Mag 7 sell-off, Wiz rejects Google, UBI, Kamala in, China's nuclear buildout, Sacks responds to PG

As of November 30, 2025, Wiz remains a privately held company pending acquisition by Alphabet/Google, and therefore does not have a standalone public market equity valuation or market capitalization.

Key facts:

• Wiz raised $1 billion at a $12 billion valuation in May 2024, one of the highest valuations for a cybersecurity startup at that time. (techcrunch.com)
• Google’s initial 2024 acquisition talks at around a $23 billion valuation fell through, with Wiz choosing to pursue an eventual IPO instead. (forbes.com)
• In March 2025, Alphabet agreed to acquire Wiz for about $32 billion in cash, Google’s largest acquisition ever and the biggest cybersecurity deal to date. (techcrunch.com)
• That deal is expected to close in 2026, at which point Wiz will be absorbed into Google Cloud rather than trading independently as a public company. (spglobal.com)

The prediction being evaluated is: If Wiz maintains its current high growth rate, its public market valuation could reach roughly $100 billion, comparable to Palo Alto Networks, within about two years of July 26, 2024 (i.e., by mid‑2026).

Because:

1. The time horizon (mid‑2026) has not yet elapsed as of November 30, 2025; and
2. Wiz has not become a public company with its own market cap, but instead is slated to be acquired and integrated into Alphabet at a ~$32B valuation,

we cannot determine whether Wiz would have reached a ~$100B public market cap by mid‑2026 had it remained independent and gone public. There is no observable public-market test of the prediction yet, and the deadline has not passed.

Therefore, the correct status for this prediction is “inconclusive (too early)”.

Evidence from fall 2024 does not match Chamath’s prediction of a broad-based wave of revenue misses and a clearly weaker macro backdrop than mid‑2024.

1. Earnings/revenues in fall 2024

• For Q2 2024 (mid‑2024 baseline), about 59–60% of S&P 500 companies beat revenue estimates, with ~5% year‑over‑year revenue growth and 10 of 11 sectors growing revenues. This was already described as the 15th consecutive quarter of S&P 500 revenue growth. (insight.factset.com)
• In Q3 2024 (the key “fall” earnings season), FactSet shows about 59–61% of S&P 500 companies reporting revenues above estimates, aggregate revenues ~1–1.5% above expectations, and 5.2% year‑over‑year revenue growth, marking the 16th consecutive quarter of revenue growth. Nine of eleven sectors had positive revenue growth. (insight.factset.com)
• A separate LSEG/I/B/E/S summary likewise finds that by late November 2024, ~60.6% of S&P 500 firms beat revenue forecasts, with revenues overall 1.5% above estimates. (exante.eu)
• Goldman Sachs’ review of Q3 2024 earnings concludes that “overall, earnings were better than expected”, not characterized by widespread top‑line misses. (marcus.com)
  Taken together, the data show a majority of large U.S. companies still beating revenue estimates in fall 2024, with continued revenue growth across most sectors—not the “broad‑based revenue misses” the prediction called for.

2. Consumer strength vs. “really under pressure”

• Macroeconomic data show the U.S. economy remained solid in late 2024. Real GDP grew 2.8% annualized in Q3 2024 and 2.3% in Q4 2024, both above typical pre‑pandemic trend. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
• Consumer spending was a key driver: personal consumption expenditures grew 3.7% in Q3 and 4.2% in Q4 2024, the strongest two‑quarter stretch since 2023. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
• Goldman Sachs’ consumer dashboards through October–November 2024 explicitly describe the US consumer as a “source of strength”, with forecast real spending growth around 2.7–2.8% for 2024 and real income growth over 3%, alongside still‑strong household balance sheets. (marcus.com)
• Goldman’s Q3‑earnings call synthesis characterizes the consumer outlook as “mixed”: companies saw value‑seeking behavior and affordability concerns, but many still said the consumer remained healthy and resilient, and Consumer Discretionary stocks had begun to outperform again. (marcus.com)
  This is not consistent with the idea that by fall 2024 the consumer was broadly “really under pressure” relative to mid‑2024; instead, aggregate consumption accelerated.

3. Consumer credit cycle

• The Federal Reserve’s November 2024 Financial Stability Report notes that credit‑card delinquency rates had climbed to their highest levels since 2010, especially among non‑prime borrowers, and auto‑loan delinquencies were “somewhat above normal.” (federalreserve.gov)
• At the same time, the Fed stresses that vulnerabilities from household debt remain “moderate”: nominal GDP and incomes have been growing faster than debt, pushing the household debt‑to‑income ratio down to about 82%, below 2019 levels. (federalreserve.gov)
• The NY Fed’s Q3 and Q4 2024 Household Debt and Credit reports show total household debt rising modestly, with 3.5–3.6% of balances delinquent and around 2% seriously delinquent—higher than 2023 but still far from crisis territory. They explicitly describe overall household financial health as “solid”, even while acknowledging pockets of stress and elevated credit‑card delinquencies. (consumeraffairs.com)

2. A consumer “really under pressure” versus mid‑2024 – Instead, consumer spending growth accelerated in Q3–Q4 2024, and major forecasters described the consumer as a continuing source of strength, albeit with more value‑seeking behavior. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
3. A clearly worsening consumer credit cycle – Some elements of this came true (credit‑card defaults and delinquencies rose to post‑2010 highs), but within a broader context where overall household leverage and delinquency rates remained moderate by historical standards. (federalreserve.gov)

Because the central, most falsifiable part of the prediction—a broad-based pattern of revenue misses and an obviously tougher overall environment than mid‑2024—did not materialize, the prediction is best characterized as wrong, even though he was directionally right that lower‑income consumers and certain credit segments would come under increasing stress.

Evidence from the days immediately after Biden’s July 21, 2024 withdrawal shows that Democratic and anti-Trump voters rapidly consolidated behind Kamala Harris and that her head‑to‑head numbers against Trump improved relative to Biden’s.

• Rapid consolidation of ‘anyone but Trump’/Dem-aligned voters: A CNN poll conducted July 22–23 (immediately after Biden exited) found Trump 49% – Harris 46%, a smaller deficit than Biden’s earlier 6‑point gap with Trump among the same respondents. The article notes that Democratic and Democratic‑leaning voters were “broadly enthusiastic” about Harris and “willing to coalesce around her” as the new presumptive nominee; 76% of them said the party should nominate her. Harris held 95% of prior Biden supporters and picked up a share of voters who had previously said they’d support neither Biden nor Trump. (abc17news.com) This reflects exactly the kind of quick rallying of anti‑Trump voters Friedberg described.

• Polling performance strengthened vs. Biden: Aggregated national polling before Biden’s withdrawal (Biden vs. Trump) showed Trump leading by about 2.8 points on average (Trump 46.9% – Biden 44.1% across major averages through July 23). (en.wikipedia.org) In the immediate post‑withdrawal period, multiple national polls showed Harris vs. Trump essentially tied or with Harris slightly ahead: e.g., Reuters/Ipsos July 22–23 (Harris 44% – Trump 42%), New York Times/Siena July 22–24 (Trump 48% – Harris 46%), and Morning Consult July 22–24 (Harris 46% – Trump 45%). (en.wikipedia.org) These are all better margins than Biden’s recent matchups.

• Contemporaneous analyses explicitly say she’s doing better than Biden: Reuters reported that both a battleground‑state Emerson/The Hill series and a New York Times/Siena national poll showed Harris performing better against Trump than Biden had, and described Harris as “gaining momentum” after entering the race. (reuters.com) Politico’s write‑up of a July 23 NPR/PBS/Marist poll (Trump 46% – Harris 45%) emphasized that Harris was already neck‑and‑neck with Trump just a day after launching and that she had “quickly consolidated support within the Democratic Party, securing delegate pledges.” (politico.com) The Guardian similarly noted that Harris had narrowed Trump’s lead and reset the race after Biden dropped out. (theguardian.com)

Taken together, these data show that in the near term after Biden’s withdrawal, Democratic/anti‑Trump voters did rapidly rally to Harris, and her polling against Trump improved relative to Biden’s. That matches Friedberg’s prediction, so it should be judged right.

It’s too early to evaluate this prediction. All of the claims are about outcomes in 2050 and 2060 (U.S. capacity doubling to ~2 TW by 2050; China reaching ~8.7 TW total capacity with ~88% renewables by 2050; ~18% of China’s power from nuclear by 2060). The current date is November 30, 2025, which is about 25 years before 2050 and 35 years before 2060, so there is no way yet to determine whether those long‑term build‑out and mix targets will be met. Even though there are various current plans and scenarios for U.S. and Chinese power systems, those are themselves projections and are not evidence that the 2050/2060 outcomes have already occurred or are guaranteed. Therefore the prediction cannot currently be judged as right or wrong.

The prediction is framed on a multi‑decade horizon (a buildout toward ~300 reactors and ~500 GW by around mid‑century), so as of November 2025 it is far too early to determine whether those long‑run targets will be met or not.

However, all observable developments since the July 26, 2024 podcast are directionally consistent with the prediction rather than contradicting it:

• At the time of the quote, China had about 26 reactors under construction; Chinese and international industry data still show China leading the world in new builds, with around 27–30 reactors under construction by end‑2024 / mid‑2025, and total operating+under‑construction units exceeding 100. (chinadaily.com.cn)
• The Chinese State Council has continued to approve large batches of new reactors. In August 2024 it approved projects totaling 16 reactors, and in April 2025 another batch of 10 reactors—the fourth consecutive year with approvals for at least 10 new units—described as a “peak period of large‑scale construction.” (worldnuclearreport.org)
• Policy targets also support ongoing expansion: recent reports from the China Nuclear Energy Association and related coverage cite goals around 110 GW of operating nuclear capacity by 2030 and ~200 GW by 2040, more than tripling current capacity and keeping nuclear as a major growth sector. (ecns.cn)
• Academic and scenario analyses used in policy discussions outline 2050 nuclear capacity in the 300–500 GW range, depending on how fast renewables scale—numbers that match the “300 reactors / ~500 GW” order‑of‑magnitude Friedberg referenced. (drganghe.github.io)

So far, China has continued and accelerated its nuclear buildout in line with those projections, but whether it will ultimately reach ~300 reactors and ~500 GW by mid‑century cannot yet be known. Hence the only defensible verdict now is that the prediction’s long‑term outcome is still inconclusive.

The prediction’s timeline is “in the future (by around 2050)”, while today is 2025-11-30, so we are only ~1/2 to 1/3 of the way through the period Friedberg is talking about. It is therefore too early to judge the long‑run claim that China’s average retail electricity price will fall below $0.06/kWh and remain well below U.S. retail prices.

What we can say so far:

• Recent data (2023–2024) show China’s average end‑user electricity prices generally in the $0.07–0.09/kWh range (about 0.45–0.65 CNY/kWh), while U.S. residential prices are much higher, typically $0.15–0.20+/kWh, with commercial/industrial somewhat lower.
• China is indeed expanding both renewable capacity (especially solar and wind) and nuclear power, with very large build‑out plans through 2035–2050, which could exert downward pressure on average costs, but outcomes will depend on many uncertain factors (grid investments, subsidies, fuel prices, policy, etc.).

Because the key part of the prediction is explicitly about the future level by ~2050 and the relative comparison at that time, and we are far from that date, the correctness of the prediction cannot yet be determined.