E97: SPAC updates, public/private market overview, Putin's end game & more

Using straightforward total-return comparison for the 5–6 months after the Sept 23, 2022 podcast, broad equities clearly did better than a cash‑in‑SPAC‑trust strategy, but on a risk‑adjusted basis (which is how you’ve normalized the claim) the answer depends on subjective assumptions, so it can’t be cleanly scored.

1. What happened to the broad equity market?

• The S&P 500 closed at 3,693.23 on Sept 23, 2022 and 4,109.31 on Mar 31, 2023, a price gain of about 11.3% over roughly 6 months; by Feb 28, 2023 it was already up about 7.5% from the Sept 23 level.
  • Sept 23, 2022 close: 3,693.23【1search1】
  • Feb 28, 2023 close: 3,970.15【1search0】
  • Mar 31, 2023 close: 4,109.31【1search3】
• Adding dividends (roughly 1–2% annually) puts the S&P 500 total return in the ~8–12% range over that 5–6 month window, depending on exact start/end dates.

2. What did “cash in a SPAC trust” offer over that window?

• Pre‑combination SPACs hold IPO proceeds in a trust invested in T‑bills or equivalents, and common shareholders can redeem for the $10 trust value plus accrued interest, making the downside similar to a short‑term Treasury plus a small equity option.【2search2】2search5】
• In October 2022 (right around the prediction date), Pender’s arbitrage commentary notes that SPACs searching for targets were trading at discounts to trust implying yield‑to‑maturity in excess of 7.1%, and they were “targeting yields in excess of 6%” from SPAC arbitrage.【2search9】
• Accelerate’s Julian Klymochko reported that through 2022 SPAC arbitrage yields roughly doubled from 2.4% to 4.3%, and by early 2023 they saw SPAC arbitrage yields ≈4.5%, with their arbitrage fund’s unlevered underlying portfolio yield around 7.1%, 75% of which was SPAC arbitrage.【2search1】
• Translating those annualized yields into a 5–6 month holding period implies a realized return on the order of ~2–4%, assuming you just sit in diversified pre‑deal SPACs and redeem/liquidate rather than take post‑merger equity risk.

3. Raw performance vs. risk‑adjusted performance

• On raw return, the S&P 500’s ~8–12% total return over the period materially exceeded the ~2–4% you’d expect from parking in SPAC trusts at 6–7% annualized yields. So if “better” meant simply “makes more money,” the prediction was wrong.
• However, Chamath’s actual wording refers to the SPAC‑trust approach as effectively a superior cash‑like alternative, and your normalized version emphasizes a “risk‑adjusted basis.” Pre‑deal SPAC trusts in late 2022 and early 2023 were widely marketed and analyzed as a low‑risk, T‑bill‑backed “fixed‑income alternative” with capital protection via redemption and modest positive carry.【2search9】2search1】
• Over the same window, equity markets were still volatile, with stress peaking around the March 2023 regional banking turmoil (e.g., Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse on March 10, 2023【4search16】 and volatility indices spiking in March 2023【4search0】). That implies a much higher standard deviation of returns for a broad‑equity position than for a portfolio of near‑par SPAC trusts.

Putting it together:

• We can measure ex‑post raw returns precisely and they favor equities, contradicting the idea that SPAC‑trust cash would simply “do better” in absolute performance.
• We do not have a single, objective standard for how Chamath intended “risk‑adjusted” (Sharpe vs. Sortino vs. drawdown‑sensitivity, investor risk aversion, which exact "market" index, which exact set of SPACs, etc.). With SPAC arbitrage offering ~6–7% annualized yields at T‑bill‑like risk and equities delivering higher but much more volatile returns, a reasonable person could argue either that:
  • Equities were better (higher realized return justifies the risk), or
  • SPAC trusts were better per unit of risk (higher Sharpe‑type ratio), depending on model and preferences.

Because the truth value of the claim hinges on a subjective, unspecified risk‑adjustment standard, and the data can support different conclusions depending on that standard, the prediction is best classified as ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.

Available data on the post‑boom SPAC market indicate that a majority of the 2020–2021 SPAC cohort ultimately liquidated and returned capital, with technology/TMT-focused vehicles making up a disproportionate share of those liquidations—consistent with Chamath’s prediction that the “overwhelming majority” of tech SPACs still searching in late 2022 would “wind up.”

Key points:

1. Large overhang of SPACs still searching in late 2022
   By December 2022 there were still more than 400 SPACs “looking for acquisition partners” and “over 400 SPACs still searching for capital,” many of them from the 2020–2021 boom period and heavily tech-oriented. (marketbrief.edweek.org) This is essentially the set Chamath was talking about (the “several hundred” still searching).

2. Liquidations ended up exceeding completed mergers for the backlog
   SPAC Research data summarized by The Logic show that from January 2022 through July 2023, 274 SPACs dissolved without finding a merger candidate, versus only 147 that successfully completed mergers during the same period—about 65% liquidations among SPACs whose fate was decided in that window. (thelogic.co) That is already well above the 50% threshold Chamath was pointing to, and this liquidation wave was drawn largely from the backlog of SPACs that were still searching in 2022.

3. By cohort: a majority of 2021 SPACs liquidated
   SPACInsider’s full‑year 2024 review reports that of the 613 SPAC IPOs from 2021, 314 (51.2%) had opted to liquidate by the end of 2024, while 227 had completed de‑SPAC mergers and 72 were still searching or in the “announced” stage. (spacinsider.com) Among the 541 SPACs from that cohort whose outcome was resolved (liquidated or merged), about 58% liquidated (314 / (314+227)). Those 2021 IPOs constitute the bulk of the “several hundred” SPACs still searching as of late 2022, so their realized outcomes are a direct test of the prediction.

4. Boom‑era SPACs overall: about half failed to find any target
   A 2025 Reuters Breakingviews analysis, drawing on SPACInsider data, notes that during the 2020–2021 boom about 860 SPAC IPOs raised roughly $250 billion, and that “roughly half of them…failed to find a target within their typical two-year deadline, instead returning the cash to shareholders.” (reuters.com) That is again squarely in line with a “more than 50% will liquidate” view for the overall pool of boom‑era SPACs.

5. Tech/TMT SPACs were particularly prone to liquidate
   A SPAC Consultants 2023 outlook notes that as of February 7, 2023 there were 348 SPACs scheduled to expire in 2023, and that SPACs looking for targets in the technology, media, and telecom (TMT) sector accounted for the majority of the 2023 liquidations so far; it also counted 158 TMT‑focused SPACs still seeking targets and projected that 2023 liquidations would exceed those of 2021 and 2022 combined. (spacconsultants.com) Given that tech/TMT-focused SPACs were a large and above‑average share of liquidations, the liquidation rate for the tech‑focused subset Chamath described is, if anything, higher than the already‑documented >50% rate for the 2021 cohort overall.

6. Cumulative liquidation numbers support the >50% threshold
   Aggregating SPAC Research figures cited in legal and market analyses shows ~140 liquidations in 2022, 193 in 2023, and 58 in 2024, for roughly 391 liquidations since the start of 2022 alone—most of them from the 2020–2021 IPO cohorts that formed the backlog still searching in late 2022. (businesslawtoday.org) That scale of liquidations, relative to the roughly 800–900 boom‑era SPACs, is consistent with (and in some cuts clearly above) a 50% liquidation rate.

Caveat: No public dataset slices the universe exactly as “tech-focused SPACs still searching as of September 2022,” so we cannot compute a precise denominator just for that subset. However:

• The majority of liquidations in 2023 were in TMT-focused SPACs. (spacconsultants.com)
• For the main 2021 SPAC cohort—which provided most of those tech vehicles—more than half have already liquidated, and among resolved outcomes, liquidations significantly outnumber mergers. (spacinsider.com)

Taken together, the best available evidence strongly supports that more than 50% of the “several hundred” tech‑oriented SPACs still hunting for deals in September 2022 ultimately failed to complete a business combination and instead liquidated and returned cash. That makes Chamath’s normalized prediction essentially correct.

Available data show that from mid‑2022 through roughly mid‑2024, the IPO/SPAC/direct‑listing market for late‑stage, venture‑backed tech companies was historically weak, with only a handful of notable exits, which matches Sacks’s “frozen for two years / very few exits” characterization.

• Macro view of the window:

  • Multiple analyses describe 2022–2024 as an IPO “winter,” with the IPO window effectively closed in 2022 and the SPAC market largely collapsed, forcing private tech companies to delay liquidity and stay private longer. (sampfordadvisors.com)
  • Jay Ritter’s VC‑exit data (as summarized in a 2025 review of unicorns) report that VC‑backed IPOs averaged just 22 per year from 2022–2024, versus 156 in 2021, the lowest level since the financial crisis, indicating a dramatic drying‑up of public exits. (reddit.com)

• Evidence specific to late‑stage tech IPOs:

  • By June 29, 2023, CNBC reported there had not been a single “notable venture‑backed tech IPO” in the U.S. since December 2021, implying essentially zero high‑profile tech IPOs over ~18 months that include the second half of 2022. (cnbc.com)
  • TechCrunch’s 2023 look at the drought counted only one meaningful U.S. tech IPO from private‑capital‑backed companies between the start of 2022 and late August 2023, underscoring how closed the window was for the kind of late‑stage startups Sacks was talking about. (techcrunch.com)
  • A 2025 overview of venture exits notes that 2022 IPO exit value collapsed by ~90% vs. 2021; the IPO window “slammed shut” in 2022 and 2023 remained very slow, with Arm, Instacart, and Klaviyo in late 2023 described as the first significant IPOs after a long drought—just a few flagship deals, not a broadly open window. (afurrier.com)

• Activity in late 2023–mid‑2024:

  • The late‑2023 IPOs of Arm, Instacart, and Klaviyo and early‑2024 IPOs such as Reddit, Astera Labs, and Rubrik are widely described as ending or thawing a two‑year tech IPO drought, not as part of a normal pipeline. (cnbc.com)
  • Even counting those, the volumes stayed very low: Renaissance Capital reported that as of October 31, 2024, only five VC‑backed tech IPOs had occurred in all of 2024, versus a 10‑year historical average of 23 per year, and that private VC‑backed tech companies had largely stayed on the sidelines for the prior three years. (renaissancecapital.com)
  • Across all sectors, the Wall Street Journal noted only 15 U.S. venture‑backed IPOs in the first half of 2024, far below the historical average of ~82 per year, confirming that the first half of 2024 was still extremely muted. Digital‑health data from Rock Health show a 21‑month stretch with no IPO/SPAC exits until Q2 2024, another sign that public exits in tech‑adjacent verticals were essentially frozen until mid‑2024. (wsj.com)

• SPACs/direct listings:

  • SPACs, which had been an alternative exit path, also collapsed: SPAC IPOs fell from 613 in 2021 to 86 in 2022 and just 31 in 2023, and hundreds of SPACs were liquidated without completing mergers, meaning this route was largely shut off for late‑stage tech as well. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, the record shows that from mid‑2022 through about mid‑2024, late‑stage private tech companies faced an exceptionally sparse set of IPO/SPAC/direct‑listing opportunities—only a few high‑profile exceptions against a backdrop of a shut or nearly shut window. That reality fits Sacks’s prediction (“exit ideas frozen for two years… very few exits”) materially well, so the prediction is best judged as right.

Key facts:

• PitchBook–NVCA data show that U.S. VC deal value in 2021 was about $330B ($329.9B) – the peak year for deployment. (nvca.org)
• In 2022, U.S. VC deal value was $238.3B, down only ~30% from 2021 (about 70% of the 2021 level), not to one‑third. (gamesbeat.com)
• In 2023, U.S. venture deal value fell further to $170.6B—roughly half of 2021, still well above one‑third. (en.ain.ua)
• In 2024, U.S. startup funding rebounded to about $209B, roughly 60% of 2021’s level, again nowhere near one‑third. (reuters.com)
• By 2025, AI-driven megadeals had pushed U.S. VC investing back to its highest levels since 2021; H1 2025 already totaled about $163B and Q1 2025 dealmaking was described as a “biggest splurge in three years,” putting 2025 on track to rival 2021 rather than remain at one‑third of it. (rothschildandco.com)

Across 2022–2024 (and into 2025), annual U.S. VC deployment has generally been in the ~50–70% of 2021 range and is now rebounding toward prior highs, not stabilizing around one‑third of 2021. That makes Sacks’s quantitative prediction about future annual deployment levels substantially incorrect.

Real‑time and revised data show that after the weak first half of 2022, the U.S. economy did not experience the double‑dip pattern Sacks described.

• BEA data show real GDP growth was positive in every quarter from Q3 2022 through Q4 2024 (e.g., Q4 2023 +3.4% annualized; Q1 2024 +1.4%; Q4 2024 +2.3–2.4%). This is a sustained expansion, not a brief, “slightly positive” pause before another downturn beginning soon after late 2022. (apps.bea.gov)
• A summary table of quarterly real GDP growth through Q1 2025 shows continuous positive growth from Q3 2022 onward, with the first negative quarter after early 2022 only appearing in Q1 2025 (–0.3% annualized). (visualcapitalist.com) That is far later than “once the full impact of [2022] interest‑rate hikes is felt” and follows more than two years of solid growth.
• Even with the Q1 2025 contraction, there has been only one negative GDP quarter so far; by either the popular “two consecutive negative quarters” rule or the broader NBER standard, this does not yet constitute a new recession or a clear “second dip.” Major coverage notes that Q1 2025’s drop has raised concerns but does not itself mark a recession. (theguardian.com)
• The National Bureau of Economic Research, which is the arbiter of U.S. business‑cycle dates, still lists the last recession as the COVID downturn that ended in April 2020 and has not announced any new peak or trough since then—implying one long expansion from mid‑2020 onward, not a double‑dip sequence. (nber.org)

Because (1) there was no downturn beginning shortly after late 2022, (2) growth instead remained robust through 2023–24, and (3) as of late 2025 there is still no officially recognized second recession following a brief positive blip, Sacks’s prediction of a double‑dip recession with the second dip starting after late 2022 has not materialized and is best judged wrong.

Assessing the 18‑month window from roughly October 2022 through March 2024:

1. Unemployment “will go back up”
   The data: The U.S. unemployment rate was about 3.6% in Q4 2022 and only edged up to 3.8% by Q4 2023, with BLS explicitly describing the labor market as still “strong.”(bls.gov) It did not meaningfully deteriorate during 2023; the more noticeable rise to around 4.1% came later, in mid‑2024, i.e., after most of his 18‑month window.(reuters.com)
   Verdict: At best marginally correct and much milder than implied.

2. “Inflation will be sticky”
   The data: CPI inflation averaged 8.0% in 2022, then fell to 4.1% in 2023 and 2.9% in 2024.(usinflationcalculator.com) Year‑over‑year CPI was about 3% by mid‑2023 and mid‑3% by early 2024, well down from 2022’s peak.(beautifydata.com) Inflation remained above the Fed’s 2% target but clearly decelerated instead of staying near 2022’s highs. Verdict: Partly right in the sense of remaining above target in 2023, but wrong on it staying broadly “sticky” at 2022‑like stress levels.

3. “Real earnings will shrink”
   The data: For 2023, BLS reports median usual weekly earnings up 5.5% while CPI rose 4.1%, meaning real median weekly pay increased.(bls.gov) BLS real‑earnings series show real average hourly earnings rising in 2023–24 (e.g., +1.4% Jan 2023–Jan 2024, with real weekly earnings roughly flat to slightly down, then positive into late 2024).(bls.gov) Earlier in 2022 real earnings had been falling, but over most of his forecast window they recovered or at worst stagnated, not persistently shrank. Verdict: Wrong for the forecast period.

4. “Consumption will ebb” for the U.S. consumer
   The data: Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) kept growing. Current‑dollar PCE rose 9.8% in 2022 and another 6.4% in 2023.(fraser.stlouisfed.org) Real PCE for the nation increased 2.5% in 2023, with real PCE rising in 48 states and D.C.(bea.gov) That is slower growth than 2021–22 but still healthy expansion, not an ebb or contraction. Verdict: Wrong; consumer spending remained resilient in real terms.

5. “Earnings will not be that great” (corporate earnings)
   The data: S&P 500 earnings growth for full‑year 2023 was about 0.6%, far below the 10‑year average (~8%), with actual quarterly earnings declines in 1H23.(insight.factset.com) That fits “not that great.” However, by 2024, S&P 500 earnings rebounded strongly: estimates and realized data point to roughly 9–13% earnings growth for 2024, and Q4 2024 earnings were ~15% higher year‑over‑year.(apnews.com) His timeframe—“through 2023 and possibly even a little bit of 24”—captures both a weak 2023 and the start of a strong 2024 rebound. Verdict: Largely right for 2023, but wrong once 2024’s rebound is included in his own stated horizon.

6. Overall consumer conditions (“really tough, sticky time”)
   Pulling this together:

   • Labor market stayed historically tight with only a slight uptick in unemployment through 2023.(bls.gov)
   • Inflation fell sharply from 2022 levels, even if still a bit above target.(usinflationcalculator.com)
   • Real incomes and real consumption generally rose, not fell.(bls.gov)
   • Corporate earnings were flat/weak in 2023 but then strong in 2024.(insight.factset.com)

   Households certainly felt a squeeze from prior price jumps and high interest rates, but the quantitative indicators do not show the broad, sustained deterioration he predicted for the 18‑month period starting late 2022.

Bottom line: Some narrow elements (slightly higher unemployment, lackluster 2023 earnings, above‑target inflation) align with his view, but the core of the prediction—shrinking real earnings, ebbing consumption, and a generally “really tough” grind for consumers through 2023–early 2024—runs contrary to observed data. Overall the prediction is best characterized as wrong.

Evidence on the major U.S. equity indices lines up with Chamath’s call that the 2022 bear market was in a bottoming process that would largely complete by late 2022 / early 2023, after which markets would base and move higher rather than making materially lower lows:

• S&P 500: The index’s lowest close of the 2022 bear market was 3,577.03 on October 12, 2022, and this level has not been undercut since. Market data and commentary widely treat that date as the bear‑market low, with the subsequent advance described as a new bull run that began from that October 12, 2022 bottom. (statmuse.com)
• Nasdaq Composite: The Nasdaq’s bear‑market closing low was 10,213.29 on December 28, 2022, the lowest close in 2022 and in the entire 2022–2024 window; after that, it trended higher and never printed a lower close through at least early 2024. (statmuse.com)
• Russell 2000 (small caps): Quarterly data show its 2022 lows occurring by mid‑2022, with subsequent quarterly lows in late 2022 and through 2023 all above those levels, indicating the small‑cap bear phase had also bottomed by late 2022 and then based at higher levels. (sec.gov)
• Post‑bottom behavior: By June 2023, the S&P 500 had risen more than 20% from its October 2022 low—meeting a common definition of a new bull market—and subsequent drawdowns in 2023–2024 were corrections from significantly higher prices, not breaks to new cycle lows. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, U.S. equity markets did finish their bottoming process roughly by the end of 2022 (S&P in October, Nasdaq by late December), and from early 2023 onward they formed a base and advanced without making substantially lower lows from those 2022 troughs. That matches the essence and timing of Chamath’s prediction, so it is best classified as right.

Evidence from the major U.S. equity indices matches Chamath’s call that by roughly late 2022 / early 2023 the market would have bottomed and begun base‑building rather than continuing its 2022 downtrend.

1. S&P 500 timing and bottom

   • The S&P 500’s bear‑market low is widely identified as October 12, 2022, when it closed at 3,577.03; SEC tables list 3,577.03 as the low for Q4 2022. (cnbc.com)
   • In Q1 2023 the S&P 500 traded in a higher range (low 3,808.10; high 4,179.76; quarter‑end 4,109.31), i.e., it did not make a lower low after October 2022. (sec.gov)
   • By June 8, 2023 the index had risen more than 20% off its October 12 low, and multiple market commentaries and data providers marked this as the official end of the bear market and start of a new cyclical bull, with the bull market’s start date defined as the October 12, 2022 trough. (rbcapitalmanagement.com)
   • By late 2024–2025, S&P 500 analyses and Reuters describe the ongoing advance as the same bull market that began from the October 12, 2022 bottom, with the index up on the order of ~90% from that low by October 2025. (reuters.com)
     Collectively, this shows the S&P 500 put in a cyclical bottom in October 2022 (within Chamath’s “by the end of this year” window) and then moved into a base‑and‑rally phase rather than continuing its prior steep downtrend.

2. Nasdaq Composite timing and bottom

   • Reuters and other reports document that the Nasdaq Composite made its bear‑market closing low on December 28, 2022, at 10,213.29, the lowest level of the decline that began in late 2021. (investing.com)
   • Historical summaries of Nasdaq closing milestones likewise identify 10,213.29 on December 28, 2022 as the “ultimate low” of the 2022 bear market. (grokipedia.com)
   • From early 2023 onward, the Nasdaq began a powerful recovery: by the end of 2023 it was up more than 40% for the year, largely driven by a renewed tech/AI rally, and by late 2024 it had roughly doubled from its 2022 low, surpassing 20,000. (cnbc.com)
     These data show the Nasdaq’s cyclical bottom occurred in late December 2022—again squarely inside Chamath’s “end of this year” timeframe—with early 2023 marking the transition into a new uptrend/base rather than a continuation of the 2022 slide.

3. No undercut of those lows after Q1 2023

   • SEC and index data through at least late 2024/2025 show that the S&P 500 never revisited or broke below its October 12, 2022 low: subsequent quarterly lows stayed hundreds of points above 3,577.03. (sec.gov)
   • Similarly, later volatility and even new bear markets (e.g., for the Russell 2000 and a 2025 Nasdaq bear from much higher levels) occurred far above the 2022 troughs, consistent with those 2022 lows being the prior cycle’s bottom rather than waypoints in a still‑ongoing decline. (cnbc.com)

4. Match to Chamath’s prediction

   • He predicted that “by the end of this year, beginning of next year” (i.e., roughly late 2022 into early 2023) the major U.S. indices would have bottomed and begin building a base, rather than continuing the sharp downtrend.
   • In reality, the S&P 500 and Nasdaq Composite did put in their cycle lows in October 2022 and December 2022, respectively, and by Q1 2023 were trading in higher ranges that, in hindsight, marked the early phase of the current bull market. (sec.gov)

Given that both key benchmarks (S&P 500 and Nasdaq) bottomed within his stated window and then transitioned into a base‑and‑advance phase that has, with hindsight, been recognized as the start of a new bull market, the prediction is best judged as right.

Multiple official and secondary sources show that during the post‑COVID inflation tightening cycle the Federal Reserve raised the target federal funds rate well above 5%. The FOMC began hiking from 0.00–0.25% in March 2022 and, through a sequence of increases, brought the target range to 4.75–5.00% on March 22, 2023, 5.00–5.25% on May 3, 2023, and then 5.25–5.50% on July 26, 2023, where it peaked. (en.wikipedia.org)

These levels are consistent with data on the effective federal funds rate, which reached about 5.33% in August 2023. (statista.com)

Because Chamath predicted on Sept 23, 2022 that the Fed funds rate in this inflationary tightening cycle would be "at or breaching 5%," and the rate in fact rose to and above 5% in 2023, his prediction was right.

Multiple major “risk asset” benchmarks put in decisive cycle lows in late 2022 and have not undercut those lows through late 2025.

• U.S. equities: The S&P 500’s bear‑market closing low was 3,577.03 on October 12, 2022, which is widely cited as the bear‑market bottom; by June 2023 it had risen more than 20% off that level, marking the start of a new bull market, and later data still reference 3,577.03 as the 52‑week/bear‑market low. These lows have not been broken in subsequent corrections. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Growth/tech equities: The Nasdaq Composite’s bear‑market closing low occurred on December 28, 2022 at 10,213.29; later corrections in 2023–2025 have all occurred at much higher index levels, confirming that the trough remained in late 2022. (investing.com)
• Crypto as a high‑beta risk asset: Bitcoin’s cycle low occurred around November 21, 2022, when it traded below $16,000; later on‑chain and market analyses explicitly identify that sub‑$16k level in November 2022 as the bear‑market bottom, and prices in 2024–2025 remain many multiples above it despite volatility. (statmuse.com)
• Global equity risk: Analyses of the 2022 stock market decline and MSCI ACWI performance note that global equities, including ACWI, reached their nadir in October 2022 before beginning a sustained recovery; by 2025 ACWI is trading far above its 2022 levels, consistent with an October‑2022 global risk‑asset bottom. (grokipedia.com)

Given that the broad U.S. equity market, global equities, and a canonical high‑beta risk asset (Bitcoin) all made durable cycle lows in late 2022 (October–December) and have not set new lows since, Chamath’s prediction that “risk assets will bottom out by the end of this year, beginning of next year” is well aligned with how the cycle actually played out.

The prediction has a 6–7 year horizon from 2022, i.e., through roughly 2028–2029, while the current date is November 30, 2025. That means only about 3 years of the forecast window have elapsed, so we cannot yet know whether prices will in fact “double again” by the end of the stated period.

What we can check so far:

• U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data show that California’s average retail electricity prices for residential customers have indeed risen substantially since 2022 (following strong increases that began earlier in the decade), but the final cumulative increase and full 6–7‑year path are not yet observable. Current prices do not yet represent a completed doubling from 2022 levels, nor do they show a clear, sustained reversal that would falsify the claim early; instead, they remain on an elevated, rising trajectory consistent with higher year‑over‑year growth, though exact annualized percentages vary by year and customer class.

Because (a) the forecast period is not over, and (b) nothing in the realized data so far definitively contradicts the possibility of doubling by 2028–2029, the only defensible judgment as of late 2025 is that the prediction’s accuracy is inconclusive (too early to tell).