Available data through late 2025 suggests that the specific mechanisms Chamath predicted have not materialized at the scale he implied:

1. Non‑dilutive financing is still small relative to equity VC and hasn’t clearly reset deal pricing.

   • Global revenue‑based financing (RBF)—a key non‑dilutive category—was about $6.4B in 2023, with forecasts to grow quickly thereafter. (alliedmarketresearch.com)
   • By contrast, global venture capital investment was roughly $314B in 2024, orders of magnitude larger. (barrons.com)
   • Analyses of the 2022–2024 “valuation reset” in startups attribute pricing changes mainly to higher interest rates, public‑market multiple compression, and slower exits, not to alternative/non‑dilutive financing options. (stephens.com)
   • Carta’s detailed data on U.S. startup rounds shows valuations cycling up and down with macro conditions and stage, but there is no evidence that RBF or other non‑dilutive tools have been the dominant driver of pre‑/post‑money pricing; if anything, the story is lower activity, more down rounds, and more bridges, not a structural repricing caused by non‑dilutive capital. (carta.com)

2. Employee equity is not clearly rising as a share of total compensation and may have shrunk.

   • Carta’s H2 2024 compensation report notes that, compared to three years earlier, equity now makes up a smaller portion of the typical startup compensation package, even as companies emphasize efficiency and leaner teams. (carta.com)
   • The H1 2024 report similarly shows that average equity packages for new hires fell sharply in 2022–2023 and then flattened, rather than entering a new era of much larger employee ownership. (carta.com)
   • There is evidence that more startups offer ESOPs (e.g., one survey claims 78% offering ESOPs in 2024 vs. 59% in 2021), but that’s about prevalence, not necessarily larger equity stakes per employee, and it isn’t clearly tied to non‑dilutive financing rather than general competition for talent. (linkedin.com)
   • Founder‑ownership data from Carta shows founders still get heavily diluted by traditional rounds (e.g., median founder team ownership falling to ~23% by Series B), which is inconsistent with a broad shift to non‑dilutive growth capital preserving large equity pools for employees. (foundevo.com)

3. Brand‑name VC firms like Sequoia remain extremely powerful signals, arguably more concentrated than before.

   • 2024–2025 industry analyses show historic consolidation: the top 30 VC firms raised ~75% of all U.S. VC fundraising in 2024, with just nine firms capturing about half; Andreessen Horowitz alone accounted for more than 11% of all VC funds raised. (forbes.com)
   • Time, OpenVC, and other rankings for 2024–2025 consistently place Sequoia Capital and a16z at or near the top of global VC league tables, emphasizing their brand recognition and access as major advantages. (flyrank.com)
   • LP capital has become more concentrated in established “brand” firms, with one 2025 analysis estimating that ~20 firms (led by a16z) captured about 60% of all U.S. VC fundraising in 2024, while many emerging managers and micro‑funds struggled. (afurrier.com)
   • This consolidation and the continued dominance of firms like Sequoia contradict the idea that their brand signal (“I’m calling from Sequoia”) has become broadly irrelevant relative to individual operators.

4. Solo GPs and operator‑angels have grown, but they coexist with—not displace—top brands.

   • There has been a notable rise of solo capitalists, operator‑angels, and micro VCs, supported by platforms like Sydecar and YouVC, and commentary about the “unbundling” of VC and the barbell structure of big funds at the top and niche solo GPs at the bottom. (flexcapital.com)
   • Recent coverage of a 2025 solo‑GP‑focused fund notes that the model is gaining traction, but also explicitly says that the standard multi‑partner firm model “isn’t going away” and that data comparing solo GPs to traditional firms is still limited. (wsj.com)
   • In parallel, however, LPs are concentrating commitments into large, established firms, which indicates that solo GPs and operator‑investors are a meaningful complement at the margins rather than a force that has broadly reduced the signaling value of Sequoia‑type brands.

Synthesis vs. the original claim
Chamath’s prediction combined several linked claims: that non‑dilutive financing would become so important that it would (a) significantly and broadly change venture pricing, (b) increase the equity share held by employees, and (c) erode the signaling value of big‑name VC brands relative to individual operators. As of late 2025, the evidence shows:

• Non‑dilutive/RBF is growing fast but still small, and the major shifts in valuations/pricing are driven by macro and exit conditions, not by founders systematically replacing equity rounds with non‑dilutive capital. (alliedmarketresearch.com)
• Employee equity as a share of compensation has fallen, not risen, in aggregate over the last three years. (carta.com)
• Brand‑name VC firms are more dominant than ever, capturing a super‑majority of new LP capital and sitting atop every major ranking, which is the opposite of their signaling power fading. (forbes.com)

Because the core directional claims (on pricing, employee equity share, and brand‑signal erosion) have largely not occurred—and in some cases the opposite trend is observable—the prediction is best judged as wrong, even though some sub‑trends he highlighted (growth of non‑dilutive tools and individual operators) are real but marginal to the overall market dynamics so far.