E113: DOJ tries to break up Google, vaccine questions, Ukraine escalation & more

The prediction window is “within a few years” from early 2023, which the user normalized to roughly 2026–2028. Today is November 30, 2025, so we have not yet reached the start of that evaluation window.

Even if we check current estimates of Amazon’s share of the global digital ad market (which various industry reports put in the low-to-mid teens as of 2024–2025), we still cannot say whether it will end up in the 15–20% range by 2026–2028. That outcome depends on future growth rates, competitive dynamics, and macro conditions that have not yet played out.

Because the prediction is explicitly about Amazon’s future share “in a few years” and that period has not yet arrived, the correct status is that it’s too early to judge whether the prediction is right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, the DOJ’s 2023 ad‑tech antitrust lawsuit against Google has not failed in court and is still active.

• In United States v. Google LLC (2023), filed January 24, 2023, the DOJ and several states alleged that Google illegally monopolized parts of the digital advertising technology stack and explicitly sought structural remedies, including forcing Google to sell significant ad‑tech assets.(en.wikipedia.org)
• On April 17, 2025, Judge Leonie Brinkema ruled that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, finding that Google illegally maintained monopoly power in the open‑web display publisher ad server and ad exchange markets, and unlawfully tied its publisher ad server (DFP) to its ad exchange (AdX). This is a clear liability win for the DOJ, not a failure.(en.wikipedia.org)
• The case is now in the remedies phase. The DOJ is asking the court to order structural divestitures (e.g., forcing Google to sell AdX and potentially Google Ad Manager/DFP), while Google argues for narrower behavioral remedies and says it will appeal.(reuters.com)
• Hearings on remedies were held in late 2025; Judge Brinkema has signaled caution about an immediate breakup and has not yet issued a final remedies order. A written decision on remedies is pending, and any order will likely be subject to appeals.(grokipedia.com)

Because (1) the DOJ has already won on key liability issues (contrary to the idea that the case would “fail”), but (2) the court has not yet decided what remedies to impose and no final judgment (including appeals) has been completed, we cannot yet determine whether the lawsuit will "ultimately fail" or whether it will "result in Google being broken up in ad‑tech." Therefore, the prediction’s accuracy is currently inconclusive (too early to tell).

The prediction hinged on Google actually removing third‑party cookies in 2024, which was supposed to make it “very hard to track a user from one website to the next” and to “hit very, very hard beginning in 2024” for ad networks and publishers.

What happened instead:

1. Limited test, not full removal. On January 4, 2024, Chrome began restricting third‑party cookies by default for only about 1% of Chrome users as a testing step tied to Privacy Sandbox, with a tentative plan to ramp to 100% later, subject to UK regulatory approval. The rest of Chrome traffic continued to use third‑party cookies normally, so cross‑site tracking remained broadly feasible in 2024. (privacysandbox.google.com)
2. Full deprecation was delayed beyond 2024. During 2024, Google officially postponed completing third‑party cookie deprecation from late 2024 to early 2025. (techtarget.com)
3. Then Google reversed course and canceled full deprecation. In July 2024 Google announced it would not kill third‑party cookies in Chrome after all, opting instead for a user‑choice model. Subsequent reporting and regulatory summaries confirm that Google abandoned the plan to block third‑party cookies by default. (cnbc.com)
4. By 2025 the phase‑out plan and Privacy Sandbox were effectively ended, with cookies still fully usable. Later updates show Google formally ending its Privacy Sandbox deprecation path and deciding to keep third‑party cookies available in Chrome, with users managing them via settings rather than a forced shutdown. (en.wikipedia.org)
5. Impact on tracking and revenue in 2024 was incremental and experimental, not a broad ‘very hard’ shock. Industry tests (e.g., Criteo and others) showed that if cookies were fully removed and only Privacy Sandbox were used, publisher revenue could drop sharply, but those were scenario tests. Because deprecation never went beyond the small‑scale 1% test population in 2024, the ecosystem did not experience the large, system‑wide revenue shock he predicted beginning in that year; instead, most discussion focused on preparation, testing, and uncertainty rather than realized collapse. (criteo.com)

Since (a) Google did not broadly remove third‑party cookies in 2024, (b) cross‑site tracking remained widely possible, and (c) the predicted significant, immediate negative hit to digital ad networks and publishers starting in 2024 did not materialize at scale, the prediction is best judged wrong.

Multiple nationally representative surveys since 2023 show a broad, cross‑vaccine erosion of trust in the U.S., beyond just COVID‑19 shots.

• The Annenberg Public Policy Center found in 2023 that only 71% of adults say vaccines approved for use in the U.S. are safe—the lowest level since they began asking—while belief that vaccines are unsafe hit a series high. The same survey reported statistically significant declines in perceived safety or effectiveness for HPV, MMR, flu, COVID‑19, shingles, and pneumococcal vaccines, indicating a general, not single‑vaccine, drop in confidence. (aafp.org)
• A Washington Post–KFF poll reports that by 2024 just 69% of Americans thought childhood vaccines were important, down from 84% in 2019, and by 2025 1 in 6 parents had delayed or skipped routine childhood vaccinations (excluding flu and COVID‑19), with most citing safety concerns rather than access. (washingtonpost.com)
• Pew and KFF both find that while large majorities still say the benefits of MMR and other childhood vaccines outweigh the risks, support for requiring these shots for school attendance fell sharply (e.g., from ~82% in 2016/2019 to around 70% in the early‑ to mid‑2020s), driven mainly by Republicans; both organizations explicitly note that COVID‑19 vaccine debates and mandates have spilled over into attitudes about other vaccines. (pewresearch.org)
• CDC data show kindergarten coverage for MMR declined from 95.2% in 2019–20 to 92.5% in 2024–25, with exemptions rising and large measles outbreaks; coverage and experts attribute this in part to post‑COVID vaccine hesitancy and skepticism, not just logistical disruption. (reuters.com)
• A 2025 KFF tracking poll still finds strong majority confidence in the safety of routine vaccines like measles and flu, but also documents low trust in federal health agencies as vaccine information sources and widespread perceptions that these agencies are not paying enough attention to science, underscoring an ongoing trust erosion environment around vaccination generally. (kff.org)

Taken together, these trends show a measurable, broad decline in public trust and compliance with vaccination in general in the U.S. in the years following COVID‑19 vaccine policies, even though most Americans still accept core childhood vaccines. That matches Sacks’s prediction, so it is best judged as right.

Evidence since 2023 shows growing public and political questioning of non‑COVID school vaccine requirements in the U.S.

Public opinion data: Pew finds that overall support for requiring the MMR vaccine for public‑school attendance fell from 82% in 2019 to 69% in 2025, with Republican support dropping from 79% to 52%; Pew explicitly links this to post‑COVID debates and notes that school vaccine policies have become a flashpoint as states like Florida move to roll back requirements. (pewresearch.org) Gallup likewise reports that the share of Americans who say it is "extremely important" for parents to vaccinate their children fell from 58% in 2019 to 40% in 2024, and that only a bare majority now say government should require childhood vaccines, down from 62% in 2019. (news.gallup.com) A 2025 KFF poll finds support for school requirements still high overall but "eroding" among Republicans and parents, with more parents delaying or skipping routine childhood shots and about one in six adults—rising to one in four Republicans—saying public schools should not require any vaccines. (kff.org)

Behavior and policy: CDC surveillance shows that kindergarten vaccine exemptions (overwhelmingly non‑medical) reached record highs in 2022–23 and increased again in 2023–24, while coverage for required vaccines like MMR, DTaP, and polio has declined below pre‑pandemic levels in most states, indicating more families are opting out of school requirements. (cdc.gov) Several high‑profile state actions explicitly challenge school mandates for non‑COVID vaccines—for example, Florida’s move to drop or eliminate long‑standing school vaccine requirements (for chickenpox, hepatitis B, etc.) in the name of "parental choice," and a West Virginia ruling allowing religious opt‑outs in a state that previously permitted only medical exemptions. (apnews.com)

Together, these trends—declining support for school vaccine mandates, rising non‑medical exemptions, and active political efforts to loosen requirements for traditional childhood vaccines—match Friedberg’s prediction that in the years after COVID, there would be growing public questioning of whether existing school vaccine requirements for other illnesses are appropriate.

Available evidence shows some negative audience reaction to the hosts’ shift away from COVID boosters and vaccines, but not clearly on the scale of “a large number of people,” and we lack visibility into the main discussion venues (YouTube and X/Twitter comments), so the prediction can’t be firmly judged.

What we can see:

• The episode’s transcript confirms the on‑air moment: all four say they are not getting further boosters (“I’m never getting boosted again… I’m not getting boosted again now”), followed immediately by Friedberg’s remark that this will “inflame a large number of people just hearing us say this,” framing the prediction. (podscripts.co)
• PodScripts, which hosts the full transcript and allows user comments, explicitly shows “There aren’t comments yet for this episode” for E113, indicating no visible discussion there despite the tool being designed for it. (podscripts.co)
• On the fan subreddit r/TheAllinPodcasts, a June 27, 2023 thread titled “Vaccines” notes that “this sub really got agitated once their deeply held beliefs on COVID vaccines started getting challenged,” and another commenter references the hosts’ argument that COVID shots “are not a vaccine because it doesn’t prevent you from getting Covid,” closely matching language from E113. (reddit.com) This shows some audience agitation and pushback over their vaccine stance.
• A related June 18, 2023 thread, “Vaccine/Mask mandate blame,” criticizes the hosts for “rewrit[ing] history,” calls them “morons,” and disputes their claims about vaccine efficacy and mandates—again indicating negative reactions from part of the listener community. (reddit.com)
• External media pieces in mid‑2023 (e.g., KFF Health News / Genetic Literacy Project and Salon) discuss the All‑In hosts’ evolving positions on COVID vaccines and their platforming of RFK Jr., portraying them as contributing to anti‑vaccine narratives, but these articles focus on later episodes and broader behavior, not specifically on the E113 booster comments or a discrete backlash to that segment. (salon.com)

Why this is ambiguous:

• We do see clear negative reactions—Reddit threads with criticism, claims that the subreddit “got agitated,” and accusations of grifting and dishonesty. That supports some part of Friedberg’s claim (that their vaccine/booster stance angered people).
• However, these conversations involve tens of comments in a niche subreddit, not obviously a “large number” relative to an audience of hundreds of thousands per episode (E113 is listed at ~361k views on YouTube). (metapodcast.net)
• We cannot reliably access or aggregate YouTube comments and X/Twitter replies, where most of the audience reaction would occur; absence of mainstream coverage calling out this particular booster remark also suggests there was no widespread, viral backlash centered on that specific statement.

Given (1) some documented but limited backlash, (2) missing data from major platforms, and (3) the inherently vague threshold for “large number” and “strong negative reactions,” the available record does not let us confidently label the prediction as clearly right or clearly wrong. Hence, “ambiguous.”

Evidence as of November 30, 2025 shows the Russia–Ukraine war is still an active, large‑scale conflict with no imposed settlement, more than 2 years and 10 months after January 2023.

• Major Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv and other regions were reported on November 29, 2025, damaging infrastructure and killing and injuring civilians, demonstrating ongoing high‑intensity hostilities rather than a frozen or resolved conflict. (reuters.com)
• Frontline offensives such as the Kupiansk and Huliaipole operations are described as ongoing campaigns within the Russo‑Ukrainian war, indicating continued maneuver warfare into late 2024 and 2025 rather than a ceasefire or peace deal. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Diplomatic initiatives (e.g., a 2025 UN Security Council resolution on Ukraine and multiple high‑level peace‑plan negotiations) explicitly refer to the war as ongoing and seek to end it, implying that no comprehensive settlement has yet been reached or enforced. (en.wikipedia.org)

From January 27, 2023 (podcast date) to November 30, 2025, the war has persisted without a forced resolution for nearly three years, matching Sacks’s prediction that the conflict was capable of continuing as an ongoing war for another 2–3 years. The realized trajectory of the conflict therefore supports the prediction, so it is best scored as right.

As of November 30, 2025, only about 2 years have elapsed since the January 2023 prediction of a ~30‑year timeframe (i.e., around the early 2050s) for broad, whole‑body reversal of human aging using approaches like Yamanaka factors.

Current status from the scientific and biotech literature:

• Yamanaka factor–based partial reprogramming has shown age-reversal effects in cells and some animal models (e.g., mice), including rejuvenation of certain tissues and extension of lifespan in progeroid models, but not whole‑body, clinically deployed human rejuvenation.
• Major companies and institutes (e.g., Altos Labs, Calico, academic labs) are investigating cellular reprogramming and other longevity approaches, but these are in preclinical or very early clinical stages and far from demonstrated, safe, whole‑body age reversal in humans.

The prediction was essentially "we will not have broad, whole‑body reversal of human aging before roughly the early 2050s." That claim concerns future decades (2023–2050+). We are still at the very beginning of that interval, and nothing observed so far contradicts or confirms the long‑term timing. Therefore it is too early to judge the accuracy of the 30‑year timeframe.