OpenAI's GPT-5 Flop, AI's Unlimited Market, China's Big Advantage, Rise in Socialism, Housing Crisis

Jason’s prediction was that “in the next five years” there would be roughly $1–2 trillion deployed into AI-related data centers. The episode aired on August 9, 2025, and the quote in transcript form clearly frames this as a five‑year forward-looking claim about cumulative investment.(speakai.co)

As of the current date (November 30, 2025), less than one year of that five‑year window (Aug 2025–Aug 2030) has elapsed, so the actual 5‑year cumulative spend is not yet known. Existing figures and reports are mainly forecasts, not realized totals. For example, Dell’Oro Group and others project that AI-related data center and infrastructure capex over the next several years will exceed $1 trillion, and some estimates (e.g., Brookfield, McKinsey) put AI data center or compute-related capex in the multi-trillion-dollar range by 2030, suggesting Jason’s order-of-magnitude estimate is plausible or even conservative.(prnewswire.com) But because these are projections rather than final, realized numbers, we cannot yet say whether the world actually did invest $1–2 trillion in AI data centers during the full five-year period he specified.

Therefore, the prediction’s correctness cannot currently be determined and is inconclusive (too early).

The prediction explicitly refers to "the coming years" and says socialism will "sweep over this nation" (the U.S.), which implies a multi‑year horizon beyond the few months that have passed between the podcast date (August 9, 2025) and now (November 30, 2025). That time frame has clearly not elapsed, so the claim can’t be fairly judged yet.

Substantively, current indicators do not yet show socialism as nationally dominant:

• National polling still shows most U.S. voters prefer a free‑market system over socialism; one 2025 survey finds 71% of likely voters say a free‑market economy is better than socialism and only 12% say socialism is better. (rasmussenreports.com)
• Gallup‑based reporting indicates that while support for capitalism is at a historic low (about 54% viewing it favorably), socialism remains less popular overall, with roughly 39% favorability nationwide. (foxnews.com)
• Within the Democratic Party, socialism has become relatively popular (about two‑thirds of Democrats view it positively), but Republicans and independents remain largely negative, so it is far from a cross‑partisan national consensus. (yournews.com)
• Politically, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed a resolution explicitly denouncing socialism, with a large bipartisan majority voting in favor—hardly evidence of socialism having already “swept” national politics. (time.com)

However, because the prediction’s horizon is “coming years,” it is too early, as of late 2025, to decide definitively whether socialism will eventually “sweep over” the U.S. and produce the broad unhappiness Friedberg fears. The appropriate classification is therefore inconclusive (too early to tell), even though available data so far do not show the predicted dominance of socialism nationwide.

What the prediction required
Normalized: If the Fed cuts rates by about 50 bps sometime in Sept–Nov 2025, then U.S. CPI inflation will subsequently rise back to 3.0–3.9% year‑over‑year (a “3‑handle”) within the following months.

What actually happened so far

1. Fed policy in Sept–Nov 2025
   The FOMC cut the target federal funds range by 25 bps on September 17, 2025 (to 4.00–4.25%) and again by 25 bps on October 29, 2025 (to 3.75–4.00%). That’s a cumulative 50‑basis‑point cut within the Sept–Nov window, so the condition (“if the Fed cuts ~50 bps in Sept–Nov”) has been met. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Inflation behavior around that time

   • CPI year‑over‑year was 2.7% in June and July 2025. (bls.gov)
   • It then rose to 2.9% in August 2025. (bls.gov)
   • The September 2025 CPI report (released October 24) shows the all‑items CPI up 3.0% year‑over‑year, i.e., already a “3‑handle.” (bls.gov)

   So by September, inflation had risen back to 3.0%.

3. Data gap after the full 50 bps of cuts
   The last 25‑bp cut that completes the “~50 bps” path occurred on October 29, 2025. The months “subsequent” to that are November 2025 onward. However, because of the October–November 2025 government shutdown, the October CPI was not collected and will not be released, and the November CPI report (which will partly impute October) has not yet been published as of November 30, 2025. (reuters.com)
   That means we do not yet have any CPI data for a month that is clearly after the full 50‑bp cut path is in place.

Why the prediction is labeled ‘inconclusive’

• The antecedent (“Fed cuts ~50 bps in Sept–Nov”) is satisfied: 25 bps in September + 25 bps in October. (en.wikipedia.org)
• We do see CPI at 3.0% in September, which matches the “three‑handle” level Jason talked about. But that 3.0% reading:
  • Largely reflects price movements before the October 29 cut, and
  • Occurs when only half of the eventual 50‑bp Sept–Nov easing (the Sept 17 cut) had taken place.
• The normalized version of the prediction you provided, however, specifies that CPI will “subsequently rise back” to 3–3.9% after the roughly 50‑bp easing in the Sept–Nov window. To test that strictly, we must look at months after the full 50‑bp path is in effect (i.e., November 2025 and beyond). Because of the data shutdown and normal release lag, those CPI figures are not yet available as of November 30, 2025. (reuters.com)

Given this, we can’t yet say—on the basis of actually released post‑cut data—whether “after the ~50‑bp cuts” inflation is at 3–3.9%. His general intuition that inflation would get back to a 3‑handle is already borne out by the September print, but the specific conditional, as normalized (tied to the full Sept–Nov 50‑bp easing), cannot yet be definitively judged.

Hence the verdict: "inconclusive" (too early to fully evaluate), with the caveat that the available data so far are directionally consistent with his claim.

The prediction specified a window of ~18 months from August 2025, i.e. until around February 2027, for “a Gen‑4 reactor [in the U.S.] deployed or started production.” As of November 30, 2025, that deadline has not yet arrived, so we cannot know whether it will ultimately be met.

Current evidence shows several U.S. Generation IV / advanced reactor projects are under development or early construction, but not yet deployed or producing power:

• Project Pele microreactor (DoD/BWXT) – DoD and DOE report that ground was broken at Idaho National Laboratory in 2024 and that the transportable high‑temperature gas reactor is being built by BWXT, with assembly starting in 2025 and potential operation at INL as early as 2026; it is expected to be the first Generation IV reactor to generate electricity in the U.S. (defense.gov)
• Kairos Power Hermes 1 & 2 (fluoride‑salt‑cooled reactors) – The NRC has issued construction permits for Hermes 1 (non‑power demonstration) and, more recently, for Hermes 2 units that Kairos describes as the first electricity‑producing Gen IV reactors permitted for construction in the U.S., but these units are not yet operating. (powermag.com)
• TerraPower Natrium (sodium‑cooled fast reactor, Wyoming) – Non‑nuclear site work started in 2024, with nuclear construction expected after an NRC construction permit targeted for 2026 and operation around 2030; as of late 2025 it has not begun nuclear island construction or operation. (powermag.com)

These timelines suggest it is plausible that at least one Gen IV project (e.g., Project Pele or a Hermes/Natrium unit) could be under construction or even operating by early 2027, but that outcome lies in the future relative to the current date. Because the 18‑month window has not elapsed and we lack information from beyond November 2025, we cannot yet determine whether Friedberg’s prediction will ultimately be correct.

Therefore, the appropriate classification as of now is “inconclusive (too early).”

It’s too early to score this prediction.

Chamath’s claim is about 2030: “I think the estimate is in 2030, 30 million electric vehicles.” The current date is November 30, 2025, so we are still about 4–5 years away from the target year. We can assess trajectory but not the final outcome.

As context, U.S. EV stock (battery electric + plug‑in hybrids) has been growing quickly but is still far below 30 million:

• The International Energy Agency estimated about 3 million electric cars in the U.S. fleet in 2023.
• Various industry and analyst forecasts (BloombergNEF, IEA, major automakers) project continued rapid growth toward the late 2020s, with cumulative EVs plausibly reaching the tens of millions by 2030, but the exact 2030 figure will depend on policy, charging build‑out, consumer adoption, and automaker product plans.

However, because 2030 has not yet occurred, we cannot say whether the U.S. will actually have “on the order of 30 million” EVs by that time. The most accurate status classification today is therefore inconclusive (too early).

There isn’t enough verifiable information on how quickly 2025 All‑In Summit scholarship applications were processed to judge Jason’s claim.

What we can see:

• The public scholarship links used in mid‑ and late‑2025 episodes (e.g., via the bit.ly URL in the show notes) just redirect to an application page that is not accessible through open web archives; none of the mirrored episode descriptions mention a specific response-time promise.(listennotes.com)
• The best third‑party description of the 2025 scholarships—Vanity Fair’s long piece on the 2025 All‑In Summit—confirms the existence and structure of the paid “scholarship application” passes (around $1,500) but does not describe how fast applicants heard back or whether decisions typically came within a week.(vanityfair.com)
• Historical user reports from earlier years (2023–2024) on Reddit show multiple people saying they applied for All‑In Summit scholarships and either had not heard back at all months later or were still waiting without any clear timeline, which cuts against a consistent one‑week turnaround in those years.(reddit.com) However, those anecdotes pre‑date the 2025 process Jason was talking about and don’t prove that 2025 timelines were the same.
• For a different All‑In event (the 2025 Holiday Party), their own event page only says scholarship applications are “reviewed on a rolling basis,” with no commitment to a one‑week SLA, suggesting they generally avoid promising a specific turnaround publicly.(accelevents.com)

Because there’s no reliable, aggregated data on 2025 scholarship response times—and only scattered, older anecdotes that point in different directions—we can’t confidently say whether applicants in 2025 “typically” heard back within a week. The prediction therefore can’t be judged definitively as right or wrong with the evidence currently available.