E25: Biden's vaccine mandate, "equity" in distribution, NFT speculation, impact of inflation & more

The prediction tied the end of the U.S. pandemic—defined as community transmission being greatly reduced and the virus having substantial difficulty spreading—to administering about 200 million vaccine doses.

The U.S. passed 200 million administered doses in April 2021, a milestone the Biden administration announced it had hit by April 22, 2021.(en.wikipedia.org) Yet, within a few months, the Delta variant became the predominant strain nationwide by late June 2021 and drove a major surge in cases, hospitalizations, and deaths during July–September 2021, including a hospital capacity crisis.(cdc.gov) This shows that, even after 200 million doses, it was not “really hard to see transmission” across the network; instead, large-scale community spread resumed.

After Delta, the Omicron wave from December 1, 2021 to February 28, 2022 produced the most intense U.S. epidemic wave to that point, with ~30 million cases and about 170,000 deaths during that period alone.(mdpi.com) Continued variant-driven waves and seasonal resurgences have persisted in subsequent years; U.S. data in 2025 still show new variants (e.g., NB.1.8.1 “Nimbus,” XFG “Stratus”) fueling nationwide summer waves rather than the virus struggling to spread.(axios.com)

Because substantial community transmission and multiple large waves occurred after the 200-million-dose mark, the specific claim that the pandemic would effectively be over in the U.S. at that point, in the sense described, did not come true.

By roughly April 27–30, 2021 (about 45 days after mid‑March), the U.S. situation closely matched what Friedberg described:

• Vaccine supply, eligibility, and uptake: By April 19, all U.S. states had opened COVID-19 vaccination to everyone 16+; Biden had moved the deadline for universal adult eligibility up to April 19, enabled by expanding vaccine availability. (cnbc.com) Around that time, about half of U.S. adults had received at least one dose, and roughly 80% of seniors had received at least one dose. (asisonline.org) As of April 29, the CDC reported about 2.6 million doses per day, with 43.3% of the total U.S. population (and 54.9% of adults) having at least one dose, and 30% of the total population fully vaccinated—evidence of both high supply and strong uptake. (archive.cdc.gov)

• Improving epidemiological conditions: CDC’s April 30, 2021 Weekly Review shows the 7‑day average of daily new cases at 52,528, down 16.2% from the prior week and down 79% from the January 8 peak of 249,669. Hospitalizations and deaths were also falling, with 7‑day averages for new hospital admissions and deaths both declining compared with the previous week. (archive.cdc.gov) Active U.S. cases were dropping as well; one contemporaneous summary noted active cases fell by about 14% over the last week of April. (creativeloafing.com) While some states (e.g., Michigan, Massachusetts) had a spring bump in March–early April, their case and hospitalization peaks were passing by late April, with vaccines credited for limiting deaths. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Contemporaneous framing as ‘turning the corner’: By early May 2021—within a week or two of the 45‑day window—the White House COVID‑19 response coordinator Jeff Zients and other officials were publicly saying the U.S. was “turning the corner” on the pandemic and moving toward a more normal summer, explicitly tying this to vaccination progress. (amny.com) CDC and White House briefings in mid‑April emphasized that widespread vaccination would help “end this pandemic” and “turn the corner on this public health crisis,” reinforcing that they viewed this as the beginning of the exit phase, even while warning that risks and variants remained. (bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov)

Later surges from Delta and Omicron show that this initial exit wasn’t permanent, but Friedberg’s prediction was about reaching, within ~45 days, a point where vaccine-driven progress and inventory put the U.S. clearly starting to come out of the acute pandemic phase. Given the substantial vaccine coverage, rapidly falling cases and severe outcomes relative to January, and official characterizations at the time, this call was directionally and temporally correct.

Evidence shows that in the 12–18 months after March 2021, Tesla’s car prices did in fact rise on the order of ~20–30%, largely due to soaring battery raw‑material costs, and Tesla explicitly framed the hikes as a response to those costs.

Key points:

• Around the time of the prediction (Feb/March 2021), the cheapest Model 3 (Standard Range Plus) in the U.S. was about $36,990–$37,000, and the Model Y Long Range AWD started around $50,000. (electrek.co)

• By March 2022, the entry‑level Model 3 (RWD) cost about $48,190 including destination, roughly $11,000 more than a year earlier, i.e. close to a 30% increase versus its ~$37k level in early 2021. (autoguide.com) That’s directly in the 20–30% bracket Chamath cited.

• Reuters‑based reporting on Tesla’s own price data shows that between January 2021 and March 2022 the Model Y Long Range price in the U.S. rose about 20%, and the Model 3 Long Range about 10.6%; Reuters also noted that Tesla raised prices on the most affordable Model 3 and Y trims “about a dozen times” over that period. (y94.com) Independent trackers like CarsDirect and Kelley Blue Book similarly document multiple 2022 increases of 5–10% per adjustment, compounding to large jumps across the lineup. (carsdirect.com)

• These price hikes were explicitly tied to battery‑material inflation. On an April 2022 earnings call, Elon Musk said Tesla raised prices because of cost pressure and singled out lithium and other battery materials as the “single biggest cost growth item.” (spglobal.com) Broader analysis from AlixPartners reported that EV raw‑material costs (driven by lithium, nickel, cobalt) more than doubled from March 2020 to May 2022, forcing automakers including Tesla to “significantly raise prices.” (cnbc.com) Reporting on China notes Tesla repeatedly raised Model 3/Y prices there as lithium prices increased roughly tenfold from early 2021. (globaltimes.cn)

• Although Tesla later cut some prices in 2023–2024 amid changing demand and competition, Chamath’s prediction was about the near‑term consequence of rising input costs from 2021 forward. In that window, the typical transaction price for key Tesla models indeed rose on the order of 20–30%, and the company itself portrayed those increases as largely unavoidable given raw‑material inflation.

Given that: (1) flagship models like the entry‑level Model 3 saw nearly 30% price increases within roughly a year, (2) at least one core variant (Model Y Long Range) rose ~20% over that span, and (3) Tesla and outside analysts tie these hikes directly to lithium/nickel/cobalt cost spikes, Chamath’s prediction that “the cost of Teslas are going to go up by 20 or 30%” and that this would be hard for Tesla to avoid is best classified as right in substance.

Meaningful inflation did in fact take hold in the U.S. economy after March 2021: headline CPI inflation climbed rapidly and peaked at about 9.1% year‑over‑year in June 2022, the highest rate in roughly four decades. (usinflationcalculator.com)

Over the same period, prices did rise broadly across commodities:

• Food and agricultural products: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show food prices were about 10% higher in 2022 than in 2021, a notably faster rise than typical. (officialdata.org) Globally, the UN FAO Food Price Index hit record highs; it had already jumped 28% in 2021 and then rose another ~14% in 2022, with cereals, meat, dairy and vegetable oils all reaching record or near‑record levels. (euronews.com)
• Broad commodity indices: Major diversified commodity benchmarks surged during the high‑inflation years. The S&P GSCI, a standard global commodity index, gained about 40% in 2021 and 26% in 2022, explicitly noted as strong performance in an “extremely hot inflation” environment. (spglobal.com) Bloomberg’s own commodity index (BCOM) also posted strong double‑digit positive returns in 2021 and 2022, tying those gains to rising inflation. (bloomberg.com)
• Metals: Industrial metals saw large broad‑based price increases: an index of core LME metals (copper, aluminium, nickel, zinc, lead, tin) rose about 32% in 2021 (after a 20% rise in 2020), with copper alone up roughly 25% that year, reflecting tight supply and strong post‑pandemic demand. (news.metal.com)

Given that (1) significant, sustained inflation materialized in the U.S. and (2) commodity prices—including food, agricultural goods, and industrial metals—rose broadly during that inflationary period, Friedberg’s conditional prediction about what would happen if meaningful inflation took hold matches the subsequent economic reality.

By 2025, non‑dilutive platforms like revenue‑based financing and similar fintech products have grown quickly but remain small relative to traditional venture capital, and industry reports still frame them as alternatives or complements rather than as a replacement for equity VC. Global revenue‑based financing volume was around $3.3–3.4B in 2023 and about $5.7–5.8B in 2024, whereas global VC investment in 2024 was roughly $314B, so classic venture capital remains two orders of magnitude larger and continues to set norms on governance, pricing, and fund structures. (blog.tbrc.info)

One of Chamath’s examples, Clearbanc/Clearco, did not become a dominant new rail for startup funding; instead, it hit serious headwinds, laying off about 72% of staff and seeing both co‑founders exit the company amid financial difficulties in 2022–2023. (en.wikipedia.org) Pipe remains active and has expanded via embedded “Capital as a Service,” with new credit facilities that could support a bit over $1B in annual originations, but that scale is modest compared with the hundreds of billions deployed yearly by VC funds and has not forced a structural change in how mainstream VCs operate. (pipe.com)

Analyses of startup finance in 2024–2025 describe non‑dilutive instruments (revenue‑based financing, venture debt, grants, etc.) as part of a broader toolkit founders can blend with equity rounds, explicitly characterizing them as complementary to, not transformative of, traditional VC’s central role. (thescenarionist.com) With more than four years elapsed since the March 2021 prediction and venture capital’s core model (equity ownership, staged rounds, board seats) still largely intact, the claim that products like Pipe and Clearbanc would materially change how venture investing is done as an industry has not borne out.

Available data through late 2025 suggests that the specific mechanisms Chamath predicted have not materialized at the scale he implied:

1. Non‑dilutive financing is still small relative to equity VC and hasn’t clearly reset deal pricing.

   • Global revenue‑based financing (RBF)—a key non‑dilutive category—was about $6.4B in 2023, with forecasts to grow quickly thereafter. (alliedmarketresearch.com)
   • By contrast, global venture capital investment was roughly $314B in 2024, orders of magnitude larger. (barrons.com)
   • Analyses of the 2022–2024 “valuation reset” in startups attribute pricing changes mainly to higher interest rates, public‑market multiple compression, and slower exits, not to alternative/non‑dilutive financing options. (stephens.com)
   • Carta’s detailed data on U.S. startup rounds shows valuations cycling up and down with macro conditions and stage, but there is no evidence that RBF or other non‑dilutive tools have been the dominant driver of pre‑/post‑money pricing; if anything, the story is lower activity, more down rounds, and more bridges, not a structural repricing caused by non‑dilutive capital. (carta.com)

2. Employee equity is not clearly rising as a share of total compensation and may have shrunk.

   • Carta’s H2 2024 compensation report notes that, compared to three years earlier, equity now makes up a smaller portion of the typical startup compensation package, even as companies emphasize efficiency and leaner teams. (carta.com)
   • The H1 2024 report similarly shows that average equity packages for new hires fell sharply in 2022–2023 and then flattened, rather than entering a new era of much larger employee ownership. (carta.com)
   • There is evidence that more startups offer ESOPs (e.g., one survey claims 78% offering ESOPs in 2024 vs. 59% in 2021), but that’s about prevalence, not necessarily larger equity stakes per employee, and it isn’t clearly tied to non‑dilutive financing rather than general competition for talent. (linkedin.com)
   • Founder‑ownership data from Carta shows founders still get heavily diluted by traditional rounds (e.g., median founder team ownership falling to ~23% by Series B), which is inconsistent with a broad shift to non‑dilutive growth capital preserving large equity pools for employees. (foundevo.com)

3. Brand‑name VC firms like Sequoia remain extremely powerful signals, arguably more concentrated than before.

   • 2024–2025 industry analyses show historic consolidation: the top 30 VC firms raised ~75% of all U.S. VC fundraising in 2024, with just nine firms capturing about half; Andreessen Horowitz alone accounted for more than 11% of all VC funds raised. (forbes.com)
   • Time, OpenVC, and other rankings for 2024–2025 consistently place Sequoia Capital and a16z at or near the top of global VC league tables, emphasizing their brand recognition and access as major advantages. (flyrank.com)
   • LP capital has become more concentrated in established “brand” firms, with one 2025 analysis estimating that ~20 firms (led by a16z) captured about 60% of all U.S. VC fundraising in 2024, while many emerging managers and micro‑funds struggled. (afurrier.com)
   • This consolidation and the continued dominance of firms like Sequoia contradict the idea that their brand signal (“I’m calling from Sequoia”) has become broadly irrelevant relative to individual operators.

4. Solo GPs and operator‑angels have grown, but they coexist with—not displace—top brands.

   • There has been a notable rise of solo capitalists, operator‑angels, and micro VCs, supported by platforms like Sydecar and YouVC, and commentary about the “unbundling” of VC and the barbell structure of big funds at the top and niche solo GPs at the bottom. (flexcapital.com)
   • Recent coverage of a 2025 solo‑GP‑focused fund notes that the model is gaining traction, but also explicitly says that the standard multi‑partner firm model “isn’t going away” and that data comparing solo GPs to traditional firms is still limited. (wsj.com)
   • In parallel, however, LPs are concentrating commitments into large, established firms, which indicates that solo GPs and operator‑investors are a meaningful complement at the margins rather than a force that has broadly reduced the signaling value of Sequoia‑type brands.

Synthesis vs. the original claim
Chamath’s prediction combined several linked claims: that non‑dilutive financing would become so important that it would (a) significantly and broadly change venture pricing, (b) increase the equity share held by employees, and (c) erode the signaling value of big‑name VC brands relative to individual operators. As of late 2025, the evidence shows:

• Non‑dilutive/RBF is growing fast but still small, and the major shifts in valuations/pricing are driven by macro and exit conditions, not by founders systematically replacing equity rounds with non‑dilutive capital. (alliedmarketresearch.com)
• Employee equity as a share of compensation has fallen, not risen, in aggregate over the last three years. (carta.com)
• Brand‑name VC firms are more dominant than ever, capturing a super‑majority of new LP capital and sitting atop every major ranking, which is the opposite of their signaling power fading. (forbes.com)

Because the core directional claims (on pricing, employee equity share, and brand‑signal erosion) have largely not occurred—and in some cases the opposite trend is observable—the prediction is best judged as wrong, even though some sub‑trends he highlighted (growth of non‑dilutive tools and individual operators) are real but marginal to the overall market dynamics so far.

Available evidence since 2021 does show directionally more VC‑like risk‑taking in public markets, especially among retail traders. Studies and market data document that individuals strongly overweight “lottery‑like” assets—low‑priced, highly volatile, positively skewed stocks—and that this preference has persisted or intensified, including after the pandemic period.(studylib.net) Retail traders have also flocked to extremely high‑risk instruments such as zero‑days‑to‑expiry equity and index options, where most positions expire worthless and a small minority can produce very large gains, a payoff profile that is explicitly described by researchers as “lottery‑like.”(wealthmanagement.com) At the same time, retail participation in equities and options remains structurally elevated versus a decade ago, with households now responsible for roughly 20% or more of U.S. equity volume and a large share of short‑dated options activity, and platforms like Robinhood openly targeting aggressive, speculative users and even planning vehicles to give small investors access to concentrated portfolios of high‑growth AI companies.(accountinginsights.org) Given that the cross‑section of stock returns is inherently power‑law distributed—with a small fraction of companies responsible for essentially all long‑run wealth creation—any concentrated basket of early‑stage or speculative public equities will mechanically tend to have a venture‑like outcome profile (a few big winners, many failures, some modest results).(econpapers.repec.org)

However, the prediction is about investors increasingly building portfolios of early‑stage, high‑risk public equities whose realized performance distribution resembles venture portfolios. Current research and public data largely focus on trading activity in specific instruments or on aggregate participation, not on the full long‑term return distribution of typical retail (or even professional) portfolios constructed since 2021. Many households still hold broad index funds or diversified ETFs as core holdings, and there is no clear, quantitative documentation that VC‑style, highly concentrated baskets of early‑stage public stocks have become the dominant or even a clearly measured class of portfolios, as opposed to a prominent but hard‑to‑size niche.(coinlaw.io) Because the behavioral trend is qualitatively consistent with Friedberg’s thesis but the key empirical claim—widespread portfolios whose overall performance distribution truly mirrors venture funds—cannot be directly verified or falsified with available data, the forecast is best judged ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

Evidence since 2021 broadly supports Friedberg’s prediction about speculative early‑stage listings and non‑diversified investors. First, there was a historic boom in speculative IPOs and SPACs in 2020–21, with U.S. IPOs hitting record levels and SPAC IPOs exceeding 600 in 2021; this boom abruptly reversed in 2022 as rates rose and markets sold off. (nasdaq.com) Subsequent analysis shows that a large share of SPACs launched in 2020–21 either liquidated or now trade below their typical $10 issue price, meaning many investors who bought and held individual de‑SPAC stocks suffered significant losses. (nasdaq.com) Second, retail investors did in fact concentrate heavily in a small set of ‘sure thing’ meme stocks such as GameStop and AMC during the 2021 short‑squeeze episode; after extreme spikes driven in part by r/WallStreetBets, many of these stocks later declined sharply, leaving late entrants with large losses. (en.wikipedia.org) Third, similar dynamics played out in concentrated high‑growth strategies: Cathie Wood’s ARK Innovation ETF (ARKK), which was filled with speculative, early‑stage or unprofitable tech names, peaked in February 2021 and then experienced a maximum drawdown of about 80% by late 2022; investors who piled in near the peak lost on the order of two‑thirds of their capital and badly lagged diversified benchmarks like the S&P 500 and Nasdaq‑100 over the subsequent years. (portfolioslab.com) Finally, regulators and the financial press report billions of dollars in recent losses from pump‑and‑dump and meme‑style scams in thinly traded micro‑cap listings, again typically involving investors putting outsized positions into a handful of touted stocks that later collapsed. (investopedia.com) While we lack a clean, comprehensive dataset that directly compares all single‑name bets to diversified baskets of the same speculative listings, the realized pattern—proliferation of early‑stage speculative listings, many individual blowups, heavy retail concentration in a few ‘already made’ stories, and large subsequent losses—matches Friedberg’s qualitative claim that non‑diversified investors in single hot stocks were very likely to have a “tremendous learning experience,” whereas only more diversified exposure and/or broader portfolios had a reasonable chance at acceptable long‑term returns relative to the market.