E42: China's tech crackdown, CRISPR breakthrough, practical climate change solutions & more

The prediction was that Democrats would keep control of the U.S. House of Representatives after the 2022 midterm elections. In reality, Republicans won a majority in the House in the November 8, 2022 midterms and took control in the 118th Congress (starting January 3, 2023), while Democrats retained only the Senate. Multiple sources document that Republicans secured the House majority in the 2022 elections.

Because the actual outcome is directly contrary to the prediction, the prediction is wrong.

The context of Sacks’s comment is the CDC’s mask / transmission guidance for vaccinated people in light of Delta (“there’s new information here… Even the CDC hasn’t officially changed their policy yet… it’s coming”).

In reality, the CDC had already made that policy change before this episode was released:

• On July 27, 2021, CDC updated its Interim Public Health Recommendations for Fully Vaccinated People in response to the Delta variant, now recommending that fully vaccinated people wear masks in public indoor settings in areas of substantial or high transmission, and explicitly noting new evidence that vaccinated people infected with Delta can spread the virus. (stacks.cdc.gov)
• This updated guidance is dated July 27/28, 2021 in CDC’s archived materials and contemporaneous summaries. (stacks.cdc.gov)
• The All‑In E42 episode was published on July 30, 2021, i.e., three days after the CDC change. (glasp.co)

Sacks’s line about “we’ve predicted the policy change on this show anywhere from two weeks to two months before they actually do it” is presented as applying to the impending CDC shift he is describing (“it’s coming, right? we know it’s coming”), but by release time that shift had already occurred.

Within the two‑weeks‑to‑two‑months window after July 30, 2021, CDC did adjust vaccine-dosing policy (e.g., on August 13, 2021 ACIP/CDC recommended an additional mRNA dose for moderately to severely immunocompromised people, and on September 23, 2021 recommended certain Pfizer boosters). (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) However, these were about extra doses, not the mask/transmission guidance he was explicitly talking about, which had already been revised on July 27.

Because the key CDC policy change on vaccinated masking and Delta transmission happened before the episode rather than within the “two weeks to two months after” window Sacks implied, the prediction — as normalized here — is best scored as wrong.

Since 2020, Chinese authorities have launched a sweeping tech-sector ‘rectification’ campaign: Ant Group’s IPO was halted and its lucrative lending businesses were forced into a new consumer-finance company in which large state-owned asset managers and local state funds hold sizable minority stakes, while Ant retains about a 50% ownership share.(digichina.stanford.edu) At the same time, state investment vehicles such as the China Internet Investment Fund and entities under the Cyberspace Administration of China have acquired 1% ‘golden share’ positions with board seats and veto-like rights in content-heavy units of ByteDance, Alibaba, Tencent, Weibo, Kuaishou, SenseTime and others, explicitly to give the state direct influence over business decisions and online content.(en.wikipedia.org) CCP party committees have also been embedded in most large private firms, greatly strengthening party influence over strategy and personnel across the corporate sector.(en.wikipedia.org) Many analysts describe this as a permanent shift toward much tighter state control over big tech, using regulation, party organs and targeted equity stakes rather than leaving firms largely autonomous.(digichina.stanford.edu) However, the bulk of China’s major internet and technology companies (including Alibaba, Tencent, Meituan and others) remain majority-owned by private and institutional investors, not converted into conventional state-owned enterprises; state holdings are typically small golden shares or minority stakes, and these companies still operate as profit-seeking, publicly listed firms.(en.wikipedia.org) In recent years Beijing has also signaled a desire to stabilize regulation and support private platforms to bolster growth, rather than continuing toward wholesale nationalisation of the sector.(reuters.com) Because Chamath’s prediction hinges on how one defines ‘de facto nationalization’—whether it means significantly expanded state influence and partial ownership (which has clearly occurred) versus broad state takeover or controlling ownership of major firms (which has not)—reasonable observers could judge the outcome differently. The direction of policy matches his thesis about rising state control, but the strong claim that major parts of the tech sector would be de facto or de jure nationalised is not clearly fulfilled, so the result is best scored as ambiguous.

Evidence since 2021 shows that mRNA COVID-19 vaccines were not a one‑off; multiple additional mRNA-based medical products have been developed and brought to market:

• New mRNA COVID‑19 vaccines beyond the original Pfizer/Moderna shots

  • AWcorna (ARCoV), an mRNA COVID‑19 vaccine developed by Walvax/Abogen, received emergency use authorization in Indonesia in September 2022, adding another marketed mRNA COVID product. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Zapomeran (Kostaive, ARCT‑154), a self‑amplifying mRNA COVID‑19 vaccine, was approved in Japan in November 2023 and later authorized in the EU in February 2025, becoming the first approved self‑amplifying mRNA vaccine. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Moderna’s next‑generation mRNA‑1283 vaccine (mNEXSPIKE) was approved by the U.S. FDA on May 30, 2025 for adults ≥65 and high‑risk individuals 12–64, as a distinct lower‑dose, refrigerator‑stable mRNA COVID vaccine. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Regulators have repeatedly approved updated Pfizer–BioNTech and Moderna mRNA formulations (bivalent and variant‑specific boosters, and 2024–25/2025–26 formulas), each marketed as new vaccine products for evolving variants. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Non‑COVID mRNA vaccines (new disease areas)

  • Moderna’s mRESVIA (mRNA‑1345) for respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) was approved by the U.S. FDA in May 2024 for adults ≥60, with its indication expanded in June 2025 to high‑risk adults 18–59. It is widely described as Moderna’s second approved mRNA product and the first mRNA vaccine approved for a disease other than COVID‑19 in the U.S. (investors.modernatx.com)
  • The same RSV mRNA vaccine has also been approved in the EU and Australia, where regulators likewise emphasize it as the first non‑COVID mRNA vaccine in those regions. (news.modernatx.com)

In 2021, only the initial Pfizer–BioNTech and Moderna COVID‑19 vaccines were on the market. By late 2025, there are multiple distinct mRNA COVID vaccines (including self‑amplifying and next‑generation formulations) and at least one major non‑COVID mRNA vaccine (RSV) approved across several jurisdictions. This clearly matches the directional claim that the original COVID vaccines would be just the first breakthrough and that “there’s going to be a lot more” mRNA‑based medical products in the ensuing years.

Given this expansion from essentially two products to a portfolio spanning several companies, formulations, and at least two different diseases, the prediction that many additional mRNA-based medical products would be developed and brought to market after the COVID vaccines has been borne out.

By late 2025, the core elements of Chamath’s prediction have materialized:

1. Major economies have begun adopting carbon border tariffs based on embedded emissions.

   • The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) was legislated in 2023 and entered a transitional phase on 1 October 2023, requiring importers of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen to report embedded greenhouse‑gas emissions; from 1 January 2026 they must buy CBAM certificates priced off the EU ETS, i.e., a de‑facto carbon tariff based on the product’s embedded emissions. (eeas.europa.eu)
   • The UK government has decided to introduce its own CBAM from 1 January 2027, placing a carbon price on imported, emissions‑intensive goods (iron & steel, aluminium, cement, hydrogen, fertilisers, etc.) calculated by reference to the UK ETS and explicitly including Scope 1, Scope 2 and certain precursor-product emissions. (gov.uk)
   • Other jurisdictions have not yet fully implemented CBAMs but are moving in that direction: Canada launched consultations on border carbon adjustments in 2021, and Australia has begun formal policy work and public signalling on a possible CBAM to protect emissions‑exposed sectors like steel and cement. (canada.ca) Global analyses from the World Bank explicitly note that the EU CBAM is encouraging more governments to consider carbon pricing in trade‑exposed sectors. (worldbank.org)
   • This is not yet universal adoption (e.g., the U.S. still has no enacted CBAM), and the UK CBAM will initially target basic materials rather than finished cars like a "British tariff on a German Volkswagen". But the overall trajectory of increasing use of carbon‑based import charges in trade policy is clear.

2. Evidence already shows substantial redistribution of economic value across countries and sectors.

   • The EU CBAM is widely reported as reshaping trade incentives: Reuters and other outlets note that Western Balkan electricity exporters are likely to become less competitive in EU markets unless they adopt domestic carbon pricing, potentially forcing major shifts in their power sectors and creating new revenue streams if they do so. (reuters.com)
   • India’s government has warned that its steel exports will be “significantly affected” because about two‑thirds of India’s steel exports go to Europe and will face the new EU carbon tax on high‑emission goods such as steel, aluminium and cement, directly threatening the value of those export flows. (reuters.com)
   • For Australia, business and policy groups emphasize that large fractions of aluminium and steel exports to the EU fall under CBAM, with compliance costs and potential loss of market share for higher‑carbon producers, while low‑carbon producers stand to gain—classic redistribution between firms and sectors. (bcsda.org.au) The UK government’s own CBAM documentation frames it as protecting decarbonizing domestic industries from being undercut by more carbon‑intensive imports, again implying gains for some producers and losses for others. (gov.uk)

Putting this together: since the 2021 podcast, carbon‑based border measures have moved from theory to binding law in the EU and UK, and they are already reordering trade incentives and profitability across high‑emission sectors and exporting countries. While the full magnitude of value destruction/creation will only be felt after CBAMs are fully operational (2026–2027 onward), the direction and mechanism Chamath described—carbon tariffs embedded in trade policy causing large redistributions of value—are now clearly in place. On that basis, the prediction is best judged as right, albeit still unfolding in scope and scale.

The prediction specifies a 20–30 year window starting from July 2021 (i.e., until 2041–2051). As of the current date (late 2025), only about four years have elapsed, so the timeframe has not expired.

Empirically, there is no widely accepted, practical room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconductor in use for energy transmission or storage today. The most advanced confirmed superconductors with very high critical temperatures are mainly hydrogen‑rich hydrides that require extreme pressures (hundreds of GPa), which makes them impractical for grid or storage applications.(chemistryviews.org) High‑profile claims of room‑temperature superconductivity at more accessible pressures—such as carbonaceous sulfur hydride and N‑doped lutetium hydride—have since been retracted by Nature after serious doubts about data and reproducibility.(en.wikipedia.org) The 2023 LK‑99 episode likewise ended with a consensus that LK‑99 is not a room‑temperature superconductor at ambient pressure.(en.wikipedia.org)

Because (1) the key enabling technology (practical ambient‑condition superconductors) has not yet appeared, but (2) there is still ample time remaining in the 2041–2051 window, the prediction cannot yet be judged right or wrong. Hence: inconclusive (too early).

As of November 29, 2025, there is no verified, commercially relevant superconducting technology that enables practical zero‑resistance electrical conduction at ambient conditions and has materially transformed global energy and power systems.

Key points from current evidence:

• The most publicized recent claim of a ‘breakthrough’ superconductor was LK‑99 (a proposed room‑temperature, ambient‑pressure superconducting material) in 2023, but multiple independent groups failed to reproduce true superconductivity; follow‑up studies concluded its behavior was not consistent with a genuine superconductor.
• High‑temperature hydride superconductors (like various hydrogen‑rich compounds under extreme pressures) have been reported at or near room temperature, but they require gigantic pressures (hundreds of gigapascals), making them far from practical commercial technologies for the grid or general power applications.
• There is no evidence in energy‑sector reports, major physics/engineering literature, or mainstream coverage that any immigrant in the U.S. (or anyone else) has produced a widely deployed, transforming technology based on practical zero‑resistance conduction.

However, the prediction’s time horizon is “within the next few decades.” Only a few years (2021→2025) have elapsed, which is far shorter than the stated window. Since the prediction explicitly allows multiple decades for the breakthrough to occur and diffuse enough to transform global energy systems, it is too early to judge it as either right or wrong.

Therefore, given the long timeframe and current lack of such a breakthrough, the correct assessment as of today is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Robinhood IPO’d in July 2021 at around a $30–32 billion valuation, consistent with Jason’s premise.(cnbc.com) As of November 28, 2025, Robinhood (ticker: HOOD) has a market capitalization of roughly $127 billion—around 4x its IPO value, but still far below the 10–30x (≈$300–900 billion) and especially the ~$1 trillion level Jason speculated it could eventually reach.

However, his statement was explicitly probabilistic (“there’s a chance”) and open‑ended in time (“someday”). Robinhood remains an operating, independent public company with substantial equity value and growth since the IPO; nothing in the current data rules out a future path—however unlikely it may currently seem—toward a $1 trillion market cap. Because the claim concerns a nonzero chance of a very long‑term outcome, it cannot yet be definitively judged as either realized or impossible.

Given this, the prediction is not yet falsifiable as of 2025, so the appropriate assessment is that it’s too early to say whether it was right or wrong.