E36: New FTC Chair, breaking up big tech, government silent spying, Jon Stewart, wildfires & more

Evidence from 2021–2024 shows U.S. treatment of Big Tech becoming a central and explicitly partisan battlefield, matching Sacks’s forecast of “hyper politicization” of Big Tech markets over the few years after Lina Khan’s appointment.

• Congressional investigations framed as partisan conflict over Big Tech. In January 2023, House Republicans—on a near-straight party-line vote (221–211)—created the House Judiciary Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, explicitly empowered to investigate federal agencies’ interactions with Big Tech and alleged suppression of conservative speech.(axios.com) The subcommittee and its GOP majority repeatedly portrayed Big Tech and federal agencies as colluding to censor conservatives, culminating in a 2024 final report accusing the Biden administration of “weaponization” tied directly to content moderation and platform behavior.(judiciary.house.gov) This is not neutral market regulation; it is framed as partisan persecution and retaliation.

• Subpoenas and rhetoric targeting Big Tech as partisan actors. In 2023, House Judiciary Chair Jim Jordan subpoenaed the CEOs of Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft as part of this "weaponization" probe, explicitly seeking documents on alleged collusion with the Biden administration to suppress speech.(thethinkingconservative.com) Coverage characterized these efforts as a partisan offensive accusing Big Tech of siding with Democrats—again, Big Tech policy treated as a core partisan grievance rather than a purely technocratic antitrust or consumer‑protection issue.

• FTC and antitrust policy around Big Tech became a partisan flashpoint. Under Lina Khan (chair from 2021), the FTC aggressively pursued major tech firms and pushed structural antitrust reforms, which critics painted as ideologically driven and overreaching.(theguardian.com) In direct response, House GOP leadership later advanced a proposal to strip the FTC of its antitrust powers—explicitly framed by critics as a political move to weaken a regulator seen as hostile to large corporations, especially Big Tech.(washingtonpost.com) That kind of institutional retribution against a specific regulator over its Big Tech posture is a sign of heightened politicization.

• Big Tech regulation and moderation rules became wrapped in broader culture‑war politics. Republican investigations and legislation, such as the Protecting Speech from Government Interference Act, were justified on the grounds that Big Tech was “out to get conservatives” and colluding with the Biden administration—language that makes tech policy part of the partisan identity struggle.(washingtonpost.com) Meanwhile, Democrats largely defended closer cooperation with platforms on misinformation and public health, and supported Khan’s more aggressive antitrust line, yielding consistently polarized messaging and votes.

• Contrast with the pre‑2021 baseline. Before mid‑2021 there was already a growing, bipartisan “techlash” (e.g., cross‑party antitrust interest), but much of the formal antitrust and regulatory debate was still framed as competition or privacy policy with some bipartisan overlap. Post‑2021, Big Tech became a centerpiece of partisan narratives about censorship, election interference, and the legitimacy of federal institutions, with committees, subpoenas, and structural-agency proposals breaking sharply along party lines. The pattern from 2021–2024 therefore reflects not just ongoing concern about tech, but a significant escalation in partisan conflict and maneuvering around Big Tech policy.

Because, in the several years following June 2021, U.S. government treatment of Big Tech clearly evolved into a heavily partisan battlefield—through House investigations, rhetorical framing, and efforts to redefine or punish regulators tied to Big Tech enforcement—Sacks’s prediction that we were “in for…a hyper politicization…of big tech markets” over the next few years is best judged as right.

Breaking the prediction into parts:

1. Both left and right would move toward treating large tech platforms as regulated common carriers.

   • Since 2021, the common carrier framing for social media and platforms has primarily come from conservatives. Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that some digital platforms might be analogous to common carriers or public accommodations, encouraging regulation along those lines. (cnbc.com) Republican-led states like Florida and Texas then explicitly invoked common-carrier language in their 2021 social‑media laws (SB 7072 and HB 20). (wlf.org)
   • By contrast, Democrats’ major tech efforts under Lina Khan and in Congress have focused on antitrust and consumer protection (e.g., Amazon/merger suits, Open App Markets Act, American Innovation and Choice Online Act) rather than reclassifying platforms as common carriers. (en.wikipedia.org) Debates over Section 230 reform are bipartisan, but the goals diverge (Democrats typically pushing for more responsibility for harmful content, Republicans for less perceived "censorship"). (theverge.com)
   • There is no evidence of a bipartisan “deal” to treat app stores, cloud platforms, or dominant social networks as regulated common carriers; instead, the parties remain sharply split on whether forcing platforms to host more speech is desirable or constitutional.

2. Within a few years, concrete U.S. regulatory or legislative actions would impose common‑carrier‑like obligations on at least some big tech platforms.

   • State laws: Texas’s HB 20 and Florida’s SB 7072 tried to impose must‑carry / nondiscrimination rules on large social‑media platforms and explicitly leaned on the idea that these platforms can be treated “similarly to common carriers.” (en.wikipedia.org) Those are concrete legislative actions and do mirror classic common‑carrier nondiscrimination duties.
   • But courts have largely pushed back. The Eleventh Circuit stressed that Congress has expressly distinguished “interactive computer services” (social‑media platforms) from common carriers in the Telecommunications Act, and that federal law protects platforms’ right to discriminate among messages—strong evidence that they are not common carriers. (law.justia.com) In Moody v. NetChoice (2024), the U.S. Supreme Court held that laws like the Florida and Texas statutes, which limit platforms’ ability to curate and moderate content, implicate the platforms’ own First Amendment editorial discretion and vacated the lower-court decisions, sending the cases back for more searching First Amendment analysis rather than green‑lighting the common‑carrier theory. (supreme.justia.com) As of late 2025, these laws remain heavily constrained and unsettled, not functioning as stable, widely accepted common‑carrier regimes for social media.
   • Federal level: There is still no federal statute or durable federal regulation that reclassifies major online platforms (social networks, app stores, cloud platforms) themselves as common carriers or that squarely imposes telecom‑style carriage obligations on them. Key bipartisan competition bills such as the Open App Markets Act and the American Innovation and Choice Online Act advanced in committee but did not become law; later reintroduced versions remain only proposals. (en.wikipedia.org) Child‑safety and age‑verification bills (e.g., KOSA, state youth‑online‑safety laws) regulate design and access for minors, not carriage‑style nondiscrimination for all users. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Separate FCC efforts to re‑impose net neutrality by reclassifying ISPs as Title II common carriers were short‑lived; the Sixth Circuit in 2025 ruled the FCC lacks authority for that reclassification, again undercutting a move toward broader common‑carrier treatment even in traditional telecom. (wired.com) Those efforts target carriers like broadband providers, not the app‑store and social‑media “platform monopolies” Sacks was talking about.

Bottom line: While some Republican‑led states enacted and defended laws that attempt to treat large platforms like common carriers, courts have not endorsed that model, and there is no bipartisan, system‑wide shift to regulating app stores, cloud platforms, or dominant social networks as common carriers. Federal law and Supreme Court doctrine currently point in the opposite direction, emphasizing platforms’ editorial rights and distinguishing them from common carriers. Given that more than four years have passed since June 2021 without the predicted bipartisan realignment or durable common‑carrier obligations for big tech platforms, this prediction is best judged as wrong.

Within roughly two years after June 2021, U.S. policy and public debate did in fact center on the tradeoff Friedberg described.

1. Congressional antitrust bills against Big Tech (2021–2023) – The American Innovation and Choice Online Act and related bills targeting Amazon, Apple, Google and other platforms sparked a highly visible fight. Industry and allied groups warned the bills would undermine low prices, free/cheap services, Amazon’s Prime benefits, selection and convenience for consumers, explicitly arguing that antitrust reforms were abandoning the traditional consumer‑welfare/low‑price focus. (cnbc.com) Bill supporters (Klobuchar, Grassley, Tim Wu, CAP and small‑business coalitions) argued the same measures were needed to restore competition and innovation and open markets to new entrants. (ace-usa.org) Klobuchar’s own office publicly rebutted industry claims that her bill would harm Prime’s free shipping and Amazon Basics, underscoring that the political argument was framed in terms of consumer benefits vs. competition. (klobuchar.senate.gov)

2. Broader antitrust framework fight focused on Big Tech – At the same time, Lina Khan and Jonathan Kanter advanced a "New Brandeis" approach, explicitly challenging the price‑focused consumer welfare standard that had long favored Big Tech on the grounds that their services are free or very cheap. (en.wikipedia.org) Think‑tank and industry commentary around Big Tech antitrust repeatedly emphasized the huge consumer surplus from free Google, Meta, Apple, and Amazon services, and warned that aggressive enforcement could sacrifice those benefits, while reform advocates countered that stronger action was needed to protect competition and innovation. (cato.org)

3. Context of active cases and regulation – This debate unfolded alongside major antitrust and regulatory actions against Google (search and adtech), Meta (Instagram/WhatsApp), and Microsoft (Activision), and Biden’s 2021 competition executive order directing tougher scrutiny of Big Tech. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because this public and policy debate—explicitly pitting consumer price/"free service" benefits against competition and innovation goals in Big Tech antitrust—was prominent by 2021–2023, Friedberg’s prediction is best judged as right.

Evidence from 2022–2025 shows that disputes and debates over mask mandates and related workplace safety rules continued for years after June 2021, matching Friedberg’s forecast of “the next couple of months at least, and maybe for several years.”

• Mandates lifted but legal fights continued: By April 2022, general state-level mask mandates in the U.S. had been lifted, and the CDC changed its guidance so most counties no longer “needed” masks, with all states ending general mandates by that time.(en.wikipedia.org) Yet the federal transportation mask mandate was struck down by a federal judge in April 2022, and the Department of Justice appealed, showing ongoing litigation and controversy even as official public-health guidance loosened.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Extended litigation over mask rules: Public Health Law Watch documents continued court battles over COVID-era mask mandates through at least late 2023, including Carlin v. CDC (airline pilots challenging the transportation mask mandate) and Texas cases involving local mask rules versus state-level efforts to restrict them. These cases were only dismissed as moot after emergency orders or mandates had already been rescinded, underscoring how long the disputes dragged on.(publichealthlawwatch.org) In 2024, the Third Circuit was still issuing decisions in cases arising from New Jersey school mask mandates and protests at school board meetings.(publichealthlawwatch.org)
• Ongoing conflict over workplace and institutional rules: Articles in 2023–2024 describe continued lawsuits and political fights over COVID-related workplace rules, including challenges to employer vaccine/mask policies and their rollbacks, illustrating that questions of what was “fair and right” at work persisted beyond the formal end of mandates.(northcarolinahealthnews.org) Guidance to employers after the end of the federal Public Health Emergency in May 2023 emphasized that, even without government mandates, organizations still had to make their own controversial decisions about mask requirements and infection-control policies.(bowditch.com)
• New disputes about banning masks and federal limits on mandates: In the 118th Congress (2023–2024), proposed amendments sought to prohibit enforcement of COVID-19 mask mandates or limit any future federal masking requirements, and floor debates explicitly framed these as fights over public health versus personal freedom.(congress.gov) By 2025, reporting shows some U.S. employers and jurisdictions attempting to ban employee masking, provoking conflicts with disability law and workers’ claims to reasonable accommodations, demonstrating that mask-related workplace disputes remain active several years later.(thesicktimes.org)

Because substantial legal, political, and workplace conflicts over mask mandates and related safety rules continued well past “the next few months” and indeed for multiple years after June 2021, the prediction that such challenges and questions would persist for several years is well supported by the record.

Key points:

1. Major disputes were indeed litigated, but not fully “sorted out” within ~1 year.

   • Federal tenant‑safety policy: The CDC’s nationwide eviction moratorium was struck down by the Supreme Court on August 26, 2021 in Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS, resolving that specific federal rule within a few months of June 2021.(caselaw.findlaw.com)
   • Federal workplace rules: OSHA’s large‑employer vaccine‑or‑test Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS), a central workplace‑safety dispute, was stayed by the Supreme Court on January 13, 2022 in NFIB v. OSHA, and OSHA formally withdrew the ETS as an enforceable rule effective January 26, 2022.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • Public‑transportation mask mandate: A federal district court vacated the CDC travel mask mandate on April 18, 2022 in Health Freedom Defense Fund v. Biden, effectively ending that rule nationwide.(healthfreedomdefense.org)
     These decisions fall roughly within the June 2021–April 2022 window and confirm that the major federal workplace/tenant rules were litigated and substantially reshaped by courts.

2. However, litigation over workplace mandates was still widespread and unresolved past June 2022.

   • A Fall 2022 class‑action trends report noted that about 75% of employer vaccine‑mandate cases were still in litigation and explicitly predicted mandate‑related employer liability “for the foreseeable future,” showing that disputes were far from worked through one year after June 2021.(natlawreview.com)
   • An October 2024 commentary on public‑health litigation described courts as continuing to consider COVID‑related employment cases, including challenges to vaccination policies and religious‑discrimination claims, underscoring the persistence of these disputes well beyond mid‑2022.(minnlawyer.com)

3. New and ongoing cases in 2023–2025 confirm that the controversy did not burn out within a year.

   • In 2025, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan was still facing over 100 lawsuits from ex‑employees fired over a COVID vaccine policy; a jury awarded one plaintiff more than $12 million (before statutory caps), and the parties sought mediation to resolve many similar suits.(apnews.com)
   • Also in 2025, a federal judge upheld a $7.8 million verdict for former BART employees who were denied religious exemptions to a 2021 vaccine mandate, arising from litigation filed in 2022.(sfchronicle.com)
   • Tenant‑side disputes likewise persisted: as of November 2025, the federal government was still defending takings‑clause damages litigation over the COVID eviction moratorium (Darby Development Co. v. United States), with claims in the tens of billions of dollars.(reuters.com)

4. Mask and mandate rules themselves wound down by 2022, but the legal fallout did not.

   • By April 2022, all U.S. states had lifted general mask mandates, and the transportation mask mandate had been invalidated, indicating that the rules were largely gone within the year.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • Yet the continued stream of mandate‑related employment and damages cases into 2023–2025 shows that the underlying workplace and tenant disputes were not fully resolved in that one‑year window.

Why this makes the prediction wrong:
Chamath was correct that post‑COVID workplace and tenant safety rules would be heavily litigated, and many headline policies were indeed addressed in court decisions within roughly a year. But his normalized prediction goes further and implies that these disputes would be worked through—i.e., substantially resolved—by litigation in about a year from June 2021. The evidence shows that, although early litigation produced major rulings by mid‑2022, large volumes of related workplace‑mandate and tenant‑protection cases remained active and are still being resolved years later. Because the disputes were not actually “sorted out” within that timeframe, the prediction is best classified as wrong rather than right or merely ambiguous.

As of November 29, 2025, SARS‑CoV‑2 has not been eradicated and continues to circulate globally as an endemic respiratory virus.

• The WHO states that COVID‑19 is now in a “post‑emergency phase” but continues to circulate, cause disease, and require ongoing management, rather than being eliminated or eradicated.
• Major health authorities (e.g., CDC, WHO, and multiple peer‑reviewed reviews) now consistently describe COVID‑19 as endemic—meaning the virus continues to circulate in the population at a baseline level, with periodic surges, rather than going to and staying at zero cases.
• No credible source reports global eradication (which would require zero transmission worldwide and is only achieved for very few diseases like smallpox). Instead, surveillance data and periodic waves of infection show continuing circulation year after year.

Because the prediction was that “Covid will always be around in the background” and that we would never reach a sustained state of zero cases, and because by late 2025 COVID‑19 remains widespread and endemic rather than eradicated, the prediction is right based on current evidence.

There is enough post‑June‑2021 evidence to argue both that life/comedy returned to something close to pre‑pandemic normal relatively quickly and that it clearly did not fully return to a pre‑COVID “normal,” so the prediction can’t be cleanly scored.

Evidence it was broadly right (for day‑to‑day social life & comedy):

• Major live entertainment and comedy institutions came back at or near full capacity within months. Broadway was authorized to reopen at 100% capacity starting September 14, 2021, with tickets going on sale in May 2021. (cnbc.com)
• U.S. late‑night talk shows quickly returned to in‑person, full‑capacity audiences. The Tonight Show went back to a full audience on June 7, 2021; The Late Show with Stephen Colbert did so on June 14, 2021, making the Ed Sullivan Theater the first Broadway theater to reopen at full capacity. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The Daily Show restored a live studio audience by April 2022, showing that even more cautious, politically charged comedy formats resumed normal taping conditions within about a year. (en.wikipedia.org) By 2022–2023, stand‑up tours, festivals, and club shows were widely back, and COVID was a routine subject of jokes and open debate in mainstream comedy.

Evidence it was broadly wrong (for society being “back to normal”):

• COVID remained a major health crisis for years after June 2021. The U.S. federal COVID‑19 public‑health emergency was repeatedly extended and only expired May 11, 2023, more than 22 months after the prediction. (oig.hhs.gov) WHO likewise did not end COVID’s status as a global public‑health emergency until May 5, 2023. (forbes.com)
• CDC data show COVID remained a leading cause of death in the U.S. through 2022 (third in 2020–2021, fourth in 2022), and that while hospitalizations and deaths fell substantially after early 2022, COVID stayed an “ongoing public health challenge,” not a background non‑issue. (cdc.gov) Expert commentary in 2025 describes COVID as having become endemic rather than gone, still causing tens of thousands of U.S. deaths annually. (washingtonpost.com)
• Structural and behavioral changes—hybrid/remote work, changed travel patterns, periodic local mask mandates in healthcare or high‑risk settings, and persistent political conflict and platform moderation fights over COVID discourse—mean overall society never fully reverted to the pre‑2020 baseline, even if many visible aspects of leisure and comedy did.

Why the outcome is ambiguous:

• If you interpret “largely pre‑pandemic normal” to mean most ordinary social and entertainment activities look and feel similar to 2019, then by late 2021–2022 (roughly a year after the prediction) that was substantially true: people were again going to theaters, comedy clubs, and live tapings without severe, continuous restrictions, and COVID was widely joked about and argued over in mainstream culture.
• If instead you interpret it to mean a broad return of society and institutions to the pre‑COVID baseline, the long duration of formal emergencies, continued high mortality, and durable changes in work, health policy, and political conflict indicate we did not simply “go back to normal pretty quick.”

Because both interpretations are reasonable and lead to opposite verdicts, the prediction is best classified as ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

The statement that the COVID‑19 crisis in the US was “all over” by mid‑2021 is clearly refuted by subsequent events.

• In June 2021, US cases and deaths had indeed declined sharply from the winter 2020–21 peak, but substantial transmission and mortality were still ongoing. The U.S. was averaging thousands of new cases and hundreds of deaths per day around that time.
• Starting July–August 2021, the Delta variant drove a large new wave. U.S. daily cases rose from under ~15,000 in late June to over 150,000 per day in late August 2021, and hospitalizations and deaths surged correspondingly.
• This was followed by the Omicron wave beginning December 2021–January 2022, which produced the highest case counts of the entire pandemic and very high, though somewhat decoupled, hospitalizations and deaths.
• The federal COVID-19 public health emergency in the US did not end until May 11, 2023, reflecting that health authorities did not consider the acute crisis phase over in mid‑2021.

Although the prediction included an appeal for remaining people to get vaccinated, vaccination rates plateaued with a significant portion of the population unvaccinated, and in reality the US experienced multiple further severe waves after mid‑2021. In hindsight, the assertion that “this is all over” by that time is therefore wrong.

Evidence from the 2021 season shows that California did, in fact, experience an extremely severe, arguably “hellish” wildfire season.

Key points:

• By the end of 2021, about 2.57 million acres burned in California across 7,396–8,800+ fires, with around 3,600+ structures damaged or destroyed and several fatalities and injuries. This area burned is described in official and summary sources as nearly 2.6 million acres, making 2021 the second‑largest wildfire year on record for California after 2020. (en.wikipedia.org)
• CAL FIRE’s own 2021 season summary notes an “unusually early start”, an ongoing drought, historically low rainfall and reservoir levels, and states that by July 2021 more than three times as many acres had burned compared with the previous year by that date, with drought, extreme heat, and reduced snowpack “contributing to the severity of the fires.” It describes the state as facing “unprecedented fire conditions” in mid‑August as multiple large fires burned simultaneously. (fire.ca.gov)
• The Dixie Fire alone burned about 963,000 acres, becoming the largest single (non‑complex) wildfire in recorded California history and the second‑largest wildfire overall in state history, destroying or heavily damaging entire communities (e.g., Greenville) and causing widespread smoke impacts across the western U.S. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The Caldor Fire burned roughly 222,000 acres, destroyed about 1,003 buildings, forced evacuation of more than 53,000 people, and is listed among the largest and most destructive wildfires in California’s recorded history. (en.wikipedia.org)
• National reporting at the time characterized 2021 as another “damaging western wildfire season” with California as a major focus, driven by severe drought and periods of extreme heat, and highlighted Dixie and Caldor among the emblematic megafires of the year. (ncei.noaa.gov)

Relative to typical pre‑2010 seasons, the combination of record‑scale fires, extremely large burned area (second only to the record‑shattering 2020 season), multiple large destructive incidents, mass evacuations, and smoke and air‑quality impacts across states is consistent with describing 2021 as a “really hellish fire season.”

Given these outcomes, Sacks’s qualitative prediction that the 2021 California fire season would be extremely severe and “hellish” is best judged as correct.

Evidence splits the prediction into one accurate component and two that clearly did not materialize.

1. “Terrible fire season” in the western U.S.
   This part is basically correct. 2021 was widely described as another disastrous fire year for the American West, with nearly 7.7 million acres burned across the U.S., heavily concentrated in western states.(theguardian.com) California alone saw 7,396 fires burning about 2.57 million acres and major incidents like the Dixie Fire (over 963,000 acres, one of the largest in state history).(en.wikipedia.org) Oregon, Washington, New Mexico and Colorado also had intense seasons with large fires like Bootleg (413,765 acres in OR) and significant statewide acreage burned.(en.wikipedia.org) So the “terrible fire season” call was directionally right.

2. “Brownouts … throughout a lot of the western states” in 2021
   What we actually see is:

• California: In 2021 it used Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) and more aggressive protection settings to reduce wildfire risk, leading to both planned and unplanned outages (e.g., PG&E PSPS events in January, August, September, October 2021, and a separate protection-settings program that caused nearly 600 unplanned outages affecting ~650,000 customers July–Nov 2021).(information.auditor.ca.gov) These were fire‑prevention or equipment‑protection shutoffs, not classic supply‑shortage brownouts across the wider West.
• Broader western grid: Articles explaining California’s emergency procedures note that rotating supply‑driven outages (“rolling blackouts”) last occurred in 2020, during a prior heat wave, and are described as relatively infrequent; they are not reported as a recurring feature of summer 2021.(capradio.org)
• Pacific Northwest example: During the June–July 2021 heat wave, Avista Utilities imposed rolling blackouts in Spokane, WA, affecting tens of thousands of customers over several days to relieve stress on the local distribution system.(spokesman.com) A follow‑up analysis explicitly contrasts this with Texas, stating that Spokane’s problem was distribution/equipment limits, not a regional shortage of generation, and that there was “plenty of power available” on the system.(techxplore.com)

Taken together, 2021 saw localized outages and wildfire‑safety shutoffs, but not the kind of widespread, supply‑driven brownouts “throughout a lot of the western states” that the prediction implies. The available reporting and reliability analyses do not show multiple western states suffering recurring brownouts from generation shortfall in 2021.

3. “Some version of [the Texas 2021 power crisis] will happen in many places in the US” during 2021

• The February 2021 Texas power crisis (Winter Storm Uri) was a large‑scale generation and fuel‑supply failure: more than 4.5 million customers in Texas lost power, some for days; ERCOT and the Southwest Power Pool ordered rolling blackouts across 14 states during the storm.(en.wikipedia.org) This is the event Chamath refers to as having happened “a few months ago.”
• The question is whether new Texas‑like grid or supply crises emerged elsewhere later in 2021. Beyond localized events like the Spokane rolling blackouts and various storm‑damage outages, the record does not show additional, Texas‑scale generation shortfall crises or multi‑state grid emergencies of similar nature and national significance in the latter half of 2021. The major systemic reliability failure of that year remains the February storm itself.

Since the normalized prediction bundles these claims—severe western fires plus widespread brownouts across many western states plus multiple Texas‑like grid crises around the U.S. in 2021—it only partially matches reality. The fire‑season part is right, but the broader, systemic brownout and multi‑region crisis components did not occur as predicted. On balance, that makes the overall prediction wrong, despite getting the wildfire risk directionally correct.

Evidence shows that Gov. Gavin Newsom and his Democratic allies did move to accelerate the 2021 recall timeline, and that one stated strategic reason for an earlier, summertime election was to avoid the political fallout from late‑season wildfires.

Key points:

• Before Democrats changed the law, the recall calendar pointed to a late October or early November 2021 election—i.e., during the traditional peak of California’s wildfire season.(everything.explained.today)
• On June 28, 2021, Newsom signed SB 152, which removed a 30‑day budget‑review step and let the lieutenant governor call the recall much earlier, as soon as August 2021, while appropriating $250 million to run it.(everything.explained.today) Democratic leaders explicitly said this funding would “allow for an earlier recall election.”(calmatters.org) This is exactly the kind of procedural change needed to “accelerate” the recall.
• After signatures were certified on July 1, Lt. Gov. Eleni Kounalakis set the election for September 14, 2021, which NPR and others noted was “much earlier than originally planned” (previous expectations were for November).(nprillinois.org) So the recall was pulled forward on the calendar.
• Analyses of the recall law changes note that a late‑August or early‑September election would help Newsom by avoiding political fallout over fires, virus variants, or school reopenings, compared with a late‑October/November date; this is described as the strategic rationale advanced by Democratic state senator Steve Glazer when he pushed for an earlier election.(everything.explained.today) That explicitly includes wildfires as a key concern.
• California’s wildfire season is generally understood to peak in the hot, dry months of August–October, and in 2021 the largest and most destructive fires (e.g., the Dixie Fire, burning July–October, and other major fires continuing through October) were indeed intense well after mid‑September.(en.wikipedia.org) Moving the recall from a likely late‑October/November date to mid‑September therefore shifted it earlier relative to the late‑season peak.

Nuance: The September 14 election still occurred during an active fire season (the Dixie Fire was already burning), and public reporting highlights multiple motives for the accelerated date—riding Newsom’s improving approval ratings and avoiding problems not only with wildfires but also COVID variants and school reopening.(nprillinois.org) However, the core of Sacks’s prediction—that Newsom and his allies would work to accelerate the recall so it occurred earlier in the fire season, partly out of concern about wildfire politics—matches what actually happened.

Because the legislative and scheduling moves clearly did accelerate the recall and contemporary analyses explicitly cite avoiding wildfire‑related fallout as one rationale, the prediction is best classified as right, even though fire season was not the only factor and the election did not precede all major 2021 fires.

Available climate data since June 2021 show that the long‑running warming trend has persisted, not reversed, which matches Chamath’s claim that betting on the trend suddenly turning would be unwise.

Key points with sources:

• NASA and NOAA global temperature analyses show that 2023 was the hottest year on record, surpassing all prior years in their datasets.
• Multiple agencies (e.g., Copernicus/ECMWF, NASA, NOAA) report that most of the warmest years on record have occurred since 2010, and that the 2010s and early 2020s continue to be significantly warmer than earlier decades, consistent with an ongoing upward trend rather than a reversal.
• Annual global mean temperatures for 2021, 2022, 2023, and preliminary assessments for 2024–2025 remain well above the 20th‑century average and are among the warmest years ever recorded, continuing the pattern observed in the prior decade rather than showing a cooling shift.

Given that several years after the June 2021 prediction have indeed followed the same warming trajectory (with new record or near‑record global temperatures instead of a notable cooling), the prediction that the established trend would keep going has, so far, been borne out.