The prediction is framed on a multi‑decade horizon (a buildout toward ~300 reactors and ~500 GW by around mid‑century), so as of November 2025 it is far too early to determine whether those long‑run targets will be met or not.

However, all observable developments since the July 26, 2024 podcast are directionally consistent with the prediction rather than contradicting it:

• At the time of the quote, China had about 26 reactors under construction; Chinese and international industry data still show China leading the world in new builds, with around 27–30 reactors under construction by end‑2024 / mid‑2025, and total operating+under‑construction units exceeding 100. (chinadaily.com.cn)
• The Chinese State Council has continued to approve large batches of new reactors. In August 2024 it approved projects totaling 16 reactors, and in April 2025 another batch of 10 reactors—the fourth consecutive year with approvals for at least 10 new units—described as a “peak period of large‑scale construction.” (worldnuclearreport.org)
• Policy targets also support ongoing expansion: recent reports from the China Nuclear Energy Association and related coverage cite goals around 110 GW of operating nuclear capacity by 2030 and ~200 GW by 2040, more than tripling current capacity and keeping nuclear as a major growth sector. (ecns.cn)
• Academic and scenario analyses used in policy discussions outline 2050 nuclear capacity in the 300–500 GW range, depending on how fast renewables scale—numbers that match the “300 reactors / ~500 GW” order‑of‑magnitude Friedberg referenced. (drganghe.github.io)

So far, China has continued and accelerated its nuclear buildout in line with those projections, but whether it will ultimately reach ~300 reactors and ~500 GW by mid‑century cannot yet be known. Hence the only defensible verdict now is that the prediction’s long‑term outcome is still inconclusive.