E134: Ukraine counteroffensive, China tensions, COVID Patient Zero, RFK Jr reaction & more

Sacks’ prediction was that Ukraine’s June 2023 counteroffensive would make only minimal territorial gains and would fail to break through Russia’s prepared defensive lines in a way that significantly reversed Russian territorial gains. In fact, the 2023 offensive (June–Dec 2023) is now widely characterized as an “operational failure,” with Ukraine recapturing only 14 villages and roughly a few hundred square kilometers (about 370 km²) of territory—incremental gains relative to the front’s overall size and to Russian holdings. (en.wikipedia.org) Analyses at the end of 2023 noted that “the territorial lines of June 2023 have barely changed” and that Ukraine had retaken only about 200 square miles (~520 km²) in 2023, underscoring the limited territorial impact. (washingtonpost.com) Key operational objectives—such as breaching Russian defenses deeply enough to reach Tokmak or the Sea of Azov and sever the land bridge to Crimea—were not achieved, and by early December 2023 multiple international outlets described the counteroffensive as stalled or failed. (en.wikipedia.org) Later, by May 2025, Russia had even recaptured all 14 villages Ukraine had gained in the 2023 offensive, meaning there was no lasting significant reversal of Russian territorial control from that operation. (en.wikipedia.org) Given the small, temporary territorial gains and the failure to achieve the main breakthrough and rollback objectives, Sacks’ forward-looking assessment that the counteroffensive was “not going anywhere” in strategic terms aligns with subsequent outcomes.

Open sources indicate that Russia had far more than 150,000 additional troops under arms for the Ukraine war by the end of 2023, so Sacks’ prediction that they would reach roughly that scale is directionally correct (if anything, conservative).

Key points:

1. Partial mobilization before 2023 already added 300,000 reservists. Putin’s September 2022 decree mobilized about 300,000 reservists for the war.(the-independent.com) Those men were in addition to Russia’s pre‑war active-duty force and were explicitly called up for the Ukraine campaign.

2. Russia then reported hundreds of thousands of new contract recruits in 2023. At his year‑end press conference on December 14, 2023, Putin said that 486,000 people had signed contracts with the armed forces in 2023 and that there were **617,000 Russian personnel in the “combat zone.”(themoscowtimes.com) Independent outlet Meduza, citing the Defense Ministry, likewise reported over 640,000 contract soldiers in the army by late December 2023 and repeated the figure of **486,000 volunteers signed up in 2023.(meduza.io)

3. Even critical analyses still imply additions well above 150,000. RealClearDefense notes that some of the official recruitment figures are likely inflated or double‑count certain contract renewals, but concludes that the true number of people who actually signed contracts in 2023 is still “several times lower than 490,000,” not an order of magnitude lower. Even if one takes a very skeptical view—say, only ~150,000–200,000 net new contracts—that still meets or slightly exceeds Sacks’ 150,000‑extra‑troops benchmark.(realcleardefense.com)

4. Total active-force growth is consistent with a ~150,000+ net increase. A 2025 U.S. Senate assessment, using NATO‑linked data, estimates Russia’s active armed forces at about 1,134,000 troops in early 2025, up from ~900,000 pre‑war—a net increase of roughly 234,000. This is consistent with Russia having added on the order of hundreds of thousands of personnel for the war by late 2023, and therefore at least 150,000.(congress.gov)

Given that all plausible counts of Russian wartime force generation by end‑2023 are at or well above 150,000 additional troops, Sacks’ prediction that Russia would have on the order of 150,000 extra men under arms for the Ukraine conflict by the end of 2023 is substantively correct, though actual numbers appear significantly higher than he suggested.

Available data show that the U.S. has not yet reached 90,000 155mm shells per month, but the prediction’s time horizon (“around 2028”) is still in the future, so it cannot be definitively judged.

Key points:

• A Congressional Research Service report states that U.S. 155mm projectile output rose from about 14,400 per month in 2022 to 40,000 per month by 2024, with a target of 100,000 per month by the end of 2025, not yet achieved as of September 2024. (everycrsreport.com)
• Reporting based on an interview with the head of the U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office for Ammunition and Armaments says that as of June 2025 total U.S. production of complete 155mm rounds was still about 40,000 per month, well below planned milestones (75,000 by April 2025, 100,000 by October 2025). (en.defence-ua.com)
• An August 14, 2025 article in National Defense Magazine quotes an Army spokesperson saying the service is currently producing 40,000 rounds per month and now does not expect to reach 100,000 per month until mid‑2026, meaning even the revised goal precedes 2028 but has not yet been met. (nationaldefensemagazine.org)
• NATO‑related and analytical reporting similarly notes that U.S. manufacturers are at roughly 40,000 rounds per month in 2025, with ambitions of 100,000 per month slipping to 2026, again indicating current output is far under 90,000. (businessinsider.com)

Because:

1. There is no evidence that U.S. production has already reached a sustained ~90,000 shells per month (which would clearly falsify the prediction), and
2. The prediction asserts this level won’t be reached until around 2028, a date still in the future as of November 30, 2025,

we cannot yet say whether Sacks’s timeline is ultimately correct or incorrect. The most we can say is that, so far, reality (40k/month and delayed goals) is compatible with his pessimistic view, but the decisive 2026–2028 period has not arrived, so the prediction remains unresolved.

Taiwan held its combined presidential and legislative elections on January 13, 2024. In the presidential race, Lai Ching‑te of the incumbent, more China‑skeptical / pro‑U.S. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won with about 40% of the vote, defeating Hou Yu‑ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), which is generally viewed as more China‑friendly and Beijing’s preferred interlocutor. Lai’s victory gave the DPP an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term, meaning the pro‑West party remained in control of the presidency rather than being replaced by the more China‑friendly opposition. (cnbc.com)

In the legislative elections held the same day, the DPP did lose its majority, and the KMT became the largest single party in the Legislative Yuan (52 seats to the DPP’s 51), with the Taiwan People’s Party holding the balance of power. However, no party secured a majority, and executive power stayed with the DPP president. (en.wikipedia.org)

The normalized prediction describes the China‑friendlier party as winning power and replacing the then‑ruling, more pro‑West party in the 2024 national election. Since the presidency—the key lever of national executive power—remained with the DPP, and the DPP was not replaced as the ruling party, this outcome contradicts the prediction. The partial legislative gains by the KMT do not amount to the pro‑China side “taking power” in the sense of forming a new national government. Therefore, the prediction is best scored as wrong.

The prediction is specifically about Ford selling around 2.5 million EVs annually by 2026–2027, and other large automakers like GM following a similar EV-and-batteries ramp over that same 2026–2027 timeframe.

As of November 30, 2025, those years have not yet occurred, so we cannot directly verify actual 2026–2027 annual EV sales volumes or the exact realized pace of the ramp.

Available data up to 2024–2025 shows:

• Ford’s global EV sales are in the hundreds of thousands per year, not millions, and the company has scaled back or delayed some EV investment and production targets amid softer-than-expected demand and profitability concerns.
• GM similarly has revised and slowed aspects of its EV rollout and battery plant ramp, although it continues to invest in EVs and batteries; its realized EV volumes so far are well below the multi‑million‑per‑year level.

These trends suggest the original forecast of 2.5M Ford EVs annually by 2026–2027 is increasingly unlikely, but because those model years and sales outcomes are still in the future, the prediction cannot yet be definitively labeled right or wrong.

Therefore the appropriate status is "inconclusive" (too early).

Pulitzer rules for journalism specify that entries must be work published in the previous calendar year; for the 2024 journalism prizes, eligible work was material published in 2023, with a submission deadline in early 2024. Older work is not eligible in later cycles. (grokipedia.com)

The reporting Jason referred to is the June 2023 investigation by Michael Shellenberger (and colleagues) on Substack’s Public, naming three Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers (including Ben Hu) as the alleged first COVID-19 patients conducting gain‑of‑function work, which was then echoed in a June 20, 2023 Wall Street Journal article citing U.S. officials. (marshall.senate.gov) That work therefore would have been eligible for the 2024 Pulitzers (covering 2023 journalism) if it were going to be honored.

However, the 2024 Pulitzer winners in journalism did not include any award for COVID‑19 origins or the Wuhan lab; the Investigative Reporting prize went to Hannah Dreier of The New York Times for her series on migrant child labor in the U.S., and the Public Service medal went to ProPublica for its Supreme Court ethics reporting. (en.wikipedia.org) Likewise, the 2025 Pulitzers (for 2024 work) honored Reuters for its “Fentanyl Express” series in Investigative Reporting and honored The Wall Street Journal for national reporting on Elon Musk, not for any COVID‑origins coverage. (reuters.com) Comprehensive winner lists for 2023–2025 show no Pulitzer at all awarded for COVID‑19 origin or “patient zero” reporting, and no Pulitzer in Shellenberger’s biography. (en.wikipedia.org)

Separately, declassified U.S. intelligence released under the COVID‑19 Origin Act of 2023 explicitly rejected key arguments advanced by lab‑leak proponents about sick Wuhan researchers, and a detailed FactCheck.org review concluded there was “no bombshell” confirming those claims or settling COVID‑19’s origin. (en.wikipedia.org) That undercut the central premise of the “patient zero” narrative rather than establishing it as proven.

Because (1) the only Pulitzer cycles in which this specific 2023 reporting could plausibly have been recognized have already passed without any award, and (2) Pulitzer eligibility rules make later recognition for the same 2023 stories effectively impossible, Jason’s prediction that this particular Wuhan‑lab "patient zero" reporting “will wind up being a Pulitzer” has not come true and is now best judged wrong.