a few years from now, people could ask, wait, why? Why was it again that Trump lost, you know, um, you know, this Covid thing will be it will be so in the rear view mirror that we'll wonder why we were so afraid of it.View on YouTube
Summary of the prediction
Sacks suggested that a few years after 2020, COVID-19 would be so far in the rear‑view mirror that:
- People would see it as something we were overly afraid of, and
- They would even question why it caused so much political damage to Trump (i.e., why he lost).
By late 2025, enough time has passed to judge this. The evidence shows parts of the prediction came true (COVID largely normalized for many people) while the hindsight minimization he anticipated is only partial and strongly partisan, and mainstream analysis still treats COVID as a central, legitimate reason for Trump’s loss. Hence the overall call is mixed/ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.
1. Is COVID “in the rear‑view mirror” for many people by the mid‑2020s?
Yes, largely.
- Emergency phase ended and daily life normalized: The U.S. federal COVID‑19 public health emergency and associated flexibilities officially expired on May 11, 2023, marking an end to the formal emergency phase and a shift to treating COVID more like an endemic respiratory illness. (oig.hhs.gov)
- Public concern has dropped sharply: A large Pew survey conducted in October 2024 found that only 21% of Americans see the coronavirus as a major threat to U.S. public health, down from 67% in 2020. A majority (56%) say COVID-19 is now “not something we really need to worry about much,” and just 4% report regularly wearing masks. (pewresearch.org)
- Many think the pandemic phase is over: A 2025 YouGov poll reports that 51% of Americans say COVID-19 is no longer a pandemic; most describe their own infections as mild or moderate. (today.yougov.com)
On this narrow point—COVID as a dominating, day‑to‑day fear—Sacks’ intuition was substantially correct: for much of the public, COVID has moved into the background of ordinary life.
2. Do people now feel “we were too afraid” and that restrictions were excessive?
Partly, but in a strongly partisan and not overwhelming way.
- Enduring sense of seriousness and harm: The same Pew work finds that about three‑quarters of Americans say the pandemic took at least some toll on their lives, and large majorities know someone who was hospitalized or died. 84% in an Axios–Ipsos poll agree COVID has permanently changed their lives. (pewresearch.org)
- Most still see COVID as more serious than a cold/flu: As of late 2024, 56% say COVID-19 is worse than a cold or flu; 40% say it’s no worse. Similarly, 39% say we’re not taking it seriously enough, while 56% say it’s not something we need to worry about much. (pewresearch.org)
→ That is not a dominant consensus that fear was irrational; opinion is split. - Clear partisan split on whether we overreacted: When asked about past restrictions, 62% of Republicans say there should have been fewer restrictions, versus only 15% of Democrats; most Democrats say rules were about right or should have been stronger. (pewresearch.org)
→ So there are “many people” (especially on the right) who now think the response went too far, but that view is far from universal.
So Sacks was partly right that a sizeable chunk of the population would later see the fear and restrictions as excessive—but that attitude is heavily partisan and counterbalanced by large groups who still regard COVID as a serious disease and think the response was broadly justified.
3. Do people now question why COVID hurt Trump politically / why he lost?
No, mainstream evidence still treats COVID—and his handling of it—as a central, obvious factor in his defeat.
- Academic studies: Peer‑reviewed political science research finds that COVID‑19 significantly reduced Trump’s electoral support, especially where health or economic impacts were salient. One Cambridge University Press article shows that information about the economic downturn and poor public‑health performance during COVID measurably depressed support for Trump. Another study using county‑level data concludes that higher COVID case counts decreased support for Trump and that, under plausible counterfactuals with fewer cases, he likely would have performed better electorally. (cambridge.org)
- Campaign and Republican diagnostics: Trump’s own campaign pollster Tony Fabrizio concluded in a post‑election autopsy that Trump lost largely because voters disapproved of his handling of the pandemic; voters who rated COVID as a top issue broke heavily for Biden. This assessment was echoed in reporting by outlets like The Washington Post and CNN. (washingtonpost.com)
- Ongoing media and political narratives: Retrospective analyses of the 2020 race—from mainstream magazines and 2024 election‑cycle coverage—continue to highlight COVID as the dominant challenge of Trump’s last year in office and a key reason he lost (especially his dismissiveness about the virus as deaths mounted). Biden and his allies still invoke Trump’s pandemic mismanagement in their narratives, indicating that the link between COVID and Trump’s loss remains widely accepted rather than puzzling. (time.com)
While some Trump supporters reject the legitimacy of the 2020 result and blame fraud, that is not the same as widespread confusion over why COVID hurt him. The prevailing scholarly and media consensus remains that the pandemic and his response to it were central, not mysterious, drivers of his defeat.
Overall assessment
-
Accurate elements:
By the mid‑2020s, COVID is no longer an acute, top‑of‑mind fear for most Americans; the emergency phase is over and daily life is largely normalized. -
Inaccurate or only partially realized elements:
There is no broad, cross‑partisan sense that we were irrationally afraid, nor is there widespread puzzlement about why COVID politically damaged Trump. Many—especially Democrats and independents—still see COVID as a serious disease that justifiably shaped their 2020 vote, and mainstream analysis continues to treat Trump’s pandemic handling as an obvious, primary cause of his loss.
Because one core part of the prediction (normalization) came true while the stronger claim about hindsight minimization of fear and Trump’s loss did not clearly materialize beyond partisan subgroups, the fairest single label is “ambiguous” rather than fully right or wrong.