Since 2020, Chinese authorities have launched a sweeping tech-sector ‘rectification’ campaign: Ant Group’s IPO was halted and its lucrative lending businesses were forced into a new consumer-finance company in which large state-owned asset managers and local state funds hold sizable minority stakes, while Ant retains about a 50% ownership share.(digichina.stanford.edu) At the same time, state investment vehicles such as the China Internet Investment Fund and entities under the Cyberspace Administration of China have acquired 1% ‘golden share’ positions with board seats and veto-like rights in content-heavy units of ByteDance, Alibaba, Tencent, Weibo, Kuaishou, SenseTime and others, explicitly to give the state direct influence over business decisions and online content.(en.wikipedia.org) CCP party committees have also been embedded in most large private firms, greatly strengthening party influence over strategy and personnel across the corporate sector.(en.wikipedia.org) Many analysts describe this as a permanent shift toward much tighter state control over big tech, using regulation, party organs and targeted equity stakes rather than leaving firms largely autonomous.(digichina.stanford.edu) However, the bulk of China’s major internet and technology companies (including Alibaba, Tencent, Meituan and others) remain majority-owned by private and institutional investors, not converted into conventional state-owned enterprises; state holdings are typically small golden shares or minority stakes, and these companies still operate as profit-seeking, publicly listed firms.(en.wikipedia.org) In recent years Beijing has also signaled a desire to stabilize regulation and support private platforms to bolster growth, rather than continuing toward wholesale nationalisation of the sector.(reuters.com) Because Chamath’s prediction hinges on how one defines ‘de facto nationalization’—whether it means significantly expanded state influence and partial ownership (which has clearly occurred) versus broad state takeover or controlling ownership of major firms (which has not)—reasonable observers could judge the outcome differently. The direction of policy matches his thesis about rising state control, but the strong claim that major parts of the tech sector would be de facto or de jure nationalised is not clearly fulfilled, so the result is best scored as ambiguous.