Red-pilled Billionaires, LA Fire Update, Newsom's Price Caps, TikTok Ban, Jobless MBAs

The prediction is about future reconstruction timelines: that many homes destroyed in the January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires will not be rebuilt for 6–7 years, i.e., until roughly 2031–2032. From a January 2025 starting point, 6–7 years later is 2031–2032, which is still in the future relative to the current date of November 30, 2025.

Only about 10 months have elapsed since the fires, so there is no way yet to empirically verify whether a substantial fraction of affected homes will indeed take 6–7 years to be fully rebuilt. Even if we can find information on early rebuilding progress or projected delays, those are forecasts, not actual outcomes observed in 2031–2032.

Because the prediction is explicitly about outcomes years past our current date, it is too early to determine whether it is right or wrong. Therefore the correct status classification is "inconclusive" (too early).

Chamath made the comment while arguing that a short-term “cooling off period” with some protections (like temporary bans on unsolicited low‑ball offers) was justified immediately after the fires, but that over the following 6–12 months normal market dynamics would reassert themselves: “I suspect that in six months and nine months and twelve months, the free market will sort all of these things out … It can allow the free market to work in a few months from now. We’re only talking 90 days.” (podcasts.happyscribe.com)

Since then, California has maintained and in some cases extended substantial emergency controls:

• Executive Order N‑4‑25 extended price‑gouging limits (generally a 10% cap over pre‑emergency prices) on building materials, storage, construction and related services in Los Angeles County all the way to January 7, 2026. (gov.ca.gov)
• Separate executive orders and alerts extended hotel/rental price‑gouging protections and rent caps into March–July 2025, and barred unsolicited undervalued real‑estate offers in affected ZIP codes until July 1, 2025. (gov.ca.gov)
• Six to ten months after the fires, officials were still reporting significant issues: widespread rent‑gouging complaints, removed listings, scams by unlicensed contractors, long delays in debris removal and rebuilding, and even litigation over wildfire‑related insurance surcharges. (sfchronicle.com)

This evidence suggests that, as of late November 2025 (roughly 10 months post‑fires), market conditions and policy responses have not yet clearly “sorted everything out,” and key price controls will certainly still be in force at least until January 7, 2026. However, Chamath’s own timeframe explicitly includes the 12‑month mark and the user’s normalized phrasing (“by early 2026”) extends slightly beyond the current date, so we have not yet observed the full horizon of the prediction. In addition, his claim is qualitative (“sort all of these things out”) and partly about how a freer market would behave, which is hard to falsify while substantial controls remain in place. For these reasons, it is premature to label the prediction definitively right or wrong, so the fairest status is inconclusive (too early).

As of November 30, 2025, Manhattan’s congestion pricing program is in effect at $9 for most passenger vehicles with E‑ZPass entering at or below 60th Street during peak hours, and it is explicitly scheduled by the MTA to rise to $12 in 2028 and $15 in 2031 under a phased‑in structure (60% of the ultimate toll from 2025–27, 80% from 2028–30, and 100% from 2031 onward).(ny1.com) Those future increases have not yet occurred, and although there have been federal attempts to rescind approval of the program, New York officials are litigating and tolls are still being collected "until further notice," so it is not yet logically ruled out that the announced schedule will be followed.(reuters.com) Because the key dates (2028 and 2031) lie in the future and no definitive policy reversal has made the forecast impossible, the prediction cannot yet be judged as right or wrong.

As of 30 November 2025, TikTok’s Chinese parent ByteDance is under a U.S. law (the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, signed April 2024) that effectively forces it to divest TikTok’s U.S. operations or face a ban, and the Supreme Court upheld that law in January 2025, shortly before Donald Trump’s second inauguration. (en.wikipedia.org) In September 2025 President Trump signed an executive order approving a framework “qualified divestiture” in which TikTok U.S. will be operated by a new U.S.-based joint venture, majority-owned by U.S. and allied investors (Oracle, Silver Lake, Dell and others) with ByteDance retaining under 20%. (whitehouse.gov) Reporting indicates this framework values TikTok’s U.S. business at about $14 billion, a figure noted as far below estimates of ByteDance’s overall valuation (around $330 billion), but that comparison is between the U.S. carve-out and the entire global company, not a clear measure of TikTok U.S.’s fair market value. (theguardian.com) Crucially, as of late November 2025 the deal has not yet closed; Trump’s order gives roughly 120 days (into January 2026) to finalize the transaction, and news coverage continues to describe the divestiture as in progress, with lawmakers still questioning its terms. (reuters.com) Because the spin-out and sale of TikTok U.S. have not been completed and no definitive market consensus exists yet on whether the final price is a “distressed” bargain relative to fair value, the multi-part prediction (forced sale to a mostly American buyer, occurring during a Trump presidency, at a well-below-fair-value price) cannot yet be definitively judged.

Public reporting shows that the federal TikTok sell‑or‑ban law (the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act) did take effect on January 19, 2025, after the Supreme Court upheld it on January 17, 2025, rather than being delayed or mooted by a deal. (en.wikipedia.org) TikTok’s Supreme Court challenge in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland failed, and the company itself stated it would have to shut down without non‑enforcement assurances.

In response, TikTok shut down its U.S. service on January 18, 2025, hours before the deadline, and Apple and Google removed TikTok and other ByteDance apps from their U.S. app stores in anticipation of the law taking effect. (theguardian.com) According to the post‑case summary, TikTok service began to be restored on January 19 after President‑elect Trump signaled he would extend the deadline, but as of January 24, 2025, neither Apple nor Google had restored TikTok to their app stores. (en.wikipedia.org)

Friedberg’s normalized prediction had two key parts:

1. A deal or formal delay around the January 19 deadline so TikTok would not actually be banned.
2. TikTok remaining active in U.S. app stores when the episode aired (within a few days of Jan 18, 2025).

In reality, there was no timely formal deal or legal delay before the January 19 deadline; the ban provisions were allowed to take effect. TikTok was removed from U.S. app stores on or before the deadline and was still absent several days later, even after partial service restoration. (en.wikipedia.org) Therefore, both the “no ban” and “still in app stores” conditions of the prediction were not met, so the prediction is wrong.

Trump’s second term began on Jan 20, 2025, so the first six months ran roughly through July 20, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) During that period, US–China relations were dominated by an escalating trade war and the “Liberation Day” tariff package, which raised U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports up to 145%, prompting Chinese retaliation and rare‑earth export restrictions. (en.wikipedia.org)

On May 12, 2025, the two sides reached an initial Geneva accord that temporarily reduced tariffs (from 145% to 30% on Chinese goods and from 125% to 10% on U.S. goods) and created a 90‑day truce to allow further negotiations. This was explicitly framed by officials and media as an initial or temporary deal, not a comprehensive settlement; steep tariffs, export controls, and broader strategic disputes remained. (whitehouse.gov) Analysts at the time specifically argued that a broad US–China “grand bargain” was not on the horizon and that only more modest, issue‑specific arrangements were realistic. (scmp.com)

Through late July 2025, coverage continued to describe the situation as a limited truce with ongoing talks and anticipated only narrow deals (for example around fentanyl), not a sweeping grand deal that reset the overall relationship. (en.wikipedia.org) A more substantial multi‑year U.S.–China trade and economic agreement was only announced in early November 2025—over nine months into Trump’s term, outside the six‑month window specified in the prediction. (ustr.gov)

Because no widely recognized, broad “grand deal” that clearly eased overall tensions and created a durable, mutual economic reset was reached within the first six months of the Trump administration, the prediction did not come true as stated.

Donald Trump was inaugurated for his second term on January 20, 2025, so the first six months of his administration run roughly through July 20, 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)

Within that window, on May 12, 2025, the U.S. and China announced a Geneva trade deal and joint statement that dramatically rolled back the new, extremely high reciprocal tariffs that had been imposed in April. The agreement lowered the reciprocal tariff component on each side from around 125–145% to 10% for an initial 90-day period, cutting the U.S. general tariff rate on Chinese goods associated with that measure from 125% down to 10% (though a separate 20% “fentanyl” tariff and pre‑existing Section 301/232 tariffs remained).(whitehouse.gov) This is a very large reduction in the marginal tariff burden that had just been imposed on Chinese imports, i.e., a clear move to “minimize tariff impacts” relative to the peak levels Trump had created.

On the Chinese side, the same Geneva deal required Beijing to cut its tariffs on U.S. goods to 10% and to suspend or remove non‑tariff countermeasures and retaliatory duties that had been put in place after April 2, 2025.(whitehouse.gov) Rolling back those retaliatory tariffs and non‑tariff restrictions materially improves access for U.S. exporters and firms in the Chinese market compared with the pre‑deal situation.

Later, on November 1, 2025, a follow‑on Trump–Xi agreement went further: China committed to “open China’s market to U.S. soybeans and other agricultural exports,” end retaliation against U.S. semiconductor manufacturers and other companies, suspend wide‑ranging retaliatory tariffs and non‑tariff measures, and extend tariff‑exclusion processes, while the U.S. further reduced certain China‑related tariffs and extended its own exclusions.(whitehouse.gov) This later deal reinforces the same basic trade‑off: U.S. tariff relief in exchange for greater Chinese-market access for U.S. entities.

There is nuance—overall U.S. duties on Chinese goods remain elevated because Trump also imposed a general 10% baseline tariff and separate fentanyl‑related tariffs, and many Section 301/232 measures stayed in force.(businessinsider.com) But the prediction was about the structure of an early Trump‑term U.S.–China “grand deal”: the U.S. easing tariff pressure on Chinese imports in return for better access to China for U.S. firms. The May 12 Geneva agreement, occurring well within the first six months, matches that pattern closely—large negotiated cuts to new reciprocal tariffs paired with China rolling back retaliatory tariffs and other barriers on U.S. goods and companies.

Given that this core dynamic did in fact occur, the prediction is best classified as right, albeit with the caveat that much of the relief was partial and initially time‑limited rather than a complete, permanent dismantling of Trump’s China tariffs.

Evidence through late 2025 shows that MBA-led search funds and ETA (entrepreneurship through acquisition) vehicles have grown rather than “effectively ceased” after January 2025.

Key points:

• A 2024 Stanford GSB Search Fund Study reports record numbers of searchers and investors, with 681 funds tracked and a record 94 core funds launched in 2023, and describes the community as experiencing “ongoing growth,” not a collapse. This model specifically targets relatively inexperienced, often MBA-trained entrepreneurs raising capital to buy and run small businesses.

  Sources: Stanford GSB Search Fund page and 2024 study highlights. (gsb.stanford.edu)

• In April 2025, Business Insider described search funds—"mini private equity"—as a growing path chosen by young professionals “often under 35 and frequently MBA graduates,” noting that the model “has seen record growth” and citing over 90 search funds launched in 2023. This directly contradicts the idea that newly graduated MBAs raising such capital is “not happening anymore.” (businessinsider.com)

• A September 2025 CNBC piece is explicit that “search funds boom as young buyers snap up firms”, highlighting investors’ strong interest and emphasizing that search funds have become an attractive alternative asset class during a broader VC/PE downturn. It again references the record 94 core funds launched and positions search funds as a safe port drawing more capital, not less. (cnbc.com)

• Multiple 2025 articles describe MBAs specifically as a major driver of ETA/search fund activity. A July–August 2025 piece notes “hundreds of US MBAs” are buying and operating small service businesses via search-fund-style ETA models, emphasizing that this trend is intensifying. (timesofindia.indiatimes.com)

• A June 2025 Forbes Council post, “Inside The Rise Of Search Funds,” frames search funds as a rising, maturing asset class with strong interest from both entrepreneurs and investors, again based on recent Stanford data. (forbes.com)

Across these independent sources, there is clear, contemporaneous evidence that:

1. The number of search funds and total capital in the model remain high and, by recent data, record-setting or near-record-setting.
2. MBA and young-professional participation is widely reported as growing, not shrinking.
3. Investors continue to fund these vehicles, with some sources explicitly saying search funds are thriving relative to traditional PE/VC.

Given that the prediction was effectively, “this won’t be funded anymore going forward,” and that within the same year (2025) we see headlines describing a boom in MBA-driven, investor-funded search funds, the prediction does not match observed reality.

Therefore, the prediction is wrong.

Chamath’s claim was explicitly about a trend that would grow in the coming years, i.e., a multi‑year structural decline in corporate demand for MBAs, especially into management roles. As of November 30, 2025, less than a year has passed since the January 18, 2025 episode, so the full forecast period has not elapsed.

Since early 2025, evidence is mixed. On one hand, reporting on top U.S. schools shows a tougher job market: job offers and placement rates for MBAs at elite programs have fallen, with big consulting and tech employers (e.g., McKinsey and major tech firms) cutting back MBA hiring and delaying start dates, and some data points (like lower placement rates at leading schools) indicating short‑term weakness in demand. (ft.com) This aligns with the idea of pressure on traditional MBA pipelines into certain middle‑management tracks.

On the other hand, large global surveys of corporate recruiters in 2024 and 2025 show sustained overall demand: the Graduate Management Admission Council reports high employer confidence in graduate business education, with the vast majority of recruiters planning to maintain or increase MBA hiring and MBAs projected to outpace other graduate business degrees in 2025. (gmac.com) A 2025 U.S. hiring pulse survey notes that about half of respondents hired fewer MBAs than they had expected for the year, suggesting a cyclical slowdown rather than clear evidence of a long‑run structural collapse. (gmac.com) Sectoral shifts also appear: MBA hiring has cooled in some tech roles but is growing in areas like healthcare and AI‑related businesses. (aacsb.edu)

Given (1) the prediction’s multi‑year horizon, which extends beyond late 2025, and (2) the conflicting current data—short‑term softness contrasted with strong stated medium‑term demand—the outcome cannot yet be determined. The fairest assessment is that it is too early to conclusively label the prediction as right or wrong.

Evidence shows that what Jason described actually happened over inauguration weekend.

1. In the closing “programming note” of the Jan 18, 2025 episode Red-pilled Billionaires, LA Fire Update, Newsom's Price Caps, TikTok Ban, Jobless MBAs, Jason says the besties will all be at inauguration parties that weekend and that they will do “live episodes” of the All-In Podcast on Sunday/Monday, telling listeners to subscribe on YouTube and follow on X so they get notifications “when we go live on those two platforms.” (speakai.co)

2. The episode list for that weekend shows:

   • Jan 19, 2025: Senator Ted Cruz | The All-In Inauguration Series.
   • Jan 20, 2025: Inauguration Interviews: Trump’s Talent, Democratic Rebrand & more with House Whip Emmer, Reps Swalwell & Khanna. These are explicitly labeled as inauguration-themed episodes released on the Sunday and Monday immediately following the Jan 18 show. (allinchamathjason.libsyn.com)

3. Transcripts of the Cruz and “Inauguration Interviews” episodes make clear that the hosts were physically in Washington, D.C. for Trump’s second inauguration. The Ted Cruz transcript opens, “We’re here at the inauguration of our 47th President, Donald J. Trump,” while the Jan 20 episode begins, “Welcome to the All In Inauguration special. We are here in town… we’re in a glass box on the street,” and closes with “That’s a wrap from the 47th inauguration of the United States.” (podcasts.happyscribe.com)

4. Independent reporting on the inauguration weekend confirms that all four All-In hosts attended inauguration-related events such as the Crypto Inaugural Ball, with photos of them at the festivities posted on X. (theguardian.com) This corroborates Jason’s statement that “we’re all going to be at the inauguration [at] various parties this weekend.” (speakai.co)

5. In the Jan 25, 2025 episode Trump’s First Week: Inauguration Recap, Executive Actions, TikTok, Stargate + Sacks is Back!, the besties do a “behind the scenes: Inauguration Weekend recap,” and guest Thomas Laffont says he “saw the live stream.” Later in the same conversation they give a “shout out to Akash Singh who joined us on the live stream as well,” clearly referring to an All-In live stream done during the inauguration coverage. (metacast.app)

Putting this together:

• The hosts did attend inauguration-related events that weekend (verified by both their own on-air statements and outside reporting).
• They produced inauguration-special episodes on Sunday (Jan 19) and Monday (Jan 20) from D.C., framed as live coverage of the inauguration.
• A later episode explicitly references “the live stream” from that inauguration coverage, and Jason had already told listeners those live episodes would be broadcast on YouTube and X.

Given this, the prediction that the All-In hosts would attend inauguration events that weekend and broadcast at least one live episode of the All-In Podcast on Sunday or Monday via YouTube/X is supported by the available evidence and should be judged right.