rates have remained far from zero: the Fed kept the target range around 5.25–5.5% through most of 2024, then eased to 4.25–4.5% in late 2024 and maintained that range into mid‑2025, with effective rates around 4–5% in 2024–2025. (ycharts.com) Fiscal policy has included large tax and budget packages (e.g., the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” and the Rescissions Act of 2025), but these are conventional tax/spending changes, not a new wave of multi‑trillion‑dollar emergency checks and subsidies on the scale and form of the pandemic bills—and critically, they’re occurring alongside positive real rates, not ZIRP. (en.wikipedia.org)

So, as of late 2025, the data to date are consistent with Jason’s claim (no repeat yet of the 2020–2021 environment), but the forecast is about the next ~20 years. There is still ample time for future shocks that could trigger another zero‑rate, massive‑stimulus episode. Because the prediction’s horizon has not come close to expiring, the correct classification now is “inconclusive (too early)”, not right or wrong.

Evidence since January 26, 2024 strongly supports Jason’s prediction that economic conditions for legacy media would keep deteriorating, with continued layoffs, closures, and financial strain.

Newspaper and magazine cuts: The Los Angeles Times implemented one of the largest staff reductions in its history in January 2024, laying off more than 20% of its newsroom to stem annual losses of $30–40 million, after earlier cuts in 2023. (clickorlando.com) TIME magazine laid off about 15% of its unionized editorial staff to improve its financial position. (foxbusiness.com) Sports Illustrated’s operating license was pulled in January 2024, leading to the layoff of its editorial staff and later disruption of its print schedule. (en.wikipedia.org) In 2025, Condé Nast folded Teen Vogue into Vogue and laid off much of its politics team, reflecting continued retrenchment in traditional and youth-focused print brands. (theguardian.com)

Digital and TV brands shutting or shrinking: Vice Media, once valued over $5 billion, announced in February 2024 that it would stop publishing on Vice.com and lay off “several hundred” employees as it shifted to a studio model—effectively shuttering its flagship news site amid ongoing financial distress. (aljazeera.com) Pitchfork, a well‑known music outlet, was folded into GQ in early 2024 with associated layoffs. (mediapost.com) Major TV and cable news organizations have also cut deeply: CNN announced around 200 layoffs and then a further 6% staff reduction as part of a cost‑driven pivot to digital; Disney cut nearly 6% of staff at ABC News and related networks; Paramount slashed 3.5% of its U.S. workforce in 2025 after a 15% reduction in 2024, with additional large layoffs after its Skydance merger. (apnews.com)

Industry‑wide layoff data: Challenger, Gray & Christmas data show that the news subset (digital, broadcast, and print) announced 4,902 job cuts in 2024, up 59% from 3,087 in 2023, even as broader “media” layoffs dipped slightly—indicating mounting pressure specifically on newsrooms. (challengergray.com) Through the first ten months of 2025, the wider media industry announced 16,680 cuts, up 26% from the same period in 2024, confirming that layoffs across TV, film, streaming, and news remain elevated. (challengergray.com) Separate tracking of journalism redundancies also shows thousands more cuts across newspapers, broadcast, and digital outlets in 2024, with further staff reductions and furloughs announced in early 2025 at brands like the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, CNN, HuffPost, and others. (mediablog.prnewswire.com)

While the exact number of job cuts fluctuates year to year, the post‑January 2024 period clearly features ongoing layoffs, closures, mergers, and aggressive cost‑cutting at major legacy newspapers, magazines, and TV networks, rather than stabilization or recovery. That pattern aligns with Jason’s directional claim that “it’s going to get worse and worse,” so the prediction is best judged as right based on the evidence to date.

The quoted line from Sacks – “Is Texas going to secede from the Union? Said, all right, what’s going to happen?” – is framed explicitly as a question, not as a declaration that Texas will secede by any particular date. It lacks:

• a clear directional claim (he does not say Texas will or won’t secede), and
• any time horizon (no "by year X" or similar),

so it doesn’t meet a basic standard for a falsifiable prediction.

Independently of that, Texas has not seceded from the United States as of November 30, 2025 (it remains a U.S. state under federal law and in all official records), so if one tried to reinterpret this as a concrete forecast that Texas would have seceded by now, that forecast would be wrong. But because the original statement is merely a rhetorical / speculative question, not a definite forecast, the appropriate status for this item is that it’s not a well-formed prediction, hence ambiguous for verification purposes.

Legal‑outcome part (Abbott “will lose in a court of law”)

• In January 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court, on its emergency docket, temporarily sided with the Biden administration and allowed Border Patrol to cut Texas’ razor wire near Eagle Pass while litigation continued. (theguardian.com) This is the context in which Sacks spoke.
• However, on November 27, 2024, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 2–1 opinion in Texas v. Department of Homeland Security, reversing the district court and granting Texas a limited preliminary injunction that bars federal agents from damaging, destroying or interfering with Texas’ concertina‑wire fence except in narrowly defined circumstances. The court found the district judge had erred on sovereign‑immunity grounds and accepted Texas’ showing of likely success and irreparable harm. (ktsa.com) This is a significant win for Texas on the razor‑wire question and directly undercuts the idea that Abbott clearly “loses in a court of law” on this issue.
• Separately, the 5th Circuit sitting en banc later allowed Texas’ 1,000‑foot floating buoy barrier in the Rio Grande to remain, overturning a prior injunction that had ordered the barrier removed—again a legal win for Abbott in a border‑barrier case against the federal government. (reuters.com)
• Texas has not won everything: for example, in July 2025 a divided 5th Circuit panel upheld an injunction blocking Texas’ SB4 migrant‑arrest law, siding with challengers and the Biden administration and emphasizing that immigration enforcement is a federal power. Texas has vowed to appeal, and the case could go to the Supreme Court. (reuters.com)
• Crucially, there is no final Supreme Court merits decision resolving the core razor‑wire or buoy disputes as of November 30, 2025, and key aspects of Abbott’s broader border agenda remain in active litigation. Given the mix of wins and losses and the ongoing nature of these cases, it is not yet possible to say that Abbott has “ultimately” lost in formal courts on the razor‑wire/border‑barrier front.

Because the long‑run legal outcome Sacks predicted has not been definitively resolved, this half of the prediction cannot yet be judged.

Public‑opinion part (Abbott “will win in the court of public opinion”)

• A national Rasmussen Reports survey conducted January 23–25, 2024—immediately after the Supreme Court’s emergency order—found that 69% of likely U.S. voters support Texas “erecting barriers at the border to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing,” with only 27% opposed. (rasmussenreports.com) This question was framed explicitly around Texas’ actions in the very dispute Sacks was discussing, and thus directly supports his claim that Abbott would win public opinion on this specific standoff.
• By contrast, an earlier PRRI/Brookings survey (summarized by Axios and others) found that a 52% majority of Americans opposed installing deterrents such as walls, razor wire and deadly buoy barriers in general, with 44% supporting them. (axios.com) So when the issue is framed broadly as “deadly border deterrents,” national opinion is more negative; when framed specifically as “Texas versus Biden on erecting barriers,” the Rasmussen data show strong national support for Texas.

Net assessment

• The public‑opinion portion of Sacks’ claim is supported by at least one national poll directly about the Texas–Biden razor‑wire dispute.
• But the legal‑outcome portion is still unsettled: Abbott has won important appellate rulings on razor wire and buoys, lost others (e.g., SB4) and faces ongoing litigation with no final Supreme Court merits decisions on the main barrier disputes.

Because a key part of the normalized prediction (“will ultimately lose in formal courts”) has not yet been definitively resolved, the overall prediction must be rated inconclusive rather than right or wrong at this time.

It is too early to determine whether this prediction about future multi‑decadal frequency of California‑scale ARkStorm‑type mega‑floods has come true.

Friedberg’s claim is about changing recurrence intervals: events that historically occurred roughly every 150–200 years purportedly shifting to every ~25–50 years or sooner, driven by warmer oceans and increased atmospheric river activity. That is, it is a statistical, long‑horizon prediction about the frequency and severity of extreme events over many decades.

As of the current date (November 30, 2025), only about one year and ten months have passed since the prediction (January 26, 2024). That time span is far too short to empirically confirm or refute a change in the recurrence rate of phenomena that are, by definition, multi‑decadal to centennial in their historical frequency. Even if one or more extreme storms occur in this short period, that would not be statistically sufficient to validate a claimed 25–50‑year recurrence pattern, nor would the absence of such events in <2 years disprove it.

Current climate research does support that:

• Atmospheric rivers impacting the U.S. West Coast are expected to increase in intensity and may increase in frequency as the climate warms, due in part to higher sea‑surface temperatures and increased atmospheric moisture.
• Studies and USGS/NOAA summaries of ARkStorm‑type scenarios emphasize that warming is likely to raise the risk of extreme precipitation and flooding events in California over the 21st century.

However, while this research is qualitatively consistent with the direction of Friedberg’s statement (more frequent/severe extreme precipitation events in a warmer world), the specific quantitative claim—that ARkStorm‑scale floods will reliably shift from ~150–200‑year events to ~25–50‑year events or less—cannot be validated or falsified based on observations in the very short period since the prediction was made. That would require multiple decades of data and/or a clear consensus in the literature on that exact new recurrence interval, which we do not yet have.

Because the prediction concerns a long‑term statistical frequency and only a short amount of time has elapsed, the correct classification is: it’s too early to tell whether it has come true.

Available evidence shows that in the ~two weeks after the January 26, 2024 recording (through about February 9, 2024), California did have very wet conditions, including major storms, but did not experience an ARkStorm‑ or ARkStorm 2.0‑level megaflood.

1. What an ARkStorm/ARkStorm 2.0 event would look like

   • ARkStorm is a hypothetical California “megastorm” scenario involving weeks of near‑continuous intense atmospheric river storms, up to ~10 feet of water in some areas, and estimated damages on the order of $725 billion to $1 trillion, far beyond typical severe storms. (nationalgeographic.com)
   • ARkStorm 2.0 is an updated modeling study showing climate change roughly doubles the odds of such a catastrophic megaflood, but it remains a scenario that has not yet occurred. (gmd.copernicus.org)

2. What actually happened in the couple of weeks after Jan 26, 2024

   • In early February 2024 (Feb 4–7), California was hit by two strong atmospheric river events, bringing record or near‑record rainfall, hurricane‑force wind gusts in some locations, widespread flooding, mudslides, power outages, and at least 9 deaths. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Damage estimates for this storm sequence are on the order of billions of dollars (roughly $3 billion in direct damages and $9–11 billion in total economic loss), which is severe but still orders of magnitude below the ARkStorm megaflood scenario. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • National Geographic, writing on February 8, 2024, explicitly notes that while the first week of February saw “historic storms and record rainfall” that killed nine people and damaged numerous homes, this “pales in comparison” to an ARkStorm‑level event and that ARkStorm remains a hypothetical disaster being discussed in the context of social‑media rumors. (nationalgeographic.com)

3. Comparison to the prediction

   • Predicted: The next couple of weeks would be wet/very wet, but not an imminent ARkStorm 2.0‑style catastrophic megaflood.
   • Observed: Early‑February atmospheric rivers did indeed produce very wet conditions, historic rain totals, and serious but regional flooding and damage. However, by all available accounts they fell far short of the statewide, weeks‑long, trillion‑dollar, ARkStorm‑scale megaflood described in the scientific and emergency‑planning literature. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because California experienced intense storms and flooding but no ARkStorm‑level, ARkStorm 2.0‑style megaflood in the stated time window, Friedberg’s prediction is best judged as right.