Massive jobs revision, Kamala's wealth tax, polls vs prediction markets, end of race-based admissions

The September 2024 FOMC meeting concluded on September 18, 2024. In its statement that day, the Federal Reserve announced it was lowering the target range for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points, from 5.25–5.50% to 4.75–5.00%. Multiple major outlets and the Fed’s own release confirm that:

• The Fed’s September 18, 2024 statement notes that the Committee decided to lower the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-3/4 to 5 percent, which is a 50 bps cut from the prior 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent range.
• Coverage from major financial media the same day explicitly describes this as a half‑percentage‑point (50 bps) rate cut at the September 2024 meeting.

Chamath’s normalized prediction had three key elements:

1. "In the September 2024 FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve will very likely begin cutting rates" – This is correct: the Fed did in fact begin cutting rates in that meeting; it was the first cut of the cycle after holding rates steady for an extended period.
2. "with substantial pressure for a 50 basis point cut" – Going into the meeting, market commentary and research pieces widely debated the possibility of a 50 bps cut versus 25 bps, with many arguing for a larger move based on softening economic data and labor‑market revisions; that constitutes “substantial pressure” in common financial-market terms.
3. "and [they] probably have enough numerical justification now to cut 50" – The Fed ultimately did choose 50 bps, implying that, in its judgment, the data did justify that magnitude of easing.

Because the Fed at the September 2024 FOMC meeting did start the easing cycle and did implement a 50 bps cut (the scenario Chamath framed as the now-likely and data‑justified outcome), the prediction is right.

(Sources: Federal Reserve September 18, 2024 FOMC statement and contemporaneous financial‑press coverage confirming a 50 bps cut at that meeting.)

Contemporaneous writeups of the CME FedWatch Tool for the week ending around August 23, 2024 show that futures markets were indeed pricing very high odds of substantial 2024 cuts:

• An India Infoline summary of CME FedWatch probabilities for the week to August 23, 2024 notes that by December 2024 there was a 100% implied probability of at least 75 bps of rate cuts and about a 64.3% probability of 100 bps of cuts.【1†turn1search0】
• A related piece summarizing CME FedWatch around mid‑August 2024 reports essentially the same structure: 100% probability of 75 bps and roughly 63% probability of 100 bps of cuts by December 2024.【1†turn1search2】

Friedberg’s claim that “trading markets … are now estimating a 100% chance of a three quarter of a percent rate cut by the end of 2024 and a 70% chance of a one point rate cut” is therefore an accurate, rounded description of those CME FedWatch probabilities (100% vs. 100%, and ~64% vs. “roughly 70%”).

Since the normalized prediction is explicitly about what interest rate futures markets were implying at that time, and that implication matches independent summaries of the CME FedWatch data, the statement is best classified as right.

Multiple independent snapshots of market pricing around August 23, 2024 show that futures / CME FedWatch probabilities for the September 18, 2024 FOMC meeting were roughly:

• ~70–76% probability of a 25 bp cut
• ~24–30% probability of a 50 bp cut
• Essentially 0% probability of no cut (all probability mass on some size of cut)

For example:

• FX Leaders, citing the CME FedWatch tool on August 23, 2024, reported a 75.5% probability of a 25 bp cut and 24.5% probability of a 50 bp cut for September. (fxleaders.com)
• VStar’s August 26, 2024 market overview similarly noted 75.5% odds of a 25 bp cut and 24.5% odds of a 50 bp cut at the September FOMC. (vstar.com)
• A Reuters piece on August 23, 2024 (via Business Recorder) said traders were pricing a 73% chance of a 25 bp cut and 27% chance of a 50 bp cut next month, with no mention of a meaningful “no cut” probability. (brecorder.com)
• Intercam’s August 23, 2024 note cited FedWatch showing 71.5% probability of a 25 bp cut in September, implying roughly the remaining ~28.5% on a 50 bp cut. (intercamblog.com)
• A recap of FedWatch probabilities for the week ending August 16, 2024 similarly showed 71.5% for a 25 bp cut and 28.5% for a 50 bp cut at the September 2024 meeting. (indiainfoline.com)

Friedberg’s description — “50 or 75% chance of a quarter point cut. 20% chance of a 50 basis point cut and then 6% chance of no cut” — is an approximate, verbal summary of this distribution. The core structure matches the data:

• He correctly characterizes a large majority (roughly three-quarters) probability on a 25 bp cut, consistent with the 71–76% range actually implied by FedWatch and futures pricing.
• He assigns a smaller but significant probability (~20%) to a 50 bp cut, which is close (within a few percentage points) to the observed ~24–30% range.
• He notes a small residual probability (~6%) of no cut, which overstates what FedWatch snapshots suggest (essentially 0%), but still correctly conveys that no cut was viewed as a low-probability tail outcome.

Because the prediction was explicitly about what prediction markets were implying at that time, not about which outcome would actually occur, it should be judged against contemporaneous market data rather than the eventual decision (which was a 50 bp cut on September 18, 2024). (reuters.com) On that basis, his qualitative breakdown (big probability on 25 bp cut, smaller on 50 bp, very little on no cut) is substantively accurate, with only modest numerical imprecision.

Given the available evidence, the statement is basically correct as an approximate description of late‑August 2024 prediction‑market probabilities, so it is best classified as "right".

Sacks predicted that the 2024 U.S. presidential election would be a nail biter that “comes down to a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of votes in swing states.” In reality, while the race was competitive, it was not that razor-thin.

Nationally, Donald Trump won 312 electoral votes to Kamala Harris’s 226, a clear Electoral College margin, and carried all seven major swing states (PA, GA, NC, MI, AZ, WI, NV). He also won the popular vote 49.8% to 48.3%, by roughly 2–2.5 million votes. (en.wikipedia.org)

Analyses of the tipping-point states show the outcome did not hinge on just “a few thousand” votes. The Cook Political Report estimates that the election was effectively decided by about 229,766 votes across Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—still close historically, but an order of magnitude larger than Sacks’s “few tens of thousands” framing. (cookpolitical.com) Moreover, several key swing states had six‑figure margins: Arizona by about 187,000 votes, Georgia by about 115,000, and North Carolina by about 183,000. (en.wikipedia.org)

So although 2024 was closer than a landslide—especially in percentage terms—it was not the ultra‑narrow, “few thousand votes in swing states” scenario Sacks predicted. Hence the prediction is best classified as wrong.

Two parts of Sacks’ prediction can be checked: (1) whether the Harris–Walz campaign was forced to show more policy substance instead of running purely on “joy” and minimal press, and (2) whether Harris’s post‑“hot swap” polling lead eroded between late August 2024 and Election Day.

1. Did the campaign have to reveal more policy substance / do more interviews?

Policy detail roll‑out

• On Aug. 16, 2024—just before the podcast date—Harris gave a major economic speech in Raleigh unveiling an “opportunity economy” agenda, including a federal ban on grocery price‑gouging, a new $6,000 child tax credit for newborns, $25,000 down‑payment help for first‑time homebuyers, and a goal of building 3 million new housing units. This was widely described as her most specific economic plan to date.(cnbc.com) Subsequent coverage and policy summaries (Reuters, TIME, Kiplinger) detailed a broader suite of tax, childcare, housing, and small‑business proposals, including higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, expanded child tax credits, and housing tax credits.(reuters.com)

Shift from low‑press strategy to a media blitz

• Through late summer and early fall, reporters and experts noted that Harris–Walz had been giving very few traditional interviews and press availabilities, a strategy described as unusually low‑profile and risky, with the campaign signaling that more press engagement was coming.(businessinsider.com)
• In early October, the campaign pivoted into a clear media blitz: Harris did a full primetime 60 Minutes candidate interview that grilled her on her economic plans and foreign policy (Israel, Ukraine, Putin), and included a segment with Walz.(theguardian.com)
• At roughly the same time, she launched a series of high‑profile interviews and appearances aimed at different voter blocs: Call Her Daddy, Howard Stern, The View, and other talk shows and podcasts, explicitly framed in coverage as a concerted “media blitz” to answer criticism that she was avoiding interviews.(theguardian.com) In those appearances she discussed abortion rights, economic policies (e.g., Medicare expansion, in‑home care), and broader governing priorities.

Taken together, the record shows that the initially interview‑shy, vibes‑heavy strategy was not sustained through to Election Day. Harris rolled out detailed policy proposals and moved into a more substantive and frequent interview posture in September–October 2024, matching Sacks’ claim that a near‑press‑free, “joy”‑based campaign would not be sustainable.

2. Did Harris’s polling lead erode relative to her initial post‑swap bump?

Initial post‑“hot swap” bump (late July–August)

• After Biden stepped aside and Harris became the nominee, national polls and aggregates showed her opening a clear lead over Trump. A Decision Desk HQ / The Hill, FiveThirtyEight and Silver Bulletin average using polls through Aug. 23, 2024 put Harris at about 48.1% to Trump’s 43.7%—roughly a 4–5 point national lead.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Individual late‑August polls around and just after the Democratic convention also showed her ahead by mid‑single digits, e.g., ABC/Ipsos 52–46, Clarity 51–45, Suffolk/USA Today 48–43.(en.wikipedia.org) This is the “post‑swap bump” Sacks was referring to.

Erosion of that lead by late October / pre‑election

• By late October, a Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted Oct. 26–28, 2024 had Harris at 44% and Trump at 43% among registered voters, explicitly noting that although she had led in all their polls since July, her advantage had “steadily diminished since late September,” leaving essentially a statistical tie.(reuters.com)
• The Guardian’s review of national polling averages found that just before Election Day, the average showed Harris only narrowly ahead, 48%–47%—an edge of about one point, markedly smaller than the 4–5 point advantage she held in late August.(theguardian.com)
• Actual results then went further: preliminary national vote totals show Trump winning the popular vote 50%–48%, meaning Harris’s support not only fell from its early‑August high but ended below Trump’s on Election Day.(theguardian.com)

So, between late August and Election Day, Harris’s initial multi‑point post‑nomination lead did erode to a razor‑thin edge in the polls and then to a narrow loss in the actual vote, aligning with Sacks’ claim that her early “hot swap” bump would “correct” downward as the race went on.

Causality vs. correlation We can’t prove that the added policy substance and interviews caused the polling erosion; many factors (economic perceptions, events, Trump’s campaign, debates, etc.) also played roles. But Sacks’ prediction was about what would happen—that (a) the campaign wouldn’t stay substance‑free and press‑shy, and (b) Harris’s inflated post‑swap polling lead would shrink over time. On both counts, the observable trajectory of the campaign and the polling matches his forecast, so the prediction is best scored as right rather than ambiguous.

Chamath’s claim is explicitly forward‑looking: that in the future a distinct investment class—primarily sovereign wealth funds and similar pooled‑capital vehicles—will emerge whose business model is to finance very large U.S. exit‑tax bills (tens of billions of dollars) in exchange for entrepreneurs relocating themselves and their companies abroad. The U.S. expatriation/exit tax regime under IRC §877A is real and well‑documented, and there is active advisory, planning, and media coverage around large exit‑tax exposures for wealthy Americans.(en.wikipedia.org) Wealth‑migration and harsh exit‑tax regimes are also clearly a trend globally (e.g., Norway’s tightened exit tax for wealthy residents; France, Spain, Germany and others enforcing or expanding exit taxes).(reuters.com) However, extensive recent coverage of exit taxes, sovereign wealth funds, and high‑net‑worth relocation—along with specialized commentary from firms that market themselves precisely to people facing U.S. exit tax—shows no reported cases of sovereign wealth funds or pooled capital vehicles systematically paying U.S. exit‑tax bills as an investment product, let alone an established "investment class" doing so.(wealthshield.asia) The wealth‑tax and exit‑tax proposals that might create even larger U.S. exit‑tax liabilities (such as Warren‑style wealth‑tax bills with a 40% exit levy) have not been enacted, so the extreme "tens of billions per entrepreneur" scenario that would drive such a market also has not materialized yet.(en.wikipedia.org) Because the prediction is open‑ended in time and describes a structural financial innovation that could plausibly take many years to appear (if at all), and because as of November 30, 2025, the best available evidence is that this specific class of investors has not yet emerged, the status of the prediction is best classified as **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right or wrong.

Chamath framed this as a multi‑year directional call ("over the coming years…they’ll only become more fungible"), and only about one year has elapsed since August 2024, so the time horizon he specified has not really played out yet. In the interim, evidence on global capital-mobility is mixed: the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index shows a rise in statutory barriers in 2024 for the first time since 2018, and the US and EU have both tightened screening of inbound and outbound investments in sensitive sectors (e.g., the US outbound-investment rule on China effective January 2025 and the EU’s move toward mandatory, broader FDI screening). (oecd.org) At the same time, some countries have removed or eased capital controls (e.g., Argentina lifting most currency and capital controls in 2025, Russia softening controls on new investments, ECB pressure to dismantle "trapped" capital within the euro area), and cross‑border channels like Stock Connect into Hong Kong and broader Chinese cross‑border flows have expanded. (apnews.com) Because both liberalizing and restrictive moves have occurred and the "coming years" window is still unfolding, it’s too early to say definitively whether capital has "only" become more fungible in the way he predicted.

As of 30 Nov 2025, the United States has not implemented a federal wealth tax comparable to those discussed in France or Norway, so the conditional prediction cannot yet be evaluated.

• Proposals by figures like Elizabeth Warren and, more recently, Kamala Harris have advocated federal wealth taxes, but none have passed Congress or been enacted into law.
• Some U.S. states (e.g., California, New York, Washington) have floated or enacted measures targeting very high net worth or high income, but these are not nationwide wealth taxes of the type referenced in the quote, and data so far are limited and mixed on capital flight and revenue outcomes.

Because the core "if" condition—a U.S.-wide wealth tax similar to those in France/Norway—has not occurred, we cannot say whether the subsequent causal claims (wealth fleeing, revenue shortfalls vs projections, broadening the tax base) are right or wrong. The appropriate classification is therefore "inconclusive (too early)."