E39: West coast super drought & climate crisis, Nuclear virtue signaling, chaos in SF & more

Available evidence shows a substantial multi‑year increase in backup and distributed generator use in California, but it does not clearly isolate a distinct new surge specifically during the summer–fall 2021 fire season, so the prediction cannot be cleanly labeled right or wrong.

Key points:

• A 2021 CalMatters commentary, citing MCubed analysis of air‑district data, reports that non‑residential backup generators in the Bay Area increased 34% in three years, and that in Southern California deployment rose 22% in a single year. The authors state that, as California faces mega‑drought, rising electricity rates, and wildfire‑related shutoffs, “businesses and residents are increasingly turning to backup power generators” and describe a rapidly growing diesel “shadow grid.” (calmatters.org) This supports an ongoing generator buildup that is very visible by late 2021.
• Earlier data show that this backup‑power boom started well before 2021. A 2020 Haas Energy Institute/UC Berkeley blog, using survey data from Californians affected by 2019 wildfire‑related outages, found that nearly 15% of outage‑exposed households bought backup generators within six months, indicating a major residential generator adoption wave tied to 2019 PSPS events. (energyathaas.wordpress.com) A 2020 San Francisco Chronicle business report likewise noted that some Bay Area retailers saw around a 400% jump in generator sales during 2019 and continued elevated demand into 2020, driven by power shutoffs, wildfires, and heat waves. (sfchronicle.com) These suggest the “big push” in consumer purchases was already underway in 2019–2020, not uniquely triggered in mid‑2021.
• Policy and discourse in 2021 further confirm that portable and backup generators had become widespread and politically salient (e.g., California’s decision to phase out sales of new gas‑powered small engines, including portable generators, by 2028, which generated concern precisely because so many residents and businesses relied on them). (asphaltandrubber.com) However, neither regulatory documents nor market overviews provide CA‑specific sales or adoption data isolating the 2021 summer–fall fire season as a period of additional notable growth beyond the existing upward trend.

Because the evidence shows a strong and growing generator market in California by 2021 but does not clearly demonstrate that summer–fall 2021 itself featured a distinct, new “big power generator push” beyond the already‑elevated levels of 2019–2020, the status of Friedberg’s time‑specific prediction is ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

The conditional part of the prediction did occur, but the magnitude and especially the consequences were substantially misstated.

1. Tier 1 shortage and size of Arizona’s cut
   • In August 2021, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s August 2021 24‑Month Study formally declared, for the first time, a Colorado River shortage for 2022 at Lake Mead, triggering a Tier 1 shortage for the Lower Basin, including Arizona. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Under that Tier 1 shortage, Arizona’s Colorado River allocation in 2022 was cut by 512,000 acre‑feet, about 18% of its 2.8 million acre‑feet allocation and roughly 8% of Arizona’s total water use, not “about 600,000 acre‑feet” and not ~15% of statewide demand. (kunc.org)
   • So, while he correctly anticipated that a Tier 1 shortage would be declared and that Arizona would face a large cut, his numerical claims (“around 600,000 acre‑feet” and “about 15% of the demand for that state”) were meaningfully off.

2. Who actually got cut and by how much
   • Central Arizona Project (CAP) and state sources describe the 2022 Tier 1 cut as a 512,000 acre‑foot reduction, equal to about 30% of CAP’s normal supply, about 18% of Arizona’s Colorado River supply, and just under 8% of total statewide water use—almost all borne by CAP users. (cap-az.com)
   • Detailed impact analyses emphasize that the cuts fell primarily on agricultural users in central Arizona (especially Pinal County), with large areas of farmland fallowed and heavy reliance on groundwater. (farmprogress.com)

3. Did this cause noticeable water‑use restrictions for Arizonans in 2022?
   • The Arizona Municipal Water Users Association explained that under the 2022 Tier 1 shortage, municipalities and tribes (which hold higher‑priority CAP rights) would not face water reductions, and that “a shortage on the Colorado River does not mean there will be a shortage at your tap” with no immediate impact on cities’ ability to serve customers. (amwua.org)
   • Major cities (Phoenix, Glendale, Mesa) did activate Stage 1 drought/water alerts in mid‑2022, but these focused on education and voluntary conservation, explicitly stating that there were no mandatory water restrictions for residents or businesses at that stage. (phoenix.gov)
   • In other words, while farmers experienced severe cuts and land fallowing, most Arizona residents did not face the kind of “rolling” or compulsory water‑use restrictions implied in the prediction during calendar year 2022.

Because the actual cut was notably smaller than he stated, his 15%-of-demand figure was wrong, and the Tier 1 shortage in 2022 did not lead to broad, noticeable water‑use restrictions on the public (only voluntary measures and agricultural impacts), the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, despite being directionally correct about there being a Tier 1 shortage and significant cuts to Arizona’s Colorado River allocation.

Available evidence since mid‑2021 supports Chamath’s core claim that new U.S. nuclear projects would not move rapidly into deployment and would remain hampered by slow, complex regulatory processes (and related political/legal fights), especially when compared with much faster builds abroad.

Key points:

1. No rapid new‑build cycle in the U.S.; Vogtle 3 & 4 illustrate very long timelines

   • The only new U.S. reactors to enter operation since the prediction are Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia. Unit 3 began commercial operation on July 31, 2023; Unit 4 entered commercial service in May 2024. Construction of these AP1000 units began in 2013, with regulatory approval expecting an in‑service date of 2016, but completion slipped to 2023–24 and costs roughly doubled to more than $30 billion.(nucnet.org)
   • IAEA‑based analysis cited by ABC News shows recent U.S. reactors (Comanche Peak‑2, Watts Bar‑1 and ‑2, Vogtle‑3 and ‑4) had average construction times of ~16.5 years from first concrete to grid connection, even before pre‑construction licensing and planning are counted.(abc.net.au)
   • By contrast, the World Nuclear Industry Status Reports and other analyses find Chinese reactors completed in the 2010s–2020s have average construction times of ~6 years from first concrete to grid connection, with some faster, and 39 of 66 global reactors started up 2013–22 were in China.(worldnuclearreport.org)
   • As of May 2024, after Vogtle‑4 entered commercial operation, no other nuclear power reactors were under construction in the U.S.(theuncontained.com) This is inconsistent with any notion of “rapid deployment” on 2–3‑year cycles.

2. Regulatory/bureaucratic timelines remain long and uncertain for new designs

   • The Government Accountability Office / EIA‑based summary notes that planning, licensing and building a nuclear plant in the U.S. typically takes 10–12 years in total, with NRC licensing alone expected to consume about four years but in practice often longer; NuScale’s first SMR design certification took almost six years.(nasdaq.com)
   • The NRC outright denied Oklo’s Aurora advanced micro‑reactor combined license application in January 2022 for “failure to supply information” on safety and accident analysis, ending the review without prejudice but underscoring how demanding and time‑consuming the process is for first‑of‑a‑kind designs.(cnbc.com)
   • Industry and legal analyses explicitly describe NRC procedures for advanced reactors as outdated and in need of modernization, reflecting a perception that regulatory processes are a serious bottleneck.(cnbc.com)

3. Flagship SMR deployment efforts stalled after years of development

   • The Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP), intended to be the first NuScale SMR plant at Idaho National Laboratory, received a DOE cost‑share award of up to $1.4 billion and had a notional schedule of construction starting mid‑decade and operation by ~2029–30.(energy.gov)
   • After about a decade of work, UAMPS and NuScale mutually agreed in November 2023 to terminate the CFPP, citing insufficient subscription from municipal utilities and sharply rising cost estimates (from ~$58/MWh to ~$89/MWh).(nuscalepower.com) The project was still only approaching a Combined License Application filing; no concrete had been poured.
   • While the immediate cause was economics and customer appetite, the outcome still matches Chamath’s broader point: even heavily supported first‑of‑a‑kind projects are not progressing quickly to construction, let alone to 2–3‑year build timelines.

4. Litigation and political opposition continue to complicate nuclear‑related projects

   • Spent‑fuel storage facilities—critical to the nuclear ecosystem—have been embroiled in prolonged litigation and state‑federal conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the NRC’s license for a private interim storage facility in Texas in 2023; in 2025 the Supreme Court ruled Texas lacked standing in that case, even as New Mexico’s governor and legislature pursued measures to block a similar Holtec facility.(axios.com)
   • Holtec ultimately canceled its planned HI‑STORE consolidated interim storage facility in New Mexico in October 2025, citing an “untenable path forward” for used‑fuel storage in that state after sustained political and legal resistance.(ans.org)
   • These fights are not about new power reactors per se, but they confirm Chamath’s claim that nuclear infrastructure in the U.S. remains vulnerable to being “bogged down” in litigation and regulatory/political hurdles.

5. Recent attempts to streamline regulation are a reaction to, not a refutation of, those delays

   • In 2025, new executive orders directed that advanced‑reactor licenses be reviewed within 18 months and moved some approval authority from the independent NRC to the Department of Energy, explicitly framed as an effort to speed approvals and reduce bureaucratic delay.(apnews.com)
   • These reforms are very recent and no reactors have yet been sited, built, and operated under this regime; they underscore that policymakers themselves see existing licensing as too slow.

Bottom line:
From mid‑2021 to late 2025, the U.S. did not achieve anything close to China‑style 2–3‑year nuclear build times. Instead, its only new reactors (Vogtle 3 & 4) exemplified decade‑long construction and huge overruns; advanced designs have faced long, uncertain licensing; a flagship SMR deployment was abandoned after a decade of preparatory work; and nuclear‑related projects like waste storage remain mired in legal and political disputes. Regulatory and bureaucratic processes are widely recognized as a major part of this drag.

Given that Chamath’s prediction was directional—nuclear progress would be slowed and obstructed enough to prevent rapid deployment comparable to China—the outcomes to date align with his statement, even though economics and project‑management issues also play important roles alongside litigation and bureaucracy.

Available evidence indicates that, although the western U.S. megadrought has continued and water scarcity has worsened, governments have not newly begun using eminent domain or equivalent legal tools since mid‑2021 to broadly seize or revoke privately held water rights because of that scarcity.

Key points:

• Water scarcity has clearly intensified. The Southwest remains in a multi‑decade megadrought, the driest such period in at least 1,200 years, and Colorado River shortages have triggered repeated mandatory cuts for Arizona, Nevada and Mexico, administered through interstate compacts and Bureau of Reclamation shortage rules—not through seizure of private rights. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Western water law already treats water as publicly owned with usufructuary rights. In states like Colorado, all surface and groundwater are public resources; private parties hold a right to use water subject to prior‑appropriation priority and availability, not absolute ownership. (law.justia.com) Likewise, California’s public‑trust doctrine (e.g., the Mono Lake decision) has long allowed the state to re‑evaluate and adjust even previously granted rights to protect public trust uses. (en.wikipedia.org) These doctrines predate the 2021 podcast and are not new drought‑era seizures.
• Eminent‑domain authority over water‑related assets exists and has been used historically, but not newly for drought‑driven reallocation of private rights. For example, Grand Junction, Colorado condemned portions of ranchers’ water rights on Kannah Creek for municipal supply in 1911, a use later upheld in City of Grand Junction v. Kannah Creek Ass’n and discussed in contemporary water‑education materials. (law.justia.com) There have also been eminent‑domain efforts involving water utilities and distribution systems (e.g., California cities seeking to condemn investor‑owned water utilities), framed as service/cost issues, not as climate‑emergency takings of farmers’ or other private appropriators’ rights. (nossaman.com) These examples are limited and mostly historical or utility‑focused, not the broad “sorry, need it back” reallocation Chamath envisioned.
• Recent drought responses have relied on regulation and voluntary deals, not condemnation of water rights.
  • California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (2014) is being enforced more aggressively—for example, placing the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin on “probation,” adding pumping fees and state oversight—but this is regulatory management authority enacted years before 2021, not eminent‑domain seizure of vested rights. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Colorado River cutbacks and conservation programs emphasize voluntary, compensated reductions (fallowing, system‑conservation agreements, water banking, tribal leasing), and states have explicitly sought to avoid mandatory federal reallocations that would spark litigation. (latimes.com)
• Several western statutes actually limit eminent domain over active water rights. California’s Water Code §60230 authorizes condemnation of property for groundwater replenishment but forbids using eminent domain to take “water and water rights already devoted to beneficial use.” (law.justia.com) The California Constitution similarly bars use of eminent domain to acquire Delta water rights or contracts for export. (law.justia.com) Colorado law has long debated restricting condemnation of water rights, and its water statutes emphasize that state agencies are not thereby authorized to acquire water by eminent domain. (landreport.com) These trends cut against a new wave of eminent‑domain takings of private rights.

Taken together, this suggests: (1) the conditions Chamath worried about (severe western water scarcity) have materialized or worsened, but (2) as of late 2025, governments have not in practice begun broadly seizing or cancelling privately held water rights via eminent domain or functionally equivalent legal mechanisms in response. Nor have there been high‑profile, post‑2021 cases that match his scenario of governments simply “taking back” water from private right‑holders at scale.

Because the prediction was open‑ended (“eventually”) and concerns a structural shift that may yet occur in the future, it’s too early to classify it as definitively wrong. At the same time, there is no solid evidence that it has already come true. Hence the most accurate assessment is inconclusive (too early) rather than right or wrong.

The prediction explicitly describes a "decade long slide" for California "from now" (i.e., roughly 2021) and pairs it with a 10‑year horizon ("I'm working for ten more years"). Interpreted straightforwardly, the forecast period is approximately 2021–2031.

As of today (November 29, 2025), only about 4 years of that 10‑year window have elapsed. Even if one could argue that some indicators (e.g., net out‑migration, housing affordability, crime, wildfires, governance issues, etc.) suggest deterioration so far, the core claim is about a full decade‑long trajectory, not just the first few years.

Because the forecasted time interval has not yet completed, it is too early to determine whether California will, in fact, experience a “decade long slide” through 2031 in the sense relevant to long‑term decisions about where to live and work.

Therefore, the correct status of this prediction as of 2025 is: it cannot yet be judged.

Multiple U.S. politicians did in fact reimpose or newly impose significant COVID-related restrictions in late summer and fall 2021, explicitly tied to the Delta variant or related COVID developments:

• New York City: In early August 2021, Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that NYC would require proof of vaccination for workers and customers at indoor dining, gyms, and entertainment venues, with enforcement beginning in September 2021, and framed this as a response to rising cases and the Delta variant becoming dominant in the city. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Rhode Island: In August 2021, Governor Dan McKee’s administration mandated masks in all schools for the fall and Providence canceled its large PVDFest event scheduled for late September 2021, both explicitly in response to growing COVID-19 concerns “fueled by the Delta variant.” (en.wikipedia.org)
• Local mask mandates: Cities like Baltimore reinstated indoor mask mandates in August 2021, with officials citing the Delta variant as a “serious threat” to unvaccinated residents, reimposing restrictions that had been lifted earlier in 2021. (wmar2news.com) More broadly, jurisdictions such as Los Angeles County and others reintroduced indoor mask mandates and recommendations explicitly because of Delta’s spread and revised CDC guidance. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Federal level: On September 9, 2021, President Biden announced a new COVID-19 action plan built around combating the Delta variant, including broad vaccine mandates for federal workers, federal contractors, health-care facilities, and large private employers. These represented significant renewed federal restrictions tied directly to the Delta wave. (de.wikipedia.org)

While most of these measures stopped short of full March-2020-style stay‑at‑home orders, they are clearly renewed, substantial restrictions (vaccine mandates, indoor mask requirements, access limits for the unvaccinated, and event cancellations) imposed in late summer and fall 2021, with politicians explicitly invoking Delta and worsening COVID metrics. That matches the normalized prediction that some U.S. politicians would attempt to reimpose shutdowns or significant restrictions in fall 2021, citing the Delta variant as justification.

Evidence from the CDC and contemporaneous reporting shows that the SARS‑CoV‑2 Delta variant did in fact become the dominant strain in the U.S. within a few months of July 2021.

Key points:

• On June 15, 2021, CDC Director Rochelle Walensky stated that the Delta variant was expected to become the dominant strain in the U.S., noting it was already rapidly increasing as a share of cases.
• CDC genomic surveillance data and multiple news summaries report that by early July 2021, Delta had already become the dominant variant nationally (surpassing 50% of sequenced cases), and by mid‑July 2021 it accounted for an even larger majority of U.S. infections.
• Thus, Sacks’ prediction that “delta variants can become the main the dominant strain if it isn't already” was borne out almost immediately after (and arguably already at) the podcast’s release date of 9 July 2021.

Because the Delta variant did indeed become (and remain for some time) the dominant SARS‑CoV‑2 strain in U.S. circulation in the near term after July 2021, this prediction is right.

Chamath made this prediction in July 2021, when the first vaccine series was still focused on the original strain.

1. Boosters for the general public did become standard.

• On September 22, 2021, the FDA first authorized a Pfizer‑BioNTech booster for higher‑risk groups, and then on November 19, 2021, expanded the EUA to all adults 18 and older, establishing boosters as part of routine Covid vaccination in the U.S. (fda.gov)
• CDC and ACIP documents describe booster doses as an ongoing part of the Covid‑19 vaccination program from late 2021 onward, confirming that subsequent vaccination cycles after mid‑2021 did indeed involve boosters for the broader public. (cdc.gov)

2. Vaccination did shift to multi‑component ‘cocktail’ shots (bivalent vaccines).

• On August 31, 2022, the FDA authorized bivalent mRNA boosters from Pfizer‑BioNTech and Moderna that include mRNA for both the original SARS‑CoV‑2 strain and Omicron BA.4/BA.5—i.e., a two‑component cocktail in a single shot. (uspharmacist.com)
• On September 1, 2022, CDC recommended these updated bivalent boosters for most people (Pfizer for ages 12+ and Moderna for 18+), making multi‑component “cocktail” boosters the standard for the general public. (archive.cdc.gov)
• In April 2023, the FDA further simplified schedules so that these bivalent (original + Omicron) vaccines were used for all doses for people ≥6 months, and the original monovalent mRNA vaccines were no longer authorized—meaning the U.S. was, for a time, effectively “on a cocktail” as Chamath described. (fda.gov)

3. Later shift back to single‑strain updated shots doesn’t negate the prediction.

• For the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 seasons, the FDA moved to monovalent updated formulas (e.g., XBB.1.5, then KP.2), but this happened after the period in which the first post‑2021 vaccination cycles had already used bivalent cocktails. (cdc.gov)

Because (a) boosters became a routine expectation for Covid vaccination after mid‑2021 and (b) at least one major phase of those booster cycles for the general public used multi‑variant, bivalent “cocktail” vaccines rather than just the original‑strain shot, Chamath’s prediction is best classified as right.

Evidence shows that by fall 2021, COVID‑19 booster doses were indeed being recommended and deployed for parts of the vaccinated population in both Israel and the U.S., matching Friedberg’s prediction.

Key timeline points:

• Israel:

  • On July 30, 2021, Israel began offering a third (booster) dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine to people aged 60 and older who had been vaccinated at least five months earlier. This is widely reported as the first national booster campaign.
  • This clearly satisfies “by fall 2021” and “for at least some portion of the vaccinated population.”

• United States (CDC / FDA):

  • On August 12, 2021, the FDA amended the EUA for Pfizer and Moderna vaccines to allow an additional dose for certain immunocompromised people.
  • In September 2021, U.S. health authorities moved more broadly: the FDA and CDC authorized and recommended Pfizer-BioNTech booster doses for specific groups (e.g., older adults, people with underlying conditions, and those at high risk due to occupational exposure).
  • These actions are explicit recommendations and led to active deployment of boosters in the U.S. during fall 2021.

Given that:

• the prediction was made on July 9, 2021;
• boosters were recommended and rolled out in multiple countries (notably Israel and the U.S.) before and during fall 2021;
• and the prediction’s condition (“for at least some portion of the vaccinated population”) is clearly met,

Result: The prediction is right.

Evidence since late 2021 indicates this prediction was essentially borne out, especially with the emergence and global spread of the Omicron lineage.

Key points:

1. A substantially more immune‑evasive variant did emerge after July 2021.

   • Omicron (B.1.1.529), first reported in November 2021, showed markedly higher ability to evade neutralizing antibodies from vaccination and prior infection compared with earlier variants like Alpha and Delta. Multiple lab studies reported large drops in neutralization titers against Omicron for sera from people who had completed primary vaccine series (e.g., 20–40‑fold reductions compared with ancestral virus).

2. Real‑world data showed much higher rates of infection among vaccinated people than with prior variants.

   • During Omicron waves, countries with high vaccination coverage (e.g., the UK, Israel, the U.S.) reported:
     • Large numbers of breakthrough infections in fully vaccinated individuals, far beyond what was seen with Alpha or early Delta.
     • Rapid declines in protection against infection and symptomatic disease a few months after primary vaccination, with two doses sometimes offering only modest and short‑lived protection against Omicron infection (though protection against severe disease, hospitalization, and death remained substantially higher than in unvaccinated people, especially with boosting).
   • Health agencies and observational studies consistently documented that Omicron caused a much larger share of cases among vaccinated people than previous variants had, largely due to immune escape plus waning immunity.

3. This goes beyond the "partial reductions" in vaccine effectiveness seen by mid‑2021.

   • By July 2021, concerns about "breakthrough" were mostly about:
     • Modest drops in effectiveness against infection with Alpha/Delta compared with the ancestral strain.
     • Some breakthrough cases, but vaccines still preventing most infections in vaccinated populations.
   • With Omicron and its subvariants, many public‑health summaries explicitly characterized it as highly immune‑evasive, noting that prior vaccination or infection was much less effective at blocking infection, even though it still greatly reduced the risk of severe outcomes. This is qualitatively closer to what the predictor labeled a future “true breakthrough variant.”

4. Does this match the normalized prediction?

   • The claim was: after July 2021, a SARS‑CoV‑2 variant will emerge that constitutes a true breakthrough variant—significantly evading existing vaccine protection beyond the partial reductions then observed, leading to substantially more infections among vaccinated people.
   • Omicron clearly:
     • Emerged after July 2021.
     • Showed substantially greater immune escape than Alpha/Delta.
     • Produced waves with many more infections among vaccinated people than earlier variants, even while vaccines (especially with boosters) still protected fairly well against severe disease.

Because the core of the prediction—a meaningfully more vaccine‑evading SARS‑CoV‑2 variant causing many more breakthrough infections—did happen with Omicron and its descendants, the prediction should be judged right in substance, even though vaccines continued to work well against severe disease and were not rendered useless.

Evidence from mid‑2021 through fall 2021 shows that Jason’s underlying prediction substantially came true.

• Low vaccination in Alabama and Mississippi at the time. In mid‑July 2021, only about one‑third of Alabama’s population was fully vaccinated (33.7%).(alreporter.com) Mississippi’s full‑vaccination rate was similarly low—around 34–35% by late July/early August 2021.(cnbc.com) These levels match the “~33%” he cites.

• Delta did “whip through” those states in the following months. By July 2021, Mississippi’s state health officer said the Delta variant had effectively taken over all COVID transmission in the state and described a “fourth wave” driven by Delta plus low vaccination, calling it a “perfect storm for an explosion in cases.”(mississippitoday.org) Mississippi and Louisiana quickly became two of the hardest‑hit states, with very low vaccination and rapidly rising cases and hospitalizations.(cnbc.com) Mississippi’s hospitals were overwhelmed (over 1,300 COVID inpatients, no adult ICU beds available statewide by early August 2021).(mississippitoday.org) In August 2021 specifically, Mississippi had the nation’s highest rate of COVID‑19 cases and deaths per capita, confirming a severe, localized Delta wave.(en.wikipedia.org)

  Alabama, meanwhile, remained among the least‑vaccinated states and saw COVID cases and hospitalizations more than double in July 2021, with officials warning of “another deadly surge” driven by Delta and low vaccination.(alreporter.com) Alabama repeatedly had some of the nation’s lowest vaccination coverage and highest test positivity and hospitalization growth as Delta spread.(alreporter.com)

• High mortality, concentrated among older adults, in low‑vaccination states. A national Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of the Delta surge (July 1–Sept 25, 2021) found that people 65+ accounted for nearly 80% of all U.S. COVID deaths and that states with lower vaccination rates among older adults had much higher death rates in that age group.(kff.org) Alabama, one of the least‑vaccinated states for seniors, had 182 deaths per 100,000 adults 65+ during this period—almost double the national average of 93.(kff.org) A CNN analysis at the same time showed the 10 least‑vaccinated states (including Alabama and Mississippi) had COVID death rates more than four times higher than the 10 most‑vaccinated states.(keyt.com)

  Mississippi’s own data during Delta showed that the vast majority of deaths were among the unvaccinated, and that essentially all breakthrough deaths occurred in people 65 and older with high‑risk conditions, underscoring that older residents bore a disproportionate share of mortality.(mississippitoday.org) By early 2022, both Alabama and Mississippi were tied for the highest cumulative COVID death rates in the United States, reflecting the cumulative impact of these waves.(en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, these facts show that after July 2021, Delta spread extensively through Mississippi and Alabama amid very low vaccination coverage, producing large waves of infections and especially high death rates among older residents. While Jason’s language (“you’re all gonna die”) was hyperbolic, the substantive prediction about a severe Delta wave with disproportionate mortality among older people in those low‑vaccination states was borne out by subsequent data.