E158: Global trade disrupted, Adobe/Figma canceled, realtors sued, Trump blocked

By late 2025, neither conflict had been resolved quickly.

For the Israel–Gaza war: Heavy fighting continued throughout 2024 and well into 2025, with large-scale Israeli offensives (e.g., the May–August 2025 Gaza offensive) and only intermittent, fragile ceasefires. A UN report describes the Palestinian economy suffering its worst-ever collapse after a two‑year war in Gaza, and estimates rebuilding costs of $70+ billion, underscoring the prolonged nature of the conflict rather than a rapid resolution.(reuters.com) Even after a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in October 2025, violence, internal clashes and protests in Gaza remained ongoing, showing the war’s political and security dimensions were far from “cleaned up.”(reuters.com)

For the Houthi Red Sea crisis: Houthi attacks on shipping, and U.S.–UK (and allied) strikes in Yemen, persisted through 2024 and into 2025. A UK Parliament research briefing notes repeated U.S.–UK strikes from January–May 2024 and further U.S. strikes as late as January 2025, in response to continued Houthi attacks.(commonslibrary.parliament.uk) As of November 2025, reporting indicates the Houthis have only pulled back somewhat from Red Sea attacks and have not formally ended their maritime campaign, instead tying their actions to conditions around Gaza and threatening to resume operations.(aljazeera.com)

While there was coordinated international pressure (UN resolutions, U.S.–UK and allied military action, diplomatic efforts) on Iran-backed groups including the Houthis, this did not lead to both the Israel–Gaza war and the Red Sea conflict being wrapped up in a short timeframe from December 2023. The core prediction—that both “hot wars” would be resolved quickly due to such pressure—did not materialize.

Multiple $20B+ M&A deals across different industries have successfully closed since December 2023, contradicting Chamath’s claim that investors could no longer “underwrite” such outcomes.

Key counterexamples:

1. Cisco–Splunk ($28B, tech/security)
   Cisco’s all‑cash acquisition of Splunk, announced in September 2023, closed in March 2024 and is described as the largest deal in Cisco’s history. EU antitrust regulators granted unconditional approval, and the transaction was completed without being blocked. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. ExxonMobil–Pioneer Natural Resources (~$64.5B enterprise value, energy)
   ExxonMobil’s acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources, valued at about $59.5B in equity and ~$64.5B including debt, closed on May 3, 2024. Exxon’s own SEC filings and deal documentation confirm completion of the merger on that date. (marketscreener.com)

3. Chevron–Hess ($53–55B, energy)
   Chevron’s acquisition of Hess, originally agreed in October 2023, faced both U.S. regulatory conditions and a major arbitration fight with Exxon over Hess’s Guyana stake. Nonetheless, Chevron finalized the roughly $53–55B acquisition on July 18, 2025. (investopedia.com)

In addition, 2024 saw a rebound in very large deals, with investment banks counting dozens of transactions over $10B, including Mars’ ~$36B acquisition of Kellanova and the $35B Capital One–Discover deal among announced megadeals, indicating that the market still supports very large M&A despite heightened scrutiny. (reuters.com)

Because several $20B+ deals were successfully completed in major, heavily regulated sectors (technology and U.S. energy) within roughly 1–18 months after the prediction, it is not accurate that such deals belong to “a different era” or cannot realistically be underwritten anymore. The prediction that acquirers and investors should not expect to complete $20B‑scale deals “in any industry” has therefore been proven wrong.

The prediction is explicitly long‑term and conditional: Chamath says that if Hustle can grow revenue at ~40% annually for ten years, it will become a very large business. Ten years from the podcast date (December 2023) would be around 2033, so the forecast period has not elapsed.

Available public information confirms that Hustle was acquired by Chamath’s Social Capital in 2020 and continues to operate as a peer‑to‑peer texting platform under that ownership, with leadership changes as recently as 2025, indicating the company is still active and pursuing growth.(finsmes.com) Earlier disclosures mention revenue run‑rate above $10M and strong growth around the time of acquisition, but they do not provide detailed, current revenue or growth figures for 2023–2025.(woodsidecap.com) There is also no evidence that Hustle has already reached the scale of a top‑tier, “ginormous” industry player.

Because (1) the full 10‑year period has not yet passed, and (2) private company financials needed to verify sustained ~40% CAGR are not public, it is too early to determine whether the condition (40% growth for ten years) will be met or whether the company will ultimately reach the implied scale. Therefore the prediction cannot yet be judged as right or wrong.

The prediction is framed over “the coming venture cycles” and “the next several years,” and VC fund cycles are typically 10–12 years long with 3–5‑year investing periods, so less than two years of data (Dec 2023 → Nov 2025) is not enough to see whether typical fund sizes structurally shrink by 3–4x back to 1990s levels. (en.wikipedia.org)

Early quantitative evidence actually cuts against the prediction in the short run: Carta data show that the average venture fund size increased by about 44% in 2024 vs. 2023, not shrank, indicating more capital concentration in larger funds rather than a broad move toward much smaller funds. (carta.com) In parallel, LP capital has become more concentrated in a smaller number of established managers, with a 2024 total of $76.1B raised across 508 funds and the top 30 funds capturing about 75% of that volume—again suggesting larger, more concentrated vehicles, not a generalized shift to $50–$200M funds. (forbes.com)

There are some countervailing datapoints—e.g., certain debut and first‑time funds are relatively modest (average first‑time fund size around $41M in 2024, and examples like America’s Frontier Fund reducing its target from $500M to $315M), which is directionally consistent with smaller vehicles for newer managers. (businessinsider.com) But these are pockets within an overall market that, so far, shows increased average fund size and strong capital concentration, especially around AI mega‑rounds and large platforms. (barrons.com)

Given (a) the explicitly multi‑year, multi‑cycle horizon of the claim, and (b) the fact that current data neither reflect a 3–4x shrink in typical fund sizes nor provide enough time for such a structural shift to play out, the correct status today is inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than clearly right or wrong.

As of late 2025, the NAR settlement and related Missouri verdict did trigger structural rule changes (e.g., banning explicit buyer‑broker commission offers in MLS listings and requiring written buyer‑agent agreements), but empirical studies show that average U.S. commission rates have stayed roughly flat or even edged up slightly—around 5.3–5.4% total, with buyer‑agent commissions near 2.4%—rather than falling meaningfully for consumers. (wsj.com) NAR membership has declined from its 2022 peak of about 1.6 million to roughly 1.5 million in 2024–2025, yet trade press and NAR leaders attribute most of this attrition to the broader housing slump and cyclical market conditions, and many agents who drop NAR remain licensed and active via non‑Realtor pathways, so there is not clear evidence yet of large, lawsuit‑driven job losses or an across‑the‑board collapse in agent incomes. (realestatenews.com) Industry analysts and plaintiffs’ attorneys characterize the reforms as a potential “generational” shift whose most significant competitive and pricing effects may take years to fully materialize, and survey data from Redfin show that most agents report commissions in their areas as roughly unchanged or only modestly lower so far, with the expectation—not yet the reality—of future declines. (realestatenews.com) Overall, the lawsuits have clearly altered rules and may eventually drive lower or differently structured commissions and greater agent attrition, but by November 2025 there is insufficient evidence that they have already produced the substantial consumer savings and widespread negative economic impact on agents described in the prediction, so the ultimate accuracy of the forecast cannot yet be determined.

Key parts of Jason’s predicted direction are partly materializing, but the forecast horizon (“in the next few years after 2023”) is not over and the final market structure is still unsettled.

What has happened so far (supports parts of his view):

• In March 2024, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) agreed to a $418M nationwide settlement in Burnett/Sitzer, with major practice changes effective August 17, 2024. The cooperative-compensation rule was eliminated, and sellers are no longer required to offer a set commission to buyer’s agents via the MLS.(en.wikipedia.org) This removes the old, MLS-driven “standard” split that underpinned the de facto 5–6% total commission.
• NAR’s own guidance now stresses that broker fees are fully negotiable, and that written agreements must spell out compensation in an objective form (flat fee, percentage, hourly, etc.).(nar.realtor) Many local associations are revising listing forms so sellers explicitly approve any money paid to other brokers and see compensation broken out by side. For example, the Iowa City Area Association of Realtors’ updated listing agreement “break[s] apart” compensation to state separately what the listing broker and a buyer broker will receive, and requires written seller approval for any payment to another broker.(icaar.org) Florida Realtors created specific “Compensation Agreement – Seller to Buyer’s Broker” and related modification forms, so sellers can affirm or adjust what they will pay a buyer’s broker on a per-transaction basis.(floridarealtors.org) These kinds of changes move in the direction Jason described: sellers explicitly deciding what to pay, rather than passively accepting a pre-filled 6% split.

Where reality diverges or is still unclear:

• The NAR settlement itself does not mandate a single national structure where every seller is presented with a standard form to “pick the percentage” for both listing and buyer’s agents; it mainly bans offers of compensation in the MLS and requires written buyer–broker agreements. Local and state associations are implementing different form structures, and some guidance even emphasizes that sellers now sign a listing agreement only for what they pay their own broker, with any buyer‑broker payments handled separately.(macleanrealtygroup.com) So his specific picture (one form where the seller dials in 2% for one side, 1.5% for the other, etc.) is emerging in some areas but is not yet universal.
• Despite more negotiability on paper, average commissions have not fallen much and remain close to traditional levels. Analyses from outlets like Kiplinger, the Wall Street Journal, and Investopedia report that overall commission rates are only slightly lower—or even slightly higher—than before, and many agents are informally re‑creating old commission splits off‑MLS.(investopedia.com) That means the practical norm often still resembles the old ~5–6% bundle, even if the legal structure has changed.
• Jason floated “caps” on percentages as a possible part of the outcome. As of late 2025, there are no broad regulatory caps on residential brokerage commission percentages in the U.S.; discussion has focused on transparency and decoupling, not hard percentage ceilings. (Some caps exist in unrelated contexts—e.g., GSE limits on closing-cost concessions—but those are not caps on broker commission rates themselves.(realestateinthedistrict.com))
• The U.S. Department of Justice has an active, reopened antitrust investigation into NAR’s commission rules, which the Supreme Court allowed to proceed in January 2025.(reuters.com) Further enforcement or settlements could still push the system closer to or farther from Jason’s envisioned structure over the next few years.

Why the verdict is “inconclusive”:

• The timeframe (“next few years after 2023”) runs beyond November 2025, so the forecast period is still in progress.
• We do see meaningful movement toward Jason’s core idea of sellers explicitly choosing how much they’ll pay, separately for their own broker and (if at all) for a buyer’s broker, via revised listing and compensation forms.
• But the change is not yet uniform or fully settled, typical commission levels remain close to the old norms, and no commission caps of the kind he speculated about have been adopted.

Given these mixed, still-evolving conditions and the incomplete timeframe, it’s too early to say his prediction is clearly right or clearly wrong, so “inconclusive (too early)” is the most accurate overall judgment.

The prediction has two falsifiable components:

1. Trump would win the 2024 Republican nomination.
   – Trump dominated the 2024 Republican primaries, securing well over the required 1,215 delegates and clinching the nomination on March 12, 2024, according to AP/Forbes and primary tallies. (forbes.com)
   – He was then formally nominated as the GOP presidential candidate at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee on July 15–18, 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)
   This clearly fulfills the “foregone conclusion” part about winning the Republican nomination.

2. He would become the strong/overwhelming favorite to win—and in fact win—the presidency.
   – In the 2024 general election, Trump was the Republican nominee and defeated Democratic nominee Kamala Harris, winning 312 electoral votes to 226 and a national popular-vote plurality. (en.wikipedia.org)
   – Betting markets and bookmakers did, at various points close to and on Election Day, treat Trump as the favorite and at times an overwhelming favorite: for example, on Nov. 4, 2024, BetMGM odds implied roughly a 58% chance of a Trump win, and as votes came in late on election night his odds moved to around a 92% implied probability (described explicitly as an “overwhelming favorite to win the presidential election”). (actionnetwork.com)
   – Crypto prediction markets such as Polymarket also had periods where Trump was the dominant favorite (e.g., reaching ~72% at one point before Harris later surged), indicating that for substantial stretches he was treated as the likeliest winner by market participants. (investing.com)

The “overwhelming favorite” language is somewhat subjective and did not hold continuously (Harris was favored at some points), but there is clear evidence that: (a) Trump did become the market favorite with large implied winning probabilities, and (b) he ultimately did win the presidency. Given that both concrete outcomes Chamath tied to the Colorado decision—Trump securing the GOP nomination and emerging as the strong favorite who goes on to win—did occur, the prediction is best classified as right.

The prediction was that the U.S. Supreme Court would overturn the Colorado Supreme Court decision disqualifying Donald Trump from the state’s 2024 presidential primary ballot, restoring his eligibility there.

On March 4, 2024, in Trump v. Anderson, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that states lack the power to enforce Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal candidates, including for the presidency, and it reversed the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision that had disqualified Trump from the 2024 primary ballot. (en.wikipedia.org) This ruling ensured Trump appeared on Colorado’s Republican primary ballot and, effectively, on ballots in all states. (reuters.com)

Because the Supreme Court did in fact overturn the Colorado ruling and restore Trump’s eligibility on the Colorado 2024 primary ballot, Chamath’s prediction was correct.

The prediction was that the 14th Amendment challenges to keeping Donald Trump off the ballot would (1) be taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court and (2) result in a substantive ruling clarifying how the 14th Amendment applies in this context.

Both parts occurred:

1. Supreme Court took the case – The Court granted certiorari in Trump v. Anderson (No. 23‑719), which involved Colorado’s decision to bar Trump from the 2024 presidential primary ballot under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. Cert was granted January 5, 2024, oral argument was held February 8, 2024, and the case was decided March 4, 2024. (law.cornell.edu)

2. Substantive ruling clarifying application of Section 3 – In a unanimous per curiam opinion issued March 4, 2024, the Court held that only Congress, not the states, may enforce Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal candidates and officeholders, and that states therefore may not exclude such candidates (including presidential candidates) from the ballot under Section 3 absent congressional authorization. This clarified who has enforcement authority under Section 3 and how that clause operates with respect to ballot access for federal offices. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the Court both took up the issue and issued a substantive, clarifying opinion on how Section 3 of the 14th Amendment applies to efforts to bar Trump from the ballot, the prediction is right.